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“In Ethiopia, and even in Nairobi, people assumed that all 
illness – even a trivial or imagined one – was fatal; they 
expected death. The news to convey in Africa was that 
you’d kept death at bay. Those things that you couldn’t do, 
and those diseases you couldn’t reverse, were left 
unspoken. It was understood… 
 
In America, my initial impression was that death or the 
possibility of it always seemed to come as a surprise, as if 
we took it for granted that we were immortal, and that 
death was just an option.”  
 
“Cutting for Stone” 
Abraham Verghese 
 
 
*** 
 
 
“How little do doctors understand the hells through which 
we put patients.” 
 
 
“[We] had trained for years to actively engage with death, 
to grapple with it, like Jacob with the angel, and, in so 
doing, to confront the meaning of a life. We had assumed 
an onorous yoke, that of mortal responsibility. Our 
patients’ lives and identities may be in our hands, yet death 
always wins. Even if you are perfect, the world isn’t. The 
secret is to know that the deck is stacked, that you will lose, 
that your hands or judgment will slip, and yet still struggle 
to win for your patients. You can’t ever reach perfection, 
but you can believe in an asymptote towards which you are 
ceaselessly striving.” 
 
“When Breath Becomes Air” 
Paul Kalanithi 
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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how institutional cultures and policies relating to 
patient autonomy influence physicians’ clinical and ethical approaches to do-not-
resuscitate (DNR) decision-making at the end of life. I explore this in the context of the 
evolution of the American medical profession that shifted medical decision-making 
power from paternalism to patient autonomy. Decades ago, the “doctor knows best” 
attitude prevailed. Since then, the pendulum has swung towards honouring patient 
autonomy. This thesis explores the implications of these changes and considers the 
tensions between the principle of beneficence and patient autonomy. 
 
I conducted 58 semi-structured in-depth interviews with internal medicine physicians, 
sampled by years of experience and medical subspecialty. These interviews were 
conducted at three academic medical centres in the United States (University of 
Washington, Johns Hopkins, Columbia New York Presbyterian) and one in the United 
Kingdom (Addenbrooke’s Hospital). It emerged during the research process that two of 
these four hospitals had policies that prioritised patient autonomy whereas the other two 
hospitals had policies that prioritised making decisions in the patient’s best interest. The 
main focus of this dissertation is on the United States, where three of the hospital sites are 
located. The UK serves as an additional site as there are no hospitals in the United States 
that permit unilateral physician decision-making in the way that the UK allowed at the 
time of the study. 
 
The focus on autonomy in American medicine today highlights the importance of 
freedom and choice to make one’s own decision. However, to truly honour patient 
autonomy, the patient or surrogate must have an adequate understanding of his situation 
and choices. Although the shift away from paternalism was a necessary positive step, I 
argue that the way in which autonomy is practiced reflects a reductionist notion of 
autonomy that disempowers rather than empowers patients, as patients are asked to make 
choices without the understanding or guidance necessary to make informed choices.  
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Particularly at hospitals where autonomy is prioritised over other ethical principles such 
as best interest, trainee physicians equate autonomy with giving a menu of choices. They 
are uncomfortable giving a recommendation based on clinical knowledge as they worry 
that would be infringing upon patient autonomy. However, trainee physicians feel 
ethically compromised and experience significant moral distress when they are asked to 
provide therapies that they perceive to be futile.  
 
Despite that, doctors are still power brokers in the physician patient relationship and are 
able to manipulate conversations in other ways to sway patients towards a decision that 
they believe is in the patient’s best interest. Through a Habermasian approach, I explore 
how trainee communication practices of using purposefully graphic descriptions of 
resuscitation to discourage that choice are pathologic and disempowering. Physicians are 
fully inculcated in their respect for autonomy but unintentionally resort to strategic forms 
of communication because they feel constrained to resist recommendations in the name 
of autonomy. Rather than focusing on an ideology of autonomy, the American medical 
system needs to move towards practices that embrace a more nuanced and empathetic 
form of autonomy that fosters a more open form of communication that allows for co-
creation of consensus between doctors and patients.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Section 1.1: Introduction of the Thesis 
 
There has been increasing recognition in the United States that Americans are neither 
dying well nor the way that they want to. Recent publications highlighting challenges in 
end of life care such as the Institute of Medicine’s report on Dying in America and Atul 
Gawande’s book, Being Mortal, among others, demonstrate the urgent need to better 
align medical care at the end of life with patient and societal preferences (Gawande 2014; 
Institute of Medicine 2014). The majority of Americans who have indicated end of life 
preferences choose to focus on alleviating suffering and pain, and prefer to die 
comfortably at home rather than with aggressive care in the hospital (Bernstein 2014).  
 
Despite that, the medical system is programmed to a default setting of aggressive care for 
the terminally ill. Intensive care unit (ICU) use in the last month of life increased from 
24% to 29% from 2000 to 2009 (Teno et al. 2013). Beyond issues of quality of care and 
honouring patient preferences, this has significant economic implications. It is 
problematic that the $170 billion that Medicare spends on the last six months of life is not 
helping us die well (Pasternak 2013). Neither physicians nor patients are satisfied with 
their society’s overall approach to dying, and yet both seem powerless to enact 
substantive change.  
 
A particularly compelling reason to explore this issue in the United States is the 
intersection of three trends: 1) The aging of the population and in particular of the baby 
boomers, many of whom will be facing end of life issues over the next 15-20 years. In the 
2010 census, those aged 85 to 94 were the fastest growing age group, at more than 5 
million people (United States Census Bureau 2012). 2) The increasing use of advanced 
technologies at the end of life, the consequent ethical imperative to use these 
technologies, and the consequent prolongation of the dying process (Livingstone 2015); 
and 3) The unsustainable growth in health care expenditures in the face of uncertain 
economic times in the US. End of life medical care constitutes 10 to 12% of the total 
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health care budget and 27-30% of the Medicare budget (Halpern and Emanuel 2012). 
Costs in the last month of life constitute 40% of cost in the last year of life.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how institutional cultures and policies relating to 
patient autonomy influence physicians’ clinical and ethical approaches to do-not-
resuscitate (DNR) decision-making at the end of life. I explore this in the context of the 
evolution of the American medical profession where medical decision-making has shifted 
from paternalism to patient autonomy. Decades ago, the “doctor knows best” attitude 
prevailed. Since then, the pendulum has swung towards honouring patient autonomy. 
This thesis explores the implications of these changes and considers the tensions between 
the principle of beneficence (best interest)1 and patient autonomy. 
 
From 7 March, 2013 to 8 January 2014, I conducted 58 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with internal medicine physicians, sampled by years of experience and 
medical subspecialty. My epistemologic foundations are rooted in constructivism, while 
my theoretical perspectives incorporate the interpretivist perspective of symbolic 
interactionism, followed by critical theory in the latter half of the thesis. Included in the 
study were physicians between one and 45 years of experience in general medical 
disciplines as well as medical subspecialties (i.e. palliative care, pulmonary and critical 
care medicine). During the interview process, patterns emerged differentiating attitudes 
and beliefs of more experienced and less experienced physicians, so subsequent analysis 
of the project further partitioned participants into stage of training2.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  use	  beneficence	  and	  best	  interest	  interchangeably	  2	  In	  the	  US,	  medical	  training	  following	  medical	  school	  begins	  with	  residency	  where	  they	  are	  called	  “residents”	  (of	  which	  the	  first	  year	  is	  called	  “internship”).	  Internal	  medicine	  residency	  is	  three	  years	  long.	  Following	  residency,	  physicians	  may	  either	  choose	  to	  go	  into	  practice	  as	  an	  attending	  general	  internist	  or	  hospitalist,	  or	  they	  continue	  with	  a	  subspecialty	  fellowship	  that	  typically	  lasts	  between	  3-­‐4	  years.	  A	  colloquial	  term	  frequently	  used	  to	  describe	  physician	  trainees	  is	  “house	  staff.”	  Years	  following	  training	  in	  the	  US	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  “Post	  Graduate	  Year”	  (PGY),	  as	  in	  PGY-­‐1	  for	  interns,	  PGY-­‐2	  and	  PGY-­‐3	  for	  residents,	  and	  PGY-­‐4	  for	  fellows,	  and	  so	  forth.	  In	  the	  UK,	  following	  medical	  school,	  trainees	  participate	  in	  Foundation	  Training	  (F1,	  F2)	  for	  two	  years.	  Following	  Foundation	  Training,	  physicians	  can	  choose	  specialty	  training	  where	  they	  are	  a	  “Specialist	  Trainee	  (ST)”	  or	  “Specialist	  Registrar”.	  The	  first	  period	  of	  specialist	  training	  includes	  “Core	  Medical	  Training	  (CMT).”	  In	  the	  US,	  senior	  physicians	  (i.e.	  medical	  team	  leaders)	  are	  called	  attending	  physicians.	  The	  UK	  equivalent	  is	  the	  consultant.	  In	  the	  US,	  a	  subspecialty	  team	  consultation	  physician	  is	  called	  a	  consultant.	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In this thesis, I have primarily been interested in the attitudes and beliefs of doctors, and 
their perceptions of care delivered and its effect on them. As such, semi-structured 
interviews are the ideal methodology to explore these issues. In Chapter 8, I discuss 
communication pathologies that arise from physician trainees’ manipulation and framing 
in these conversations. For this section, I can only base my hypotheses on physician 
reports rather than actual practices. However, the prevalence of these descriptions in the 
interviews as well as my own experiences on the wards suggest that these practices do 
indeed occur at some frequency. Future studies would be helpful to further explore and 
confirm these practices.  
 
These interviews were conducted at three academic medical centres in the United States 
(University of Washington (UW), Johns Hopkins, Columbia New York Presbyterian) and 
one in the United Kingdom (Addenbrooke’s Hospital). It emerged during the research 
process that two of these four hospitals had policies and cultures that prioritised patient 
autonomy whereas the other two hospitals had policies and cultures that prioritised 
making decisions in the patient’s best interest. The original intent of this study was to 
compare US and UK practices, but it became apparent during my interviews at UW that 
local cultures played a key role. As such, the focus of my thesis shifted from a 
comparative analysis to its current form. The main focus of this dissertation is the United 
States, where three of the hospital sites are located. The UK serves as an additional site as 
there were no hospitals in the United States that permit unilateral physician decision-
making in the way that the UK allowed during the time of my study.  
 
The shifts towards autonomy occurred due to criticism of physician paternalism. The 
traditional attitudes of paternalism have given way to patient autonomy and an emphasis 
on individual choice to make decisions over one’s body. Best interest decision-making 
reflects an understanding that there may be other factors that are important to prioritise 
beyond autonomy. Although best interest decision-making is far from paternalistic, 
comparing hospitals that prioritise autonomy versus best interest shines a light onto how 
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this shift from paternalism to autonomy has affected physician attitudes, behaviors, and 
communication strategies regarding DNR decision-making. 
 
It is important to first discuss the distinction between beneficence (best interest decision-
making) and paternalism, which can sometimes be a fine line. Although it is possible to 
be both beneficent and paternalistic, acting with beneficence does not imply that one is 
being paternalistic. Beneficence is characterised as acts that benefit others, or acting in 
one’s best interest. Definitions of paternalism are varied. Beauchamps and Childress’s 
definition of paternalism is when someone overrides an individual’s wishes against their 
will, defended by a claim that the person would be better off or protected from harm 
through the paternalistic act (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). Acts of paternalism may 
also include purposeful deception such as failure to disclose a bad diagnosis or 
purposeful omission of critical elements of informed consent in order to skew the 
decision towards a particular treatment plan.  
 
Variations on this definition include somewhat “softer” definitions including Allen 
Buchannan’s where, “paternalism is usually characterised as interference with a person’s 
liberty of action, where the alleged justification of the interference is that it is for the 
good of the person whose liberty of action is thus restricted (Buchanan 1978).” Gerald 
Dworkin’s definition of paternalism is similar to that of Buchanan, where this 
interference is justified by “reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, 
needs, interests, or values of the person being coerced (Dworkin 1988).” 
 
The specific example I use to explore these sociological and medical issues is the 
perceived de facto requirement to offer cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to terminal 
patients with little likelihood of survival. This one critical decision of resuscitation status 
has significant downstream effects, as well as consequences on the overall aggressiveness 
of care and overtreatment at the end of life. Although a DNR decision is but one small 
component of a goals of care conversation, focusing on this particular conversation 
allowed me to hone in on a discrete decision that serves as an exemplar of the challenges 
we face in end of life decision-making. 
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A DNR order is implemented when it would not be appropriate or desired to perform 
CPR and other life-sustaining measures when the heart stops. This procedure was first 
established in 1960 to restart the heart following certain cardiac arrhythmias such as 
ventricular tachycardia and was very effective in doing so (Cooper, Cooper, and Cooper 
2006). Since then, its scope has been expanded to become the default in hospital for 
anyone who dies, despite the fact that its efficacy is extremely limited in most medical 
conditions. For most patients, CPR is entirely ineffective, as it does nothing to correct the 
underlying conditions, which caused the patient to die, such as terminal metastatic 
cancer.  
Resuscitation is not harmless, as it requires cracking ribs to adequately pump the heart, 
insertion of invasive lines, placing a tube down the throat to ventilate the lungs, and 
electric shocks to the heart to attempt to restart it. It also means that the last moments of 
the patient’s life are spent receiving an aggressive and possibly futile treatment 
surrounded by medical staff rather than in peace surrounded by loved ones. Many 
physicians believe that performing resuscitation when it is unlikely to work causes harm 
and suffering.   
It is important to clarify the specific clinical scenarios in which a DNR order would be 
appropriate that I focus on in this thesis. I am primarily interested in decisions 
surrounding patients who are imminently dying or who have no chance of meaningful 
survival to discharge (Taylor, Gustin, and Wells-digregorio 2010). Some might describe 
this scenario as one where resuscitation would be futile, which I define further in Chapter 
3. Based on physiologic parameters, co-morbidities, and typical standards of reasonable 
modern medical care in the US and UK, the patients population I focus on has an 
extremely low likelihood of meaningful survival following CPR and some have a zero 
chance of survival as they may be imminently dying. By focusing on this population, I 
seek to avoid value-based arguments surrounding the degree to which a life is worth 
living. The purpose of this thesis is not to engage in these philosophical, theological, and 
personal debates. The goal of my thesis was to explore physicians’ perceptions and 
reactions to cases they felt to be significant and that adhered to their understanding of the 
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above parameters. I interviewed internal medicine physicians who engage in a wide 
variety of subspecialties. These physicians see patients with a broad array of medical 
pathologies. It would have limited the scope of responses and eligible respondents to 
limit the patient population to a specific disease type.  
 
The focus on autonomy in American medicine today highlights the importance of 
freedom and choice to make one’s own decision. However, to truly honour patient 
autonomy, the patient or surrogate must have an adequate understanding of their situation 
and choices. Although the shift away from paternalism was a necessary positive step, I 
argue that the way in which autonomy is practised reflects a reductionist notion of 
autonomy that disempowers rather than empowers patients, as patients are asked to make 
choices without the understanding or guidance necessary to make informed choices. 
 
Particularly at hospitals where autonomy is prioritised over other ethical principles such 
as best interest, trainee physicians equated autonomy with neutrally giving a menu of 
choices. They are uncomfortable giving a recommendation based on clinical knowledge 
as they worry that would infringe upon patient autonomy. However, trainee physicians 
feel ethically compromised and experience significant moral distress when they are asked 
to provide therapies that they perceive to be futile. An important finding in this study was 
that inexperienced physicians (i.e. physician trainees) were more affected by their 
institutions’ cultural and policy leaning than experienced physicians. Experienced 
physicians, regardless of where they were based, generally appeared to have a more 
nuanced understand of autonomy to mean more than merely giving choice, and seemed 
more comfortable giving recommendations.  
 
Despite this discomfort, doctors are still power brokers in the physician patient 
relationship and are able to manipulate conversations in other ways to sway patients 
towards a decision that they believe is in the patient’s best interest. Use of language and 
framing during these conversations can be used strategically in ways that hinder open 
communications, but the inevitability of framing must also be recognised. Through a 
Habermasian approach, I explore how trainee communication practices of using 
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purposefully graphic descriptions of resuscitation to discourage that choice are pathologic 
and disempowering to the patient. Central to this problem, are also issues of colonisation 
of the lifeworld by the system, not only from the patient’s perspective, but also 
colonisation of the doctor’s own lifeworld during medical training.  
 
Physicians are fully inculcated in their respect for autonomy but unintentionally resort to 
strategic forms of communication because they feel constrained to resist 
recommendations in the name of autonomy. Rather than focusing on an ideology of 
autonomy, the American medical system needs to move towards practices that embrace a 
more nuanced and compassionate form of autonomy that fosters a more open form of 
communication that allows for co-creation of consensus between doctors and patients.  
 
These communication pathologies are harmful because they may result in treatments that 
are neither in the patient’s best interest nor consistent with their goals and values. 
Furthermore, my interviews demonstrate that situations where US trainees are asked to 
provide therapies and resuscitation that they perceive to be futile, causes significant 
moral distress, which may contribute to alienation, burnout and decreased empathy.  
 
Section 1.2: Structure of the dissertation 
 
This thesis highlights the importance of local institutional policies and cultures on 
physician trainees’ conceptualisation of ethical principles. This in turn influenced 
trainees’ willingness to make recommendations regarding resuscitation at the end of life, 
which subsequently influences the way they communicate their recommendations. The 
interviews revealed that less experienced physicians were more likely to be influenced by 
these factors than experienced physicians. The conceptual framework below summarises 
my hypotheses of how institutional policies and cultures influence physician trainees’ 
attitudes and communication practices.  
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Figure 1.1: How institutional policies and cultures influence physician trainees’ attitudes and 
communication practices. Hospital Policies and Culture (step 1) influences how physicians conceptualise 
autonomy (step 2), which then influences their willingness to make recommendations regarding DNR 
decisions (step 3) and hence their communication practices surrounding DNR decision-making (step 4). 
However, this is not completely linear, as the actions and behaviours influenced by steps 2, 3, and 4 all 
contribute to and/or reinforce the existing hospital policies and culture.   
 
In this introduction (Chapter 1), I outline my research question and the scope of the 
study. I then summarise the structure of the PhD and follow by introducing the 
conceptual framework that forms the structural backbone of the dissertation.  
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I set the stage for how autonomy became the dominant 
discourse in the doctor patient relationship by describing the sociological transformation 
of the physician from the 1950s to the present, particularly in the United States. As a 
consequence of the deprofessionalisation, consumerisation, loss of trust and loss of 
knowledge monopoly, the American medical profession experienced a change in its 
power relations with patients. This contributed to the shifts from paternalism to autonomy 
in the physician patient relationship. Chapter 3 hones in on the effect of this shift on the 
example of end of life decision-making, and specifically the decision to institute a DNR 
order.  
Chapter 4 describes my methodological approach. I use Michael Crotty’s framework for 
conceptualizing methods, which focuses sequentially on Epistemology -> Theoretical 
perspective -> Methodology -> Methods. I outline how my constructivist perspective 
naturally leads to an interpretivist approach rooted in symbolic interactionism followed 
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by a critical theory approach. The methods I employ, which I describe in detail, are semi-
structured in-depth interviews.   
 
In Chapter 5, I describe how a hospital’s prioritisation of autonomy versus best interest 
as reflected in institutional culture and policy appeared to influence the way that 
physician trainees conceptualised patient autonomy. This may have influenced the degree 
of choice and recommendations they were willing to offer regarding DNR decision-
making. Trainees at hospitals where policies and culture prioritised autonomy-focused 
approaches appeared to have an unreflective deference to autonomy and felt compelled to 
offer the choice of resuscitation neutrally in all situations regardless of whether they 
believed resuscitation to be clinically appropriate.  
 
In contrast, trainees at hospitals where policies and culture prioritised best interest-
focused approaches appeared to feel more comfortable recommending against 
resuscitation in situations where survival was unlikely. Similarly, experienced physicians 
at all sites, did not exclusively allow their actions to be prescribed by policies and 
institutional culture, and were willing to make recommendations against resuscitation if 
they believed it would be futile. A paper based on this chapter was recently published in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) Internal Medicine (Dzeng, 
Colaianni, Roland, Chander, et al. 2015). 
Building upon the dichotomy set forth in Chapter 5 between hospitals that prioritise 
autonomy versus those that prioritise best interest, in Chapter 6, I focus on the ethics 
portion of the conceptual framework. I elucidate how a hospital’s prioritisation of best 
interest or autonomy influences a physicians’ conceptualisation of ethical principles and 
how they balance autonomy and beneficence.  
The ethical foundations of autonomy were initially grounded in rigourous moral 
reasoning and an adaptation to increasing societal prioritisation of patient choice. 
However, due to the time constraints, workflow, culture and structure of American 
medicine (particularly at hospitals which have a culture of prioritising autonomy), 
autonomy has been reduced to mean unlimited patient choice, rather than one of several 
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ethical principle that need to be considered in order to guide moral behavior. In essence, 
there has been a failure to transfer the theories of principlism3 to practice on the wards.   
American medical trainees working over 80 hours a week do not have the time and space 
in their daily routine to develop conceptions of autonomy that are thoughtful and 
reflexive. As a result they distil the four principles, and especially that of autonomy into 
an unreflexive requirement to provide choice and are unwilling to take on the 
responsibility of making clinically informed treatment recommendation. They over-
interpret resuscitation policies to mean that they must give a menu choices, and by doing 
so allow themselves to be shackled by their interpretation of autonomy.  
This reductionist understanding of autonomy as the dominant discourse in American 
medicine, harms patients and runs counter to the original intentions of principlism. These 
self-imposed cultural constraints upon physician behavior reflect an overall over-
interpretation of hospital policies, which are in part due to deprofessionalisation and 
perceived loss of power of the American physician described in Chapter 2. 
Ironically, trainees’ reductionist interpretation of autonomy may actually exacerbate their 
own moral distress, as they feel obligated to offer choice of treatments that they feel 
would not benefit the patient. Chapter 7 describes the moral distress physician trainees 
experience when they feel obligated to provide treatments at the end of life that they 
believe to be futile. Some trainees developed detached and dehumanising attitudes 
towards patients as a coping mechanism, which may contribute to a loss of empathy. A 
major theoretical aspect of this moral distress is the concept of alienation and how that 
might hinder the physician trainee’s ability to find meaning in their work, which has wide 
array of consequences from decreased empathy to burnout. A modified version of this 
chapter is under review (“revise and resubmitted”) at the Journal of General Internal 
Medicine.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Principlism, which characterizes medical ethics in terms of the four principles of autonomy, 
nonmalefecance, justice and beneficence, is the predominant way of conceptualising ethics in American 
medical schools and hospitals (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). Principlism as a strategy to address ethical 
dilemmas examines the ethical dilemma through each of the four lenses and attempts to find the solution 
that best addresses all four principles. Conflicts between principles frequently occur, which is seen as a 
limitation of principlism. I will discuss principlism in more detail in Section 6.2.2	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Chapter 8 exposes communication pathologies that may occur between physician 
trainees and patients/surrogates in end of life discussions by bringing together Habermas’ 
Theory of Communicative Action and behavioural economic approaches to framing.  
Because medical trainees at autonomy dominant hospitals feel uncomfortable making 
recommendations, but feel that patients sometimes choose the wrong intervention 
resulting in harmful overly aggressive treatment measures and futile resuscitation, they 
instead frame conversations in deceptive ways in order to manipulate patients and 
surrogates into choosing the “correct” treatment. These trainees frequently used graphic 
descriptions of CPR, such as breaking ribs and electrocuting the heart, to discourage 
patients/surrogates from choosing resuscitation. 
This framing reflects what Jürgen Habermas describes as concealed strategic action in his 
Theory of Communicative Action, where speech is instrumentalised for purposes 
contingently related to what is said. In contrast to communicative action, which is 
oriented towards understanding and consensus, this strategic action is used to maintain 
dominance. I hypothesise that medicine’s focus on patient autonomy constrains younger 
physicians from believing they can make recommendations. They instead revert to 
manipulative means to convince while continuing to give a “neutral” choice.  
 
I then discuss the ways these graphic descriptions of resuscitation relate to ethical and 
practical debates surrounding the use of framing in conversations regarding resuscitation. 
I describe trainees’ understanding, perception, and use of framing. I draw upon 
Kahneman and Tversky’s research on heuristics to demonstrate how framing influences 
decision-making. I then discuss the inevitability of framing and argue that it is not only 
ethical to use framing, but it would be unethical not to frame, as either positive or 
negative framing is inevitable.  
In this chapter, I also explore how these micro-sociological actions between individual 
actors reflect the macro-sociological changes I discussed in Chapter 2. Although there 
has undoubtedly been a shift of power from the physician to patient over the past several 
decades, physicians are still dominant in the relationship. They choose when to give 
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choice, and they are able through language to frame conversations in manipulative ways 
to shape decisions. And yet, these younger doctors often feel powerless to provide care 
that is in the patient’s best interest. It is due to these perceived constraints that they revert 
to manipulative rather than persuasive means to come to a consensus.  
These unintended actions not only contribute to trainee moral distress described in 
Chapter 7, but also harm patients and run counter to the rhetoric of patient empowerment 
and patient-centred care in modern medicine. These communication pathologies further 
create additional conflict between doctor and patient. Doctors perceive patients as being 
“demanding” and “difficult” without realizing their own role in creating situations where 
consensus is constrained. Antony Giddens’ Structuration Theory is then used to elucidate 
this relationship between physicians’ reflexive interpretation of their situation, their 
consequent actions, and the unintended consequences of their action on the overall 
structure in which they then operate. 
I conclude my thesis in Chapter 9 with a discussion of how the medical profession might 
improve how autonomy is conceptualised and enacted in medical interactions. 
Institutional cultures and policies might influence how physician trainees develop their 
professional attitudes towards autonomy and their willingness to make recommendations 
regarding the decision to implement a DNR order. A blind focus on autonomy might 
inadvertently undermine patient care by depriving patients and surrogates of the 
professional guidance needed to make critical end of life decisions. My research suggests 
that policies and cultures that are focused on autonomy may have inadvertently become a 
mechanism of social control that constrains physicians’ ethical reasoning towards a 
reductionist understanding of autonomy merely as offering choice.  
 
A Habermasian analysis of these communication pathologies allows us to better 
understand how this frequently employed strategy of graphic descriptions disempowers 
patients by depriving them of the ability to act as an equal partner in co-creating 
consensus regarding their end of life decisions. Understanding these pathologies 
facilitates the creation of future medical educational interventions that can raise 
awareness of, and modify these communication patterns.  
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There is a need to recalibrate the way physicians conceptualise and operationalise 
autonomy, as well as a need to keep physicians engaged with the lifeworld throughout 
their training. By fostering a culture in medicine where physicians do not forget their own 
lifeworld experiences, we can maintain the mutual trust, empathy and understanding to 
establish more open communications. A way to overcome communication pathologies is 
to embrace an emancipatory approach by encouraging awareness and self-understanding 
regarding these communication pathologies and physicians’ roles in perpetuating them.  
Another possible intervention is to establish policies that focus more on trust and care 
rather than merely choice. Policies that are more flexible and focused on best interest 
decision-making may allow physicians more room for self-reflection and consideration. 
This liberty to provide their clinical judgement and expertise to make recommendations 
in a patient’s best interest rather than through a misinterpreted dogma of autonomy might 
improve patient care and provider satisfaction. In addition, this empirical data suggests 
that a best interest approach (i.e. informed assent) may improve the ways in which 
doctors and patients and surrogates can come together to co-create consensus on end of 
life decisions.  
To summarise, the aim of this thesis is to explore how institutional cultures and policies 
surrounding patient autonomy influence physicians’ clinical and ethical approaches to do-
not-resuscitate (DNR) decision-making at the end of life. What follows in the next 
chapter is a sociological discussion of the transformation of the American physician from 
the mid-twentieth century to the present.  
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Chapter 2: The Changing Role of the American Medical 
Profession from the 1950s to the Present 
 
I begin this chapter with an introduction to the history of the modern American medical 
profession, describing its rise to power in the first half of the twentieth century. I will then 
describe how the consumerisation and bureaucratisation of the medical profession led to 
deprofessionalisation and proletariatisation. These arguments set forth by sociologists in 
the 1970s and 80s, portended a fall of physician authority and the consequences it has 
had on power relationships in the physician-patient interaction. Simultaneously, a 
gradual erosion of public trust, as well as physicians’ loss of knowledge monopoly 
through emerging technologies such as the Internet, further signaled a decline in 
authority. I conclude by arguing that this loss of physician authority allowed for a shift 
towards increased patient decision-making and choice.  
 
Section 2.1: Introduction 
 
The practices and norms of the American medical system today that I will describe in this 
thesis must be understood in light of the sociological processes that gave rise them. The 
current relationship between physicians, patients, and the medical industrial complex 
arose from a power struggle between these entities over the past several decades, 
culminating in the triumph of medical consumerisation and bureaucratisation (Starr 
1982). These larger macro-sociological shifts that I will describe in this chapter have 
significant consequences on the micro-sociological interactions between doctors and 
patients, which I will elucidate in subsequent chapters. 
 
From the 1950s onwards, sociologists became increasingly interested the sociology of the 
medical profession. The Social System (Parsons 1951) and in particular, his elucidation of 
the doctor patient relationship and the sick role, is often taken as the beginning of the 
detailed sociological scrutiny of the medical profession. Parsons emphasises the role of 
the physician and more generally the role of the professions in American society as a 
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special and highly privileged occupation. The Social System's publication began a 
protracted debate about the sick role and more generally opened up a considerable debate 
about the medical profession in the North America. This gradually enlarged into a 
consideration of the capitalist transformation of the American health care system.  
 
Eliot Friedson, John McKinlay, Marie Haug, and others exchanged heated arguments 
about the rise and fall of the medical profession and its implications for care. Their 
discussions foreshadowed the effects of technologies, consumerisation, and other social 
forces on the physician’s ability to maintain power in the health care system and in 
individual patient interactions. During that time, physicians were less aware of the 
developments that impacted their profession and did not adapt their behaviors and 
attitudes to these changing tides (Wolinsky 1988). Based upon my interview evidence, I 
will later argue that that is no longer the case, and physicians are very much aware of 
these social changes and its impact on their profession and practice.  
 
An understanding the historical sociological context of the medical profession and how 
that shapes the physician-patient interaction helps provide context into how deeply 
ingrained societal and individual factors affect the behavior of doctors and patients. One 
example of the influence of social changes on the medical profession has been the 
prioritisation of choice and patient autonomy over clinical judgement in the United 
States. The erosion of trust in physicians has weakened the ability of the profession to 
legitimately claim that efforts to decrease patient autonomy are not for self-interested 
purposes. This becomes particularly relevant in conversations at the end of life, where 
decisions often have to be made within the constraints of critical illness, lack of patient 
capacity, emotional trauma, and limited prognostic information. A nuanced 
understanding of how choice and autonomy are prioritised will help contribute to 
understanding how physicians and patients may better work together to best serve patient 
interests at the end of life.  
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Section 2.2: The Rise and Fall of the Profession of Medicine 
 
Prior to the publication of the Flexner Report in 1910, medical educational standards in 
America were non-existent and there was significant variation in the quality of medical 
training. This ranged from commercial medical colleges to the newly established Johns 
Hopkins School of Medicine, which established medicine as a highly rigourous, graduate 
level discipline. The Flexner Report investigated every medical school in the US and 
found that standards at most schools were deplorable and corrupted. The nascent 
profession realized that, it would never be respected “until it sloughed off its coarse and 
common elements (Starr 1982).” Medical authority was conferred when the American 
Medical Association (AMA) was “granted broad, monopolist-like powers over the health 
care industry, in exchange for its promise to provide quality medical care and eliminate 
the sad state of affairs described by Flexner (Wolinsky 1988). This control of theoretical 
knowledge including the development of specialized training and education, testing 
through formal exams and exclusion of individuals from the professional organisation 
through admission criteria, further differentiated a profession from merely being an 
occupation (Millerson 1964).  
 
The rise of medical professional domination occurred during the “golden age” of 
medicine, which spanned the 1940s to 1950s. McKinlay defined this “golden age” as a 
time when physicians were maximally influential and strongly supported by the state, 
through almost unlimited third-party reimbursement, maintenance of legitimacy and 
exclusivity through state licensing and regulations, and significant state support of the 
training of new physicians (Mckinlay and Marceau 2002). This was the time when 
physicians consolidated their power and became elevated in society from a status and 
authority standpoint (Starr 1982; Wright and Perry 2010). With this came significant 
autonomy and self-regulation, as it was established that their exclusive knowledge to 
define and treat disease entitled them to be the sole purveyors of medical authority 
(Clarke 1981; Freidson 1972; Parsons 1951). This power instilled a stronger sense of 
professionalism and ideal commitment to dedicating their lives to serve the people 
(Wright and Perry 2010).  
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Talcott Parsons was among the first to contemplate the role of illness and physicians in 
society where he defined the “sick role” (Parsons 1951). He classified sickness as a form 
of social deviance, whereby the sick person was exempted from social obligations and 
responsibility for her condition. The expectation was that sickness was a socially 
undesirable position and thus it was the sick person’s responsibility to get better as 
quickly as possible. This was to be accomplished by seeking the care of a physician and 
cooperating with him to get well. This consequently placed the physician in a powerful 
role of defining who was exempted as a socially acceptable deviant. Physicians were in 
turn obligated to do everything within reason to help his patient, focusing solely on the 
welfare of the patient rather than on maximisation of profits.  
 
Parsons wrote The Social System during the “golden age” of medicine, where physicians 
were at the peak of their power, authority, and social status. His theories thus reflect the 
normative beliefs of the time, that a “deference to medical authority by the sick patient 
was necessary for the doctor-patient relationship to function effectively (Goodyear-Smith 
and Buetow 2001).” According to Parsons, “the prestige of the physician’s scientific 
training, his reputation for technical competence, gives authority to his approval, a basis 
for the acceptance of his interpretations (Parsons 1951).” The physician was at that time, 
the epitome of the dominant professional, defined by control over not only the content of 
his own work, but also that of the health care sector as a whole (Timmermans and Oh 
2010). Parson’s description of the doctor role portrayed physicians as universally 
altruistic and competent. This assumption has been one that has been questioned for 
potentially ignoring the reality that physicians and patients might have conflicting 
interests (Turner 1987).  
 
Michel Foucault discussed the relationship between knowledge and power in his book, 
Birth of the Clinic (Foucault 1973). He defined the “clinical gaze” as the changing 
medical approach to the body and disease, as well as a broader implication of medical 
power. Clinical examinations and technological innovations such as the stethoscope, 
allowed physicians to closely observe patients and pinpoint much more precisely than 
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had previously been possible where the problem was likely to be located. This created a 
completely new way of looking at a body and reflected not only a revolutionary advance 
in knowledge about the body, but also access to scientific knowledge, which bolstered 
physicians’ influence and prestige (Turner 1987). Arguably, a physician’s knowledge 
could be used to consolidate power and control over people by differentiating norms and 
deviations, which allowed populations to internalize notions of pathology and deviance. 
Physicians were important gatekeepers of definitions of normal and abnormal.   
 
Eliot Friedson’s arguments about professional dominance challenged Parsons’ normative 
claims of patient deference to physicians (Freidson 1972; Light and Levine 1988). 
Friedson’s theory reflected the changing perception in society of the unchallenged status 
of physicians. He suggested that professional dominance resulted from professional 
autonomy and control over the work of others in its domain, such as nurses, midwives 
and pharmacists. This included subordinating other health care occupations beneath them, 
limiting associated professions to a specific sub-area such as dentistry and chiropractics, 
and excluding competing occupations such as homeopathy by challenging their 
knowledge base (Turner 1987). Strategies to ensure exclusivity also included creating a 
rigourous set of barriers for admission into the profession and restricting access to 
medical training to those with similar and desirable backgrounds as a form of social 
closure (i.e. white, upper class male) (Navarro 1976). The dominance of the biomedical 
model also allowed medical professionals to extend their control into other spheres of life 
through the medicalisation of social problems such as drug use, gambling, homosexuality 
and crime (Freidson 1970).  
 
Further reflecting the skepticism of physician authority, in Limits to Medicine, Ivan Illich 
explored the concept of over medicalisation and iatrogenesis (Illich 1974). His three 
categories of iatrogenesis included clinical, social, and structural iatrogenesis. Clinical 
iatrogenesis was defined as the side effects of medical technology and therapies on the 
individual, whereas social iatrogenesis described the increasing reliance of society on 
medical interpretations and the treatment of natural processes. Structural iatrogenesis 
described the medical profession’s power to reduce the individual’s ability to cope with 
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the normal process of body changes. Sickness, pain, and death, which were integral 
aspects of the human journey, were now seen as things to be controlled and treated. 
Individuals no longer took responsibility for their health problems and society 
encouraged people to become consumers of medical therapies.  
 
Section 2.3: Consumerisation’s Contribution to Sociological Changes in the Medical 
Profession 
 
Just as the American state was instrumental in creating the “golden age” of medicine, 
they were just as powerful in expropriating it. A gradual shift of the state’s allegiance 
from the medical profession towards the corporation created a new age of corporate 
dominance. Former President George Bush especially “emphasised individual 
responsibility in making decisions about health care and paying for it, as well as the 
positive role of the private market place (Mckinlay and Marceau 2002).” At the core of 
this transformation was the broader movement towards the neo-liberal values of 
individualism and the supremacy of competitive market forces in the 1980s (Wright and 
Perry 2010). This laid the foundation for an emphasis on the autonomous patient 
consumer, who was encouraged to demand the right to choose their treatments as one 
would choose products at Tesco. Given that Americans do not have a nationalised health 
care system and oftentimes have to pay out of pocket, these effects of consumerisation 
are especially prominent.   
 
Medical authority can be “defined as the right to influence and direct behavior (Haug and 
Lavin 1979).” Consumerism’s “focus on purchasers’ (patients’) rights and seller’s 
(physician’s) obligations,” directly challenges the traditional authority relationships of 
physicians as set out by Parsons and critiqued by Friedson (Haug and Lavin 1979). The 
emphasis on individual choice in the US has made it particularly difficult for physicians 
to exert authority in the clinical setting. Rather than being driven by a clinical assessment 
of the patient’s needs, the doctor’s path of least resistance is to keep the entitled customer 
happy by giving them what they wanted (Sanders 2004). The threat of a second opinion, 
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increasingly weighs on physicians’ minds. Oftentimes choices are made to give patients 
what they want for fear that if they did not, the patient would choose a different doctor.  
 
However, there is growing evidence that this focus on satisfaction in the US is misguided 
and possibly even detrimental. One American study demonstrated that higher patient 
satisfaction was associated with higher health care and prescription drug expenditures, 
greater inpatient use, as well as increased mortality (Fenton et al. 2012). Despite this, 
patient satisfaction has essentially been enshrined as the metric for optimal care, as the 
Department of Health and Human Services have recently decided to base 30% of 
hospitals’ Medicare reimbursement on patient satisfaction survey scores (Robbins 2015). 
As a result, hospitals can be punished for patient satisfactions that are completely 
divorced from quality medical care such as a quadruple bypass patient complaining of 
mistreatment because he did not get enough pastrami on his sandwich (a high salt food 
item not recommended for a post-bypass cardiac patient). This focus on choice and 
satisfaction might detract from care that is actually needed.  
 
The medical industrial complex, comprised of corporations such as pharmaceuticals and 
insurance companies, has been a primary contributor in this move towards 
consumerisation. One strategy is direct to consumer marketing of drugs, essentially 
bypassing the physician as the powerful gatekeeper of drugs. Pharmaceutical spending on 
direct to consumer advertising increased by 330% between 1996 to 2005 where they 
spent $29.0 billion (Donohue, Cevasco, and Rosenthal 2007). These effects have 
generally been “at the margin of clinical appropriateness” with questionable implications 
on quality of care (Timmermans and Oh 2010).  
 
Aggressive marketing has been used to significantly downplay dangerous side effects and 
even broaden disease definitions, essentially changing patterns of diagnosis and disease 
classification. This has been particularly prevalent in psychiatry where the mantra might 
be: “before you sell a drug, you have to sell the disease (Lane 2008).” One example is the 
transition of shyness from a personality trait to a social anxiety disorder that must be 
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pharmacologically intervened upon and the explosion of antidepressant use in people 
without diagnoses of depression (Lane 2008; Spielmans and Parry 2009).  
 
Section 2.4: Deprofessionalisation of the Medical Profession 
 
Two counterarguments to Freidson’s professional dominance thesis were the theories of 
proletarianisation and deprofessionalisation. Durkheim and Weber defined a profession 
as one where altruistic values were institutionalized and its members were officially 
committed to community welfare and personal service rather than economic or personal 
reward (Turner 1987). The sociological definition of a profession often involves the 
possession of esoteric knowledge and freedom from lay control (Katz 2002). A more 
idealist interpretation of the medical profession from a Parsonian perspective emphasises 
the ethical nature of the profession, its commitment to serving the person and its basis in 
technical knowledge. Departure from this ideal, such as a business orientation towards 
the client, signified occupational change and deprofessionalisation.  
 
Sociologists have argued for decades that the medical profession was undergoing 
deprofessionalisation, defined as a loss of “their unique qualities, particularly their 
monopoly over knowledge, public belief in the service ethos, and expectations of work 
autonomy and authority over the client (Haug 1973).” It has been suggested that the loss 
of the ideals associated with this “noble” profession of medicine may have paved the way 
towards practices that succumbed to the temptations of financial incentives. For example, 
lucrative reimbursements for chemotherapy and infusions, increasingly trump unbiased 
clinical decision-making (Smith and Hillner 2010, 2011). The consumerisation of 
medicine legitimized the “individual pursuit of financial self interest,” at the risk of 
corrupting the profession’s fundamental dedication to altruism and commitment to 
serving the patient’s best interests (Freidson 2001; Timmermans and Oh 2010).  
 
Despite the changes to medical practice including the possible loss of professional 
autonomy and status, medical training and practice continues to be emotionally, 
intellectually, and physically grueling. Young physicians are now less willing to fully 
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commit to the professional standards and ideologies of their predecessors. One 
commentator described the changes in the culture of medicine as follows, “you had a 
family, which your wife took care of, but your career came first,” to one where medicine 
is a job rather than a calling (Smith 2008). The drive towards specialisation reflects a 
prioritisation on financial compensation and lifestyle (Dorsey, Jarjoura, and Rutecki 
2003; Richtel 2004; Smith 2005).  
 
Section 2.5: Loss of Knowledge Monopoly 
 
The rapid rise of information technologies has contributed to the erosion of authority 
bestowed upon the physician as the sole keeper of medical knowledge. Marie Haug 
foreshadowed the effect of computer technologies in challenging the profession’s 
“knowledge monopoly”, hypothesising that “changes in control over esoteric knowledge, 
as its storage and retrieval are computerized, present a potential threat to the eroding 
monopoly (Haug 1976).” This narrowing of the “competence gap” between doctors and 
patients would only increase as society becomes more egalitarian and educated and as 
greater volumes of information become available.  
 
An abundance of information easily accessible online creates an illusion of knowledge 
and entitlement whereby patients may feel empowered to demand treatments and 
question medical opinion (Haug and Lavin 1979). Internet technologies have accelerated 
this to the point that much information is universally available and gives a false 
impression that self-diagnosis and treatment are possible. The Internet has also 
encouraged consumerisation of doctor shopping, through easily accessible physician 
directories and websites where consumers can rate and comment on a particular 
physician’s care. Online support groups also contribute to knowledge empowerment and 
higher standards of accountability. 
 
Another important change is the explosion of new medical knowledge from technology 
driven research, which has made it impossible for a single individual to have detailed 
expertise in all areas of medicine (McKinlay and Arches 1985). The dependence on 
	   39	  
technology transfers power from the physician as the owner of the means of production, 
to the capitalist who sells the technology. Technology has fundamentally changed the 
way physicians are trained, how they think and use information, and how they interact 
with their patients. Given the extent of medical knowledge, it is impossible for doctors to 
be experts in every disease. Instead, many physicians rely heavily on the Internet and 
technologies such as the iPhone for medical knowledge. This explosion of medical 
information is redefining the boundaries between lay and medical knowledge in some 
areas such as rare diseases, where at times the patient may know more about their disease 
than the physician, having done a significant amount of research on the internet.  
 
Section 2.6: Proletariatisation of the Medical Profession 
 
McKinlay and Arches were the first to propose the theory of proletariatisation of 
physicians, which they later relabeled corporatisation (possibly after realizing that 
physician proletarianisation was perhaps an inaccurate exaggeration as well as to distance 
the term from Marxism). They adapted the concept of proletarianisation from Harry 
Braverman’s analysis of the changing nature of class structures and the decline in 
income, political power and status of the middle class in part due to changing 
technologies (Braverman 1974). They define proletarianisation as “the process by which 
an occupational category is divested of control over certain prerogatives relating to the 
location, content and essentiality of its stated activities and is thereby subordinated to the 
broader requirements of production under advanced capitalism (McKinlay and Arches 
1985).”  
 
This involved a loss of control over at least one of the following: the criteria for entrance, 
the content of training, autonomy regarding the conditions and terms of work, 
remunerations for labor, and the objects, tools, and means of labor. Some may argue that 
the proletarianisation thesis is an exaggerated view of the physician professions’ loss of 
authority, as they still retain significant status and autonomy in comparison to the 
workers described in Braverman’s book. Despite that, if we examine the profession over 
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the course of the last few decades, there are clear trends towards loss of authority due to 
increasing bureaucratization, corporatization, and consumerisation.  
 
During the “golden age” of medicine in the US, most physicians tended to be self-
employed fee-for-service businesses where they directed their own work and 
compensation. Today, this has been increasingly replaced by bureaucratisation and a 
medical industrial complex centred around large urban-based centres such as university 
academic centres, for-profit hospitals, and health maintenance organisations. Physicians 
have slowly been displaced down to middle management by administrators, retaining 
only narrow control of the technical and financial aspects of care (McKinlay and Stoeckle 
1988). Furthermore, physicians frequently perceive themselves to be participating in 
“assembly-line medicine,” where seeing see one patient every ten minutes is not 
uncommon. John Stoeckle described it as, “working on the factory floor with an M.D. 
degree (Stoeckle 1987).”  
 
The movement towards evidence based medicine (EBM), which sought to create 
consistent standards of quality of care, further supports the proletariatisation thesis. The 
drive towards standardisation as well as increasing evidence of widely inconsistent 
practice variations which have significant economic implications, created a preoccupation 
with evidence-based guidelines (Timmermans and Kolker 2004). Standardised trials, and 
particularly the randomised controlled trial, created the impression of scientific 
objectivity and thus helped elevate its apparent legitimacy and rigour.  
 
Despite this attempt at regulation, physicians do not seem to follow their own guidelines. 
While sociologists have argued that this reflects the “resiliency of professional 
autonomy,” physicians themselves have attributed this to other more practical factors 
such as a lack of awareness, inertia of previous practices, outcome expectancy, and lack 
of belief in efficacy (Cabana et al. 1999; Timmermans and Oh 2010). EBM also reflects 
the tremendous growth of publications, which have become overwhelming and 
unmanageable under traditional forms of knowledge retention and diagnostic thinking.  
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Trends towards standardisation as an attempt to improve quality and conformity have 
found their way into many aspects of the physician’s workflow. One of the risks of 
standardisation and EBM is a growing overemphasis on algorithmic rules rather than 
individualized patient centred care and clinical expertise (Greenhalgh, Howick, and 
Maskrey 2014). A large percentage of hospitals in the US and UK for example have 
adopted the EPIC system, a physician ordering system and electronic medical record, 
where templates and checkboxes are the structure for all electronic notes.  
 
Rather than free text writing, this computer system encourages physician to fill in blanks 
and tick checkboxes of symptoms. One can choose a specific type of note (i.e. “chest pain 
note”) that automatically populates a standard template. Keyword shortcuts that 
completely populate sections of the note further promote both efficiency at the expense of 
depersonalised, unnuanced care. A new generation of physicians will be trained not in the 
nuanced skill of crafting a differential diagnosis, but instead be prompted by a computer 
program to think in a series of symptoms that must be checked off.  
 
Similarly, electronic order sets on the physician ordering system (i.e. standardised chest 
pain order set including serial troponins, EKG, oxygen, morphine, aspirin, etc.) mean that 
the diagnostic process becomes further devoid of critical thinking and personalised care. 
These trends in turn further encourage bureacratisation and managerial overstep into the 
clinical realm. The shift away from the more intellectually engaging aspects of medical 
diagnostic thinking towards mechanical algorithms alienates physicians from meaningful 
and independent work (Sayers 2011).  
 
Section 2.7: Erosion of Public Trust in Physicians 
 
According to Freidson, the medical profession was able to claim (whether deserved or 
not) reliable authority and its special status, through its “extraordinary trustworthiness,” 
bestowed upon them by their ethicality and knowledgeable skill (Freidson 1970). Haug 
stated that the profession’s knowledge monopoly, coupled with their claims of public 
service, legitimated the “professional’s authority and institutionalises client obligations to 
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trust the professional (Haug 1976).” Wolinsky further argues that loss of dominance was 
due to neither deprofessionalisation nor proletariatisation, but instead a public perception 
that the profession had lost their trust and adapted a self-interested, combative stance 
(Wolinsky 1988).  
 
He urged medical professionals to return to Parson’s notion of a fiduciary agency and a 
“significantly greater stewardship of the limited resources available.” He warned of the 
consequences of the “benign neglect of maintaining the public’s imputation of medicine’s 
original avowed promise (Wolinsky 1988, 1993).” In particular, he cited a need to take 
responsibility for the allocation and consumption of resources, a commitment to the 
public good, and awareness of the negative image of excessive financial rewards. 
Suspicions that physicians act on financial incentives, sometimes over patient interests, 
have further contributed to distrust. His warnings ring particularly true today, with an 
increasing awareness amongst physicians of the need to take responsibility for controlling 
costs and limiting overuse of low value treatments. 
 
The erosion of public trust in institution of medicine in the US has become increasingly 
evident. A recent study showed that only 34% of Americans stated they had great 
confidence in the leaders of the medical profession, in comparison to 73% in 1966 
(Blendon et al. 2014). However, in this same study, they found that trust in physicians’ 
integrity remained high in 69% of respondents. The degree of public trust in physicians in 
the US ranks near the bottom of the 29 industrialized countries surveyed – only 58% of 
respondents believed they could trust their doctors, whereas 76% of British respondents 
felt they could trust their doctors.  
 
Scandals, widely publicized malpractice suits and reports highlighting physician conflicts 
of interests may also contributed to mistrust, especially amongst African Americans. 
These situations demonstrate lapses in ethical behavior and circumstances where the 
physician prioritises his own benefit to the harm of others. Prior to the development of 
research ethics codes, this often took the form of unethical medical experimentation. 
Examples include the medical profession’s involvement in unethical research studies 
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such as the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, where researchers knowingly failed to treat 
syphilis patients despite known efficacy of penicillin. The Johns Hopkins Hospital in 
particular was responsible for taking cancerous cells from a poor African-American 
woman, Henrietta Lacks, without her permission for research purposes (Skloot 2011). 
Her cervical cancer cells became the first and most prolific immortal cell line (HeLa 
cells) used in biological research. Indeed, myths are abound at Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
where there is significant distrust amongst the predominantly low income African 
American East Baltimore population. A common parental warning is not to get too close 
to Hopkins because the doctors would “snatch you up and experiment on you.” 
 
More recently, as market forces and financial conflicts of interest became more prevalent, 
lapses of professionalism often involved doctors performing unnecessary procedures for 
financial gain. For example, a Baltimore cardiologist with close relationships to Abbott 
Laboratories, was found to have inserted 585 unnecessary stents produced by Abbott 
Labs. A victim of this scandal described this betrayal of trust: “I was really shocked…I’m 
from a generation where doctors are thought very highly of (Harris 2010).” This erosion 
of trust has thus been “both a consequence and an accelerant for patient consumerism 
(Timmermans and Oh 2010).” This in turn has contributed to the changes in patient 
health behaviors, including interest in complimentary and alternative medications (CAM) 
and solicitation of second opinions. 
 
These issues have not been confined to the US. Political interference and local 
mismanagement in the UK have created similar scandals. Although the cause of these 
scandals were less due to sinister motives and more to managerial incompetence, they 
still achieved similar effects of decreasing trust in the medical profession. One widely 
publicized scandal was the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Hospital Trust scandal, where poor 
care and infrastructure resulted in mortality rates in emergency care between 27-45% 
higher than expected (Smith 2009). While this particular scandal in part stemmed from 
the Trust’s prioritisation on NHS metrics (i.e. prioritizing patients with minor illnesses 
over seriously ill patients in order to prevent breaching the NHS’s four hour A&E wait 
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time target), reflecting the control of bureaucracy in medical care, this scandal reflected 
poorly on the physician profession as a whole.  
 
Media portrayals of the medical profession throughout the past few decades reflect and 
influence popular beliefs and perceptions of professionalism, which consequently effect 
attitudes of trust. TV doctors in the 1960s and 1970s were father figures, garnering great 
respect through their sagacious, authoritative confidence. Television doctors such as Ben 
Casey (1961-1965), Marcus Welby, MD (1969-1976), and Dr. Kildare (1961-1966) not 
only had impeccable bedside manner but also dispensed wise life lessons. The 
introspective, respectful child prodigy portrayed in Doogie Howser, MD (1989-1993) 
stands in stark contrast to the misanthropic, self serving Dr. House, in House, MD (2004-
2012). The popularity of these shows both mirror societal beliefs and strongly influences 
popular attitudes. Unrealistic depictions run the risk of adversely affecting public 
perception of medical professionals.   
 
Section 2.8: Conclusion 
 
The words of journalist, Katy Butler describing her dying mother’s disillusionment 
encapsulates the changing perception of the modern physician:  
 
“She was no longer a trusting and deferential patient…She no longer saw 
doctors…as healers or her fiduciaries. They were now skilled technicians with 
their own agendas. But I couldn’t help feeling that something precious – our old 
faith in a doctor’s calling, perhaps, or in a healing that is more than a financial 
transaction or a reflexive fixing of broken parts – had been lost (Butler 2010).”  
 
Her single sentence describing physicians as simultaneously “skilled technicians” and 
with their “own agenda” encapsulates the contradictory dilemma of physicians who are 
perceived to be powerless yet completely powerful. This quotation reveals an interesting 
tension between the prevailing sociological interpretation of the evolution of the 
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American medical profession in the 20th century that I described in this chapter and the 
perception of physician responsibility for challenges in end of life care.  
 
She describes physicians as “technicians,” which highlights the proletarianisation of 
physicians where they merely perform a task without control over the overall means of 
production. This reflects consumerisation and the co-option of the health care industry by 
the managerial class, which dictates the way care is administered. To illustrate, a recent 
article in the New York Times illustrates how financial incentives set by insurance 
providers and powerful nursing home and health care industries make it very difficult for 
a patient to actually die at home (Bernstein 2014). Oftentimes, physicians themselves are 
unable to advocate for patients in the face of economic and business oriented demands.  
 
However, she simultaneously describes physicians as no longer healers, but having “their 
own agenda,” which implies that physicians do have the power and intention to go 
against a patient’s wishes and skew treatment decisions towards the most profitable 
choice. Because of this perceived conflict of interest, the medical profession had betrayed 
her mother’s trust. 
 
Many reports in the US seeking to understand root causes contributing to problems in end 
of life care focus on economic factors that incentivise aggressive treatments. As this 
chapter outlines, there are many more complex sociological interactions that influence 
health care practices beyond economic factors (Smith and Hillner 2010). As such, I have 
focused my study on physicians at academic medical centres because they are more 
sheltered from the business and economic incentives that drive the medical system. 
Although the institutions in which they work are still guided by productivity measures 
and profit, academic physicians are likely to be less directly tied to a need for profit as 
say, a private oncologist who owns his own infusion centre.  
 
Physician trainees especially, are even less likely to be motivated by the business and 
financial incentives. From my own observations and first hand knowledge of the US 
residency training system, economic pressures may be transmitted to house staff via 
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pressures to discharge or admit a certain number of patients as well as instructions on 
discharge planning led by social workers, but beyond that there are few intrinsic financial 
pressures. Discussions of financial motivations during patient care planning are more 
likely to come from hospital administrators and social workers than the physician trainees 
themselves. Furthermore, trainees are inexperienced having just completed medical 
school, and are thus an interesting subject of analysis as they are easily impressionable 
and adapt quickly to the particular routine and culture of their institution. Exploration of 
trainees’ attitudes and beliefs thus reflect the institution’s medical education and culture 
laid onto a relatively blank slate.   
 
By focusing my study on academic physicians, and especially trainee physicians, I was 
able to strip away the factor of financial influences to expose a sociologically oriented 
pathology in the doctor patient relationship. This is not to say that we should not concern 
ourselves with the potential that physicians may be motivated to provide unnecessary or 
harmful care due to financial means, but that we must also explore alternative causations 
which also influence care and be perceptive of institutional and structural constraints that 
influence physician behavior.  
 
Circling back to Katy Butler’s quote, my thesis hones in on the consequences of the shift 
in medical power described in this chapter on end of life care. In the next chapter, I will 
begin to link these broader changes to the specifics of DNR decision- making at the end 
of life. As Sarah Palin’s death panel scare in 2009 demonstrated4, the subject of choice 
and self-determination in death and dying is an echo chamber of an individual’s deepest 
fears and insecurities. Given the intensely personal and emotional aspect of death and 
dying, exploring the influence of changing social attitudes on end of life care can be 
particularly illustrative.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  During	  the	  2009	  US	  presidential	  campaign,	  Sarah	  Palin	  set	  off	  a	  political	  firestorm	  by	  falsely	  claiming	  that	  a	  bill	  that	  would	  have	  paid	  physicians	  for	  providing	  voluntary	  advanced	  care	  planning	  counseling	  to	  Medicare	  patients,	  would	  created	  “death	  panels”	  where	  doctors	  and	  government	  bureacrats	  would	  decide	  whether	  Americans	  would	  be	  worthy	  of	  medical	  care	  (Palin	  2009).	  The	  subsequent	  media	  frenzy	  made	  many	  false	  claims	  including	  ones	  where	  elderly	  grandmothers	  would	  be	  told	  how	  to	  “end	  their	  life	  sooner	  (Richert	  2009).”	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Chapter 3: End of Life Care in the US and UK 
 
In this chapter, I begin with a general overview of what it means to die a “good death” 
and how dying in America in reality is far from the ideal of a dignified, peaceful death at 
home. This is in part due to structural constraints in the health care system that drives 
care towards more aggressive measures. I then follow with a brief history and 
epidemiology of CPR at the end of life, as well as a discussion of futile care. Finally, I 
discuss some of the differences in end of life decision-making and resuscitation practices 
between the US and UK, including differences in ICU triage, decisions when the patient 
has lost capacity. I additionally discuss significant media events, which demonstrate 
public mindset and controversy regarding death and dying in the UK.  
 
Section 3.1: Introduction 
 
The social changes in the medical profession that I described in the previous chapter had 
a significant impact on how ethical priorities have shifted over the past few decades and 
the way health care is delivered. In part as a consequence of the physician profession’s 
loss power, societal demands prevailed resulting in a shift away from physician 
paternalism towards patient autonomy (Gillon 2003). The social forces I described in the 
last chapter such as a general decreased deference to authority and a loss of knowledge 
monopoly due to the rise of internet technologies contribute to a desire for greater say in 
one’s own treatments.  
 
This has affected both the willingness to which physician are willing to act unilaterally to 
implement a DNR order and the extent to which society is willing to accept physicians’ 
unilateral decision regarding DNR orders (Marsh and Staver 1991). Influential books 
such as The Silent World of Doctor and Patient by Jay Katz, written in 1984, exposed the 
physician profession’s unwillingness to permit patient participation in decision-making. 
He attributed this professional dominance to a “time-honoured professional belief in the 
virtue of silence, based on the ancient notions of a need for faith, reassurance, and hope,” 
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justifying physicians’ trust by the faith that physicians would act in their patients’ best 
interest (Katz 2002).  
 
As a result, the primary ethical obligation of physicians shifted away from the duty to 
first do no harm and the obligation to act in the patient’s best interest, towards the 
dominance of patient autonomy. Today, physicians’ attitudes are markedly changed from 
decades past, having fully embraced (at least on the surface), the importance of 
respecting autonomy. It has become professionally and ethically unacceptable to act 
paternalistically, for example by withholding a diagnosis of cancer for fear of emotional 
distress. This shift was obvious as early as the late 1970s, as one paper demonstrated a 
complete reversal of attitudes from 1961 where 90% of physicians respondents indicated 
a preference for not disclosing a cancer diagnosis to patients to 97% in 1977 who 
indicated a preference for diagnostic disclosure (Novack et al. 1979). 
 
However, this autonomy has created additional challenges and unintended negative 
consequences that are increasingly recognised. Perhaps most troubling are situations 
where physicians are asked to perform treatments at the end of life that they believe to be 
futile, such as resuscitation following cardiac arrest in a dying patient. Futile treatments 
not only are not in a patients’ best interest, but also can be harmful and deny a patient of a 
“good death.” Concerns about low value care and overly aggressive treatments at the end 
of life have further encouraged the need for discussion.  
 
This chapter focuses on the United States since the focus of this thesis is on the American 
health care system and the influence of local institutional cultures, with the UK as a 
fourth site that at the time of the study allowed unilateral physician decision-making. 
Later in this chapter, I briefly describe the climate of end of life care in the UK to add 
context to the UK example.   
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Section 3.2: Dying a “Good Death” 
 
Dying a “good death” has become increasingly elusive. It is defined by the Institute of 
Medicine as, one that is “free from avoidable distress and suffering for the patients, 
families, and caregivers; in general accord with patients’ and families’ wishes; and 
reasonably consistent with clinical, cultural, and ethical standards” (Emanuel and 
Emanuel 1998). One study determined that factors considered most important at the end 
of life by patients, families, and care providers were pain and symptom management, 
physician communication, preparation for death and a sense of completion of life 
(Steinhauser et al. 2000). Although the majority of Americans want to die comfortably at 
home (Institute of Medicine 2014), the medical system is programmed to a default setting 
of aggressive care for the terminally ill where most die in the hospital or ICU (California 
Health Care Foundation 2012; Teno et al. 2013).  
 
The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of 
Treatments (SUPPORT) was a major multi-centre study conducted from 1989 to 1994, 
which described many shortcomings in the care of dying patients and showed that these 
preferences are not met. They found that only 47% of physicians knew when their 
patients preferred to avoid CPR. Thirty eight percent of patients who died spent at least 
ten days in the ICU and 46% of DNR orders were written within two days of death, even 
though 79% had DNR request elsewhere (SUPPORT Principal Investigators 1995).  
 
Follow up studies from the SUPPORT data also showed that nearly 50% of patients 
reported pain, including 15% who reported extremely severe or moderately severe pain at 
least half of the time and nearly 15% of those with pain were dissatisfied with its control 
(Desbiens et al. 1996). A subgroup analysis also showed that in a sample of 479 patients, 
391 preferred to die at home, but 216 of them ultimately died in a hospital. A recent UK 
study showed that while 70% of individuals would prefer to die at home, more than half 
take place in the hospital (Wise 2012). Epidemiologic evidence demonstrates that despite 
an interest by patients in dying painlessly at home, measures that are consistent with less 
aggressive care, in practice it is difficult to accomplish.   
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Section 3.3: Structural Constraints to Dying a Good Death 
 
Patients are not getting the care that they want at the end of life; their prevailing concerns 
are being treated too aggressively rather than not enough (Jacoby 2012). Structural 
constraints such as malpractice lawsuits, financial incentives to pursue aggressive care, 
medical culture, laws and hospital policies steer clinical practices in a way that go against 
both patient and physician interests (Gawande 2014; Kaufman 2006). The allure of new 
technologies in combination with patients’ fear of death results in ever escalating 
interventions where the goal of health is forgotten for the sake of longevity (Elster 2013). 
 
Choice and patient autonomy appear to be a priority at the end of life, but sometimes this 
choice is an illusion (Drought and Koenig 2002). Theresa Drought and Barbara Koenig 
argue that the idealised discourse of patient choice is flawed due to problems of 
prognostication and shared decision-making. They further describe that patients actually 
hold other values to be more important than autonomy, thus forcing a choice upon them 
when other factors may be more important to them.  
 
Sharon Kaufman describes how dying in the hospital is deeply embedded in the “politics 
and economic organisation of medical care, the logic of hospital routine, [and] the values 
and language associated with individualism” (Kaufman 2006: 19). She argues that these 
individual decisions are not actually decisions, but instead determined by the structural 
pattern of the hospital system, which forces particular decisions upon both physicians and 
patients while claiming a false illusion of choice. This hospital mandated choice makes 
the decision even more anguishing as the decision to “choose death” is couched as a 
positive right, but instead becomes emotionally overwhelming and constrained.  
 
Both physicians and patients are concerned about overly aggressive care, and yet both 
parties find themselves swept away by the currents onto this path. Most American 
hospitals have medical futility policies, and major medical organisations such as the 
AMA and the American College of Physicians (ACP) have policies that encourage 
adaption of policies that permit withholding futile treatment (Council on Ethical and 
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Judicial Affairs 1999; Snyder 2012). Although some do not, the majority of American 
hospitals have policies that typically give the physician the authority to discontinue life-
sustaining treatments if they are non-beneficial.  
 
Despite this, many physicians feel uncomfortable making decisions that go against a 
family’s wishes based on futility and feel they would not be supported by their institution 
to making decisions to withhold non-beneficial care “…the unwillingness to refuse life 
support was not based on the belief that physicians ought to provide such treatment but 
rather that refusal to treat would subject the hospitals to unwanted litigation and adverse 
publicity” (Schneiderman and Manning 1997). De facto practices bind physicians to 
administering non-beneficial treatments and offering CPR regardless of clinical situation 
and de jure policies.  
 
This tension between what doctors feel required to do and what they believe is right, is 
emotionally and ethically burdensome and has been known to contribute to burnout in the 
medical field. Practitioners can experience a high level of “moral distress” regarding 
treatments they perceive might be overly aggressive and contributes to a feeling of 
powerlessness regarding treatment decisions (Hefferman and Heilig 1999). This issue of 
moral distress amongst physician trainees regarding the obligation to provide treatments 
perceived to be futile and not in the patient’s best interest will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter 7.  
 
One strategy American physicians have employed to circumvent taking part in ethically 
compromising situations while also maintaining themselves within the system, is the 
concept of a “limited code” or “slow code” (in the US, resuscitations are called “codes”). 
This is a deliberate decision not to attempt aggressively bringing a futile patient back to 
life when the patient is “full code” (Muller 1992). Although this practice is ethically 
questionable and is explicitly not permitted by some hospital policies, I have seen this 
practised on multiple occasions throughout both medical school and residency. It is also 
discussed in the medical literature as a practice that is not uncommon. The perceived 
	   52	  
need to underhandedly defy these rules emphasises the problematic nature of these 
structural constraints. 
 
Most American doctors do not want this aggressive treatment for themselves if they were 
in that situation. This is particularly telling since doctors will at some point in their life 
become a very well informed patient. An essay by Dr. Ken Murray was widely circulated 
and acclaimed as an eloquent verbalisation of the sentiments of many American 
physicians (Murray 2012). He described that because most medical professionals have 
seen the consequences of futile care, they are most emphatic about not wanting that type 
of death for themself. They understand that overly aggressive care creates unnecessary 
pain and suffering that goes against most dying people’s wishes.  
 
Reflecting this sentiment, a recent study demonstrated that 88.3% of physicians would 
choose a DNR order if they were terminally ill (Periyakoil et al. 2014). Perhaps more 
telling is another study comparing physician versus non-physician Medicare 
beneficiaries’ utilisation of resources at the end of life. Interestingly, there was no 
difference found in physicians’ likelihood of utilizing the hospital, likelihood of dying in 
the hospital, difference in mean ICU days, proportion using hospice, difference in mean 
number of days in hospice, nor any difference in utilisation of health care resources in the 
last month of life (Fischer et al. 2015). So although physicians state that they would 
prefer less aggressive care at the end of life, evidence shows that they are not any less 
likely to use aggressive care than non-physicians. There are many possible interpretations 
of these results and more research will need to be done to elucidate the cause of this 
surprising discrepancy5.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  During	  a	  conversation	  with	  one	  of	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  study	  (Alex	  K.	  Smith)	  at	  the	  conference	  where	  this	  study	  was	  presented	  (Society	  of	  General	  Internal	  Medicine	  Annual	  Meeting,	  2015),	  he	  said	  that	  he	  suspected	  that	  these	  physician	  deaths	  reflected	  an	  older	  generational	  attitude	  towards	  dying.	  These	  physicians,	  who	  were	  all	  over	  the	  age	  of	  65,	  practised	  during	  the	  earlier	  era	  of	  medicine	  that	  I	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  prior	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  autonomy,	  technology,	  and	  corporatisation.	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case	  would	  be	  dependent	  on	  when	  these	  physicians	  stopped	  practicing.	  As	  I	  discuss	  later	  in	  this	  thesis,	  older	  physicians	  in	  my	  study	  were	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  the	  social	  and	  technological	  changes	  in	  end	  of	  life	  care.	  An	  alternative	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  these	  results	  reflect	  the	  default	  of	  aggressive	  care	  in	  American	  medicine,	  where	  even	  those	  who	  are	  most	  medically	  savvy	  and	  aware	  of	  their	  preference	  cannot	  save	  themselves	  from	  overly	  aggressive	  care	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life.	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Section 3.4: CPR at the End of Life 
 
CPR is a medical procedure where rhythmic closed chest cardiac massage is performed 
on a patient who has experienced clinical death due to cardiac arrest. Additional 
components of Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) include defibrillation of the heart 
to restore a viable cardiac rhythm, placement of invasive central venous lines into large 
vessels and delivery of powerful pharmacologic agents to elevate blood pressures, 
increase heart rates, and stabilise cardiac rhythms. A large scale study of 433,985 elderly 
patients showed that 18.3% of patients receiving CPR survived to discharge (Ehlenbach 
et al. 2009). A meta-analysis of 49 studies showed an overall rate of immediate survival 
of 40.7% and survival to discharge was 13.4% (Ebell et al. 1998). A more recent UK 
study found that survival to discharge after in-hospital cardiac arrest was 14.6% (Findlay 
2012).  
 
CPR is effective in attempting reversal of sudden, unexpected death in certain conditions 
such as ventricular arrhythmias. It is not indicated when the patient has a terminal 
irreversible illness, and was not meant to be used in this way. In the first CPR guidelines 
written in 1974 by the National Conference on Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and 
Emergency Cardiac Care, there was also no mention of discussion with the patient or 
family when CPR was contraindicated (Faber-Langendoen 1991). Guidelines changed as 
expectations of autonomy and individual decision-making increased. The default option 
now assumed that resuscitation should be instituted in all instances of cardiac or 
respiratory arrest regardless of pre-arrest diagnosis. There was also a shift in the US in 
the authority to pursue resuscitation lying unilaterally with the physician, to a discussion 
that now occurs between the doctor and patient/surrogate.  
 
Non-beneficial CPR is one example of overtreatment and overly aggressive care at the 
end of life. This can have significant downstream effects and implications for cost 
containment and utilisation of resources. Multiple large-scale studies have shown that 	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survival to discharge after CPR is highly dependent upon the comorbidities and condition 
that led to the cardiac arrest. Survival to discharge is zero amongst patients with stroke, 
sepsis, or metastatic cancer (Larkin et al. 2010; University of Washington 2013).  
 
One argument supporting universal CPR is that the patient is already terminal and that 
any desperate attempts to preserve life is worthwhile. If the patient is going to die 
anyways, it does not hurt to try as the alternative is certain death. However, some argue 
that there are fates worse than death, such as situations where one is not dead but 
permanently in an unconscious state unable to be weaned off life support (Kitzinger and 
Kitzinger 2013). There are also significant risks to CPR though that should not be 
discounted, including the possible preference of passing in a dignified and non-traumatic 
manner. CPR can be an emotionally difficult and traumatic experience for family 
members and prevents loved ones from being with the patient in his last moments. 
Harmful side effects of CPR include rib fractures, traumatic central line insertion, 
hypoxic brain injury and internal organ damage. Even if a terminal patient survives the 
initial CPR effort, there is rarely meaningful prolongation of life and survival without 
intensive care life support is unlikely. Pain and suffering could be increased.   
 
Section 3.5: Futile Resuscitation at the End of Life 
 
Some argue that patients should be divided into three categories: 1) consider CPR as a 
plausible option, 2) Recommend against CPR, and 3) Do not offer CPR (Blinderman, et 
al. 2012). The third group of patients are those in whom resuscitation would not work. 
The term “futility” is highly controversial, and some argue that the term should not be 
used since there are negative implications to the term, but if defined correctly, I believe it 
is an appropriate term to use to describe this scenario.  
 
Lawrence Schneidermann’s general definition of medical futility is as follows: “Medical 
futility means any effort to provide a benefit to a patient that is highly likely to fail and 
whose rare exceptions cannot be systematically produced (Schneiderman 1993).” They 
then further provide a quantitative definition of futility, that a treatment is futile if it has 
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not worked in the last 100 cases. Mark Ebell has attempted to achieve a less arbitrary 
basis for determining quantitative futility, which are based on “the number of consecutive 
failures of an intervention…to calculate the probability of success for the next attempted 
treatment (Ebell 1995).” Alternatively, he also proposes using quality-adjusted life years 
to balance burdens and benefits of a treatment to ultimately determine the probability of 
success beneath which a treatment would be futile.   
 
One must emphasise that futility does not refer to a patient’s circumstance, but rather a 
particular treatment applied to a particular person at a particular time. In other words, a 
person is never futile; providing care is never futile but rather there may be treatments 
that are futile. They also emphasise that arguments against the notion of futility often 
abstract care down to the “mechanistic or biologically fragmented level. As long as 
medicine can achieve a physiological effect on any part of the body, such as lungs or 
heart or kidneys, they argue, then that treatments such as attempted CPR are not futile 
(Schneiderman 1990).” They counter that the goals of medicine are not to keep a body 
and its individual organ systems functioning, but to maintain a person.  
 
Many physicians believe that there is a certain point beyond which resuscitation and 
other life-prolonging intensive care interventions should not be offered. One paper 
suggests that DNR should not be offered to patients where the probability of surviving to 
hospital discharge after CPR is less than 3% (Murphy and Finucane 1993). This includes 
patients with advanced, progressive, ultimately lethal chronic diseases such as bedbound 
patients with metastatic cancer, Child’s Class C Cirrhosis, dementia in a long term care 
facility, unsuccessful out of hospital CPR, and acute near fatal illness without 
improvement after three days in the ICU. The burden and cost of perceived futile care in 
the intensive care setting is high (Huynh et al. 2013).  
 
One study found that during a three month period at five American ICUs, 8.6% of 
patients were perceived as receiving futile treatment, receiving 464 days of treatment 
perceived to be futile in the critical care setting, accounting for 6.7% of all assessed 
patient days. 84 of the 123 patients perceived as receiving futile treatments died before 
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discharge. The cost of futile treatment was estimated at $2.6 million. One study found 
that 15.7% of patients in the ICU who died received CPR prior to death (Hart et al. 2015). 
Given that 22.4% of deaths in America occur in the ICU, this is a fairly large proportion 
of patients (Angus et al. 2004).  
 
DNR orders are an important step in framing overall aggressiveness of care in the 
inpatient setting. A study of 627 advanced cancer patients reported that only 31.2% of 
patients had end of life discussions (Zhang et al. 2009). Those who had end of life 
conversations revealed a mean cost of care of $1876 compared with $2917 for those who 
did not. Furthermore, those who had higher costs reported worse quality of death in their 
final week. There have been several editorials by prominent physician experts invoking 
cost containment as a motivation for limiting DNR in elderly patients where the 
likelihood of discharge from the hospital is unlikely (Emanuel 1996; Halpern and 
Emanuel 2012; Murphy and Finucane 1993). Arguments to instituting such a policy 
include protecting patients from overtreatment, operationalising the concept of futility, 
reflecting upon the majority opinion of marginally beneficial life sustaining care, and 
protecting professionals from burnout (Murphy and Finucane 1993).  
 
There has been increasing interest in the variation across hospitals regarding DNR orders, 
advanced care planning, and end of life care in general (Goodman et al. 2011). These 
variations of concern because a DNR orders and health care decisions should be a 
personal decision based on patient factors, rather than physician behavior and 
institutional culture. One study showed that there was considerable association between 
use of DNR orders and hospital characteristics, even after accounting for variations in 
patient characteristics (Zingmond and Wenger 2012). In particular, the odds of having an 
early DNR order written was significantly lower in for profit hospitals, larger hospitals, 
and in academic institutions. Rates of DNR order use varied ten fold across counties. 
Another study demonstrated wide variations in the proportion of patients admitted with 
treatment limitations (range <1.0-20.9%), the proportion who received CPR (3.8-92.4%), 
new forms of life support (6.0-84.2%), and in survivors, new treatment limitations 
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established (1.9-57.3%) (Hart et al. 2015). This variation could not be consistently 
explained by measurable centre level characteristics.  
 
Other studies have highlighted the influence of advanced care planning norms and its 
influence on end of life ICU use. Amber Barnato has performed mixed methods studies 
demonstrating different cultures of high intensity institutions and low intensity 
institutions influence the way practitioners conceptualise a patient’s medical situation and 
interpret medical findings in different ways (Barnato et al. 2012). These affect their 
patterns of decision-making regarding initiation, continuation, and withdraw of life 
sustaining therapies and contribute to institutional variations in end of life ICU care 
practices (Barnato et al. 2014).   
 
Section 3.6: US and UK Differences in Resuscitation Practices 
 
The UK serves as an ideal “control” site that had a greater emphasis on best interest 
decision-making than permitted in most US hospitals, due to the cultural similarities 
between these two developed Western nations of common origins. Despite these 
commonalities, the two health systems have very different historic roots and contrasting 
political philosophies. A simplified historical account of the NHS6 points to the collective 
ethos of the UK which has long been present and was strengthened following the 
devastation of World War II, where the British people felt a need to ensure equitable and 
just distribution of resources regardless of the ability to pay. Individuals were willing to 
accept the sacrifices inherent in the welfare state in order to create a more just and 
equitable society. The NHS was borne out of this principle. In contrast, the US has 
developed a market-based, consumer driven health care system that embodies traditional 
American ideals of individual freedom and choice. As such, the drive towards patient 
autonomy over physician paternalism developed over the past few decades in the US, 
whereas the UK is only now beginning to see similar shifts (Borgstrom and Walter 2015). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  I	  recognise	  this	  does	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  richness	  of	  British	  public	  health	  history,	  but	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  NHS	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	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Both the US and UK have experienced varying levels of dissatisfaction with their health 
care systems and calls to reform. Ironically, both countries are seeking to improve their 
systems by moving closer towards each other. In the US, despite backlash against 
“socialised medicine,” many proposed initiatives have sought to increase regulation and 
distribution of quality care although resistance from the American right have made this 
politically challenging to implement. Obama’s Affordable Care Act was a step towards 
increasing access to care. Recent health and social care reforms have moved the NHS 
towards a more competitive marketised system, emphasizing patient choice. End of life 
care controversies in the UK signal a further shift towards a prioritisation of choice and 
autonomy more similar to US sentiments.  
A UK court case last year illustrates some of the challenges surrounding DNR orders and 
societal shift in mentality. A patient’s family took doctors to court claiming that doctors 
at the Addenbrooke’s Hospital (one of the sites in this study) “badgered” Janet Tracey, a 
63-year-old woman into agreeing to a DNR order and ultimately instituted it without the 
family’s permission (Judd 2012). She had fractured her neck in a car accident shortly 
after she was diagnosed with terminal lung cancer. The controversy surrounding the 
incident spotlights two questions: Is there a legal duty to inform and consult patients on 
DNR decisions? And should patients have the right to demand resuscitation, whatever the 
medical circumstance? 
The courts initially decided the case should not go forward to judicial review, thus 
reaffirming that the decision to pursue CPR should be based on the doctor’s clinical 
assessment of what is in the best interest of the patient. Subsequently, the case went to a 
higher court, which overturned the decision stating that the hospital had violated her 
rights by not consulting her or her family before a DNR order was instituted. According 
to Dave Tracey’s (the husband) lawyers, his focus was not that patients should have the 
right to demand resuscitation, but rather that patients had the right to know how DNR 
decisions were made, and to be consulted about them.  
This controversy cast light on the practice that physicians could (and should) refrain from 
discussing DNR decisions with patient if it would cause significant distress. Distress is an 
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important consideration and unfortunately not something that US physicians are 
permitted to invoke as a reason for not discussing resuscitation with their patients. 
However, this also creates a convenient “out” for physicians who do not want to discuss 
these decisions with patients for other reasons such as physician discomfort and a 
perceived lack of time to have these discussions. The judgement emphasises that patients 
have a legal right to be consulted and informed of decisions to withhold resuscitation; 
“distress is no longer a sufficient reason not to inform and consult with a patient. There 
must now be convincing reasons to displace this right (Meikle 2014).” 
A joint statement from the British Medical Association, the Resuscitation Council UK, 
and the Royal College of Nursing was published in October, 2014, which clarified the 
guidance in the UK surrounding DNR decision-making (British Medical Association, 
Resuscitation Council UK, and Royal College of Nursing 2014). It states that CPR should 
not be attempted if death is inevitable, and that decisions not to attempt CPR if there is no 
realistic prospect of success does not require patient consent, though the presumption 
should be in favour of informing the patient. The report emphasises that physicians are 
under no obligation to offer or deliver inappropriate treatments such as resuscitation that 
would not work. If there is a disagreement between the provider and the patient about a 
DNR order, a second opinion should be offered.  
Around the same time, another national controversy took hold in the UK surrounding the 
Liverpool Care Pathway (LCP), a gold standard pathway intended to replicate best 
practice standards for care of the dying found in many hospice centres within the hospital 
setting (Neuberger 2013). This included assessments of whether any further medications 
and tests would be beneficial and should be continued, whether fluids should be given, 
and a focus on ensuring patient comfort such as pain relief and aggressive symptom 
management. This pathway was created to help terminal patients die with dignity, but 
controversy ensued fuelled by media campaigns, with concerns that people were placed 
on the LCP without consent or their family’s knowledge and that the pathway hastened 
death. This ultimately led to the phasing out of this pathway (Dzeng 2013b).  
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Although this attention highlighted important concerns regarding informed consent and 
disclosure, unfortunately public outcry was fuelled by misleading reports from 
newspapers such as the Daily Mail, misconstruing facts about the LCP (National Health 
Service 2012). One of the concerns of the LCP was that it encouraged a tick box 
approach to end of life care, which can miss the original intention of each step (i.e. nurses 
preventing family members from giving comfort feeds because the pathway says that 
fluids are not necessary) and deindividualises this very personal process. These 
controversies highlight the growing demand for patient choice and informed consent in 
end of life decision-making.  
Section 3.6.1: British Policy Regarding End of Life Decision-Making 
 
The changes delineated in the previous section are changing policies and possibly 
practices in the UK. Because these changed occurred after my study, in this thesis, I will 
primarily describe UK practices during the period of my study prior to the changes 
prompted by the Tracey case. During the time of my study, patients were permitted to 
refuse but not demand additional treatment in the UK. CPR could be withheld without 
discussion with the patient/surrogate if it is deemed medically appropriate. The GMC’s 
recommendations for treatment and care at the end of life illustrate the relative authority 
of physicians to make clinically informed decisions:  
 
If the…doctor considers that the treatment would not be clinically appropriate to 
the patient, they do not have to provide the treatment…if you judge that CPR 
should not be attempted…you must carefully consider whether it is necessary or 
appropriate to tell the patient that a DNACPR decision has been made…While 
some patients may want to be told, others may find discussion about interventions 
that would not be clinically appropriate burdensome and of little or no value…If, 
after discussion, you still consider that CPR would not be clinically appropriate, 
you are not obliged to agree to attempt it in the circumstances envisaged.  
 
 (UK General Medical Council 2010)  
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The GMC assume a level of trust that the British people have for the medical 
establishment that simply does not exist in the US. A leading physician was quoted in 
The Guardian, “If the decision is purely made because CPR is not going to work, the 
General Medical Council and the resuscitation guidelines are quite clear that we don't 
need to discuss with patients – why discuss it with a patient who is ill and frightened if 
you are not going to do it anyway? (Boseley 2012)” One could imagine the uproar and 
outrage this sort of comment would illicit in the US, where patients appear more 
suspicious and distrustful of a physician’s motivations.  
 
Section 3.6.2: Implications for Clinical Practice and in Particular ICU Triage7 
 
These differences in the way DNR decisions are made have significant implications for 
the management of patients who experience cardiac arrest and have no chance of survival 
or meaningful recovery. There are inevitably situations in both countries where patients 
in whom a DNR order would be appropriate, but had not been addressed prior to an in-
hospital cardiac arrest. In the US, this scenario often results in the code team trying to 
resuscitate the patient while calls are frantically made to try to locate the surrogate and 
attempts are made to elicit an immediate decision to accept a DNR order so that 
resuscitation attempts can be stopped. Either the resuscitation proves unsuccessful or vital 
life signs are regained and the patient is sent to the ICU for further management. The ICU 
does not have the power to refuse such admissions, and both culture and legal climate are 
such that that scenario would not cross anyone’s mind. Frequently the patient eventually 
dies in the ICU.  
 
In the UK, physicians, including ST3s and above, have the authority to end or withhold a 
futile resuscitation. Furthermore, the physicians in the ICU have the authority to refuse a 
patient’s transfer to the ICU if they decide it would be an inappropriate transfer. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  ICU	  triage	  in	  the	  US	  is	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  whether	  a	  patient	  should	  go	  to	  the	  ICU.	  At	  some	  institutions,	  including	  Columbia,	  this	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  team	  of	  senior	  residents	  and	  an	  attending	  physician.	  Decisions	  are	  made	  based	  on	  bed	  availability,	  patient’s	  condition	  and	  prognosis.	  Although	  DNR	  status	  should	  not	  necessarily	  play	  a	  role	  in	  ICU	  triage	  decisions,	  from	  my	  experience	  practicing	  at	  Columbia,	  at	  least	  at	  this	  particular	  institution,	  in	  practice	  they	  did	  influence	  decisions.	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includes patients who have no chance of survival, such as a patient in whom vital signs 
were regained during resuscitation, but the chance of meaningful survival is nil. In this 
scenario, the medical team would attempt to get a hold of the family and inform them that 
the patient had a cardiac arrest and was on life support but would not survive. They 
would maintain life support to allow the patient’s loved ones to see him, and then they 
would terminally extubate the patient.  
 
Section 3.6.3: Palliative Care in the US and UK 
 
Medical cultures and societal culture surrounding death and dying also differ between the 
US and UK. Due to the leadership of Dame Cicely Saunders, generally regarded as the 
founder of the modern hospice movement, as well as of others, the UK has a strong 
tradition of palliative care. The NHS has integrated palliative care into the fabric of the 
health care support system in England, where services are escalated gradually as patients 
approach the end of life in tandem with treatment regardless of its intent (i.e. curative or 
palliative).  
 
Despite this authority, there is evidence that UK physicians could do a better job of 
determining who would be appropriate for a DNR order. A study by the National 
Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Deaths (NCEPOD) showed that the UK 
also has problems with properly determining cases where a DNR would be appropriate 
(Findlay 2012). Only 44 of the 526 patients had DNR decisions recorded in the notes. 
The research team felt that an additional 89 patients who had not had a resuscitation 
decision should have also been DNR.  
 
In contrast, the US Medicare system requires that patients choose between palliative care 
and treatment with a curative intent. In order to qualify for palliative care services, the 
patient must have a life expectancy of less than 6 months and must withdraw from 
curative treatment. This policy creates dire misunderstandings that are structurally 
ingrained, as people then assume that palliative care means end of life rather than 
symptom palliation throughout the course of a serious illness. Forcing patients to choose 
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between curative and palliative care encourages overly aggressive care and inadequate 
palliation as patients are often not ready to give up hope of a cure at a time when they 
would very much benefit from palliative care services. A landmark study was published 
shortly before I started my PhD studies in the UK demonstrating that early palliative care 
in metastatic non small cell lung cancer patients significantly improves quality of life and 
mood (Temel et al. 2010). This was hailed as a new, significant finding in the US but I 
was struck in the UK that people approached this study with confusion, as early palliative 
care was the norm and its findings appeared obvious to most.  
 
Section 3.6.4: Decision-Making Following the Loss of Patient Capacity 
 
Ideally, physicians should engage in discussions directly with patients regarding end of 
life and DNR decisions. Unfortunately, reality is far from ideal. In American and British 
hospitals, patients have often lost the capacity to engage in these discussions by the time 
they are brought up by the medical team or family. As such, necessary focuses of this 
discussion are the decisions made by surrogates rather than that of the patient. The 
question of how to best respect patient autonomy when the patient has lost capacity is one 
that the US and UK have addressed in different ways. British policy has enshrined in the 
Mental Capacity Act of 2005 best interest decision-making as the standard for patients 
who lack capacity (Mental Capacity Act 2005). As such, families and surrogates in the 
UK have no legal authority to decision-making in the UK, although physicians are 
encouraged to take into consideration families’ preferences.  
 
In contrast, in the US, autonomy is transferred from the patient to the surrogates when 
capacity is lost. The surrogates’ substituted judgement is the accepted approach for 
decision-making in incapacitated patients in the US. The surrogate should make decisions 
based on what they believe the patient would have wanted, rather than on what the 
surrogate desires. There is a great deal of controversy surrounding substituted judgement 
with many critics arguing that substituted judgement places unreasonable expectations 
that cannot be fulfilled onto the surrogate.  
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Surrogates often have not had conversations with their loved one as to their goals and 
values, and are thus unable to truly make decisions based on the patient’s wishes. Studies 
have shown that surrogates’ predictions of patients’ preferences are no better than 
chance, although many patients also wish their surrogates to make decisions on their 
behalf, including overruling them if there is a conflict (Drought and Koenig 2002). Even 
if they are aware of the patient’s wishes, oftentimes other factors such as emotions, guilt, 
and an inability to let go cloud decision-making. The distinction between patient 
autonomy and substituted judgement of surrogates as a proxy for patient autonomy has 
important ethical implications that impact upon moral distress and care. There has been 
much ethical debate in the US regarding how best to make decisions for patients without 
capacity (Phillips and Wendler 2014; Sulmasy and Snyder 2014; Sulmasy and Sulmasy 
2015).  
 
Similar to situations experienced on the wards, most respondents assumed that the patient 
no longer had capacity when DNR decisions were being made amongst patients in whom 
survival would be unlikely. As such, most US physicians assumed that surrogates would 
be making the decision while in the UK most physicians assumed that a best interest 
decision would be made by the physicians in consultation with the patient’s family. 
Although in interviews, themes of surrogate decision-making emerged in various 
circumstances, it was not specifically within the scope of the thesis to discern the 
differences in decision-making between patients and surrogates. It is also outside the 
scope of this thesis to engage in an ethical or legal debate between substituted judgement 
versus best interest decision-making.  
 
Section 3.6.5: Existing Literature Addressing US-UK End of Life Issues 
 
Literature on US-UK comparisons of DNR decision-making is limited. There have been 
some editorial papers discussing these differences. Many acknowledge the similarities 
between the UK system and proposals in the US to limit CPR in patients who would not 
benefit (Bishop et al. 2010a; Perkins, Pitcher, and Soar 2012). Prior empiric evidence 
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includes a qualitative study by Michelle Mello of 34 physicians and nurses in the US and 
UK eliciting their beliefs on DNR practices (Mello and Jenkinson 1998).  
 
This latter study concluded that American doctors believed that they were legally 
obligated to discuss this decision with patients and provide futile care if requested. British 
physicians felt less obligated to do so, but felt a greater moral obligation to do so. Based 
upon my preliminary conversations with American physicians, legal requirements and 
standards of practices have changed where there has been an even greater shift towards 
autonomous patient decision-making over the past couple decades. Mello’s article, 
written in 1994, likely reflects these earlier times where the transition was only becoming 
apparent.  
 
Section 3.7: Conclusion 
 
In order to fully understand the challenges we face in end of life care, it is important to 
have a historical sociological understanding of the forces that led us to where we are 
today. A particularly telling study demonstrated that physicians generally lacked 
awareness of the systemic and clinician related barriers to goals of care discussions (You 
et al. 2015). They primarily attributed barriers to primarily family and patient factors 
such as difficulty accepting a poor prognosis, difficulty understanding potential 
complications and limitations of life-sustaining care, and patients’ inability to make goals 
of care decisions. This is particularly illustrative of the impulse to attribute problems to 
parties other than oneself, but also the tendency to ignore the less obvious influence of 
systems constraints.  
 
Understanding and addressing how social trends affect end of life decision-making is 
critical to our ability to improve quality of care and the overall experience of death and 
dying. A fundamental aim of this thesis is to draw attention to structural factors and 
inadvertent mental biases that drive overly aggressive care at the end of life. This thesis 
will explore how institutional cultures and policies, as a consequence of shifting priorities 
on autonomy changed how doctors give choice and make recommendations, and the 
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unintended consequences of this mentality on communication practices and framing. In 
the next chapter, I will discuss methods employed in this thesis.  
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the methodological aspects of my thesis. I begin with a 
discussion of the interdisciplinary differences between sociology, medicine and bioethics 
that affect the epistemology and methodologies of studying ethical dilemmas in the real 
world setting. I then describe the methods and analytical strategies employed. The first 
half of this chapter relates to the theoretical framework and epistemological stance. I 
outline how my constructivist perspective naturally leads to theoretical perspectives 
rooted in symbolic interactionism, followed by critical theory. The second part of this 
chapter then details the exact methods I used in this study. Finally, I end with a broader 
discussion on reflexivity and self-reflexivity in research.   
 
Section 4.1: The Interaction of Sociology, Bioethics, and Medicine 
 
In my thesis, I employ ethical arguments from the existing medical ethical literature to 
derive normative claims on the appropriate balance between autonomy and the other 
principles. I employed the descriptive methods of sociology to understand how this 
ethical reasoning takes place in the context of medical practice. With my sociological 
theoretical foundations in symbolic interactionism predominantly in Chapters 5 and 6 
followed by the critical theory of Habermas in Chapter 8, I have used these data to 
develop a framework on how physicians conceptualise and enact the ethical principles of 
autonomy and beneficence. Using a sociological framework helps hone in on the critical 
importance of social context, shaped by culture and policy, on individual physicians’ 
normative ethical thinking and behavior. The way in which clinicians understand ethics 
has implications on the choices they offer to patients, communication strategies, and the 
subsequent interactions forged by their communication practices.  
 
Rather than focusing on disciplinary boundaries and constrain myself to pre-existing 
disciplinary conception of the way the world works and what strategies we employ to 
understand it, I have sought instead to find the best epistemologies and methods to 
answer the research question. The goal of my thesis was to understand how institutional 
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cultures and policies influenced the way physicians conceptualised autonomy. This 
required combining the traditions sociology, medical ethics and clinical medicine.  
 
There is a precedent for interactions amongst these disciplines, though these interactions 
have sometimes been fraught with conflict and tensions. My own experience and 
conversations with researchers operating within this interdisciplinary space betray a 
“negative solidarity” where over-defensiveness and dissatisfied compromises by the non-
dominant discipline prevail (Hedgecoe 2004; Vries et al. 2006). Philosophers and social 
scientists may look down upon each other over the normative/descriptive divide (Herrera, 
2008), where “philosophers who do medical ethics tell us social scientists: ‘You can’t get 
an ought from an is,’ and we social scientists respond, ‘You can’t get an ought from an 
ought (De Vries 2010)!” Medical sociologists bristle at the ways in which physician 
researchers have imposed positivist epistemologies onto “qualitative research,” 
demanding measures of validity and generalizability that do not make sense in 
qualitatively oriented interpretive frameworks (Barbour 2003).  
 
Despite these tensions, researchers have increasingly recognized the necessity for 
integration between medicine, sociology, and bioethics (Hedgecoe 2004). Bioethicists 
speak of the “empirical turn” in bioethics (Borry, Schotsmans, and Dierickx 2005). Along 
with it, there is a growing realisation that an empirically informed bioethics is necessary 
to maintain relevance. Adam Hedgecoe asserts that the “significant differences between 
ethics as presented in bioethics, and the way in which ethical reasoning takes place in the 
clinic…isolates bioethics from practice, undermines the validity of its claims, and 
reduces its contribution to policy debates (Hedgecoe 2004).” As such, more integration of 
empirical methods is critical to bioethics’ ability to maintain relevance and authority in 
present day bioethical debates (Herrera 2008). 
 
Philosophers examine moral dilemmas from a normative perspective where a priori 
truths guide moral behavior. Although sociologists should not assume that an ’ought’ can 
be derived from ‘is’ - that because something is done in a certain way does not mean it 
should be done that way, they can instead explore how ethical practices are enacted in 
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real life. Sociological research demonstrates that in practice, people do consider the way 
things ought to be; that cannot be separated from the way things are currently already 
done. But, Hedgecoe argues, this division of labor between philosophers who explore 
ethical justification and sociologists who explore ethical understanding is an untenable 
division that does not reflect moral reality (Hedgecoe 2004).  
 
The strengths of empirical bioethics is its ability to combine the philosophically 
normative with the sociologically descriptive to understand how facts and values interact 
and are influenced by each other in practice (Ives and Draper 2009). Utilizing sociology’s 
empirical methodologies allow medical ethics to address critiques such as the following:  
 
“The justificatory apparatus of traditional bioethics: …(2) disregards the extent to 
which moral concepts and norms derive their meaning and their force from the 
social and cultural surroundings in which they are embedded; (3) neglects the way 
in which moral problems are generated and framed by the practices, structures, 
and institutions within which they arise; and (4) ignores the means by which 
social and cultural ideologies, and the power relationships they entrench, can both 
perpetuate moral inertia and effect moral change (Hoffmaster 2001).”  
 
Hedgecoe argues for a “critical bioethics” approach which seeks to incorporate social 
science research into philosophical thinking (Hedgecoe 2004), Much of his critique 
centres around the origins of bioethics in moral philosophy where deductive arguments 
determine moral norms that are prescriptive by virtue of their rational justification. By 
justifying theories in terms of their rationality rather than by its applied practices, it 
ignores the gaps between the theory and practice of ethics. Because of ethics’ focus on 
establishing universal principles and concerns of moral relativism, it attempts to 
transcend culture and imply that solutions are applicable in all cultural and social 
contexts. However, critical bioethics must be more than descriptive. It must be willing to 
maintain a critical stance with regards to its empirical findings. To fail to do so would 
resign it to a conservative bystander, “propping up, rather than challenging unsavory 
systems and practices (Hedgecoe 2004).”  
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Section 4.2: Constructionism as my Epistemology and Interpretivism as my 
Theoretical Position  
 
Michael Crotty, in his book, The Foundations of Social Research, outlines the four 
elements he regards as sequentially necessary to properly position one’s research (Crotty 
1998). He describes them as epistemology -> theoretical perspective -> methodology -> 
methods, which are necessary to justify the ultimate methods that are most appropriate 
for the research question. Reflection upon one’s theoretical framework is critical prior to 
the initiation of any research study because it fundamentally influences the way we as a 
researcher perceives the world and analyse and synthesise the data that comes out of it. 
Epistemology, a theory of knowledge exploring how we know what we know, is integral 
to providing the philosophical grounding for how we generate and legitimate the 
knowledge we seek. Theoretical perspective characterises the philosophical stance that 
informs one’s methodology, “thus providing a context for the process and grounding its 
logic and criteria (Crotty 1998).”  
 
The goals of my qualitative inquiry are to describe the underlying phenomena behind 
physicians’ ethical understanding, develop a deeper conceptual understanding and 
framework, and elucidate hypotheses that may drive future work. As such, the most 
appropriate epistemology with which I have explored my qualitative inquiry is 
constructionism. This philosophical stance acknowledges that there is no particular 
objective truth that is universal, but rather that truth is constructed through our 
engagement with the realities of the world (Holstein and Gubrium 2008). Meaning is 
constructed by different subjects in different ways, rather than discovered somewhere in 
the real world. As such, there may be several interpretations to the same phenomena, co-
constructed by subject and object and dependent upon the culture within which they are 
situated.  
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Section 4.2.1: Symbolic Interactionism  
 
The theoretical perspectives employed in this thesis are interpretivist symbolic 
interactionism and critical theory. Symbolic interactionist approaches will factor most 
prominently in Chapters 5 and 6, whereas critical theory will be the predominant 
approach in Chapter 8. I will first briefly describe symbolic interactionism here, and 
address critical theory the following section.  
 
The ideas inherent in the symbolic interactionism approach were first proposed and 
developed by Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Herbert 
Blumer, drawing particularly on Mead, later coined the term symbolic interactionism, 
which rests on three defining premises:  
 
1) People act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them 
2) The meaning of things is derived from the social interaction that one has with one’s 
peers 
3) These meanings are modified through an interpretative process used by the person in 
dealing with the things he encounters.  
 
(Blumer 1969) 
 
Symbolic interactionism, in the tradition of interpretivism, hones in on the centrality of 
meaning. It focuses on the source of that meaning to the actor and the consequent 
influence that meaning has on the actor’s interpretation of the world and her actions. 
Meaning is not intrinsic to the object nor does it arise within the subject herself, but arises 
from the social interactions between the subject and object. It is also dependent on the 
ways that the subject sees others act towards the object. An actor’s development of 
meaning is not a passive process but a process of interpretation where meanings are used 
and revised through self-interaction and interaction with others. As such, symbolic 
interactionism accounts for how individuals “shape and control their conduct by taking 
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into account the expectations of others with whom he acts…[by studying] the margins 
where collective behavior and individual conduct overlap (Becker et al. 1961: 19-20).” 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I describe how a hospital’s institutional culture and policies 
influence how physician trainees conceptualise the ethical principles of autonomy and 
beneficence, which then influences their prioritisation on choice in end of life decisions 
and their willingness to make recommendations. The symbolic interactionist approach in 
these chapters highlights the importance of understanding how meaning is constructed by 
physicians in relation to ethical decision-making at the end of life. Their meanings of 
autonomy are constructed from their interpretation of the hospitals’ culture and policies 
as reflected by the actions and attitudes of their peers and superior. Their interpretations 
of ethical principles do not necessarily reflect theoretical understandings of autonomy, 
but rather the local cultures’ interpretation of these policies. Their interpretation then 
influences the way they offer choice and recommendations in end of life conversations, 
which then in turn influences how other physician trainees interpret and act. 
 
Section 4.2.2: Critical Theory  
 
Jürgen Habermas, a Second Generation Frankfurt School critical theorist whose work I 
will engage with primarily in Chapter 8. He describes three non-reducible “knowledge-
constitutive interests” - the technical, the practical, and the emancipatory (Bernstein 
1985: 8). The last approach, the emancipatory approach, is the one most aligned with my 
research. The technical encompasses the positivist empirical-analytic approach, whereas 
the practical describes the historical-hermeneutic sciences, which are governed by a 
practical interest in understanding human behavior by interpreting the reasons people 
have for their activity. The emancipatory approach, or the critical theory approach, 
dialectically incorporates the empirical and hermeneutic disciplines to derive a 
framework aimed at facilitating emancipatory self-reflection. The goals are to achieve 
freedom from domination through a heightened understanding of the subject’s life 
circumstances and rational autonomy of action (Giddens 1985: 127).  
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Through this self-reflection, “individuals can become aware of forces which have exerted 
a hitherto unacknowledged influence over them (Held 1980: 318).” Habermas’ critical 
theory is firmly rooted in language. Dominance derives its power from the ability to 
systematically distort communications, but emancipation rises from the transcendence of 
these structures of communication to establish an alternative ideal speech situation 
(Crotty 1998: 143). A major focus of Habermas’ critical theory is a critique of ideology, 
which systematically examines power relations that are embedded in the communicative 
process and the social systems that allow ideology to appear natural.  
 
A critical theory approach is most relevant in this thesis because as I will discuss further 
in later chapters, the lines between who is dominating and who is powerless are blurred. 
Traditionally, medical sociology has attributed power to the physician. The evolution of 
modern medicine has seen a welcomed shift of power from the doctor to the patient in 
order to empower patients to make decisions. However, these dichotomies of power and 
the powerless are rarely so simple.  
 
Shifting power in the form of autonomy from the physician to the patient may have 
resulted in forced choice and false choice that is as disempowering as not having had 
choice at all. Despite this loss of power, physicians still remain the dominant player in the 
physician patient relationship, but as I demonstrate later in this thesis, physician trainees 
often feel powerless to act in a patient’s best interest. This can be both distressing for the 
physician as well as harmful to the patient. This is why an emancipatory approach is 
appropriate. Both doctors and patient feel powerless, but self-awareness and self-
emancipation in both parties have the potential to promote true empowerment.  
 
Symbolic interactionism, the main theoretical perspective using the interpretivist 
perspective used in Chapters 4 and 5, helps clarify how physicians’ interpretation of 
autonomy, rather than theoretical ethical principles defined in the ethical literature, is 
critical to the way they consequently act. I shift gears slightly in Chapter 8 where the 
theoretical perspective is instead critical theory. Critical theory allows us to consider the 
steps necessary to free oneself of the dominance of ideology and interpreted meaning 
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described in Chapters 5 and 6 by examining systematically distorted communication 
pathologies and the emancipatory alternatives of ideal speech types that we can instead 
strive towards. The dual focus on both empirical bioethics and critical theory work well 
as both methodologies have a strong commitment and tradition of reuniting theory and 
practice (Giddens 1985; Hedgecoe 2004).  
 
Section 4.3: Methodology  
 
Methodology describes the process and design underlying the particular choice of 
methods, thus linking the choice of methods to the desired outcome (Crotty 1998). 
Methods then describe the specific techniques and procedures used to gather and analyse 
data. In this section I will outline my methodology (approaches derived from grounded 
theory), which provides the context for Section 4, which describes my methods 
(interviews).  
 
Blumer is critical of the more traditional forms of social scientific research, which focus 
on “adhering to scientific protocol, engaging in replication, testing hypotheses, and using 
operational procedures (Blumer 1969: 32).” They neither account for alternative 
empirical situations not circumscribed by the hypothesis, nor do they empirically validate 
the initial premises, data, relations, interpretations, and concepts. Rather than taking their 
evidence from the empirical social world, researchers sometimes instead resort to “a 
priori theoretical schemes, to sets of unverified concepts, and to canonised protocols of 
research procedure,” which force research to “serve their character and bend the 
empirical world to their premises (Blumer 1969: 33).”  
 
He instead calls for a need to for direct examination of the empirical social world; to 
meticulously examine whether one’s premises, questions, data and interpretations are 
actually legitimate. The methods that naturally arises from symbolic interactionism is 
thus participant observation, in-depth unstructured interviews, and ethnography. All of 
these research methods seek to describe the ways that ordinary social actors understand 
and construct their world. Mead argues that to genuinely understand the attitudes of a 
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community, the researcher must take the role of others by adopting the standpoint of 
others (Crotty 1998: 74):  
 
“The situation must be seen as the actor sees it, the meaning of objects and acts 
must be determined in terms of the actor’s meaning, and the organisation of a 
course of action must be understood as the actor organises it. The role of the actor 
in the situation would have to be taken by the observer in order to see the social 
world from his perspective (Psathas 1973: 6-7).” 
 
Section 4.3.1: Analytical Approach During Interviews      
 
A multitude of labels and approaches arose from qualitative approaches that derive from 
Glaser and Strauss’s Grounded Theory approach, all of which are united by the primacy 
given to data rather than preconceived hypotheses (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Truly 
grounded theory is nearly impossible in today’s research environment (i.e. grant funding 
requirements), as few are able to come into research with a complete blank slate. As an 
insider physician, this is clearly not possible for myself. Although I do not employ the 
specific strategies proposed by Glaser and Strauss such as coding specific to grounded 
theory, memo writing and coming into the research process with a complete blank slate 
without a prior literature review, the qualitative approach I use is one variation derived 
from grounded theory. Elements of grounded theory that I adapted into my own research 
included the integration of data collection and analysis, as well as the intimate 
relationship between theory and research. Although I had done a narrative review of the 
literature and my research was grounded in my own past experiences on the wards, my 
intent was to use the data to generate hypotheses and not test preconceived logically 
deduced hypotheses.  
 
A narrative review of the literature, rather than a systematic review, best suited for this 
qualitative approach. The goals of my literature review were to examine a range of ideas 
across a diverse territory to broadly examine sociological thought from a historical 
perspective. Similar to grounded theory, subsequent analysis occurred throughout the 
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process of data collection through a constant comparative method, and nascent 
hypotheses were subsequently integrated into the interview guide to be tested, adapted, 
and refined. During the data collection and analysis process, I advanced and refined the 
hypotheses generated and circled back to the literature to further position them amongst 
the backdrop of existing bioethical debates and sociological theory. In the next section on 
hospital sample, I will describe in more specific detail how this occurred in my project.   
 
As many prominent theorists have emphasised (Blumer 1969; Giddens 1985; Scambler 
2001; Wacquant 1992) theory cannot be divorced from empirical research. Also 
important is the need to consider both the micro and macro aspects of sociological 
interactions (Scambler and Britten 2001; Wacquant 1992: 3). I have sought to remain true 
to this spirit in this thesis by considering how the macro-sociological changes in the 
medical profession may have affected micro-interactions between physicians and patients 
as well as how physicians perceive themselves and their actions.  
 
Section 4.3.2: Insider Research and Auto-Ethnography 
 
I have a uniquely privileged perspective as a researcher studying my own profession. In 
this sense, I have been participating in an auto-ethnographic study for my entire academic 
career, having been socialised originally into the profession through medical school, 
experienced the very issues of moral distress and ethical challenges I describe in this 
thesis, and continued to practice clinically during my graduate studies. As such, I 
inherently inhabit the actor’s world and perspective in which I am interested in as an 
object of study. I am thus absolved to some extent of one of the primary challenges 
encountered in interpretative research, namely that the researcher “does not have a 
firsthand acquaintance with the sphere of social life that he proposes to study…His 
position is almost always that of an outsider; as such he is markedly limited in simple 
knowledge of what takes place in the given sphere of life (Blumer 1969: 35).” As a result 
of that, the researcher will tend to form his own views, beliefs, and judgements of the 
group.   
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As an insider, I face a different problem of bias, which might be focusing too much on 
my own views, beliefs and judgements, which may not only not be the views of others, or 
reflect general views of physicians who inhabit a culturally different social world, but 
will act as a lens through which I see the world. I discuss these issues and reflexivity in 
more detail in section 4.6 of this chapter. As such, in order to obtain the views of a 
diversity of physicians, the method that I choose was in-depth interviews. This allowed 
me to build upon my pre-existing auto-ethnographic foundation to query and understand 
a broader range of perspectives across the diverse physician population. The inclusion of 
several different hospital sites allowed me to explore the influence of local cultures on 
physician’s understanding of ethical issues at the end of life.  
 
Section 4.4: Methods and Study Design  
 
Through semi-structured in-depth interviews and to a lesser extent, ethnography and 
auto-ethnography, I investigated physicians’ views regarding the influence of institutional 
culture and policies on physicians’ attitudes towards choice and autonomy in the DNR 
decision-making process. This study was exploratory in nature, intended to deepen 
conceptual understanding of underlying phenomena that drive physician attitudes and 
behavior.  
 
My qualitative approach is grounded in a framework that acknowledges that multiple 
perspectives are intrinsic to the research process, and the particular importance of the 
perspective that the researchers bring to the fieldwork and analysis (Barbour 2001; 
Golafshani 2003; Mays and Pope 2000). Throughout the analyses, I drew upon my own 
clinical experiences in a reflexive manner, reflecting upon how it might both inform and 
potentially bias my interpretation of the interview data.  
 
Section 4.4.1: Pilot Interviews 
 
Prior to beginning my interviews, I had the opportunity to conduct a small number of un-
recorded informal preliminary interviews with four senior consultants at Addenbrooke's 
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Hospital and two attendings at Columbia (palliative care director and ethics director) 
regarding DNR decision practices. Through these dialogues, I had the valuable 
opportunity to learn more about UK practices and perceived norms which have informed 
the design of this study. The initial hypotheses and study design were largely based on 
my conclusions from these initial pilot interviews. In addition, I obtained an honourary 
passport to shadow physicians (geriatrics, general medicine, chest medicine) on the wards 
at Addenbrooke's to gain a better sense of practices and norms in the UK.  
 
Section 4.4.2: Hospital Sample 
 
I purposively sampled three large academic medical centres with well-established 
residency and fellowship teaching programs in urban cities in the US (Columbia New 
York Presbyterian Hospital, Johns Hopkins Hospital, and the University of Washington 
(UW)) and one in the UK (Addenbrooke's Hospital) based on expected differences in 
hospital culture and variations in hospital policies. Columbia and Hopkins’ policies and 
culture reflect prioritisation of patient autonomy, whereas UW and Addenbrookes’ 
policies and culture prioritised beneficence-based decision-making. This was evident in 
the policies of each hospital which are summarised in this table:  
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Table 4.1: Hospital Characteristics and DNR Policies  
 
Hospital Geographic 
Location 
Ethical 
basis of 
decision-
making 
Policy 
Columbia North-East, 
USA 
Autonomy-
focused 
“Consistent with the Hospital’s mission, “We Put 
Patient’s First, [Hospital A] protects patients’ rights, and 
the rights of those authorised to make health care 
decisions on behalf of the patients, to be fully informed 
about their health care in order to make treatment 
decisions. New York Public Health Law Article 29-CC, 
the Family Health Care Decisions Act (FHCDA), protect 
patients…who are unable to make their own decisions by 
granting medical decision-making authority to the 
patient’s family members or designated surrogate (New 
York Presbyterian Hospital 2010). (Hospital policy) 
Physicians must obtain consent from patient or surrogate 
before entering a DNR order “even if the physician 
concludes that administration of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation would be ‘medically futile.’ (Spitzer 2003)” 
(New York State policy)  
Johns Hopkins Mid-
Atlantic, 
USA 
Autonomy-
focused 
DNR orders are implemented with consent of the patient 
or surrogate. ”It is the attending’s responsibility to advise 
the patient or family that considerations can be given to 
withholding resuscitation. The patient or surrogate shall 
be assured that the choice to provide, limit, or withhold 
resuscitation is free from coercion. When a DNR order is 
in effect and the patient or surrogate raises new concerns 
about the existing DNR order, it shall be rescinded by the 
attending physician until steps can be taken to resolve the 
problem. Physicians are not obligated to provide 
treatment that is considered medically ineffective or 
futile” but an ethics consult must be called…(Hospital 
policy)  
UW Pacific 
North-West, 
USA 
Best 
Interest-
focused 
“A DNAR order may be written for a patient when the 
patient has expressed her preference that resuscitation not 
be attempted, or the attending physician has made a 
determination of futility according to the procedures 
described below…The attending physician bears ultimate 
responsibility for a DNAR Order, although in most cases 
the decision represents a consensus of all those involved 
in the patient’s care” (Hospital policy)  
	   80	  
Addenbrooke's East of 
England, 
United 
Kingdom 
Best 
Interest-
focused 
“A DNACPR decision should only be made after 
appropriate consultation and consideration of all aspects 
of the patient’s condition. Decisions must be taken in the 
best interests of the patient, following assessment that 
should include likely clinical outcome and the patient’s 
known or ascertainable wishes…The overall decision for 
a patient’s resuscitation status rests with the consultant in 
charge of the patient (Hospital policy).” (See Appendix 
A) 
“If the…doctor considers that the treatment would not be 
clinically appropriate to the patient, they do not have to 
provide the treatment (UK General Medical Council 
2010)” (UK national policy)  
 
Insights into these institutional cultures also came from ethnographic and auto-
ethnographic observations. My experience as a medical student at Johns Hopkins, a 
resident at Columbia, and a physician observer at Addenbrooke's helped confirm that 
these policies reflected the culture of the institutions. As I describe in Section 4.4.4, it 
was the differences between interview responses at Hopkins and my own experience as a 
resident at Columbia that compelled me to change my research question from a US/UK 
comparison to one exploring local institutional cultures.  
 
DNR forms can also be a telling reflection of the legal and structural differences in 
resuscitation decision-making between the two countries. I have included DNR forms for 
the Columbia New York Presbyterian Hospital and the Addenbrooke's Hospital in 
Appendix B and C at the end of this thesis. Columbia’s forms reflect draconian New 
York State legislation well known to be one of the most restrictive in the nation in terms 
of prioritizing patient autonomy (Iserson 2010). It is a six-paged document that requires 
multiple signatures by the patient, the attending physician, a physician witness, and a 
general witness. The language is formal, comprehensive and reads like a legal document.  
 
In contrast, Addenbrooke’s form does not require the patient’s signature and wording is 
minimal. As an American physician, a surprising aspect of the DNACPR form to me 
were the laxity of reasons for initiating a DNR order seen on completed forms on the 
wards. One form seen on the wards included “futility” on multiple occasions, as well as 
“multiple falls” and “osteoporosis.” (See Appendix D) Furthermore, many forms had 
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written “ward staff” in response to the question of whom the decision has been discussed 
with. 
 
Section 4.4.3: Initial Hypothesis 
 
Reflecting a grounded theory influenced approach, the research question and hypotheses 
flowing from them evolved as the study progressed, reflecting the emergence of 
unexpected themes and patterns in the initial interview data. My initial intention in 
interviewing physicians at Hopkins and Addenbrooke's, was to explore differences 
between the US and UK and to contrast physician practices and beliefs that I 
hypothesised were due to cultural and policy differences between these two countries. 
Specifically, I was interested in whether US and UK doctors believed that they acted in 
patients’ best interest regarding resuscitation practices.  
 
Reflecting this, my initial research questions were as follows: 
 
What is the degree of difference in the obligation US and UK doctors feel to implement 
CPR against their judgement of what they believe is in the patient’s best interest?  
 
How do these choices reflect individual and societal attitudes, beliefs and values? What 
are the social and political factors underlying this decision. Why might they differ 
between the two countries? 
 
My initial hypothesis for the project following the pilot interviews but prior to my 
interviews was the following: 
 
Given that American physicians are both legally and de facto in practice required to 
discuss DNR decisions with patients and must get their consent before implementing one, 
I hypothesized that the vast majority of US physicians would inform a patient that a DNR 
is being considered and that the decision making authority lies with the patient. In 
contrast, responses would be more varied in UK physicians. I believed that US physicians 
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experience a greater discordance between what they think is in the best interest of the 
patient and what they would feel obligated to do. I surmised that US and UK physicians 
might have similar beliefs on what is clinically appropriate care for a terminal patient, but 
moral obligations may differ.  
 
Section 4.4.4: Evolution of My Hypotheses During the Study 
 
My hypotheses and research question evolved significantly during the course of the study 
as I interviewed more respondents and evaluated their responses in the context of the 
overall study. During my interviews at Hopkins, I was struck by the differences between 
physician responses and my own views, which were shaped by my experiences as a 
house staff at Columbia. I wondered whether these differences reflected my own unique 
views that were different from doctors in general, or whether they reflected overall 
differences in physician attitudes between Hopkins and Columbia. As such, I chose to 
then broaden my study to include physicians at Columbia to gain further insight into this 
evolving theoretical framework.  
 
It appeared from my own experiences and confirmed during interviews that Columbia 
appeared to be more extreme on the spectrum of respect for patient autonomy compared 
to Hopkins. Based upon my experiences as a resident, where New York laws were often 
cited and discussed during rounds and informal conversations as a reason why DNR 
decisions were carried out in a certain manner, as well as similar sentiments expressed 
during interviews, I hypothesised that institutional policies might have some influence on 
the differences I observed between Hopkins and Columbia. At this point, I spoke to 
several attendings at Columbia who were able to direct me to the specific written 
document (Spitzer 2003). 
 
In light of these local institutional differences, my supervisors and I discussed the need to 
follow up by exploring a hospital that was on the other side of the spectrum, closer in 
nature to Addenbrooke's and the UK, but located within the US. I decided subsequently 
to choose UW, a hospital geographically located in the Pacific North West of the United 
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States, because I hypothesised they might have a different culture from the East coast due 
to their known differences in norms regarding the end of life, such as the Death with 
Dignity movement in the Pacific North West, informed the selection of hospitals ("Death 
with Dignity Act, 2008). Furthermore, there were significant differences in the intensity 
of end of life care usage (Goodman et al. 2011).  
 
The “eureka” moment for this project occurred during my two days of interviewing at 
UW, where I was very excited to note the distinct differences in attitudes, beliefs, and 
communication practices of UW physician trainees. It was here that I began to realise that 
the influence of local cultures might be as important as national differences. It was 
striking to recall how Columbia and Hopkins physicians remarked that obviously the US 
could never be like the UK since Americans prioritised autonomy so much, and then to 
hear respondents at UW describe how it was important to balance best interest and 
autonomy.  
 
My hypothesis at this point was that each of these four hospitals was located on a 
spectrum of decision-making, ranging from autonomy focused (Columbia), intermediate 
(Hopkins), shared decision-making (UW), paternalistic (Addenbrookes). I hypothesised 
that while experienced physicians at all sites thought it was appropriate and important to 
make recommendations regarding resuscitation where appropriate, that inexperienced 
physicians had views which varied by their institutional setting. Trainees’ comfort 
regarding making recommendations in a patient’s best interest appeared to lie on a 
spectrum of decision-making from autonomy to shared decision-making to paternalism. 
There also appeared to be differences in the degree of conflict perceived between the 
doctor and patient which varied by institutional setting.  
 
Subsequent to my interviews at UW, I had the opportunity to interview additional 
respondents at both Hopkins and Addenbrooke's, where my questions sought to hone in 
on further exploring some of the patterns and differences that emerged during the UW 
interviews. These subsequent interviews did indeed help confirm some of the findings 
from my previous interviews. During the course of my interviews, further reading also 
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helped broaden my theoretical understanding of the issues relevant to my developing 
hypotheses and position my research in the existing literature, such as Hafferty’s writing 
on the hidden curriculum and medical papers describing variations in institutional norms 
in end of life care (Barnato et al. 2014; Hafferty and Franks 1994). 
 
Following completion of the interviews, I began having doubts as to whether a shared 
decision-making focused approach was accurate, since the specific issues I focused on 
was whether physicians felt comfortable making recommendations grounded in 
beneficence. UW’s policy of considering whether resuscitation would benefit the patient 
rather than offering all options regardless of clinical benefit perhaps reflected clinical 
judgement rather than a shared decision-making approach.  
 
As such, I decided that a more appropriate approach was a dichotomous categorisation 
into autonomy focused (Columbia and Hopkins) versus best interest focused institutions 
(UW and Addenbrookes). I then hypothesised that while experienced physicians at all 
institutions felt comfortable making recommendations against resuscitation when 
appropriate, trainees at autonomy focused institutions were more likely to feel 
constrained by a reductionist understanding of autonomy to mean offering choice 
regardless of whether resuscitation would be clinically appropriate. In contrast, trainees at 
best interest focused institutions were more likely to have developed a more nuanced 
understanding of autonomy and like experienced physicians, felt more comfortable 
offering recommendations where appropriate.   
 
Section 4.4.5: Institutional Changes During the Course of the Project 
 
As is the case with any project that spans several years, changes have occurred on a local 
and national level that may have affected respondent’s experiences and attitudes. I have 
already described in the previous chapter, national shifts in the conversation surrounding 
dying in the US and UK including the Janet Tracey court case. Institutional changes have 
also occurred at Johns Hopkins and Addenbrooke's.   
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At Hopkins, Tom Smith was recruited to start the Program in Palliative Care in October, 
2011, the same month I began my PhD and the year prior to initiating interviews. Prior to 
his arrival, there was essentially no palliative care presence at Hopkins, but through his 
leadership, the program is flourishing. Palliative care consults began upon his arrival and 
a six-bed inpatient palliative care unit was subsequently opened in March, 2013. This had 
the effect of changing the culture towards greater awareness of end of life issues and 
utilisation of palliative care services at Hopkins. Simultaneously, changes were occurring 
at a state level, where on July 1, 2013, a new Maryland law mandated that hospitals must 
document patient’s decisions about CPR and other life-sustaining treatments with a 
Maryland Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST) form. This was 
primarily required in patients being transferred to another health care facility such as a 
nursing home or rehabilitation facility.  
 
At Addenbrooke's, a new initiative was piloted, trialed and subsequently rolled out called 
the Universal Form of Treatment Options (UFTO) which sought to replace the DNAR 
form with a more comprehensive form that addressed treatment options beyond just 
resuscitation (Fritz et al. 2013). Several of the respondents took part in educational 
initiatives relating to the UFTO roll out or may have been in one of the trial arms that 
implemented the UFTO. Following the roll out of the UFTO hospital wide, all physicians 
were exposed to the UFTO and discussions surrounding the UFTO. Initiatives to improve 
end of life care at both these hospitals may have contributed to an increased awareness, 
discussion, reflection, and possibly altered practices regarding palliative care and end of 
life issues. I will discuss this in more detail in my conclusion in Section 9.3.4. 
 
Section 4.4.6: Ethical Considerations 
 
Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees and interview data were 
anonymised during transcription. Please see Appendix E and F for the informed consent 
form and participant information sheet. The study was approved by the Johns Hopkins 
University Institutional Review Board and the UK National Health Service (NHS) 
National Research Ethics Service. Prior to initiating interviews, potential risks included 
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emotional distress and anxiety, though this was never an issue during interviews. 
Potential concerns were that the respondents’ answers might affect their evaluation or be 
relayed to their superiors. None of these concerns materialised. Participants were told 
before the interviews that it would be confidential and that the interviewer had no 
affiliation with their residency program. During the interviews, they did not seem hesitant 
or concerned about discussing their training or superiors in an anonymised manner. 
 
Privacy and confidentiality was protected at every stage of the research including data 
collection, analysis, and reporting. Interviews took place in private settings. Interview 
data was de-identified via a coding system that protects participant confidentiality. A 
single electronic master document in my private possession correlates the interview code 
with the identity of the respondent as well as their demographic information including 
their institution, years of experience, and contact information. Consent forms were signed 
and stored in a secured location separate from the interview data.  
 
Section 4.4.7: Physician Sample 
 
I recruited and interviewed fifty-eight internal medicine physicians (including internal 
medicine subspecialties) in person, with the exception of two interviews that were 
conducted via Skype. Interviews took place between March 7, 2013 through January 8, 
2014. Participants were eligible if they were full time physicians at the selected 
institutions who were routinely involved in DNR conversations with patients at the end of 
life. They were purposively sampled by stage of training, years of experience, and 
medical subspecialty to provide a wide range of perspectives and contribute to 
understanding emerging patterns and themes. I specifically sought out categories of 
participants in order to yield a diverse and approximately equal number of participants in 
each category.  
 
Determination of whether a candidate was an appropriate respondent was purposive in 
that selection occurred either prior to recruitment (in cases of referrals from respondents) 
or after the person expressed interest. For example, if I found out later that the person was 
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not an internal medicine physician, I politely declined. When I found that I had enough 
respondents who were, for example, less experienced, I focused recruitment instead on 
recruiting more experienced respondents. As this was a qualitative exploratory study 
intended to deepen conceptual understanding of phenomena and generate hypotheses, 
with a sampling strategy was opportunistic, the intention was not to generalise to the 
totality of the medical profession. Physicians were excluded if they had not been 
practicing in the US or UK for the majority of their clinical career.  
 
Recruitment occurred through group e-mail advertisements, individual solicitations, and 
referrals from respondents. Given this, there were no refusals, but only non-responses. 
We do not know anything about the reasons why people did not engage. Please see 
Appendix G for the recruitment e-mail. Given that my networks within the physician 
community were not as strong in the UK, I sought key networkers such as division heads, 
senior consultants, and program directors, asking them to send e-mails to their physician 
employees on my behalf and allowing me to briefly recruit for my study prior to meetings 
such as morning grounds or didactic lectures. Snowball sampling was subsequently used 
where participants recommended other colleagues who might be amendable to 
participation, whom I then subsequently vetted for appropriateness. Given the challenges 
of recruiting physician trainees, eventually I also included a £10-15 coffee gift card 
incentive in the UK.  
 
Recruitment at Hopkins and Columbia was relatively easy, as I had established networks 
of physician colleagues, as well as a familiarity with the structure of each hospital’s 
training programs. I began by targeting a wide variety of physicians of various levels of 
experiences and subspecialties. I also targeted “key informants” who were known 
palliative care or ethics experts and leaders, who could give an overall perspective of the 
hospital’s culture, attitudes and practices regarding end of life care.  
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Recruitment of house staff posed different challenges given how busy they were8. In 
order to maximise responses, I logged onto the resident scheduling system (amion.com) 
and searched for house staff who were on less time consuming rotations such as vacation, 
research, and outpatient. I sent each of them personal e-mails and also offered a $5 coffee 
gift card as an incentive. This strategy worked well and I had no trouble finding enough 
interested participants. Response bias may be a concern raised regarding sampling 
technique. As this was a qualitative exploratory study intended to deepen conceptual 
understanding of phenomena and generate hypotheses, with a sampling strategy was 
opportunistic, the intention was not to generalise to the totality of the medical profession.  
 
Participant recruitment at UW was slightly different, and as such, may have resulted in a 
slightly different demographic, which I note as a limitation in the limitations section 
within the conclusion of this thesis. A key informant, who leads the palliative care 
program at that institution, assisted me with the recruitment of participants at his hospital. 
Given that he was doing me a tremendous favor and that without him, I would not have 
been able to feasibly recruit their physicians myself, I was not able to apply the same 
degree of diversity of subspecialty as I was at the other institutions. As such, there was a 
preponderance of pulmonary and critical care physicians.  
 
Section 4.4.8: Interview Guide and Interview Process 
 
Based upon my initial research question of interest, literature reviews, initial pilot 
interviews, participant observation on the wards at Addenbrooke's hospital, and my own 
auto-ethnographic experiences at Columbia and Hopkins, I developed an interview guide, 
which went through multiple iterations and refinements with peer review by mentors and 
supervisors and preliminary pilot testing (Appendix H). The interview guide used across 
all sites provided thematic continuity. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  House	  staff	  in	  the	  US	  are	  restricted	  to	  working	  80	  hours	  a	  week,	  averaged	  over	  four	  weeks,	  which	  in	  actuality	  means	  that	  they	  are	  working	  more	  than	  80	  hours	  a	  week.	  Oftentimes,	  house	  staff	  do	  not	  log	  in	  all	  the	  hours	  worked	  beyond	  80	  hours	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  with	  work	  hour	  regulations.	  These	  are	  significantly	  longer	  hours	  than	  that	  typically	  worked	  by	  an	  attending	  physician.	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Prior to the start of the interview, I again summarised the purpose of the interviews, 
which was to better understand physician attitudes and practices regarding DNR 
decision-making at the end of life. I provided them with a participant information sheet 
and had them read over and sign the consent form. They agreed to have the interview 
audio recorded. I then pushed the record button, placed the recorder on the table between 
myself and the respondent, and then began the interviews by asking the first question on 
the interview guide.  
 
Although there was an interview guide, the semi-structured in-depth interview format 
was open ended, encouraging participants to explore those aspects they considered most 
relevant. Interviews lasted between 45 and 120 minutes and were audiotaped and 
transcribed verbatim. General themes began emerging very early on within the first five 
interviews at each site.  
 
Subsequently, if there were particular comments that appeared to disconfirm hypotheses, 
I would question the respondent further to clarify their response. Frequently, their 
additional response would be helpful to clarify either their alternative position or 
alignment with the hypothesis. For example, at UW, I would ask some respondents 
whether they were familiar with Informed Assent9, to which some would frequently 
respond “no” and that they’ve never heard of it. I would then question them further and 
see that their clinical practices reflected Informed Assent even though they were not 
familiar with the actual term. Disconfirming cases were recognised and analysed in light 
of their effect on the emerging hypotheses.  
 
As I described earlier, as themes and patterns emerged during the interviews, I had 
opportunities to reflect upon them and further refine my hypotheses in between 
interviews. Interview guide questions were adapted throughout the entire process to 
further hone in on emerging patterns. Hypotheses and themes developed became the 
subject of questions in subsequent interviews to further confirm the trustworthiness of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I	  will	  discuss	  Informed	  Assent	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  Informed	  Assent	  is	  where	  the	  clinician	  does	  not	  insist	  that	  the	  decision	  ultimately	  be	  made	  by	  the	  patient	  or	  family	  member,	  and	  explicitly	  recommends	  against	  CPR	  when	  clearly	  not	  indicated	  (Curtis	  and	  Burt	  2007b).	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data. I have included in Appendix I my final “working” interview guide which has been 
left in its working stage of additional questions that I left as notes to potentially ask, and 
which by the end of the interviews, I only loosely followed. Questions during interviews 
did not rigidly follow the interview guide and were conversational in nature. I asked 
follow up questions based upon the flow of the conversation. At the end of the 
interviews, I would review my interview guide in order to be thorough and ask questions 
that had not come up already during the interview.  
 
Section 4.4.9: Data Management 
 
Interviews were recorded using a Sony ICD-PX312 digital flash voice recorder. Audio 
files (MP3 format) were transferred to my password-protected personal Macbook Air 
laptop that is essentially always either in my possession or locked in my home. After 
audio files were transferred to my computer, they were immediately erased from the 
voice recorder.  
 
Given a lack of funding and the need to cover the majority of transcription costs out of 
my own pocket, it was financially impossible for me to rely on expensive professional 
transcription services typically used by universities. Instead, I was able to find a 
transcriptionist via the internet service elance.com. I placed an advertisement seeking a 
transcriptionist for transcription of health interview data. Transcriptionists were first 
required to sign a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement prior to initiating the first 
interview.  
 
Transcriptions were done by “Get Your Typing Done” transcription services (Deborah 
Huyton) based in Manchester, England for $25 USD (£16.25 GBP) per audio hour. Audio 
files and Microsoft word files were exchanged electronically via Dropbox. Segments of 
the interview that were inaudible to her were noted on the transcript with red highlighting 
and a time stamp. I listened to the audio recording in that section and was able to 
transcribe those relevant sections. 
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Section 4.5: Analysis 
 
In this section, I will describe the analytical process that led me from the raw data to the 
hypotheses generated in this thesis. 
 
Section 4.5.1: Coding of Transcripts 
 
The hypotheses generation process I described in Section 4.4.4 occurred during and 
between my interviews, which were all completed prior to them being coded. During the 
interviewing phase, I continued to take notes on my evolving ideas and analysis after 
each interview day. Hypotheses were tested and refined continuously during the course of 
the interviews, where I asked questions in subsequent interviews to determine whether 
they were consistent with the evolving hypothesis. The final hypothesis described in 
Section 4.4.4 is the hypothesis I went into the coding process with and review and coding 
of the interview data did not result in any changes to the hypothesis during the coding 
process itself. 
 
De-identified and transcribed interviews were printed on A4 sheets of paper. All 
interviews were read over once without any coding in order to re-familiarise myself with 
all the data, to get a sense of the larger picture, and to develop an initial codebook of 
themes and patterns that I saw emerging from my initial read of the interviews. This 
initial codebook has been included as Appendix J.  
 
I then went back through all the interviews a second time for more in depth coding. Using 
coloured pens on the printed transcripts, I went through line-by-line and circled sections 
of the transcript that had a particular theme attached to it. I used the initial codebook as a 
foundation for coding, and added additional codes as they arose during interviews. Some 
codes also included sub-codes, which were related to the overarching code. For example, 
the code “Death” had multiple sub-codes such as “Death Fearing”, “Death Unexpected, 
and “Death Denial”. I have included a sample coded transcript page as Appendix K. 
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Four excel spreadsheets were created for each level of experience (i.e. senior attending, 
junior attending, fellow, and resident) with four sub-pages on each spreadsheet (Hopkins, 
Columbia, UW, and Addenbrooke's). Each page listed a code in the first column, the sub-
code if applicable in the second column, the relevant quote in the third column, and the 
corresponding interview and line number in the fourth column. For example, this 
segment, “I guess you're asking me about my ideal world, but I'll just say that I feel now 
there's no room for clinical judgement. We have to put the entire, you know, menu out 
there.” Would be categorised under “Choice Offering” which is a sub-code of “Choice.” 
All codes and sub-codes are listed in alphabetical order and quotes were listed 
sequentially by interview number and line number. A screen shot of a sample excel 
spreadsheet is included as Appendix L. 
 
Given that thinking and reflection of my hypotheses and analysis occurred throughout the 
course of my interviews, as well as the importance of analysing quotations in context 
rather than assuming meanings of isolated segments in a reductive manner, the most 
formative analysis occurred through close reading of full transcripts in light of the overall 
context of the interview and in relation to one another. Coding provided several useful 
functions. Firstly, as a means of organising my data into manageable sections so that 
when I wanted to compare directly responses surrounding a particular theme, I could 
easily identify and compare responses from all eight subgroups (hospital and level of 
experience). I was able to use the themes and codes to help confirm my final hypothesis, 
as I could go to a particular code that was relevant to my hypothesis.  
 
For example, in the choice category, different understandings and insights regarding 
“choice false” would elucidate important differences between trainees at autonomy 
versus best interest focused institutions. Similarly, “choice of choice” was a theme that 
arose amongst trainees at best interest focused institutions, demonstrating a greater 
awareness of the need to tailor choice to the patient’s preferences. “Choice offering” 
occurred in autonomy focused trainees as something they felt compelled to do, whereas it 
arose in best interest focused trainees as a reflective critique of offering choices that were 
not in a patient’s best interest.  
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In addition, coding and categorisation helped highlight differences between subgroups 
that were not initially obvious during interviews. For example, it became clear during 
coding that moral distress was a theme that arose frequently amongst trainees in the US, 
but occurred less frequently amongst UK junior doctors and among experienced 
physicians in both countries. I should note that the nature of my study makes the number 
of times a particular theme occurs an unreliable measure, since it may only reflect 
whether it was discussed in the unstructured interview rather than whether there was 
actually less moral distress in particular subgroups. Thirdly, the coding was a necessary 
step in the process of double coding, which I describe in the next section.  
 
Section 4.5.2: Second Coder 
 
“Double coding” is required as a quality standard for publication of qualitative research 
in medical journals to help mitigate potential bias and to improve validity. As such, I 
recruited Alessa Colaianni, to be my second coder. At the time of the study, she was a 
third year medical student at Johns Hopkins taking a year away from medical school to 
pursue an MPhil in Cambridge in the History and Philosophy of Science.  
 
She was an ideal candidate, as she had experience on the wards as a medical student at 
Hopkins as well as familiarity with the UK during her year here. In addition, she had a 
research interest in this area, having written papers about the hidden curriculum, the 
ethics of slow code, and an ethical paper on Nazi doctors, and had interdisciplinary 
experience and knowledge in the social science and ethics of medicine (Colaianni 2012). 
Alessa was compensated both with modest amounts of cash, as well as co-authorship on 
manuscripts derived from this study. Files were shared with Alessa through Dropbox, as 
well as Google Docs. 
 
She double coded twelve of the 58 interviews (20%). I selected a wide range of 
interviews to be double coded including those that I found to be particularly rich with 
insights and those which I wanted to get alternative thoughts on interpretation. The first 
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time we met, I had already read through all the interviews and developed the initial 
codebook, which I gave her access to. We met two to three times prior to giving her the 
first transcript to discuss the project, my overall vision of the project, and to explain to 
her the coding process. I asked her to follow the identical process I did with printing the 
interviews and circling quotes and relating them to themes prior to our meeting.  
 
We then met either in Baltimore or Cambridge depending on where we both were, to 
discuss each interview individually. We first discussed our overall impression of the 
interview, its implications on the overall data set and hypotheses, and particular features 
that supported or did not support the emerging themes and patterns. We then went line by 
line through the transcript discussing the codes that we had categorised quotes in prior to 
meeting in order to come to a consensus on coding.  
 
Most often, we either had both written the same codes down. If there was disagreement, 
there was a discussion on whether it would be an appropriate code to put down. 
Discrepancies were usually due to omission rather than disagreement, and there was 
rarely overt disagreement after discussion. If new codes or sub-codes came up in the 
interviews, we would discuss the need for a new code, distinguish why this particular 
code differed from pre-existing codes, and agree upon a definition for the code, which we 
would then write in the code book (See Appendix M for final code book).  
 
Following our meeting, I would then input the hand written codes into the excel 
spreadsheet as described in the previous section. Simultaneously to the process of double 
coding, I also continued to analyse additional transcripts using the same process. After 
completing all the double coding on 20% of the interviews, I went through the remaining 
interviews in the same manner until they were all completed.  
 
Section 4.5.3: Synthesis of Data Following Coding 
 
Analysis of the data occurred on a holistic level during the iterative readings of the 
transcripts and the coding process. The hypotheses generated in this study began to 
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develop during the interviews and during iterative readings of the transcripts as a whole. 
This sort of sociological and ethical analysis is best achieved through this more holistic 
analysis rather than the disjointed and taken out of context quotations coding develops. 
There were less new insights that occurred during the micro-coding level of analysis than 
during the stage where I analysed the complete transcripts and quotes in situ. It is also 
important to note that my coding not only took note of what respondents said, but my 
interpretation of what they said both in the context of that specific interview as well as its 
implications as a whole. A known challenge in qualitative research is the problem of 
primacy and recency bias (Suzuki et al. 2007). Reading through all the transcripts all at 
once following the completion of the interviews gave me the opportunity to assess all the 
interviews as a whole in light of my most recent thinking, which helped minimise this 
bias.  
 
The coding process was subsequently useful as a confirming mechanism as well as an 
organisational tool. The division of quotations into codes out of context was useful for 
grouping types of quotes for direct comparison with each other and amongst different 
categories in the study. It made it possible to more easily discern patterns amongst 
institutions and amongst different levels of experience. Grouping quotations into codes 
was also useful for the writing up process. For example, if I wanted to write a section on 
“torture,” I could go to the excel spreadsheet and compare all the quotes where the theme 
“torture” occurred. I could compare whether or not they occurred more frequently 
amongst different groups (i.e. frequently in trainees and rarely in experienced 
physicians), and the nature of the quotation.  
 
In deciding which quotations to use, I choose quotes that best illustrated the particular 
point I wanted to make. In order to avoid bias, I attempted to select quotes from a 
diversity of respondents and take into account the degree of variation and different 
perspectives. I did find that some respondents were selected more frequently than others. 
This may have been because in those particular interviews, I spent more time talking 
about that particular theme and thus had more material. Other times, a particular 
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respondent had particularly eloquent or informative descriptions or had the strength of 
response that I was looking for. 
 
Some medical researchers may believe that counting the number of times a particular 
word or theme arises is informative. This qualitative study was not designed to make 
quantitative conclusions and it would be misleading to attempt to do so. This was a semi-
structured interview, which meant that the interview guide served only as a guide and the 
questions asked in the interview emerged from themes that the respondent raises, which 
were further explored in subsequent questions. As such, expressing a percentage would 
be misleading because the number of times something is said can be influenced by 
whether I asked more questions on the particular topic of interest.  
 
Section 4.5.4: Member Checking and Ethnographic Validation 
 
In addition to the 58 formal semi-structured interviews, I have also had substantial 
informal interactions with physician colleagues in both the UK and US, which helped 
inform and to some extent to validate my research. Extensive feedback and discussion on 
my project occurred during informal one on one conversations as well as in larger groups 
through invited presentations at both Cambridge, Hopkins and beyond. This included 
presentations at academic conferences such as the Society of General Internal Medicine 
Annual Meeting as well as the Johns Hopkins General Internal Medicine Fellowship’s 
Research In Progress seminars, which I presented at bi-annually.  
 
In addition, I presented my research several times to various physician groups at 
Addenbrooke's hospital. Because the subjects of my study were my professional 
colleagues, comments from my academic physician colleagues were valuable both from 
the perspective of professional feedback as well as their own personal experiences and 
beliefs on these issues. These discussions in essence served as member checking and 
opportunities to test my hypotheses in a more general, informal manner.  
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Informal conversations with my physician colleagues about my research provided 
insights that were not captured in the interview data. As such, I do not formally report 
these as results in my thesis. Nonetheless, they were very important. For example, when I 
talked to my colleagues on the East Coast about my British experience, a frequent 
response would be, “We could never have a system like the UK. People in the US care 
too much about individual choice to allow doctors to constrain choice.” It was thus 
tremendously striking to later hear UW physicians endorsing limited choice as a means to 
providing beneficence based care. The insight that UW physicians had views more 
similar to their British colleagues than their American East Coast colleagues was one that 
arose from these informal interactions, which I then used the formal interview data to test 
and validate.   
 
From a more ethnographic/auto-ethnographic perspective, I continued to practice 
medicine approximately 20% of the year at Johns Hopkins on the medicine consult 
service, hospitalist service, and in outpatient clinics. These served not only as 
opportunities to stay engaged in clinical medicine, but also as ways to be reflexive about 
my own clinical practice and how I engaged in shared decision making with my patients. 
From decisions to transfuse blood to end of life discussions, I found myself changing my 
own practices to reflect best practices learned through my research.  
 
I reflected upon the things that I was doing that contradicted the best practices I preached 
in my research and dissected the structural aspects of care in practice that made theory 
more difficult to apply in practice. I also spent some time as a guest observer in Hopkins 
ethics committee meetings and ethics consultations, which further informed my study. In 
the UK, I was able to get an honourary passport to be an observer on the wards at 
Addenbrooke's Hospital. This was an opportunity for participant observation of 
differences between clinical practices between the US and UK.  
 
 
 
 
	   98	  
Section 4.6: Reflexivity, Self and my Research 
 
Pierre Bourdieu was one of the greatest advocates of reflexivity10 and relational thinking, 
emphasizing that epistemic reflexivity was a requirement for the praxis of sociology 
(Wacquant 1992: 38). He called for cognizance towards the “sociologist’s knowledge of 
himself and his position in the social world.” He describes the biases inherent in the 
sociologists’ position in the academic field, the intellectual space within which they 
operate and its consequent field of power, defined by their differences and distance from 
other competing fields. He reminds us of the need to constantly “scrutinise and neutralise 
in the very act of construction of the object, the collective scientific unconscious 
embedded in theories, problems and categories of scholarly judgement (Wacquant 1992: 
40).” What is required is a dialogical public debate and mutual critique between the 
researcher, his subjects, and complementary scientific fields. In this next section, I will 
describe how I have sought to accomplish this during the research process.  
 
In this regard, my own “lifeworld” experience was a total immersive experience, which 
reflected not only research reflexivity but also epistemic reflexivity. The very process of 
moving to Cambridge to do my PhD, and its inherent geographical and physical 
separation from the world of American medicine, required substantial epistemic 
adjustment and self-reflexivity. As a physician, I too had been inculcated throughout my 
entire academic life in the knowledge and epistemologies of medicine and positivist 
sciences. To an extent, my professional sense of self was infused with taken for granted 
assumptions embedded in the hidden and explicit curricula of medical training as well as 
institutional teachings to aspire to the qualities of the ideal doctor. I felt like a distinct 
outsider in the social scientific word, disoriented by conversations where name dropping 
seemed to be an oddly essential element (Who the heck were Foucault, Heidegger, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Reflexivity attends to recognition that "a researcher's background and position will affect what they 
choose to investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the 
findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions (Malterud 
2001)." Reflexive awareness allows the researcher to understand the context of her knowledge production 
and how her perspective and position shapes her research at each step of the research process.  
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Sartre?) and insulting “doctor bashing” critiques from anthropology and sociology were 
commonplace. This forced me to be reflexive about what I see now as my original 
intellectual narrowness.  
 
I not only realised how much of my intellectual identity was moulded by my medical 
training, but also that the entire discourse of medicine has influenced the way I think and 
perceive the world in realms completely beyond medicine. I remember thinking to myself 
initially that conversations about illness as a social construction and skepticism about 
what I believed were established truths were somewhat of a waste of time. There was no 
time when a hypovolemic patient was exsanguinating from an upper GI bleed to question 
whether the bleed was a social construction!  
 
Throughout these past four years, as I became more exposed and open to unraveling the 
epistemic assumptions into which I had been socialised during my medical training, I 
realised I’ve “gone native.” I believe that my way of thinking now is more akin to that of 
a sociologist than a physician and at times I have to be careful during conversations with 
physician colleagues that I don’t inadvertently insult them by speaking too critically on 
the dominance of the physician profession. Going back to the wards always bears an 
element of culture shock for me now, where I need to transition my mindset from being a 
critical intellectual to a professional technician doing each medical task as they come 
along.  
 
Straddling these two worlds not only academically, but also in real life and 
geographically, has allowed me to approach Bourdieu’s definition of epistemic and 
intellectual reflexivity. Working in the medical field full time for seven years and part 
time for four gives me the insider’s perspective and knowledge, but the four years of 
work in sociology has given me the distance to be critical from alternative, if not an 
outsider’s perspective. The insider perspective was critical to the success of my PhD 
project. It helped me establish rapport and trust with the physician participants. In 
particular, belonging to the Hopkins Medicine and Columbia New York Presbyterian 
communities as a current fellow and former resident were essential in establishing trust 
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and connections. I am familiar with the language, culture, and knowledge of medicine, 
which greatly facilitated communication and understanding during the interviews.  
 
My position in the UK was also unique, as I was a partial insider being a medic, but one 
from a very different system. Although many aspects of medical practice in the UK were 
similar to the US, there were also striking differences that brought additional insights and 
perspectives to my understanding of the US medical system. For example, I was struck 
upon arriving to the UK by the frequent use of the term “patient’s best interest.” This was 
a term I had rarely, if ever, heard on the wards in the US. The omission of this term, 
which now seems so obvious to our goals as a physician, was a cause for professional 
introspective. This difference was so notable that it became the basis for this thesis.  
 
Those who come from a predominantly objectivist mindset tend to see “insider” research 
as a fatal limitation; the bias and subjectivity that arises from this situation is said to 
invalidate its findings (Ellingson and Ellis 2008). The counterargument is that the 
perspective and position of the researcher is inextricable from the type of research she 
produces, even when using positivist methods. Andrew Curtis argued that subjectivity is 
ingrained in the scientific method, as the first few steps involve forming hypotheses and 
collecting data to substantiate or refute each hypothesis (Curtis 2012). Given that a 
hypothesis is a conjecture derived from but unproven by known natural laws, the 
influence of the scientists’ prior experiences and reasoning inevitably influence these 
initial steps. One study found that a geologist’s academic or professional background and 
experience influenced their interpretation of a scientific finding and their hypothesised 
geological model (Bond et al. 2012).  
 
Ignoring the inherent nature of subjectivity in the objective sciences causes researchers to 
become vulnerable and blind to potential errors in their findings. Foucault argues that this 
subjectivity/objectivity debate instead reflects power/knowledge dynamics. Claims to 
objectivity do not actually result in objectivity, but instead reflect the power and authority 
of the dominant group’s ability to exert their particular perspective over others. The 
authority to judge knowledge as objective, and thus inherently more valuable, ensures 
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that knowledge (and thus power) remains in the status quo above the reportedly less 
objective group (Ellingson and Ellis 2008).  
 
The interpretivist framework highlights the importance of acknowledging the 
researcher’s lens to enhance one’s research as well as ensure trustworthiness. Indeed, to 
not recognise the influence of the researcher’s lens on research in general, is to ignore an 
important aspect of the data produced. Interpretivists recognise that there are multiple 
perspectives to the world that are co-created and constructed in everyday life as well as in 
the research process. The researcher operates as the instrument, bringing her own lens to 
the interpretation (Golafshani 2003). Reflexivity and understanding of how my own lens 
both informs and potentially biases the interpretation of the data is essential to the 
process. 
 
Section 4.7: Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I described the epistemology and theoretical perspectives that informed 
my methodology and methods. My constructivist perspective led naturally to an 
interpretivists understanding of my data rooted in symbolic interactionism. This 
perspective was primarily used in Chapters 5 and 6. Subsequently in Chapter 8, I use 
Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action, which is rooted in critical theory, to 
explain communication pathologies in end of life communications. I then described my 
methods of semi-structured in-depth interviews in detail and concluded with a discussion 
of reflexivity and my position as a researcher. In the following chapter, I begin describing 
the empirical findings of my study.  
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Chapter 5: Influence of Institutional Culture and Policies on 
Do-Not-Resuscitate Decision-Making at the End of Life11 
 
In this chapter, I focus primarily on the hypothesis that trainees at autonomy 
versus best interest focused institutions have different conceptions of autonomy, 
which subsequently influences their willingness to make recommendations. I also 
describe differences between trainee physicians and experienced physicians, who 
for the most part generally have a less reductionist understanding of autonomy, 
similar to trainees at best interest focused institutions. In the subsequent chapter 
on ethical thinking, I elaborate further on the ways physician trainees 
conceptualize autonomy. 
 
Section 5.1: Balancing the Ethical Principles of Autonomy and Beneficence 
 
Although beneficence, the obligation to act in the patient’s best interest, traditionally 
embodied the primary obligation of health care professionals, due to the social shifts I 
described in Chapters 2 and 3, this has given way to the primacy of patient autonomy 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013; Gillon 2003; Schneiderman et al. 1990; Starr 1982). 
Controversy exists regarding whether the decision to pursue a Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) 
order should be grounded in an ethic of patient autonomy or in the obligation to act in the 
patient’s best interest (beneficence). 
 
Some worry that the pendulum has swung too far towards autonomy, replacing concerns 
of paternalism, where a person’s preferences are intentionally overridden, with simplistic 
understandings of autonomy that “abandon patients to their autonomy” (Loewy 2005). 
This is problematic in situations where patients are overwhelmed by, do not want to, or 
are not able to choose from the menu of different options. The philosophical foundations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  chapter	  is	  based	  on	  a	  manuscript	  published	  this	  year	  in	  JAMA	  Internal	  Medicine	  (Dzeng,	  Colaianni,	  Roland,	  Chander,	  et	  al.	  2015).	  As	  with	  the	  thesis	  as	  a	  whole,	  this	  was	  a	  completely	  independent	  endeavour	  from	  start	  to	  finish.	  Alessa	  Colaianni’s	  role	  as	  second	  coder	  is	  delineated	  in	  the	  Methods	  section	  and	  other	  co-­‐authors	  provided	  editing	  suggestions	  and	  mentorship.	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of autonomy according to Kant where autonomy meant the freedom to reason rather than 
the freedom to do whatever one wanted, bears only a hollow resemblance to its original 
intention in some situations described by my respondents. This may result in patients 
choosing treatments that are neither in their best interest nor consistent with their goals 
and values.  
 
Some practitioners believe that in order to respect autonomy, they must present patients 
with all possible options and refrain from expressing recommendations (Quill & Brody, 
1996). This stands in contrast to the guidance of the majority of professional 
organisations, which state that futile therapies should not be offered and 
recommendations consistent with the patient’s goals and values should be addressed in a 
resuscitation status discussion in order to honour patient autonomy (Allen et al. 2012; 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1991). The American Thoracic Society recently 
released a policy statement reaffirming that clinicians should not provide futile 
interventions (Bosslet et al. 2015). The definition of futility is controversial with no 
single definition being universally accepted. One definition describes futility as an 
inability to regain consciousness or survive outside the ICU setting (Schneiderman et al. 
1990). Navigating the balance between beneficence and autonomy can be especially 
fraught at the end of life and in particular regarding resuscitation decisions. 
 
Studies have shown that survival to discharge after CPR is highly unlikely in certain 
conditions such as sepsis or metastatic cancer, and is near zero when irreversible dying is 
imminent (Ebell et al. 1998; Taylor et al. 2010). Offering CPR when not clinically 
indicated can cause harm (Botti, Orfali, and Iyengar 2009; Workman 2011). On the other 
hand, leaving such decisions completely in the hands of physicians may lead to biased 
decision-making partially based on unconscious factors (i.e. patient race, age, 
socioeconomic status) as I discussed in Chapter 3 (Kelly and May 1982). Some have 
argued that DNR12 decisions should be tailored to three distinct patient populations: 1) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  There	  are	  variations	  in	  the	  exact	  terminology	  used	  to	  describe	  this	  order	  including	  DNAR	  (do	  not	  attempt	  resuscitation)	  and	  DNACPR	  (do	  not	  attempt	  CPR).	  I	  have	  used	  DNR	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  consistency,	  even	  though	  the	  four	  institutions	  studied	  used	  different	  terms.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  two	  autonomy	  focused	  institutions	  use	  DNR,	  whereas	  the	  University	  of	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consider CPR as a plausible option, 2) recommend against CPR, or 3) do not offer CPR 
to those imminently dying or who have no chance of surviving to discharge (Blinderman 
et al. 2012). This framework embraces the notion that providing clear recommendations 
is a part of a physician’s duty to act with beneficence and empowers rather than hinders 
the patient’s ability to make an informed, autonomous decision.  
 
The concept of “informed assent” operationalises this best interest framework, where the 
clinician does not insist that the decision ultimately be made by the patient or family 
member, and explicitly recommends against CPR when clearly not indicated (Curtis and 
Burt 2007a). National and local policies differ between and within the United States and 
United Kingdom. Whereas broadly American institutions tend to prioritise autonomy and 
individual choice, British institutions promote best-interest decision-making guided 
primarily by the physician, who has the unilateral authority to withhold CPR where 
deemed appropriate (Bishop et al. 2010b; Mello and Jenkinson 1998; NHS 2011).  
Studies have shown that institutional cultures surrounding advanced care planning 
contribute to variation in care provided by hospitals in end of life ICU care (Barnato et al. 
2012, 2014; Quill et al. 2014; Wunsch and Harrison 2005). Others have demonstrated 
considerable variation in use of DNR orders and withdrawal of life sustaining therapies, 
even after accounting for variations in patient characteristics (Quill et al., 2014; 
Zingmond & Wenger, 2012).  
 
Section 5.2: Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants 
Thirteen to sixteen physicians participated at each site, with approximately equal 
numbers of attendings, fellows and residents13 at each site interviewed. Years of 
experience ranged from one to forty-five years of experience. Demographic 
characteristics, level of experience, and subspecialty within internal medicine (if 
applicable) are described in Table 5.1 below. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Washington	  uses	  DNAR	  and	  the	  UK	  uses	  DNACPR.	  Terminology	  is	  important	  and	  can	  influence	  decision-­‐making	  (Venneman	  et	  al.	  2008).	  These	  institutions	  enshrined	  in	  their	  terms	  a	  recognition	  that	  these	  would	  be	  attempts	  at	  resuscitation	  and	  not	  solely	  resuscitation.	  13	  See	  Introduction	  for	  explanation	  of	  UK	  medical	  ranking	  equivalents	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Table 5.1: Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants 
 
 Columbia 
(n=13) 
Hopkins 
(n=16) 
UW 
(n=13) 
Addenbrooke’s 
(n=16) 
Years of 
Experience14 
Range 
2-45 
 
1-42 
 
2-40 
 
2-34 
 
Male:Female 6:7 11:5 6:7 11:5 
Professional Status     
Attending or 
Consultant 
6 (46%) 9 (56%) 5 (38%) 9 (56%) 
Fellow or ST 3 (23%) 3 (19%) 4 (31%) 4 (25%) 
Resident or 
FY/CMT15 
4 (31%) 4 (25%) 4 (31%) 3 (19%) 
Internal Medicine 
Subspecialty 
    
General Internal 
Medicine 
5 (38%) 10 (62%) 5 (38%) 4 (25%) 
Pulmonary/Critical 
Care 
6 (46%) 2 (12%) 6 (46%) 4 (25%) 
Palliative Care 1 (8%) 2 (12%) 1 (8%) 1 (6%) 
Geriatrics 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (19%) 
Oncology 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (8%) 4 (25%) 
Cardiology 1 (8%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Neurology 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Section 5.3: Institutions Prioritise Patient Autonomy or Patients’ Best Interest 
At each hospital, physicians’ ethical attitudes towards DNR decision-making reflected its 
hospital’s policy position regarding its prioritisation of autonomy versus best interest 
(See Table 4.1). In general, physicians at Columbia and Hopkins, whose policies 
prioritised autonomy, felt that patient autonomy rose above other ethical principles. In 
contrast, at hospitals whose policies emphasised best-interest decision-making, UW and 
Addenbrooke’s, physicians were more likely to feel that they had the ability to make 
clinical recommendations that respected both autonomy and the patient’s best interest, or 
prioritised best interest as a whole. Most physicians at UW felt comfortable using the 
informed assent approach when appropriate. I recognise that these categorisations are a 
blunt instrument that do not reflect the richness and variation that is inherent to the social 
world. Nonetheless, what I hope to convey with this dichotomy are that broad 
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  (i.e.	  after	  medical	  school	  graduation)	  15	  FY=Foundation	  Year	  Trainee,	  CMT=Core	  Medical	  Trainee,	  ST=Specialist	  Trainee	  
	   106	  
characteristics appeared to emerge which seemed to influence physicians’ ethical 
thinking and behaviour.   
Physicians in the UK have the unilateral authority to determine resuscitation status, 
which must first be determined clinically (please see Appendix H). Similarly, UW’s DNR 
policy begins with a “determination of futility” prior to the section on eliciting “patient 
preferences.” In this section, the policy indicates the likelihood of successful resuscitation 
is extremely low with pre-existing conditions such as metastatic cancer and sepsis, and 
emphasises that “there is consensus that CPR would not be effective or even if successful 
would not be beneficial to the patient. There are some patients in whom CPR should not 
be attempted (University of Washington 2013).” This language emphasises the 
importance of the physician’s clinical judgement in determining DNR status. Trainees 
were generally not aware of their hospitals’ DNR policies but appeared more aware of the 
culture of their institution regarding these policies rather than the policies themselves. 
The vast majority were unfamiliar with the details as they had never read the policy. 
Table 5.2 below describes select illustrative quotations from interview respondents that 
demonstrate institutions’ ethical priorities that focus on either autonomy or best interest. 
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Table 5.2: Selective Illustrative Quotations of Institutional Ethical Priorities16 
Columbia – Autonomy 
focused approach 
Hopkins – Autonomy 
focused approach 
UW – Best Interest 
focused approach 
Addenbrooke’s – Best 
Interest focused 
approach 
“I think we face [futile 
CPR] a lot. I think if 
that’s what they want, 
that’s what they want. I 
think it’s a fair thing…if 
they want it after 
understanding all of 
those things, then that’s 
what they want. I think 
to some extent, that it’s 
not our job to dictate 
what exactly what you 
should do…it’s their 
decision. It’s their life, 
their body, they should 
choose whatever they 
want to be done with it. 
(PGY-3: 10)” 
 
“I'm afraid autonomy 
pretty much drives the 
system, whether or not 
we think it should or 
not. Hospital policy says 
the patient is in the 
driver's seat. Autonomy 
is the principle that rises 
to the top. (Attending: 
3)”   
“House staff are 
thoroughly inculcated in 
the concept of the 
patient.  DNR decisions 
are just kind of the tip of 
the iceberg. I often see 
them taking 
overwhelmed families 
and giving them a long 
list of therapies to 
approve or 
disapprove…I don't 
know where [medical 
students] get it, you 
know...There's multiple 
ethical principles but 
somehow the autonomy 
becomes the only one 
that enters into these 
discussions (Attending: 
4).” 
“Ideally I like for patient 
best interest and patient 
autonomy to line up.  To 
get to a place where if 
the patient understands 
that they may 
understand that what 
we’re recommending is 
probably best 
interest…same with 
intubation sometimes. 
It’s not in the patient’s 
best interest, we 
shouldn’t be offering it. 
I think it’s a fine line 
trying to table out which 
way to go. (PGY-6: 8)”   
 
“I feel a personal, 
clinical, legal 
responsibility to do the 
best for my patients so 
to offer them the best 
possible care but not to 
offer them treatments 
for which they're, they 
are unlikely to benefit. 
(Consultant: 1)” 
 
“Best interest decision-
making, we're mandate 
by The Mental Capacity 
Act17 to take into 
account family's views. 
So it would be 
absolutely impossible 
not to.” 
(Consultant: 5) 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  I have chosen to present my quotations slightly differently in this chapter than I will in subsequent 
chapters. I have done this in order to emphasise the dichotomy of differing attitudes amongst respondents 
which appear to differ between institutions that prioritised best interest versus those that prioritised 
autonomy.  
17 The Mental Capacity Act of 2005 is a law that mandates best interest decision-making in patients who 
lack capacity(Mental Capacity Act 2005)	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Section 5.4: Experienced Physicians at All Sites were Willing to Recommend 
Against CPR when Resuscitation was Unlikely to Work 
Experienced physicians at all sites generally felt comfortable engaging in best interest 
decision-making and when clinically appropriate, either not offer or make explicit 
recommendations against offering resuscitation. Table 5.3 below describes selective 
illustrative quotes demonstrating experienced physicians’ willingness to make 
recommendations against resuscitation when clinically appropriate. 
Table 5.3: Selective Illustrative Quotations of Experienced Physicians’ Willingness 
to Recommend 
Columbia – Autonomy 
focused approach 
Hopkins – Autonomy 
focused approach 
UW – Best Interest 
focused approach 
Addenbrooke’s – Best 
Interest focused 
approach 
“If the patient gets 
worse, you’re going to 
hear me recommend 
DNR because I’m not 
too sure that doing chest 
compressions will 
actually save this 
person’s life. 
(Attending: 2)” 
“I will tell the family 
that there is nothing 
more to offer and when 
they die we're not going 
to do CPR to bring them 
back to a condition that 
is worse than they were 
moments ago. 
(Attending: 7)” 
“I tend to be a bit more 
directive and I say that 
in my experience the 
chance of your loved 
one being able to leave 
the hospital…if they’ve 
come to the point of 
requiring resuscitation is 
very small. (Attending: 
1)” 
“I will say, our plan is 
that we wouldn’t be 
active at that stage to try 
and re-start your heart 
and many of them say, 
well thank goodness for 
that. (Consultant: 2)” 
Respondents stated that they would discuss with the patient or surrogate the situation 
from a goal of care perspective and either recommend against resuscitation, or focus on 
comfort care without explicitly mentioning resuscitation. Many of them expressed the 
belief that failure to give recommendations should be seen as a derogation of 
responsibility. As one attending at Hopkins stated: 
“I would recommend the following and the patient decides. I think that’s 
autonomy. I think to say, ‘you could be resuscitated or not, what would you like 
to do?’ seems to me to be an abdication of responsibility to the patient in the name 
of autonomy. As the patient reminds me often, ‘You’re the doctor, how do I 
know?’ (Hopkins, Attending in Oncology: 2)”  
	   109	  
Experienced physicians at hospitals that prioritised autonomy, recognised the primacy of 
autonomy at their institution, but believed that that did not mean that they should offer 
futile treatments that would not serve the best interest of their patients. They remained 
committed to what they believed was ethically the right thing to do, finding ways to 
balance autonomy and the law and making unilateral clinical decisions when they felt 
they were appropriate. This quote from a senior physician at Columbia demonstrated this 
balance:  
“I have to do it because I cannot break the law. You do your best and try to 
minimise the amount of ethical or moral compromise by limiting the attempted 
resuscitation as much as possible…When it comes to a procedure that I know far 
better than the patient or the family, to question whether it is appropriate for me 
not to exercise my judgement, I think would be wrong. It is just the opposite. I 
would call it being a responsible doctor and exercising good judgement… My 
primary responsibility is to the patient, and if a family is asking me to do 
something that clearly is harmful to the patient, I will explain to them patiently 
why I don’t think [it’s right.] I am not going to let somebody suffer because of it 
(Columbia, Attending in Pulmonary Medicine: 1).” 
 
Several respondents acknowledged a great degree of variation amongst physicians in 
terms of skill, attitudes, and practices, although many also expressed that their views 
were relatively mainstream.  
Section 5.5: Inexperienced Physicians at Autonomy Focused Hospitals Felt 
Obligated to Offer Choice of CPR Without Explicit Recommendations Even if 
Success was Unlikely 
Although hospital policies primarily dictated whether patient preferences should be 
honoured, and none of the hospitals required physicians to offer the choice of 
resuscitation if it was unlikely to work, trainees at hospitals where policies reflected 
autonomy focused approaches often interpreted policies to mean that they were obligated 
to offer a choice of resuscitation in all cases regardless of likelihood of survival, and that 
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they should not provide clinical recommendations (See Table 5.4 below, columns 1 and 
2). 
Table 5.4: Selective Illustrative Quotations of Inexperienced Physicians’ Willingness 
to Make Recommendations 
Columbia– Autonomy 
focused approach 
Hopkins – Autonomy 
focused approach 
UW – Best Interest 
focused approach 
Addenbrooke’s– Best 
Interest focused 
approach 
“I feel it’s more of 
moral burden for me, to 
say this person needs to 
be a DNR and I’m going 
to make then a DNR. I 
don’t necessarily know 
if I have the right, to 
make that decision for 
that patient. Again, I’m 
torn. I know that these 
decisions often mean, 
that yes, we’re going to 
spend x, y, and z time 
doing a potentially 
useless thing on this 
person and causing pain. 
I just don’t know. With 
my level of training and 
where I am, I don’t 
think I’ll feel 
comfortable doing that. 
(PGY-5: 8)” 
“These two attendings 
were wonderful… They 
don’t ask the patients 
and families, they sort of 
tell them. “You’re 90 
years old, this would not 
be good for you. We 
would not do that. It 
would be a horrible 
experience, we would 
not want to do that to 
you.” Usually, in that 
format that they say it, 
the family members are 
like, “Okay, yeah, of 
course.” It was a 
completely different 
experience. It was really 
nice to see that. I 
remember having a 
“The idea is not transfer 
of the right to make 
medical decisions to me, 
it’s to their loved one. 
And the reason for that 
is because they 
presumably know them 
better than I do, so you 
know. I try to give you 
as much information to 
make an informed 
decision, but it’s still 
[their decision]. So I do 
still subscribe to 
autonomy, I think more 
than perhaps [even if] I 
really don’t think this is 
in the patient’s best 
interests. (PGY-4: 12)” 
 
“There was family 
discord…that wanted to 
do everything and it 
doesn’t seem like the 
patient’s wishes but I 
think in those 
circumstances that I 
wish I could just say, 
you know: I think it’s 
not really medically 
indicated and we’ll 
make sure that she’s 
comfortable. (PGY-2: 
15)” 
 
“I feel strongly about 
our responsibilities for a 
recommendation and I 
think I do that more now 
than before. (PGY-3: 
11)” 
 
“We don’t necessarily 
need them to pick from 
a list of options. It’s 
within the bounds of our 
responsibility to offer 
what our expert opinion 
is. (PGY-3: 10)” 
 
“And so if it’s one of 
those scenarios and 
we’ve already sort of 
decided that the patient 
wouldn’t benefit from a 
resuscitation…we will 
try and give as much 
information as we can 
before we finally say 
this is from our 
perspective what's going 
on, and this is why we 
think your family 
member would not 
benefit from a 
resuscitation. (PGY-3: 
11)”  
 
“I came in to residency 
with the mind-set that 
it’s just two options and 
you just choose one.  
You know you present 
them very equally and 
you leave it completely 
up to the family and you 
kind of leave your own 
opinion on the back 
“And then explaining 
why we would feel that 
resuscitation wasn’t 
going to be in their best 
interests and why we 
thought it wasn’t going 
to be successful. That’s 
usually what I would 
say. (Jr Clinical Fellow 
in Oncology: 15)” 
 
“So I don’t pose it as a 
kind of [choice], it 
would be unusual for me 
to say, I don’t know 
what to do what do you 
think? It would be this is 
what I think tell me 
what you're thinking, I’ll 
then think about it, we’ll 
discuss it I would 
recommend I would say 
I think this is best. 
(Geriatrics SpR (ST5): 
10)”  
 
“I’d probably give it as a 
recommendation. I think 
if you tell a patient 
that’s what we’re going 
to do and it’s not open 
for discussion it results 
in agitation and 
annoyance. If you give it 
to them as a choice 
they’ll very rarely make 
a decision because they 
haven’t got the 
knowledge, the 
resources and it’s a very 
difficult decision to 
make. If you make a 
recommendation and 
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discussion with my co-
residents after that. We 
were thinking, we were 
just saying that we don’t 
know if we could get 
away with doing that. 
(PGY-3: 11)” 
burner…[some of the 
attendings taught me 
that] through greater 
medical understanding 
your opinion can kind of 
creep into the room and 
be helpful adjunct. You 
should come in with a 
mind-set like what you 
think is your 
recommendation from a 
medical standpoint.  So 
that’s definitely 
changed. (PGY-2: 13)” 
“I feel like I have 
embraced the idea of a 
physician as somebody 
who makes 
recommendations and 
offers alternatives based 
on assessment of best 
interest, that if I’m 
going to make an 
informed assent, it’s 
with the understanding 
of what the patient or 
their loved ones 
framework of best 
interest is and trying to 
match those goals. 
(PGY-3:10)” 
say this is what I think, 
would you like to have 
some input, what are 
your ideas? You know 
do my recommendations 
align with your 
thoughts? That’s often a 
better way to approach 
the discussion. (SpR: 
14)” 
 
Trainees did not feel comfortable recommending that resuscitation be withheld even if 
the chance of successful resuscitation were negligible (See Table 5.4 above, columns 3 
and 4). One resident at Hospital A felt it was inappropriate to, “inject your own personal 
opinions of life and death.” To another resident, respecting autonomy meant providing 
information without biasing the patient with a recommendation and that “it’s my 
responsibility…to do everything as they say (Hopkins, PGY-2: 15).” Less experienced 
physicians at autonomy-focused hospitals expressed to a degree their responsibility for 
decision-making, but they appeared to be more hesitant to take on that responsibility.  
In contrast, trainees at hospitals that had policies that encouraged a best interest decision-
making approach (UW and Addenbrooke’s) felt more comfortable expressing clinical 
judgement against resuscitation when appropriate. Many of the trainees at UW were 
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willing to utilise informed assent and strongly recommend against or not offer 
resuscitation if it was very unlikely not to work. One resident said:  
 
“I can think of a few times per rotation where informed assent was done. I did it at 
least a few times in the ICU, where if things head towards CPR then I’d say, ‘It 
wouldn’t be something that we think would be appropriate for you and here is 
why (UW, PGY-3: C12).’” 
 
This chart below (Figure 5.1) presents a summary of the patterns that emerged amongst 
respondents, which appeared to vary based upon institutional prioritisation of autonomy 
and level of experience.  
 
             
 
Figure 5.1: Differences in physicians’ willingness to make recommendations regarding the decision to 
pursue a DNR order amongst institutions focused on autonomy versus best interest decision-making 
 
Section 5.6: Perceived Conflict Between Physicians and Patients 
 
One study noted conflict regarding the decision to limit life sustaining therapies in the 
ICU perceived by staff in 78% of the cases, 48% between the staff and family members 
(Breen et al. 2001). Families also acknowledge conflict; 46% of families perceived 
conflicts regarding withholding life-sustaining support, the majority of which were 
between themselves and the medical staff (Abbott et al. 2001). There was much variation 
in the degree of perceived conflict between doctors and patients regarding resuscitation 
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preference. Most often, this involved scenarios where the physician believed it would not 
be medically appropriate to resuscitate and the patient/surrogate wishes to be resuscitated.  
 
Despite this variation, there were also striking patterns between institutions, especially 
amongst less experienced trainees. In my interviews, conflicts between patients and/or 
surrogates and physicians regarding decisions to institute a DNR order seemed to be 
more common amongst physicians at autonomy focused than beneficence focused 
institutions. These respondents at autonomy focused institutions described instances 
where they felt patients were demanding and difficult:  
 
“I’m thinking of a particular case of a gentleman who had cancer that had spread, 
completely wiped out his liver and he came here because they told him nothing 
else was to be done at Penn, and we felt there was nothing to be done. He and his 
family didn’t want to hear it, they insisted, they brought us the patients’ Bill of 
Rights and said we should see the Liver and Oncology specialists (Hopkins, PGY-
3: 14).” 
 
“We’ve certainly had patients that families that were asking for things that just 
don’t exist. A colleague of mine had someone asking for a brain transplant 
(Hopkins, Attending: 9).” 
 
Table 5.5 below further illustrates the contrast between autonomy-focused and best 
interest-focused institutions in the perceived degree of discordance between physicians 
and patients regarding resuscitation decisions. 
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Table 5.5: Selective Illustrative Quotations Describing Degree of Discordance 
Between Physicians and Patients Regarding DNR Decisions 
 
Columbia – Autonomy 
focused approach 
Hopkins – Autonomy 
focused approach 
UW – Best Interest 
focused approach 
Addenbrooke’s– Best 
Interest focused 
approach 
“It’s not uncommon. I 
would say 30% to 40%. 
But that maybe more. 
The patients where I 
thought by the 
parameters that I 
mentioned earlier -- age, 
illness, and all that. I 
think of those patients, I 
think there are about 
30% that we could, that 
they chose things that I 
felt fairly confident were 
things that I would not 
recommend. (Attending: 
6)” 
 
“It depends…on 
whether they’ve talked 
about it…how sick the 
person…but what 
percentage actually want 
to continue to get 
everything done, I 
would say anywhere 
from 25% to 50%. 
(PGY-2: 13)” 
“I think about half/half. 
I would say, about 
equal…I would say 
about half of the time, 
that they agree with the 
recommendation or they 
insist on being 
full…despite having 
conversations the family 
still insists on doing 
everything. (PGY-4: 
12)” 
 
“After those 
discussions?  Probably 
2/3 to 3/4.”(PGY-3: 13) 
 
“I think that a surprising 
number of people want a 
full resuscitation. (PGY-
1: 16) 
 
 
I’ve never had a family 
argue with me or the 
team because normally 
it’s such a relief that 
someone else is making 
that decision and that 
they don’t have to make 
any decision.” (PGY-6: 
7) 
 
In a situation where I 
don’t think doing CPR 
would achieve the goals 
of the family or the 
patient then I would say 
in this situation it’s very 
unlikely that your mom 
or dad or whatever will 
survive this. I would not 
recommend that if he 
were to have a cardiac 
arrest we would perform 
a CPR. Most people, 
once you’ve gone 
through all that, we’re 
all usually all on the 
same page. I don’t find 
that, fortunately the over 
conflicts don’t happen to 
me that frequently. 
(PGY-6: 6) 
 
“Less than 1%, you 
know point something 
percent, a very small 
proportion.” (SpR: 14) 
 
“I've never been in this 
exact situation myself.” 
(Consultant: 5) 
“I will often say at the 
tail end of that, and if in 
the unlikely event that 
your heart was to stop, 
our plan at the moment 
is that we wouldn’t be 
active at that stage to try 
and re-start your heart 
and many of them say 
well thank goodness for 
that.” (Consultant: 2) 
 
 
I was not very surprised to see less conflict amongst British doctors and patients in 
comparison to the US given the cultural and social differences between the US and UK. 
Americans are known for being more vocal and demanding about their wishes and are 
stereotyped for their willingness to voice individual preferences. In contrast, the British 
are often perceived as being more reserved and less willing to overtly admit 
disagreement, especially to authority. Lack of conflict might then reflect these cultural 
differences with respect to questioning authority. Given that UK physicians had unilateral 
authority to institute a DNR order at the time of my study, there is likely a tendency to 
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communicate medical realities in a more directive and authoritative manner making it 
more difficult to question in general.  
 
General Medical Council (GMC) best practices at the time of my study, stated that not 
only did physicians not have to provide treatments that would not be clinically 
appropriate, but that they: 
 
“Must carefully consider whether it is necessary or appropriate to tell the patient 
that a DNACPR decision has been made…While some patients may want to be 
told, others may find discussion about interventions that would not be clinically 
appropriate burdensome and of little or no value (GMC, 2010)”  
 
Given this, there are likely situations where there is little conflict because the physician 
simply did not have a conversation with patients about DNR decisions. During my 
observations and informal conversations with patients at Addenbrookes, it was not 
uncommon to see DNACPR orders in the chart with documentation that the ward team 
had discussed with the patient. However, the patient was neither aware that a DNACPR 
had been instituted nor could they recall that they had a conversation about resuscitation 
with the doctor. This policy has changed in light of the Tracey court case as patients now 
need to be involved and informed in the DNR decision-making process if so desired.  
 
It was thus especially striking to me when interviewing at UW in the US, that they 
appeared to also rarely experience conflict in ways more similar to the UK physicians 
than the US physicians. I could not attribute this as easily to cross cultural differences. 
My research suggests that an important determinant of conflict might include the ways in 
which physicians offer choices, frame conversations, and make recommendations. I 
hypothesize this is a major reason why the doctors at UW and Addenbrooke’s both 
seemed to encounter less conflict with patients regarding resuscitation preferences.  
 
Conflict between physician and patient/surrogate seemed to be greater at hospitals that 
prioritized autonomy in comparison to hospitals that prioritized beneficence in part due to 
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the differences in their willingness to make recommendations (trainees at Columbia and 
Hopkins less willing to make recommendations than UW and Addenbrooke’s). These 
patterns of conflict that emerged, while striking, also demonstrated significant within 
institution variation amongst respondents. This likely reflects the degree to which 
communication skills, framing, and even personality of the physician influences 
interactions and degree of conflict. These physicians at UW appeared to understand the 
importance of communication and presentation of facts:   
 
“You offer somebody something, they say what they want, they say I don’t really 
like that answer…that seems adversarial. But in the UK it seems that they just don’t 
offer something and take it away but simply go with the decision and says that’s 
what's appropriate. That makes more sense.” (UW, PGY-3: 11) 
 
“Usually its an easy sell, it’s easy to get the family on the same page as long as it’s 
presented in the right way. There’ve been times where I could tell that the family 
appreciated having the decision taken off their shoulders and that’s one of the 
things I think about a lot is this idea that we don’t force a family to choose 
antibiotics for their loved one. It seems strange that we force them to choose 
whether or not to do this one procedure. I have never had somebody seem offended 
that I propose it this way [informed assent]” (UW, PGY -3: 10) 
 
Section 5.7: Conclusion 
 
A hospital’s culture and policies’ prioritisation of autonomy versus best interest appears 
to influence the way that physician trainees conceptualise patient autonomy. This may 
subsequently influence the degree of choice and recommendations they are willing to 
offer regarding DNR decision-making. While experienced physicians in this study 
acknowledge institutional culture and policies, it appears they do not exclusively allow 
their actions to be prescribed by policies, and were willing to make recommendations 
against resuscitation if they believed it would be futile. While variation existed amongst 
respondents, in general, experienced doctors at all sites understood and acted upon their 
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ethical obligations to recommend and offer treatments responsibly. This may 
subsequently influence the degree of conflict regarding patients and physicians’ 
preference of whether resuscitation should be pursued. 
 
Although hospital policies, even at the most patient autonomy-focused institutions, do not 
require doctors to offer futile resuscitation nor to withhold recommendations, I found that 
less experienced doctors at autonomy-focused hospitals tend to over-interpret hospital 
policies and embrace a reductionist, limited understanding of autonomy. Ethics and 
communications at the end of life are generally present in the medical school and 
residency didactic curricula, but lack of time and space on the wards for reflection might 
promote an excessive, un-reflexive deference to patient autonomy that risks placing 
unwanted and unreasonable responsibility for medical decision-making onto the patient 
or surrogate (Billings and Krakauer 2011; Quill and Brody 1996; Salmon and Hall 
2003).”  
 
It seemed that as physicians become more experienced, they develop a professional 
confidence that allows them to feel empowered to act according to their own moral 
compass, despite policies or cultures that incentivised not doing so. This would for 
example entail strongly recommending against resuscitation that would have a negligible 
benefit for the patient. They have learned through experiences with patients – what 
worked and what didn’t – that the idea of autonomy as merely giving choices is overly 
simplistic. 
 
Unlike more senior physicians, trainees have not yet developed the experience or 
professional confidence to advocate for their patient’s best interest by making explicit 
recommendations regardless of their institution’s policy or cultural constraints. Trainees 
at autonomy-focused hospitals appear compelled to offer the choice of resuscitation 
neutrally without a specific recommendation in all situations regardless of whether they 
believed it to be clinically appropriate. Their attitudes might reflect perceived constraints 
due to policies and expectations, which focus on patient autonomy. It suggests that the 
ethical principles embraced by experienced physicians were not transmitted to learners at 
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autonomy-focused institutions.  
 
The culture and policies at UW and Addenbrooke’s actively encourage best interest 
decision-making. Although some of the physicians at UW had never heard the term 
informed assent, the cultural norm at that institution, similar to the hospital in the UK, 
was not only that it was appropriate to discourage ineffective CPR, but also that it would 
be ethically suspect to offer CPR in futile situations. These trainees appeared to have the 
time and space within their workflow and culture to develop similar attitudes to 
experienced physicians. Interns and residents come from medical schools across the 
country, and yet seemed to adapt similar attitudes to their peers in residency training.  
 
Studies have shown that in practice, physicians and residents do not provide adequate 
information during conversations regarding resuscitation (Anderson et al. 2011; Tulsky, 
Chesney, and Lo 1995). The majority omit critical information on prognosis, goals of 
care, or explanations of the processes involved in various interventions. Although 
medical residents generally have a great respect for autonomy, omission of these critical 
elements may deprive patients of the very autonomy that physicians seek to respect 
(Billings and Krakauer 2011; Salmon and Hall 2003).  
 
Interventions to improve end of life communication skills have focused on formal 
curricula and increasing opportunities for house staff to practise these skills (Curtis et al. 
2013). Few studies have explored the effects of a hidden curriculum on the development 
of medical trainees and its effect on their ethical beliefs and communication strategies 
(Cribb and Bignold 1999; Goldie 2000; Hafferty and Franks 1994; Hundert 1996). This 
hidden curriculum describes the inadvertent transmission of attitudes and behaviors to 
trainees through everyday interactions during their training that are in conflict with the 
normative ideals and official policies of the medical profession (Hafferty 1998). Because 
so much of residency training involves an apprenticeship-based peer learning, the 
influence of the cultural milieu cannot be overemphasised.  
 
It is often perceived that the US and the UK are on opposite ends of the autonomy-best 
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interest spectrum, where the focus in the US is more on individual choice and patient 
rights, and the culture in the UK reflecting a greater acceptance of more paternalistic 
practices (Iserson 2010). This study suggests that there may be important differences in 
approaches not only between the US and UK, but within the US itself. Trainees at the 
American hospital that encouraged best interest decision-making had attitudes and beliefs 
about DNR decision-making that appeared more similar to British doctors than doctors at 
the other American sites. In contrast to trainees at the autonomy-focused hospitals, they 
seemed more willing to not offer resuscitation if they did not think that it was indicated.  
 
There are inadequacies in physician communication at the end of life, especially amongst 
medical trainees (Chi and Verghese 2013). Prior studies have shown that advanced care 
norms impact end of life ICU use, but to my knowledge, this is the first study that 
explores the influence of a hospital’s policy or culture on physicians’ understanding of 
autonomy and willingness to recommend resuscitation decisions (Barnato et al. 2012, 
2014). This thesis hypothesises that culture and policies oriented towards autonomy may 
have unintended consequences of constraining a physician’s willingness to make 
recommendations, especially that of trainees.  
 
It is ironic that the very policies that seek to empower patients might inadvertently 
deprive them of their autonomy through an overemphasis on a reductionist, checklist 
approach to autonomy. Perhaps policies more oriented towards best interest decision-
making, might allow physicians the space to shift their focus from a discourse of choice 
to one of care and compassion.  
 
In the next chapter, I will elaborate upon the ethical issue introduced in this chapter and 
position my findings within current ethical debates on principlism and whether autonomy 
should be the principle that rises to the top. Subsequent chapters will further demonstrate 
how the way these ethical conceptualisations harm physician trainees, patients and 
surrogates. Chapter 7 will link this powerlessness with moral distress regarding futile 
treatments at the end of life, while Chapter 8 will focus on how this failure to recommend 
encourages physician trainees to revert to pathologic forms of communication to try to 
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convince patients and surrogates to reject futile resuscitation.  
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Chapter 6: Principlism in Practice: Moving Beyond an Ethics 
of Choice 
 
In this chapter I discuss principlism - the dominant framework for ethics in the US - in 
practice on the wards, followed by a discussion of the problems with the ideology of 
choice in this quest to honour patient autonomy. I critique the reductionist thinking that 
equates autonomy as choice in autonomy focused institutions and suggest that we should 
instead shift the focus from the beneficence of outcome towards beneficence in the 
process of decision-making. I further critique the current neoliberal discourse of choice 
in decision-making at the end of life and argue that it both disempowers and allows the 
physician to absolve himself of responsibility. I conclude with an enquiry into why best 
interest decision-making seems to align itself more with a more nuanced understanding 
of choice, and what we can do in practice to improve that.  
 
Section 6.1: Introduction 
 
This chapter contributes empirical evidence to debates surrounding principlism and the 
manner in which its theory inadequately translates to clinical practice. Again, because the 
focus of the thesis is on local institutional practices predominantly in the US, with the UK 
serving as an additional “control” site, my ethical analysis in this chapter will be focused 
on ethics in the US. Ethical principles are established in the clinical setting by 
institutional policies and culture through the hidden curriculum and influence how 
medical trainees conceptualise ethical conflicts surrounding the decision to pursue a DNR 
order at the end of life. The contrasts between policies and cultures that prioritise 
autonomy versus beneficence describe the practical manifestations of theoretical debates 
surrounding autonomy and beneficence. It is worth reviewing relevant background from 
Chapters 2 and 3 in light of the specific ethical quandaries that I discuss in this chapter.  
 
Based on Hippocratic principles, medicine was traditionally governed by a beneficence 
model, where the physician’s primary obligation was to provide medical benefit (Faden 
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and Beauchamp 1986). Popular trust that physicians acting on behalf of patients in their 
best interest reflected the dominance and authority of physicians. In part because 
physicians possessed control over the esoteric knowledge of medicine and a professional 
aura of altruism, physicians were able to command a paternalistic authority over patients 
and indeed act in a patient’s best interest (or at least the physician’s perception of what 
was in the patient’s best interest) (Katz 2002). The social transformation of American 
medicine that began decades ago shifted power from the doctor to the patient, and 
younger physicians are now predominantly indoctrinated in an ideology of autonomy 
(Starr 1982). The question that remains now is whether society’s move away from best 
interest towards autonomy is ultimately in patients’ best interest. 
 
Section 6.2: Sociological Trends in Patient Autonomy and Decision-Making 
 
Section 6.2.1: The Shift Towards Autonomy as a Consequence of the Social 
Transformation of Physicians 
 
These changes in the dominance of physicians and the consumerisation of medicine 
outlined in Chapter 2 shifted the power dynamic within the clinical interaction. No longer 
were people willing to accept the “doctor knows best” attitude (Rhem 2012). Changes in 
the physician-patient relationship resulted in a new emphasis on patient autonomy and 
participation. The emergence of patients rights as a societal demand reflect the more 
general trend of empowering individuals against authority (Truog 2012). Practitioners 
find themselves offering and discussing decisions in ways they would have never 
imagined in the past. Consumer-based health care models have enshrined this primacy of 
choice into policy. Americans increasingly see health care as a commodity that they, 
rather than their physician, should have the right to decide. Some physicians questioned 
whether offering this a la carte menu of choices was a clinically appropriate response to 
this culture of consumerism (Billings and Krakauer 2011; Quill and Brody 1996).  
 
The increasing bureaucratisation and corporatisation of health care has also threatened 
the autonomy of physicians not only from an administrative and economic standpoint, but 
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also within the clinical setting (Mckinlay and Marceau 2002). Physicians lament that they 
are now being told how to practice medicine (Hejafred 2014). The encroachment of prior 
approval requirements and limited choice of therapies dictated by insurance companies 
result in clinical decisions that are not made at the bedside, but instead by a non-
medically qualified administrator miles away from the actual patient. In the quest for 
autonomy, patients may have exchanged paternalism by doctors with paternalism by non-
physician administrators who are more concerned about cost savings than care. Increased 
use of information technologies also closely monitor physician performance and 
scrutinise based on conformity, efficiency and cost savings, further decreasing physician 
autonomy and self-regulation. 
 
This move away from paternalism is a positive step, as it prevents undue influence of 
power and authority, where a paternalistic physician prescribes therapies that might not 
be the best fit for the patient. However, what I argue in the remainder of this chapter is 
that patient choice alone does not guarantee better outcomes or patient empowerment, 
and that we must be more nuanced about the way that we fulfill this autonomy.  
 
Section 6.2.2: The Rise of Autonomy and its Challenges to Beneficence 
 
Medical ethics established its prominence within the practice of modern medicine with 
the Nuremberg Code, established as a response to the atrocities of World War II and 
specifically the role of Nazi physicians in holocaust and eugenics experiments (Katz 
1996; Kaufman 2006). The Nuremberg Code comprised of ten principles that outlined 
basic medical ethical standards, including voluntary consent. Despite this, for several 
more decades researchers in the US paid relatively little attention to these principles and 
especially that of informed consent (Katz 1996). It was not until the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research’s Belmont Report was created by Congress in 1979, that patient rights and 
autonomy became a priority in the US (The National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979). Involvement of lawyers 
and academic philosophers in these sorts of commissions led to the dominant principles 
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of patient autonomy, first in the research realm, and subsequently in the clinical setting. It 
is important to note that this evolution away from paternalism and physician authority 
was primarily led by those outside of the medical profession (Kaufman 2006: 73).  
 
The dominant ethical framework in clinical practice today in the United States is 
principlism, based on the four principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and 
justice, as outlined by Beauchamp and Childress in “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” 
(PBE) (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). Beneficence dictates that a physician should act 
in the best interest of the patient, which oftentimes also means making efforts to help 
secure their well being. Justice focuses on conceptions of equality and fairness. Non-
maleficence is the concept of first doing no harm (Primum non nocere), an ancient moral 
standard enshrined by the Hippocratic Oath. The importance and weight of each of these 
elements have shifted significantly through the decades, most importantly with shifts 
from acting with beneficence to an emphasis on autonomy. Autonomy can be broadly 
defined as the liberty and agency to act freely and ownership over one’s own body. 
 
Contemporary origins of the ideas of individual autonomy hark back to Immanuel Kant, 
who believed that autonomy reflected the capacity of a person guide one’s actions based 
upon their free and flexible use of their own reasoning, not the person’s liberty to do 
whatever they want (Halpern 2001). In the nineteenth century, in his essay On Liberty, 
John Stuart Mill noted that individuality and autonomy are not fulfilled merely by the 
ability to choose, but that one must take charge of their own desires and choices:  
 
“A person whose desires and impulses are his own – are the expression of his own 
nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture – is said to have 
a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no 
more than a steam engine has a character (Mill 1974)” 
 
More recently, bioethicist Ruth Faden defines autonomy as requiring intentionality, non-
control, and patient understanding (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). Contemporary 
definitions of autonomy were in part shaped by the Belmont Report, which includes a 
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respect for persons where the focus is on treating people with courtesy and respect. This 
means acknowledging autonomy, but also a requirement to protect those with diminished 
autonomy (The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979). For those who are capable of self-
deliberation about personal goals, weight should be given to the autonomous person’s 
opinions and choices, and the freedom to act on these considered judgements. It also 
means respecting and protecting those who are incapable of self-determination.  
 
The challenge facing physicians as a result of this shift creates a potential conflict 
between autonomy and beneficence, especially the commitment not to provide non-
effective treatments where the risks outweigh the potential benefits of treatment. To what 
extent does autonomy cover the right to demand treatments? How can autonomy be 
respected in a way that preserves the ultimate goals of the physician-patient encounter, 
which is to initiate treatments that are mutually agreed upon as in the best interest of the 
patient?  
 
Section 6.2.3: Models of Decision-making 
 
An autonomy focused model of decision-making (independent choice model) describes a 
strategy where the physician “objectively present patients with options and odds but 
withholds their own experience and recommendations to avoid overly influencing 
patients” (Quill and Brody 1996).  Within the patient encounter, there is increasing 
recognition that “excessive or reflexive deference to an unreflective concept of patient 
autonomy…places unwarranted and unreasonable responsibility for technical medical 
decisions on patients…[thereby] harming patients [and] depriving them of expert, 
professional advice” (Billings and Krakauer 2011). An ideal balance of roles and 
responsibilities might assume that the patient is the expert on his or her values, goals, and 
preferences, while the physician is the expert on the medical means for honouring the 
patient’s perspective. 
 
	   126	  
One critique of the independent choice model states that it, “confuses the concepts of 
independence and autonomy and assumes that the physician’s exercise of power and 
influence inevitably diminishes the patient’s ability to choose…it sacrifices competence 
for control” (Quill and Brody 1996). In a recent lecture, Joseph Nye, a preeminent 
international relations scholar, urged countries influential in the geopolitical arena not to 
think of “power over others, which is a zero sum game, but power with others, which is 
not a zero sum game” (Nye, 2012). Perhaps the medical profession should approach 
issues of power and authority similarly. One should not think of power as a zero sum 
game that must be wrestled from the physician to the patient, but as a cooperative 
interaction that reimagines the concept of power in a more sophisticated manner. 
 
An alternative is the shared decision-making model, which recognises that autonomy 
does not merely equate to an unqualified right to choose. Decisions that prioritise 
autonomy should not go against clinical judgement and evidence based reason. The 
physician should not be passively following patient requests but instead providing 
“coherent deliberation” (Brett and McCullough 2012). The shared decision-making 
model is an alternative, which encourages patients and physicians to share their power 
and actively exchange ideas in order to create a plan that best fits that particular patient. 
Shared decision-making is an attractive option for both people who feel that there is too 
much physician paternalism, as well as those who believe that the pendulum has swung 
too far towards autonomy.  
 
The evidence for whether patients want to be the ones making the decisions is not 
entirely clear. One study found that 97% of patients wanted to be told what was going on, 
but 67% wanted the doctor to make the decision (Chung et al. 2012). It is also not 
apparent that patient satisfaction is the best mechanism for determining quality of care 
and costs. One study highlighting the “cost of satisfaction,” showed that patient 
satisfaction was associated with greater inpatient use, higher overall health care and 
prescription drug expenditures, and increased mortality (Fenton et al. 2012).  
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Section 6.2.4: Debates Surrounding the Principlist Approach 
 
There has been much debate as to whether the principlist approach can adequately and 
universally capture the whole scope of ethical dilemmas in medicine (Campbell 2003). 
Raanan Gillon has been a major advocate of principlism, championing its applicability 
across the majority of clinical contexts. He recognises its limitations with respect to 
addressing conflicts between principles and the overall scope of individual principles, but 
also argues that the approach provides a basic moral language and analytical framework 
for doctors that is practical and simple for use in the clinical setting (Gillon 2015).  
 
Although principlism when understood properly and appreciated in its entirety, provides 
a useful and universalisable framework for understanding applied medical ethics, most 
doctors have not had the opportunity to read PBE nor reflected upon them beyond its 
chapter headings. The challenge of principlism thus lies not only in its content, but also 
its overly simplified and frequently misconstrued interpretation in the clinical setting. 
Criticisms of the four principles often centre around the reductionist, unreflective 
checklist approach of principlism seen in clinical practice that is “reduced to a flowchart 
approach denuded of nuanced reasoning” (Kong 2015).  
 
A related debate centres around autonomy as the principle that rises “first amongst 
equals” (Gillon 2003). American medicine, and increasingly British medicine, reflects an 
ideology of autonomy and choice. Both ethicists and physicians have raised questions as 
to whether there has been too much emphasis on autonomy as a principle that supersedes 
the others (Billings and Krakauer 2011; Dawson 2010; Quill and Brody 1996). These 
attitudes lead to dogmatic and unreflective understandings of autonomy that do not 
question the nature and grounds for this moral claim (Dawson 2010). As a result, 
autonomy is frequently the trump card in the majority of ethical dilemmas, automatically 
taking precedence over beneficence, nonmaleficance, and justice, without due 
introspection on how autonomy is meant to be fulfilled beyond giving the patient choice.   
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Section 6.3: An Ethics of Choice?  
 
These ethical challenges are common at the end of life; the uncertainty of prognosis and 
the ethically permissible boundaries of treatment create confusion and conflict about 
balance of benefits and burdens experienced by patients. Embedded in end of life care are 
ethical dilemmas that are punctuated by conflicts between two conflicting ethical 
obligations such as respecting a patient’s autonomy and the duty to do not harm. 
 
Section 6.3.1: Respect for Autonomy Misconstrued as Giving Choice 
 
Overall survival to discharge after in hospital CPR is around 18.3% in elderly patients 
over the age of 65 in the US (Ehlenbach et al. 2009). Studies have shown that likelihood 
of survival is highly unlikely in certain conditions such as sepsis or metastatic cancer, and 
is near zero when irreversible death is imminent (Ebell et al. 1998; Taylor et al. 2010). 
Despite these odds, as I explicated in the previous chapter, doctors at autonomy-focused 
hospitals often felt compelled to offer choice in situations even when the likelihood of 
meaningful success from resuscitation was negligible (Dzeng, Colaianni, Roland, Smith, 
et al. 2015). 
 
Some trainee respondents’ interpretation of autonomy had strayed quite a bit from the 
definitions of autonomy proposed in the ethical literature. Rather than autonomy focused 
on understanding and the ability for self-reasoning, they had been taught that autonomy 
meant giving choice of therapies in a “neutral” manner. Medical trainees at autonomy-
focused hospitals frequently misinterpreted autonomy to mean the freedom to make one’s 
own choice:   
 
“For patients I think have a chance of dying on this hospitalisation, I’d say 
explicitly. ‘One of the things we always ask people when they come to the 
hospital is, in case of extremis where your heart stops beating, what would you 
want us to do? There are many things that we can do these days in medical 
practice.’” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
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They felt that offering choice justified treatment decisions regardless of whether it might 
cause harm or benefit. Amongst some interviewees, there was a degree of self-reflexivity 
about the pressure at their institution to offer a menu of choices: 
 
“I feel there’s no room for clinical judgement. We have to put the entire menu out 
there” (Hopkins, PGY-2: 15)  
 
“One thing I have noticed is this kind of grab bag of things offered. It’s almost 
like a buffet. ‘Well, we can do this, this and this. We can offer chest compressions 
and intubation.’ And a family will say, ‘Maybe I’ll take the compressions but I 
won’t take the intubation.’ I really don’t understand how we’ve gotten to that 
point.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 12) 
 
Erich Loewy argues that presenting a laundry list of choices and insisting the patient 
chooses “is not only abandoning patients to their autonomy but is, in fact, a crass form of 
violating the patient’s autonomy (Loewy 2005).” He instead champions a shared 
decision-making approach (though he does not use the term himself), where the patient 
states his or her goals and values, and the physician in turn informs the patient whether 
the goal is attainable and if so, how that goal can be reached.  
 
In contrast to autonomy-focused hospitals, the cultural and policy milieu at beneficence-
oriented hospitals appeared to cultivate an understanding that it was the clinician’s 
responsibility to guide patients with their expert opinion, and that it was not always 
appropriate to give a menu of choices. These trainees employed shared decision-making 
approaches in their communication with patients. This resident at UW said:  
 
“We don’t necessarily need them to pick form a list of options. It’s within the 
bounds of our responsibility to offer what our expert opinion is. I think it’s totally 
reasonable.” (UW, PGY-3: 10) 
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Experienced physicians at all hospitals also understood that autonomy did not just mean 
giving a list of things to choose from. In the interviews, experienced physicians at 
autonomy-focused institutions frequently lamented the way that house staff believed that 
giving choice was the way to fulfill autonomy:  
 
“House staff are thoroughly inculcated in the concept of patient autonomy. DNR 
decisions are just the tip of the iceberg. I often see them taking overwhelmed 
families and giving them a long list of therapies to approve or disapprove.“ 
(Hopkins, Attending of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine: 4) 
 
Section 6.3.2: Autonomy or False Choice? 
 
Physicians at beneficence-oriented hospitals were at times critical of this reductionist 
approach to autonomy. This sort of introspection and critique of autonomy in practice 
was less frequently seen in trainees at autonomy dominant hospitals. An English registrar 
at Addenbrooke's suggested:  
 
“I think the issue in my mind is calling it autonomy…you can't choose whether to 
be resuscitated or not, only whether someone tries. But the way we phrase it is to 
make it sound like you're choosing. Most of the people in whom I fill out 
resuscitation forms it just will not work. So actually you haven't really got any 
autonomy…because there isn't a decision to be made.” (Addenbrooke's, 
Consultant in Geriatrics: 9) 
 
This resident at UW recognised the contradictions in the way that doctors sometimes give 
choice to patients, and how this can be overly burdensome in some cases:  
 
“There’s been times where I could tell that the family appreciated having the 
decision taken off of their shoulders and that’s one of the things I thought about a 
lot is this idea of we don’t force a family to choose antibiotics for their loved 
ones. It seems strange that we force them to choose whether or not to do this one 
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procedure. I’ve never had somebody seem offended that I proposed it this way.” 
(UW, PGY-3: 10) 
 
Critique of this idealised discourse of choice highlights that some of the choices 
surrogates are asked to make are physiologically false choices (Drought and Koenig 
2002). Families are often asked whether they want to resuscitate a loved when the 
likelihood of meaningful survival is negligible. Even in situations where the patient has a 
negligible chance of surviving CPR, surrogates may still be asked to make this 
exceedingly difficult decision, which is often framed as a decision between life and death 
rather than a decision whether CPR will be attempted before death most certainly occurs.  
 
Section 6.3.3: Ethical Challenges in Surrogate’s Substituted Judgement  
 
In Chapter 3 I described differences in decision-making following the patients’ loss of 
capacity. In the US, surrogate substituted judgement, though controversial, is the 
accepted practice. Many respondents acknowledged that surrogates were often more 
aggressive than patients, and that it was not uncommon to feel that the patient’s wishes 
were being trumped by the family’s emotionally motivated decisions. Even when 
emotions are not a factor, studies have shown that surrogates are quite poor at choosing 
treatments that were the same as what the patient would have chosen for himself (Hare, 
Pratt, and Nelson 1992). Many surrogates are concerned about guilt and are not ready to 
let go and allow their loved one to die. Others may have secondary gain interests in 
keeping their family member alive, such as disability payments. As such, the emphasis on 
substituted judgement might contribute to the general culture of overly aggressive care. 
For example, these residents at Hopkins said:   
 
“The patient has lost capacity. When they still had capacity, you’ve had 
conversations with them and they’ve said they didn’t want this. But when the 
patient lost capacity [the family] says the patient would want to continue 
fighting.” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
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“He says he is suffering. He says he is in pain, but the family is really moving for 
continued aggressive resuscitation and everything else. What does the patient 
really want and what’s coming from the family?” (Hopkins, PGY-4: 12)  
 
Doctors provide patients and surrogates with choice, but are more often willing to take 
away this autonomy to err on the side of aggressive care than towards less. Physicians in 
my study sometimes questioned the ethics of the not uncommon scenario where a patient 
had previously expressed the wish not to receive extraordinary life sustaining treatments, 
but once capacity was lost, their surrogates wanted them be full code and for aggressive 
measure. Respondents alluded to avoidance of conflict and potential for litigation as 
reasons that the surrogate’s wishes were more often honoured. Several trainees voiced 
moral distress and discomfort over having to treat patients in ways that were overly 
aggressive.  
 
One trainee at the autonomy-focused hospital recalled a situation where a severely burned 
boy’s mother wanted to continue aggressive treatments but the father wanted comfort 
care. She questioned why the team sided with the father and continued aggressive 
treatments, despite the fact that the father’s views were more clinically reasonable: 
“It was horrible taking care of him because he seemed to be in so much pain…  
There’s actually a discordance between the parents because dad didn't have any 
guilt feelings cause he was not involved in the house fire. Dad wanted care 
withdrawn and mom didn't and I though ethically: Why do we have to go with 
mom, why do we have to go with the parent that's going to be more aggressive? 
Dad was having his wishes not honoured. And that was hard, partially cause I 
agree with him…Everyday we'd round to him and just I felt horrible continuing to 
do everything to this kid rather than withdraw care and let him die.” (Hopkins, 
PGY-2: 15) 
 
In these interviews, the hierarchical constraints where trainees who had to perform 
treatments, but were not able to make decisions about them, in combination with this 
default of aggressive care, contributed to moral distress in trainees. This moral distress 
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will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Some trainees at the beneficence focused hospital 
further pointed out that at times the way in which doctors frame these choices beg a 
decision that is inherently biased towards aggressive care: 
 
But I think that it all starts with getting everybody on the same pathway before 
you just dive right into what do you want. Because then they’re like ‘what do you 
mean, what do we want?’ Of course you want your family member to live forever. 
We don’t want them to die. Because if you say ‘what do you want’ then that 
implies that their thought is we want them to live, so do everything. (UW, PGY-6: 
6) 
 
“They might know that they’re not going to recover or they might have a very bad 
outcome, but they’re almost certainly going to say yes anyway because otherwise 
they would be the ones who say, “No, don’t resuscitate her.” Can you imagine 
living with that? But then if they’re thinking, “Oh, I don’t want her to suffer either 
or I don’t want her to be in a coma or have hypoxic brain injury” or all these 
things, they don’t want that either. But it’s still probably, they might feel that 
they’re giving them a death sentence by, even if you explain it and say, “No, 
they’ve already died, technically they’ve already died,” they probably would feel 
that they were the ones who said no, don’t resuscitate. I think that’s too much 
guilt for a family member to have to deal with.” (Addenbrooke's, F2: 16) 
 
Furthermore, surrogates are frequently unaware that there may be a physiologically false 
choice that resuscitation for example, would likely not work. Even if surrogates wish to 
de-escalate aggressive care at the end of life, they may find it very difficult to decline 
treatments offered, as it might be perceived as “killing” their loved one. This places an 
unfair and unnecessary burden and guilt on families, as it is not true. Respondents at 
beneficence-oriented hospitals mentioned the burden and guilt that these decisions placed 
on surrogates more frequently than respondents at autonomy-focused hospitals. These 
physicians at UW said:  
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“I feel that to give a family member a choice is a remarkable burden and for them 
to say don’t do anything more would be really hard. It seems at times more 
respectful rather than making them say those words but simply to say it’s time for 
your loved one to pass and we’ve done everything we can and we’re going to let 
him or she pass peacefully rather than forcing a family member to make that 
choice.” (UW, PGY-3: 11) 
 
“I generally make a point never to ask a family what do you want to do. I think it 
puts the family in a very uncomfortable position and implies that it’s their 
decision alone to terminate support, which I think is an enormous burden for a 
family to say. It makes you seem like a neutral party like, ‘what do you want? 
We’ll do whatever you want. Just tell us.’ That’s really unfair to family members. 
Most people, once you’ve gone through all that, we’re all usually on the same 
page. Fortunately overt conflicts don’t happen to me that frequently.” (UW, PGY-
6: 6) 
 
There were several mentions from physicians that when the medical team made 
decisions, family members were relieved to have the burden of decision-making lifted: 
 
“I’ve never had a family argue with me or the team because normally it’s such a 
relief that someone else is making that decision and that they don’t have to make 
any decision.” (UW, PGY-6: 7) 
 
“I certainly have had really meaningful conversations with families after their 
loved one has died and haven’t been coded where they were just incredibly 
thankful that decision was taken off their shoulders and that we were there talking 
to them the whole way.” (UW, PGY-3: 10) 
 
This British house officer said that taking on the responsibility of decision-making 
absolved surrogates from having to make these seemingly cruel decisions:  
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“I usually say I want to make it clear that it’s my decision to make. And I spin 
that positively and say it’s my decision to make, the responsibility lies with me, 
its not that you're having to make this decision, it’s my decision, I just want you 
to help me to get a feel of a few things that will help me make that decision. So 
that they're not, they're not feeling gosh I’ve just condemned my mother to death.” 
(Addenbrooke's, ST5 in Geriatrics: 10) 
 
Physicians often acknowledged treating the family rather than the patient. Treatments 
may be administered that do not benefit and potentially even harm patients, in order to 
help the family feel like they were “doing everything”. There are major problems with 
this term, “do everything,” which drives overly aggressive care by the failure to place 
reasonable parameters on the limitations of care based on physiology and patient 
preference. It also often reflects a false promise (on the part of the physicians) and false 
request (on the part of the surrogates) as modern medical technologies allow us an almost 
endless array of possible interventions and saying that everything will be done is an 
unreasonable and untenable promise. It then confounds communications and expectations 
on what actually can be accomplished.  
 
Furthermore, there are often disparate understandings of what “doing everything” entails, 
potentially meaning very different things to the patient/surrogate than the physician. For 
example, one interview study described the following, “One woman said that her 
grandson would definitely want everything done, but in the next breath said that when it 
was his time, though, they should just let him go, let him have some dignity (Drought and 
Koenig 2002).” This highlights the importance of avoiding terms such as “doing 
everything” and clarifying what is exactly meant by those terms rather than leaving it at 
that. 
 
There was much ethical uncertainty amongst respondents as to whether to respect the 
patient’s prior wishes or the surrogate’s wishes when they conflict:  
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“We felt this shouldn't be done anymore because it didn't feel like it was the 
patient who really wanted this. I think at the end of life for a lot of these people, 
they might be doing this to treat their family members. I guess there is somewhere 
a role for that, but I'm not sure. I think it depends on how much you think you're 
hurting the person in order to treat the family.” (Hopkins, PGY-1: 16) 
 
“It's a real challenge because you want to first do no harm and you don't feel like 
that's what you're doing, but sometimes the patient is not your only patient, the 
parents are your patient too. This little boy is going to die and Mom has to live 
with it to the rest of her life. So I think we will remind ourselves that this is an 
illness episode that we participate in briefly, whereas for the patient and the 
family this is everything - forever.” (Hopkins, PGY-2: 15) 
 
“I think that as a resident it’s almost cruel to us to resuscitate people when there’s 
no chance of bringing them back or it’s going to lead to a long ICU admission that 
they probably won’t survive. But some families take comfort in knowing they did 
everything. So it’s hard to say.” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
 
This fellow discusses his ethical reasoning for treating the family by performing 
resuscitation that would not work:  
 
“I don’t see the harm in trying. You could argue that yes, you are wasting 
resources but I really think in the big scheme of things if that’s what the family 
needs, then I would see more harm in not giving the family what they need 
because they are the ones who are going to be alive. The patient is going to be 
dead and probably not aware of what’s going on. So you’re not really harming the 
patient, right? But the family could go away with a lot of harm if the outcome of 
their death is not what they need it to be.” (UW, PGY-6: 7) 
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Section 6.3.4: Why Having Choice Isn’t Always Better 
 
A relatively unquestioned assumption of this discourse of choice amongst doctors is that 
choice is always better than no choice and that individuals are the best judges of their 
own interests. However, there are also significant burdens and costs to increased choice. I 
have already previously discussed the psychic cost of responsibility of deciding whether 
to “kill” their loved one, a decision that can cause significant harm. Social and legal 
sanctions on the choice maker, such as family discord and pressures to conform to certain 
choices potentially leave the surrogates worse off for having to make the decision.  
 
Gerald Dworkin provides many examples where expanding choices actually limits 
freedom and diminishes welfare in ways that are irreversible once the choice has been 
offered (Dworkin 1982a). For example, if blood is permitted to be sold rather than 
donated, the gift relationship is inherently threatened; altruism becomes unnecessary once 
blood is a commodity. Offering a choice can have inherent implications. For example, 
offering the option for remedial tutoring informs a pupil they are falling behind. These 
more general examples illustrate that the assumption that choice is always preferred to 
not having choice, as is the case in our individualistic societies, is not always the case.  
 
One could say that patients have the right to refuse to make a decision, but this is 
especially difficult given the inherent power differential between doctors and patients and 
something that patients may not think they are able to do. As Dworkin emphasises, it is 
already morally significant that the patient has been given the choice. The option to 
decline having a choice is already different than never having had a choice at all. The 
evidence for whether patients want to be the ones making the decisions is not entirely 
clear. One US study found that 97% of patients wanted to be told what was going on, but 
67% wanted the doctor to make the decision (Chung et al. 2012). Another study showed 
that 66% of patients though that resuscitation decisions should a joint decision between 
the patient and physician and 40% believed the decision should be made by the physician 
(Stolman et al. 1990).  
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In a meta-analysis of surrogates’ experiences with decision-making, most surrogates 
wanted to make life support decisions (55%) and 40% wanted to share the decision-
making with physicians (Wendler and Rid 2011). 29 of the 40 articles reported that a 
“substantial minority of surrogates experienced stress, anxiety, or other emotional burden 
as the result of making or helping to make treatment decisions for an incapacitated adult” 
and at least 1/3 of surrogates overall experienced a negative emotional burden.  
 
Another study of parents dealing with “tragic choices” in Neonatal Intensive Care Units 
in France and America is particularly noteworthy (Botti et al. 2009). In contrast to the 
US, where parents are given the choice of whether to remove their terminally ill babies 
off life support, French doctors generally make this decision on behalf of families.  
Qualitative interviews of these parents demonstrated that American parents struggled 
more to cope, have difficulty reaching closure, and experience a greater duration of 
psychological pain. They had greater guilt and self-blame and had a significant 
perception of a personal causal link to the negative decision and the death of their child, 
despite the inevitable terminal nature of their child’s condition. Parents are not able to 
blame it on bad luck or fate, but feel that they’ve had a hand in their child’s death.  
 
Section 6.3.5: Issues of Time 
 
Time is a structural constraint that hinders trainees’ capability to reflect and consider 
ethical principles. Issues of time arose frequently in interviews, both from the perspective 
of the patient and surrogate needing time to make decisions, but also the way that time 
and physicians’ schedules restricted the ability to have in-depth, focused conversations 
about resuscitation. Oftentimes the difficulty of translating theory to practise in medical 
ethics lies with the challenges that occur in the practice environment which challenge our 
abilities to achieve best practices. The following quotes emphasise the difficulties 
balancing daily workflow and necessarily time intensive end of life conversations. These 
quotes are in some ways concerning as the tone of these quotes imply a resignation to the 
inability to do the right thing due to structural constraints.  
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“There were several pressures to not have that conversation in as much depth. 
One was a time pressure. With increased demands to discharge patients more 
quickly and to pick up higher patients, you have less time than you had before. So 
when it comes down to having these kinds of conversations that require time. It's 
harder and harder to have them. I do try to at least briefly let the family and the 
patient know that I think this would do more harm than good. But I also let them 
know that it's their decision. In the past, I had been more aggressive about getting 
the ethics consults. Now, I've given up on that, again because of time constraints. 
If they've already made their mind about it, then I just respect their decision and if 
the patient suffers, then the patient suffers.” (Hopkins, Attending in Hospital 
Medicine: 7) 
 
“It always made me uncomfortable because if I had a senior resident that said, ‘I 
need to know the code status on you patient’, I can remember a few times 
thinking you’ve got to be kidding me, a code status conversation is a forty five 
minute discussion with this patient and you expect me to do that between now and 
five pm? Where are we going to make some time to actually do this? I remember 
feeling what I was being asked to do when I was learning was not consistent with 
where I knew I needed to end up. So there's a recognition that we were as a group 
doing it badly and I didn’t want to be a part of that, but I needed to pick my 
battles.” (Hopkins, Attending in Hospital Medicine: 6) 
 
“It’s difficult. Obviously it’s a nuanced, long conversation. Intern year on your 
fifth admission at two o clock in the morning, you have to present in like five 
hours and you still have to write three notes. It becomes very, very difficult. So it 
just becomes, ‘Oh have you guys talked about it, you know do you want 
everything done, do you want shocks, do you want chest compressions, do you 
want tube breathing machine? Yes, no, okay.’” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
 
These quotes highlight the importance of considering how theory is translated to practise 
in clinical ethics. Physicians that are overwhelmed by patient care are less likely to have 
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the capacity within the structure of everyday clinical practice to focus on ethical 
considerations.  
 
Section 6.3.6: Time to Shift the Focus From the Outcome to the Process?  
 
Patient centred care and personalised medicine are buzzwords in medicine today, but 
more thought should be given to how one achieves personalisation. Perhaps the best way 
to realise patient centred care in this particular context is to think about individualizing 
approaches to choice rather than the ultimate choice itself. Shifting the focus to the 
process would allow patients and surrogates the choice of how much choice they want in 
decision-making, rather than forcing a choice or giving false choices. 
 
The approach more frequently employed at beneficence-oriented institutions was a 
flexible, tailored approach towards decision-making. These physicians noted that some 
patients and surrogates were more interested in making decisions than others, and that a 
key facet of the ideal decision-making approach required understanding how much 
autonomy the patient or surrogate wanted in the decision-making process:   
 
“It’s hard to have a blanket approach to that. I think it’s really dependent on the 
dynamic of the family. If it’s a family that I feel like they need some guidance or 
direction or they’re having difficulty making that decision themselves, then I 
would give a stronger recommendation. If I get a sense that the family has thought 
about this and considered it, they understand it, and depending on their view and 
what their relationship is with the ICU team, I would be more inclined to let them 
come to that decision on their own.” (UW, Attending in Critical Care: 5) 
 
Beauchamps and Childress discuss the “triumph of autonomy” in American bioethics, 
and the fallacy of its critiques by pointing out that importantly “the duty of respect for 
autonomy has a correlative right to choose, but there is not correlative duty to choose 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013).” They further emphasise that “health professionals 
should almost always enquire about their patients’ wishes to receive information and to 
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make decisions.” While more experienced physicians and trainees at beneficence-
oriented hospitals more frequently recognised this, trainees at autonomy-dominant 
hospitals less often recognised that autonomy requires in essence, a choice of choice. As 
Daniel Sulmasy states in his support for a model of “substituted interests and best 
judgements”, decision-making should honour the diversity of patient beliefs about how 
decisions should be made, whether that be a desire for greater autonomy or deferral of 
decisional authority to loved ones due to their relationship or cultural norms (Sulmasy 
and Snyder 2014). 
 
Perhaps the ethical foci of autonomy and beneficence itself should shift from outcomes to 
the process that leads to the best decision. Beneficence and autonomy of choice would 
encourage physicians to identify cases where it would be in the patient’s best interest to 
have a choice in consultation with the patient. To give choice due respect, practitioners 
would need to carefully consider with beneficence how choice is enacted. Physicians can 
act with beneficence in structuring choice, which should begin by assessing and asking 
how much choice patients/surrogates want to makes. It allows surrogates to make not just 
the best decision, but allowing the best decisions to be made, in order to have the best 
outcome. Autonomy of choice allows patients the autonomy to choose how they want 
decisions to be made. The emphasis would be on their freedom to make decisions on the 
spectrum from accepting responsibility for decision-making, to allowing the physician to 
make a best interest decision based on his medical expertise.  
 
From this perspective, beneficence becomes aligned with shared decision-making. Shared 
decision-making holds a certain appeal to people who are wary of both extremes of the 
spectrum. Shared decision-making was conceived as a response to paternalistic practices, 
as a way to equalise the physician patient relationship and give patients and surrogates a 
voice. But as the pendulum has swung towards autonomy, physicians who felt that the 
focus has shifted too much towards autonomy began to also see shared decision-making 
as an opportunity to bring medical expertise back into the decision-making process 
(Billings and Krakauer 2011; Quill and Brody 1996). Focusing autonomy and 
beneficence on the choice itself allows us to embrace shared decision-making as part of 
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this process, where first patients and surrogates are asked their preferences in the actual 
decision-making process.  
 
It is important to note that this beneficence of choice lies closer to the UW model of best 
interest and differs from the UK’s traditional best interest oriented model. Although 
practices and policies are changing in the UK to ensure that families are informed and 
involved in end of life conversations, in reality, the degree to which doctors communicate 
treatment plans with patients needs to be improved (Parlimentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman 2014). UK physicians are mandated to act in the patient’s best interest, but 
this does not reflect the beneficence of choice that I described in this section. The UW 
appears to incorporate a beneficence of choice strategy into their DNR practices by 
focusing on a tailored approach to decision-making.  
 
This framework also implores trainees to pay closer attention to the intentional and 
unintentional effects of framing in their conversations. One could make a case for 
libertarian paternalism, where framing is deliberately used to act with beneficence. 
Framing is inevitable regardless of what is said, as choices are necessarily conveyed with 
a default one way or another. Defaults have been shown to significantly affect one’s 
choices in health care decisions (Halpern, 2007).  
 
Even when a physician attempts to remain neutral and say, “In the event that your heart 
were to stop, would you want us to restart it?” there is still a positive frame on the 
statement. As such, doctors’ attempts to frame neutrally are in actually framed with a 
positive default. Rather than make these choices haphazardly, why not recognise the 
inevitability of framing and appropriately use deliberate framing to act with beneficence. 
These issues of framing and persuasion will be explored further in Chapter 8.  
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Section 6.4: Understandings of Autonomy 
 
Section 6.4.1: Patient Understanding of Illness as a Challenge to Fulfilling 
Autonomy 
 
The attitudes of trainees at autonomy-focused hospitals reflect a commitment to a 
simplified dogma of autonomy rather than a nuanced understanding of what is required to 
truly respect autonomy. These trainees believed that autonomy was fulfilled as long as 
choice was given, regardless of whether the patient or surrogate had the information 
necessary to make the decision. In particular, the requirement of understanding and the 
preconditions necessary to fulfil it were often ignored. For example, they rarely 
considered the potential for illness, psychological duress, and emotions to hinder 
patients’ or surrogates’ ability to understand and act rationally and autonomously beyond 
that of mental capacity from a medical sense (Loewy 2005).  
 
While many trainees stressed the importance of autonomy, they simultaneously 
acknowledged that they did not think their patients necessarily understood neither the 
choices they were making nor its prognostic implications. This resident said:  
 
Interviewer: What is your understanding of the definition of autonomy?  
Respondent: I guess it would be the ability of the individual to determine 
their own destiny.  To be autonomous, you have to have 
capacity to use medical terms and you have to be making an 
informed decision knowing all the options. Having all available 
information is what you need to be autonomous.  
Interviewer: Do you think you give patients that?  Do they know the 
information to make a decision? 
Respondent: I think often times they don’t. 
Interviewer:  Do you think they understand what the severity is and what the 
prognosis is? 
Respondent: I think a lot of people don’t understand. 
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(Columbia, PGY-4: 9) 
 
Yet it was common for trainees at autonomy-focused hospitals to say that giving choice 
was the way in which they respected autonomy. In their minds, their role was to provide 
information about resuscitation, including the risks and benefits, but refrain from 
providing a recommendation since that was potentially seen as unduly influencing the 
patient with their medical “opinion”. This corroborates with criticism in the ethical and 
biomedical literature that practitioners “confuse the concepts of independence and 
autonomy and assumes that the physician’s exercise of power and influence inevitably 
diminishes the patient’s ability to choose…it sacrifices competence for control (Quill and 
Brody 1996).”  
 
Section 6.4.2: Prognostication and Truth Telling in Autonomy 
 
This discomfort stems in part from the difficulty of prognostication. It is frequently 
difficult to extrapolate population based prognostic indicators onto individual patients 
and physicians resist the attempt to do so. Although there are several epidemiological 
studies describing comorbidities and factors associated with low likelihood of survival 
following resuscitation (Larkin et al. 2010), most physicians are not aware of these 
statistics and tend to be overly optimistic about likelihood of success. One study showed 
that while 95% of physician survey respondents believed that there are some medical 
conditions where in-hospital resuscitation would be futile, these respondents 
overestimated the likelihood of survival to discharge following in-hospital CPR by as 
much as 300% for some clinical scenarios (Miller et al. 1993). Other studies on 
prognostic accuracy have shown that only 29% of physician predictions were accurate, 
with 63% of physicians being overly optimistic about prognosis (Christakis and Lamont 
2000). 
 
Many experts in palliative care recommend that physicians need to change what they tell 
patients about prognosis and ensure understanding, using the “Ask-Tell-Ask” approach 
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(Christakis 2001; Weeks et al. 1998). In practice, one study demonstrated that in only 
14% of family conferences did physicians check to verify that families understood the 
prognostic information (White et al. 2011). Another study showed that 69% of patients 
with incurable lung cancer and 81% with colorectal cancer did not understand that their 
chemotherapy treatments were palliative rather than curative (Weeks et al. 2012). This is 
likely due to a combination of factors including optimism bias regarding bad news, 
choosing not to believe bad news, lack of understanding of the message, or physicians not 
telling them or not adequately conveying the message (Smith and Longo 2012). This 
same study also demonstrated that these inaccurate beliefs were most prevalent amongst 
patients who rated their communication with their physician very favorably.  
 
In another sense, the willingness to tell the truth (i.e. accurate prognostication) might 
reflect courage shunned behind the façade of autonomy. It is difficult to tell the truth 
about a patient’s prognosis, especially given both the allure and frustration of prognostic 
uncertainty. Prognostic uncertainty gives some the justification to say that they can not 
tell the truth at all as it might be possible to beat the odds:  
 
“I have a very hard time saying there is no hope. Can I say with 100% certainty 
that we can’t bring you back if you were to code? I can’t say that. I’m not going 
to say it wouldn’t probably be better if I said, ‘definitely there's no chance that 
you would be able to come back to any kind of meaningful quality of life,’ but I 
have a hard time saying that.” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
 
The SUPPORT study showed that physicians often choose not to engage patients in 
discussions surrounding DNR (SUPPORT Principal Investigators 1995). Newer studies 
have continued to show that physicians delay discussions about DNR status and other end 
of life decisions (Keating et al. 2010). Others have shown that during direct observation, 
while two thirds of doctors tell patients that they have an incurable disease in an initial 
visit, only one third explain the prognosis (Kiely, Stockler, and Tattersall 2011). In 
practice, physicians and residents do not provide adequate information during 
conversations regarding resuscitation (Anderson et al. 2011; Tulsky et al. 1995). Doctors 
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are as prone as the general public to societal taboos against talking about death and do not 
enjoy having to give patients such bad news (Wise 2012). They are fearful of destroying 
hope and causing depression, but some studies have shown that that does not always 
happen (Mack and Smith 2012; Von Roenn 2003). Recommended ways to tell the truth 
include emphasizing that the patient will not be abandoned and that the doctor will help 
them live as long and as comfortably as possible (Smith and Swisher 1998).  
 
Being a physician necessitates actions that are unpleasant and in other contexts, taboo. 
Part of the goals of medical training are not only to learn the knowledge and skills of 
medicine, but also to establish the professionalism that allows them to cause physical 
pain and discomfort for the patient’s long-term benefit. Learning how to for example, 
insert a central venous catheter is as much about as the confident but compassionate 
willingness to put the patient through discomfort, as it is identifying the right vessel and 
insertion point.  
 
Similarly, physicians should take as seriously their professional duty to practise necessary 
emotional harm when required and develop a willingness to breaking bad news and 
convey truthful prognoses with skill. Learning the most sensitive way to break this bad 
news is similarly analogous to learning how to insert a central line in the most 
comfortable way possible. This is not to say that there aren’t barriers and challenges to do 
this. A recent study showed that patients found doctors who were less optimistic in 
delivering bad news were perceived to be less compassionate and less trustworthy (Tanco 
et al. 2015). More research and dialogue is clearly needed to explore the best ways to 
communicate in these conversations.  
 
Section 6.4.3: Balancing Principles  
 
Section 6.4.3.1: Conflicts or Harmony Between Autonomy and Beneficence 
 
The tension between autonomy and beneficence can be described as balancing an ethic of 
choice at the cost of doing what is good for the patient versus the “ethical obligation to 
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persuade patients from making a poor choice (Gillon 2015; Kong 2015).” In the medical 
ethics literature, beneficence is not defined as an imposition against an autonomous 
person’s wishes, but rather a responsibility of the physician to persuade and reason with 
patients. Faden further states that “professionals would be morally blameworthy if they 
did not attempt to persuade their patients to consent to interventions that are medically 
necessitated.” (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). If one accepts a definition of beneficence, 
which permits persuasion (rather than conflating it with paternalism), then the possibility 
remains open to simultaneously honour beneficence and autonomy. 
 
In contrast to this definition, trainees at autonomy-focused hospitals felt that autonomy 
prevented them from acting with beneficence, because their understanding of autonomy 
required them to withhold influencing recommendations. In essence, these trainees 
conflated beneficence with paternalism. When asked whether they would feel 
comfortable recommending against resuscitation if it would be in the patient’s best 
interest, they responded:  
 
“I think it’s not a very common practice. I feel like the standard is that it’s the 
patient’s decision. It would be great if there were some type of standard where 
you could make medical recommendations and then it may not be such a heartless 
thing to decide to do.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 13) 
 
“I have thought about that and I have wanted to say [my recommendation], but I 
never do because I feel that it is wrong, that it goes against ethics in terms of 
autonomy. You want to say it but at the same time but you doubt yourself. It is the 
family’s decision, not ours.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 12)  
 
These trainees more frequently perceived internal personal conflict between honouring 
autonomy and acting with beneficence. There was no space for persuasion and 
recommendation in these trainees’ understanding of beneficence, and thus there was no 
way to balance the two. These residents at the autonomy focused hospital said:  
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“If they say yes I want everything to be done, I do probably subscribe to 
autonomy over beneficence in the sense that…I don’t know, maybe I’m jaded too 
much in the sense that in this hospital I’ve seen people do so much to themselves. 
You know hopefully not in the hospital, it’s like I can’t force you to do the right 
thing.” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
 
“In terms of DNR discussions, it’s definitely more because of autonomy. Often 
we’ll think it’s not in their best interest. I think it would be extremely painful and 
uncomfortable and have very little benefit. But we err on the side of autonomy.” 
(Columbia, PGY-3: 10) 
 
These physicians frequently felt moral distress over providing treatments that they did not 
feel was in the best interest of the patient. However, by internalizing a discourse of 
choice, some respondents were able to absolve themselves of the moral distress of 
providing futile care. It is in part a coping mechanism as they must act within the system 
and subject themselves to the rhetoric of autonomy in order to make their lives easier. 
They were able to justify these behaviours by saying that it was what the patient wanted: 
 
“Because you know you are presumably doing something which someone would 
want, whether or not they were informed enough to know what it is they were 
asking for, but you are doing everything (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13).”  
 
Some physician trainees reflected upon the challenges between honouring patient 
autonomy at the expense of acting in a patient’s best interest. One resident from 
Columbia said:  
 
“I think it’s really tough. It’s this American value that patients get to dictate. I do 
think you should have some say in how you end your life, that’s the right of the 
patient. But it’s difficult when the decision is to have everything done. And 
you’re wondering, what are we doing? We’re spending all of these resources, all 
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of this money on somebody that is clearly not going to benefit from it. So it’s 
tough…you see so often how poorly it turns out.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 13) 
 
It is concerning that physicians believe that some of the treatments they are being asked 
to perform are harmful to patients and potentially unethical. At best interest focused 
institutions, respondents felt that they were able to act in a way where autonomy and 
beneficence could be balanced, rather than stand in conflict. This fellow at UW said:  
 
“Oftentimes we’re prioritizing autonomy because autonomy in the 
best case scenario should be best interest patient autonomy, they should not be 
mutually exclusive but it should be the same thing.” (UW, PGY-6: 7) 
 
Unlike Columbia in New York where resuscitation must be performed if a patient or 
surrogate desires, UW encourages “informed assent,” whereby the clinician does not 
insist that the decision ultimately be made by the patient or family member, and explicitly 
recommends against CPR when clearly not indicated (Curtis and Burt 2007a):  
 
“Many of us will take that approach where we make sure that the family 
understands why CPR is not indicated but don’t give them the option, just say 
we’re not going to do it. If the family objects despite that than I often would not 
write DNR order because I feel like that just puts a barrier between me and the 
family. Most of the time the family doesn’t object. They will just let me make that 
decision.” (UW, Attending in Critical Care and Palliative Care Medicine: 2) 
 
“My belief is that the goal, this idea that this informed assent conversation what 
this does, it does align the best interest with the autonomy of the patient and lets 
the patient dictate what their goals are, and then finds the solution that best 
achieves those goals.” (UW, PGY-3: 10) 
 
This permission to withhold futile treatments gave physicians the space to act with 
beneficence: 
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“I think it’s easier to do here because there is an acceptance of not offering 
interventions that aren’t going to have clear benefit. I think just having that 
acceptance makes it easier to have the discussion…Ideally I like for patient best 
interest and patient autonomy to line up. To get to a place where if the patient 
understands that what we’re recommending is probably best interest. I don’t think 
they are completely mutually exclusive. If it’s not in the patient’s best interest, we 
shouldn’t be offering it.” (UW, PGY-6: 8) 
 
“I feel that when I watch the way they did it here and when I felt like I was doing 
it myself, it felt both morally and philosophically like I was being consistent with 
what I consider the rules of the game. I feel like I have embraced the idea of a 
physician as somebody who makes recommendations and offers alternatives 
based on assessment of best interest.” (UW, PGY-3: 10) 
 
Section 6.4.3.2: Balancing Justice 
 
To recapitulate what I described in Chapter 2, in contrast to US practices, UK intensivists 
are empowered to triage and refuse ICU admission to those unlikely to survive. For 
example, if a patient arrests, is resuscitated, regains a heartbeat but is unlikely to survive, 
in the US the patient would automatically go to the ICU. In the UK, the intensivist would 
likely refuse the patient, notify family, and withdraw life support. Therefore, there is less 
scope in the UK to accept futile treatments regardless of surrogate wishes. Physicians 
would for example say this to the patient:  
 
“You know [the ICU] won’t just say ‘well okay we’ve got a patient and now we’ll 
ventilate them just because they're handed a patient’…I often say to them, ‘Even 
if you would like to be considered for intensive care there’s absolutely no 
guarantee that intensive care physicians would offer you a place on the unit’. And 
if [the intensivist] were to ask my advice I would say that that wouldn’t be 
appropriate. Given that, I think it’s very unlikely that you would get an 
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opportunity for intensive care treatment and mechanical ventilation.” 
(Addenbrooke's, Consultant in Critical Care Medicine: 7) 
 
Many UK respondents noted that they were able to place limits on ineffective treatments 
by invoking institutional limitations such as NICE and NHS regulations. In the UK, 
physicians have the authority to unilaterally institute a DNR order (Bishop et al. 2010b; 
NHS 2011). As such, the burden does not fall to the doctor to say, deny fourth line 
chemotherapy to a forty year old mother with young children – a situation where giving 
the drug is easier to do than deny the drug. Instead, the doctor can instead say that it is 
not he who is denying the drug, but simply that the NHS will not pay for the drug, as it is 
not covered based on NICE guidelines. When asked whether justice factored into 
treatment decisions, and how the ethical principle of justice fit into their ethical thinking, 
many of the British physicians stated that consideration of limited resources rarely played 
a part on an individual level:   
  
“As an individual doctor treating an individual patient, I don’t think resources 
should come into it. I think you may have to have the discussion in a country or in 
a hospital about what resources are valuable that you can spend on patients, but I 
don’t think when you're treating an individual patient. It is a wider discussion to 
decide whether people over the age of X or Y or people with this condition get 
this drug. So that’s why things like NICE that decide that certain drugs are 
appropriate. The funding decisions need to be taken out of an acute clinical 
situation.” (Addenbrooke's, Consultant in Critical Care Medicine: 4) 
 
It was evident in interviews that although doctors believed that they did not allow 
distribution of limited resources to factor into decisions at the individual patient level, 
that societal and institutional prioritisations of justice subconsciously influenced their 
attitudes and behaviours towards individual decision-making. For example, the scenario 
described above regarding withdraw of life support following resuscitation during an ICU 
triage decision was deemed acceptable to UK physicians, but would likely be completely 
inappropriate to most US doctors. US doctors were also cognizant of justice concerns and 
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mentioned but did not act upon them. This difference reflects the relative positioning of 
justice amongst ethical principles, and the manner in which that influenced treatment 
decisions for the individual patient.  
 
One British physician’s perspective was particularly interesting. He believed that a 
doctor’s verbal limit was a way for families to still feel like they had “done everything,” 
rather than in the US where “doing everything” was a physiologic limit: 
 
“If they've protested to me and I've still said that I don't think we should do it, 
then they have tried everything they can try. So actually they even got the 
mentality well. In the end was we had the intensive care doctor comes along and 
said they wouldn't ventilate him again. I said, ‘Well, there's no point trying to 
restart his heart again because he'd be exactly the same, you can't go back to 
intensive care, we would just putting him through unpleasant experience we'd 
have to watch the heart stop again.’ But, they had the ability to feel that they've 
protested as much as possible and then they've all sit with me saying, ‘We're just 
not meant to do it’. Whereas if you said to the family, ‘He's very frail and he's old, 
his heart might stop, what would you like us to do if it stops?’ Then they're not 
trying their hardest and so they say, ‘Let's try’.” (Addenbrooke's, Consultant in 
Critical Care Medicine: 4) 
 
Section 6.4.4: Self-Surveillance Magnifies the Effect of Policies and Litigation 
 
This reductionist interpretation of autonomy appeared to be more prevalent in hospitals 
whose policies prioritise autonomy, but were less often seen in hospitals whose policies 
prioritise beneficence, suggesting that trainees feel constrained by these policies which 
shackled them to a dogmatic conceptualisation of autonomy, enforced by laws and 
policies rather than their own moral compass. One senior attending at Columbia said this 
as an example of common house staff thinking:  
“I have to do it because I cannot break the law. There are things in medicine that 
are ethical but not legal and there are things that are unethical but legal. I can be a 
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martyr to the cause and say, I refuse to resuscitate your loved one, but what is that 
going to accomplish? All that does really is it is going to push off to somebody 
else the unpleasant task of attempting resuscitation. So I can feel very holy about 
it but I don’t think it fair to my colleague who is going to carry out the 
resuscitation because they will go to patient services.” (Columbia, Attending in 
Pulmonary: 1)  
 
In New York, laws are most restrictively in favour of patient autonomy, stating that 
physicians must obtain consent from patient or surrogate before entering a DNR order 
“even if the physician concludes that administration of CPR would be ‘medically futile’” 
but even here, the policy does not advise against making a medical recommendation 
(Spitzer 2003). Indeed, Johns Hopkins’ policy states that it is a “physician’s 
responsibility to engage the patient/surrogate in discussion and advise him/her if it is 
consistent with expert medical opinion, that resuscitation may be futile or produce an 
undesirable outcome for the patient.”  
 
Policies favoring patient autonomy were put in place in order to prevent biased decision-
making partially based on unconscious factors (i.e. patient race, age, socioeconomic 
status), but the unintended consequences of these policies may have even more harmful 
effects. No hospital’s policy states that physicians should refrain from making 
recommendations, and does not require that physicians offer treatments that won’t work, 
but trainees at autonomy-focused institutions often over-interpreted policies in that way. 
This reflects not only their personal ethical beliefs shaped by their learning environment, 
but for some respondents, it seemed constrained by a fear of litigation – be it real or 
imagined: 
 
“I just think the idea of imposing [a DNR order], to me, all sorts of badness comes 
as a consequence of that mode of arrival at a code decision. Lots of patient 
dissatisfaction, well, the patient’s dead, but the patient’s family’s dissatisfaction, 
and the litigious nature of our society, like, I think badness comes from that 
(Hopkins, PGY-4: 12).” 
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This respondent reflected upon how legal concerns can become intertwined with what 
individuals might believe is normatively ethical:  
 
“…the fact that ethical principles get stacked to protect the institution, that’s 
definitely coming out of the ethics committee. There are hospital lawyers on the 
ethics committee. You know, I’ve had ethical decisions come down, obviously 
came out of the concern that the husband was going to sue us, therefore we should 
do what he says (Hopkins, Attending: 3).”  
 
However, the case for litigation being a major driving factor in decisions is not so straight 
forward. Several other respondents described feeling that litigation was not a significant 
concern nor contributor to their resuscitation decision-making practices: 
 
“Depending on how you weigh those [ethical] principles, I think you can make an 
ethical argument to say I’m implementing a DNR/DNI. I also, I don’t know for 
sure, but I think legally you’d be well supported to say that because you are a 
physician and you are allowed to impose these sorts of judgement…(Hopkins, 
PGY-4: 12)” 
 
“No, I don’t feel that drives most people in this system. I think we’re a huge 
system that’s self-insured and pretty protected from mal-practise insurance rates 
and things like that. So I don’t see much decision-making driven by fears of 
malpractise and try to discourage them whenever I see it (UW, Attending: 2).”  
 
These quotes demonstrate that fears of litigation are intertwined and perhaps conflated by 
fears of difficulties that may occur with families and discomfort with conflict: 
 
“I mean there's a legalistic aspect of it too. The ideal thing in that situation would 
be saying to the family, he probably would not want this. The right thing for the 
patient would be to let them pass. But if they insist on it, I don’t think you can 
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defend insisting. It would be a huge fight and you would probably be fighting it in 
court and all that kind of stuff because I’m sure they would be pissed off enough 
to sue you and all that kind of stuff. They would say, ‘how dare you make that 
judgement, we’re his family, we know the patient, and that’s right.’ (Hopkins, 
PGY-3: 13) 
 
“We still escalate care. I think you still just push straight ahead…I have been told 
this by many people before that the idea that the hospital does not want to create a 
scene. They never say lawsuit or anything like that. You do not want to upset the 
remaining family members for even patients who are in all senses dead already. 
And so you just if the family still pushes for it you go ahead and do it as much as 
you do, not necessarily [because you] want to (Columbia, PGY-3: 11’. 
 
As these quotes demonstrate, while litigation is an oft cited reason for overly cautious or 
overly aggressive practices in the US, there is much disagreement and uncertainty as to 
the actual extent of real or imagined worries about litigation. Notably, none of the three 
hospitals in the US have recently been subjected to legal issues due to the withholding of 
aggressive treatments or inappropriate resuscitation, but Addenbrooke's has recently been 
embroiled in a legal battle over improperly placed DNR orders in the Janet Tracey case18 
(Davies 2014). Although the doctors at the UK hospital were very cognisant of the case 
and had thought about its implication on their decision-making at the end of life, they 
nonetheless still appeared less concerned about litigation than the US respondents: 
  
“Not particularly, no…Generally what I’m being told from the senior clinicians is 
that you’re making the right decision for the patient. It’s the right decision legally 
as long as you inform the patient. You’re making clear your reasoning for that 
decision-making. That will usually stand up in terms of people getting sued when 
they do things wrong, not for doing the right thing (Addenbrookes, CT3: 13).” 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Please	  refer	  back	  to	  Chapter	  3	  for	  details	  on	  the	  Janet	  Tracey	  case	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This fear of litigation in the US reflects a self-surveillance that seemed to be a more 
powerful mechanism for societal control than the actual policies themselves. As Michel 
Foucault writes in Discipline and Punish, the invisible and all-encompassing nature of 
this surveillance, where the source of surveillance can come from any direction, be it a 
colleague, superior, patient or family:  
 
“The more numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are, the greater 
the risk for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his anxious awareness of 
being observed…He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which 
he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his on subjection 
(Foucault 1977).”  
 
This response in some ways demonstrates the social nature of concerns over litigation, 
and that that beliefs and behaviours play off of each others’ real or imagined fears of 
litigation: 
 
“I don’t [worry about litigation] but I’m a resident and that may change next year. I don’t 
want to say that my attendings do fear being sued, but if nothing else it’s developed a 
culture where some doctor was scared of being sued and they instilled a behaviour and 
the person became the next attending and they instilled the behaviour in the person below 
them so it could be a domino effect (UW, PGY-3: 11).” 
 
Section 6.4.5: The Importance of the Hidden Curriculum in Moulding Local 
Normative Ethical Beliefs 
 
An interesting finding in my study was what American physicians believed was ethically 
normative, how universal they believed them to be, and how local these understandings 
in actuality were. There was a belief that what was ethically normative at their institution 
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was ethically normative universally in the US. When I interviewed doctors at Hopkins 
and Columbia on the East Coast the US, many physicians stated as a universal fact that 
no American physician or patient would likely accept an approach where physicians 
made explicit recommendations against a treatment that were unlikely to work.  
 
“If I bring in my 85 year old mother with Alzheimer’s disease who is non-verbal 
and has a feeding tube and pneumonia, and I say in the US, I want her intubated 
and in the ICU and I want you to keep her alive as long as possible. You might 
get an argument from the doctor, you are sure you want this? But when push 
comes to shove she will go, she will be intubated and she will go into the ICU. In 
England I suspect it would be, well your mum has had a good life, it is really time 
now and I suspect they will not be given the choice. Over here ultimately it is the 
choice of the family.” (Columbia, Attending in Pulmonary Medicine: 1)  
 
It was thus especially interesting subsequently interviewing at UW in the Pacific 
Northwest, where ethical norms appeared to favor beneficence or in many cases, aim for 
balance between autonomy and beneficence. Many physicians at this hospital practised 
and accepted the concept of informed assent. Although UW’s policies did not endorse 
unilateral decision-making in the way that the UK does, there was a distinct 
understanding that unrestricted choice of resuscitation was not always appropriate. In 
essence, UW’s doctors had attitudes and beliefs about DNR decision-making that were 
more similar to British doctors than doctors at the other American sites.  
 
There is likely no significant difference in the formal ethical training in medical school 
received by house staff at these four hospitals, since trainees come from medical schools 
around the country before beginning residency at these respective institutions. It speaks 
to the power of the hidden curriculum of these hospitals in modulating not only their 
understanding of ethics, but also their beliefs about what is ethically normative. It reflects 
the is/ought distinction in ethics that I described briefly in the beginning of my methods 
chapter, which emphasises that because something is done in a certain way, does not 
mean that it should be done in that way (Hedgecoe 2004; Ives and Draper 2009). In 
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practice, physicians’ understanding of what ought to be done appeared to be influenced 
by what people were already doing. Values that were seen as distinctly and universally 
American are not necessarily universal, and can be moulded by the institution’s cultures 
and policies.  
 
Section 6.4.6: Critiques of Autonomy in Practice 
 
Reductionist interpretations of autonomy and choice are riddled with contradictions 
(Dworkin 1982b). If informed consent and choice are so ethically imperative to the 
practice of medicine, why is choice not offered in every possible circumstance? Doctors 
still often choose when they decide to allow patients to make decisions. Although studies 
have shown that some patients would like to make decisions as routine as antibiotic 
choices (12% in one study), doctors generally do not offer this option to patients 
(Johnson et al. 2011). So why are these unattainable standards taken so seriously and how 
can we morally justify applying them only in select circumstances? Doctors make 
countless unilateral decisions throughout the course of a hospital stay, but subsequently 
present patients with a choice of whether they want resuscitation at the end of life. Is this 
is as paternalistic as the paternalism that medicine has sought to distance itself from? As 
one interviewee stated:  
 
“You offer somebody something, then ask them what they want, then say I don’t 
really like the answer, that seems adversarial. In the UK it seems that they just 
don’t offer something and simply go with the decision that’s appropriate and 
makes more sense. It doesn’t make sense for me for us to do as we do in the US to 
offer a choice, not like the choice, and then say it’s not the right choice. You 
either offer it with respect saying this is going to be the decision, or not.” (UW, 
PGY-3: 11)  
 
Far from actually challenging medical authority, this right to refuse or accept treatment 
choices is merely a small concession that physicians have given to patients to provide the 
illusion of challenging medical authority without actually securing truly meaningful 
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independence (O’Neill 2002). Although patients have the right to refuse treatments, their 
choices may be false choices. In the case of futile resuscitation, there is merely an illusion 
of choice between life and death, and yet, when given the choice, it is difficult to say no. 
In informed consent more generally, treatment may be the only option, and so consent 
becomes a hollow gesture. In practice, physicians have tremendous power to sway 
patients into agreeing to procedures in ways that may be inconsistent with autonomy, 
regardless of whether an informed consent form was signed. I will discuss this in detail in 
relation to manipulation and framing in DNR conversations in Chapter 8. These choices 
can also become a burdensome forced choice, if the patient or surrogate does not want to 
make decisions and would prefer to defer choice to the physician.   
Although there has been a shift of power from the physician to patient over the past 
several decades, physicians are still dominant in the relationship. As discussed above, the 
manners in which choice is given still places power distinctly in the physician’s hands. 
And yet, the language in the interviews, particularly in trainees who operate at the bottom 
of a structured hierarchical system, was often one of powerlessness to provide care in the 
patient’s best interest: 
“The family wanted to do everything and it didn’t seem like the patient’s wishes. I 
wish I could have just said, I think it’s not really medically indicated and we’ll 
make sure that she’s comfortable.” (Hopkins, PGY-2: 15) 
In this current system, neither party feels satisfied nor in control. The choices given to 
patients have not actually helped secure patient autonomy, but have succeeded in 
changing physician’s perceived authority in ways that potentially harm the patient and 
contribute to practitioner moral distress.  
This foisting of responsibility onto the patient reflects a neoliberal conception of 
autonomy where positive freedoms and empowerment exaggerates an individual’s actual 
power, thus implying that people are only to blame themselves when they fall ill 
(Crawford 1977).” It also reflect an ethical thinking that ignores the inherent power 
differences between the doctor patient relationship, where autonomy might be 
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experienced instead as abandonment (Hedgecoe 2004). In the case of surrogate decision-
making in resuscitation, this responsibility results in surrogates feeling guilt and blaming 
themselves for their decisions. On the other side, this “discourse of the patient as agent 
has been used in clinical consultations to constrain doctor’s responsibility for patient 
suffering (Salmon and Hall 2003).” This discourse of choice inadvertently teaches young 
physicians to escape the responsibility of delivering potentially harmful care, absolves 
them of risk of litigation, and permits physicians to manage their time more efficiently:  
“it’s what makes the decision-making easier. In the old days, paternalism made it 
easier. You didn’t talk about things with patients, but today you can’t do that 
anymore. You still want to make the decision-making easy. You’re still under the 
gun as an intern. You still have too many things to do and too few minutes to do it 
in. And so they’re going to find the next easiest way. They can’t get away with 
paternalism anymore, so they just go in they say, ‘yes, no we’ll do whatever you 
want’, and they don’t spend a lot of time on the decision-making.” (Hopkins, 
Attending in Oncology: 2) 
 
Section 6.5: Conclusion 
 
While the initial ethical foundations of principlism were grounded in moral reasoning, 
due to time constraints as well as policies and cultures that simply prioritise autonomy, 
reductionist19 notions of autonomy have been canonised to mean unlimited patient 
choice, encouraging trainees to employ checklist thinking. There is a certain allure to 
principlism in applied medical ethics primarily because it can be easily simplified and 
understood by practitioners with little ethics training. There is simply not enough time or 
space in their busy schedules to contemplate moral philosophy. The great dilemma in 
medical ethics is how to translate the rigourous, nuanced thinking that theoretical ethics 
affords, into clinical practice where practitioners are often deluged with competing 
demands and too little time.  
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An interesting relationship emerged in the interviews between autonomy and checklist 
thinking, and beneficence and more reflective thinking. Why was it that there was a 
correlation between beneficence-focused cultures and more reflective, nuanced 
understandings of autonomy, and between autonomy-focused cultures and checklist 
thinking? One possibility is that if autonomy is believed to merely equal choice, the 
“correct” action is straightforward and can be easily simplified to a checklist. This 
mentality is easily operationalised in a busy resident schedule. It is similar to the notion 
of “Getting the DNR” which is much lamented in the palliative care world as a checklist 
strategy for end of life care conversations, which should instead focused on a discussion 
of the patient’s goals and values (Billings 2012). In contrast, if one employs a 
beneficence-based approach, there is no single easy action that allows a physician to act 
ethically with beneficence. It is an inherently nuanced concept, requiring a tailored 
approach to each individual scenario taking into considering the medical situation, 
patient’s values, culture, etc.  
 
Furthermore, it appeared that there was more “give” in the system regarding end of life 
decision-making at beneficence-focused institutions, as compared to autonomy-focused 
institutions. Trainees felt more constrained by policies that seemed to demand a specific 
action. By this, I mean that there was more leeway and space for doctors to make medical 
decisions that were not strictly rules-based. This concept is similar to that of the previous 
paragraph on an institutional level. Because policies in autonomy-focused hospitals 
prioritised autonomy above all others, there tended to be less space for trainees to 
develop their own moral confidence about what was ethically right and wrong beyond the 
giving autonomy. In contrast, at beneficence-focused institutions, best interest decision-
making necessarily gave physicians the freedom and flexibility to be reflective and act 
ethically based on the specific situation at hand.  
 
These findings highlight the importance of the hidden curriculum and the unintended 
consequences of policies that encourage an unreflective black and white depiction of 
autonomy. My research suggests that policies that orient institutions towards a focus on 
autonomy rather than beneficence affects the ways practitioners conceptualise autonomy, 
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give recommendations, and understand their relationship with and responsibilities 
towards their patients. Trainees at autonomy-focused institutions often felt shackled by 
demands for autonomy and developed a perceived powerlessness where they felt 
constrained and sometime unable to act with beneficence, causing in some cases 
significant moral dilemmas between conflicting principles. Although this was a 
qualitative study that will need to be further validated, there are promising suggestions 
that policies and cultures oriented towards beneficence have the potential to ameliorate 
these reductionist tendencies. 
 
While principlism might be the most practical ethical framework for physicians, perhaps 
ethics curricula should also broaden its scope to also include other frameworks, which 
might challenge medical trainees to think about ethics beyond a checklist manner. 
Perhaps for example, as Annemarie Mol suggests in her book, Logic of Care, the focus 
should shift from a discourse of choice, to a logic of care where we can return to 
medicine’s original values of compassion and relief of suffering that were lost with 
medicine’s shift to consumerisation (Mol 2008).  
 
Ethical approaches that might help the profession reclaim their original call to healing 
might include expanding medical education to also include a virtue ethics approach. On a 
more individual level, virtue ethics focuses on the character of the moral agent as the 
basis of moral decisions rather than the rightness of the action (Gardiner 2003). 
Beauchamps and Childress discuss the five virtues applicable to medical practioners to 
be: trustworthiness, integrity, discernment, compassion and conscientiousness 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013). A virtue ethics approach would allow the medical 
establishment to emphasise internal sources of moral good, rather than externally 
enforced approaches that are rule based and thus easily circumvented or enacted without 
reflection. It encourages the physician to “take responsibility as moral agents and to fully 
acknowledge the humanity of others (de Zulueta 2015).”  
 
Another alternative to the justice-based approach is care ethics, which focuses on 
relationships rather than the individual. Similar to virtue ethics, it focuses on the practices 
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and values that a caring person has in order to care for others. It focuses on the moral 
importance of meeting the needs of others whom we take responsibility for. By placing 
care in the context of social relations, care ethics helps create communities that foster 
healthy social interactions rather than individual self interest (Gilligan 1990). Ethics of 
care also places great value in emotions, rather than rejecting them, as is often done in 
rationalistic moral theories (Held 2007). It recognises that emotions such as sympathy, 
empathy, responsiveness and sensitivity are moral emotions that should be cultivated to 
help us become moral beings. Given the degree of moral distress experienced by trainees, 
recognizing rather than suppressing emotions would allow house staff to better care for 
themselves, and by doing so, enhance their ability to care for others.  
 
Some might argue that a care or virtue ethics approach might be too abstract for the 
clinical setting, where discrete situations arise necessitating an actionable approach 
(Allmark 1995). That after all explains the appeal of the checklist approach to 
principlism. I agree that neither virtue nor care ethics can practically replace principlism. 
However, as my research suggests, the effects of the cultural milieu and hidden 
curriculum cannot be ignored. More needs to be done to foster cultures of ethics that 
allow trainees to internalise moral goodness, rather than policies and checklist ethics that 
lies extrinsic to the individual’s identity.  
 
There has been a growing realisation in medical education of the need to foster greater 
humanism, empathy and compassion in medical trainees. Expanding ethics curricula to 
include awareness and understanding of other ethical frameworks would expose young 
doctors to the broader frameworks that guide ethical behaviour and influence the overall 
culture of the institution. The justice-based approaches of principlism will appeal to the 
need for a basic ethical standard and a simple, practical way of conceptualizing complex 
ethical dilemmas. Care and virtue ethics could then complement this by influencing the 
cultural milieu within which trainees learn and practice, allowing them to internalise 
moral character and embrace the roles of emotions, compassion, and suffering in moral 
decision-making.  
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In this chapter, I described a need to shift from beneficence of the outcome, to a 
beneficence of process. Questioning the inherent power differences between doctors and 
patients, I discussed how this focus on autonomy as merely choice disempowers rather 
than empowers patients. Yet, I also described the ethical tensions felt by physician 
trainees who felt unable to balance beneficence and autonomy leading them to feel 
morally compromised. I expand upon these concepts in the next chapters by exploring 
further the alienating and empathy decreasing effects of this perceived powerless and 
inability to act in what physicians believe are in a patients’ best interest.  
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Chapter 7: Moral Distress and Alienation in US Physician 
Trainees Regarding Futile End of Life Care20 
 
In this chapter, I describe how physician trainees associate their obligation to 
offer choice with a perception of powerlessness over their ability to guide 
patients towards treatments that would be in the patient’s best interest. Feeling 
forced to provide treatments that they believe are harmful threatens their moral 
personhood and professional self-identity. These physicians experience 
significant moral distress and emotional angst over seeing patient suffering, 
and they in turn suffer.  
 
Section 7.1: Introduction 
 
Earlier in this thesis, I described how physician trainees at autonomy-focused hospitals 
appeared to equate autonomy with choice and as a consequence, did not feel comfortable 
constraining choices by making clinical recommendations regarding resuscitation 
decisions even if they felt that resuscitation would be inappropriate. In the preceding 
chapter, I discussed how this emphasis on choice betrayed a simplistic understanding of 
autonomy and principlism as a whole. Young physicians have fully embraced the 
necessary shift towards patient autonomy described in chapter 2, but an unreflective 
focus on choice and hesitation to provide recommendations provides a distorted illusion 
of autonomy. Unfortunately, this autonomy in practice may be more harmful than 
helpful, as it places the burden of decision-making onto patients and surrogates without 
giving them the tools and guidance necessary to make informed decisions. Offering 
treatments that violate good medical practice not only results in false hope and false 
choice, but may also compromise the physician’s professional integrity (American 
Thorasic Society 2015).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A paper based on this chapter has been published in the Journal of General Internal Medicine entitled 
“Moral Distress Amongst Physician Trainees Regarding Perceived Futile Treatments at the End of Life: A 
Qualitative Inquiry” (Dzeng, Colaianni, Roland, Levine, et al. 2015). 
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Another harmful consequence of equating autonomy with choice is its effects on moral 
distress and empathy in American physician trainees, which arose as a major theme in my 
interviews. Themes that emerged amongst American trainee respondents relating to 
moral distress included language of torture and suffering, practitioner suffering, 
powerlessness, hierarchy, and dehumanisation. Physician trainees at UW also discussed 
institutionally organised coping mechanisms such as conversations about patients who 
died. 
 
In this chapter, I will describe how physician trainees associate their obligation to offer 
choice with a perception of powerlessness over their ability to guide patients towards 
treatments that would be in the patient’s best interest. More insidiously, feeling forced to 
provide treatments that they believe are harmful threatens their moral personhood and 
professional self-identity. Their over-interpretation of policies and reductionist 
interpretation of autonomy create institutionally influenced, self-imposed constraints that 
are distressing. These physicians experience significant moral distress and emotional 
angst over seeing patient suffering, and they in turn suffer.  
 
I argue that this has significant implications for the health of the medical profession and 
for individual physicians. Firstly, in order to care for others, one must first be able to care 
for themself. The moral distress they experience, and coping mechanisms of 
dehumanisation and detachment contribute to decreased empathy and burnout. Their 
perceived powerlessness to act in a patient’s best interest results in a withdrawal of 
responsibility for the negative consequences of care. They reason that harming the patient 
was acceptable, as it was the patient’s choice.  
 
These feelings of powerlessness and performing of meaningless events (i.e. futile 
treatments) that are out of their control contributes to an alienation that has significant 
implications for both the individual as well as for medical care. Marx’s theory of 
alienation focuses on the alienating aspects of the social and economic conditions of 
capitalism; the social processes affecting the medical profession described in chapter 2 
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are analogous, with alienation occurring as a consequence of this process (Sayers 2011). 
In this chapter, I primarily rely upon Rahel Jaeggi’s interpretation of alienation, which 
draws upon the philosophical traditions of Hegel, Marx, Heidegger and others. In her 
book, Alienation, she characterises alienation as the “absence of meaningful relationships 
to oneself and others, which manifests in feelings of helplessness and the despondent 
acceptance of ossified social roles and expectations (Jaeggi 2014).”  
 
There is a growing crisis in medicine where physician burnout, mental illness, thoughts 
of quitting, and suicide are an intrinsic problem (Dyrbye et al. 2008; Dyrbye, Thomas, et 
al. 2010; Shannon 2013). This is a deadly problem; two medical interns in New York 
committed suicide months after starting residency last year (Sinha 2014). Patients 
complain that physicians are unempathetic and uncaring, and yet medical culture 
dismisses demonstrations of emotion and empathy as weak and unprofessional and 
encourage physicians instead to display aequanimitas, or unperturbability (Dzeng 2013a; 
Johns Hopkins Osler Medical Residency 2014)  
 
Medical educators in the United States have struggled to counteract problems with 
humanism and compassion in several ways including selecting for more empathetic 
students or implementing courses designed to foster empathy. However, these 
interventions frequently focus on individual responsibility for problems associated with 
burnout and seek to remediate unempathetic trainees, rather than recognising the systemic 
challenges that may also be at the root of the problem (Hughes 2002; Paice and 
Hamilton-Fairley 2013). For example, residents struggling with burnout are asked to take 
responsibility by sleeping more and pursuing wellness activities – something impossible 
in the face of 80 hour per week of a physically and emotionally exhausting job (Krasner 
et al. 2009; Peteet 2015).  
 
Section 7.2: Futility 
 
Physicians experience moral angst regarding overly aggressive or “futile” care 
(Schneiderman 1993). The definition of futility is controversial and no one definition is 
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universally accepted. One definition describes futility as an “effort to provide a benefit to 
a patient that is highly likely to fail and whose rare exceptions cannot be systematically 
produced (Schneiderman and Jecker 2011).” In one study, nearly 70% of house staff 
reported acting against their conscience in the care they provided at the end of life, with 
four times as many respondents concerned about overtreatment than undertreatment 
(Solomon et al. 1993). Surveys have shown that clinicians sometimes perceive care in the 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) to be inappropriate or futile, which result in high costs and 
resource utilization (Huynh et al. 2013; Piers et al. 2011). Practitioners can also 
experience a high level of moral distress regarding treatments they perceive to be overly 
aggressive but are unable to conscientiously object to, creating feelings of powerlessness 
(Hefferman and Heilig 1999; Murphy and Finucane 1993).  
It is important to note that I was interested in trainee physicians’ attitudes towards 
treatments that they perceived to be futile, thus reflecting a broader typification of 
respondents’ understanding of futility. This is because I was primarily interested in their 
perceptions and reactions to clinical situations that they personally felt were futile and 
distressing. When respondents were asked to describe relevant cases specifically in the 
context of a decision to pursue resuscitation, the majority of these cases appeared to 
fulfill the standard definitions of futility described earlier in the thesis. Some examples 
include these patients:  
“This person with advanced dementia had been in and out of the ICU multiple 
times that month at baseline, and had very poor cognitive functioning. She had no 
quality of life. She was septic. I forget how many other comorbidities on board. 
Just kind of a remote family member was making the decisions, and had spent a 
week in the ICU remaining full code despite everybody’s efforts and ultimately 
coded again and didn’t survive. But I think that’s a pretty common scenario 
especially in the ICUs and everything.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 13) 
 
“This ICU patient was in severe sepsis and septic shock. There were multiple 
rounds in this. The family said absolutely we are going to do everything and he 
was on four pressers. Was on every antibiotic and had all of these MDR bugs. He 
had peritoneal signs but was not a surgical candidate. The family was just very 
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upset and it had been going on for quite a while so it’s like a lot of ICU resources 
even though we think that there is nothing further to be gained by it. This guy was 
on CVVH. He was intubated.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 11) 
 
Section 7.3: Site-Specific Variations in Futility Policies and Practices 
 
Johns Hopkins has a futility policy. UW has a futility clause that is incorporated into their 
DNR policy. Columbia does not have a futility policy at all. Given that New York state 
law requires physicians to perform resuscitation even if the physician believes that it 
would be medically futile (Spitzer 2003), one key informant and respondent at Columbia 
said, “I could never see that happening any time soon, honestly.” Similar to their 
awareness of resuscitation policies, trainees were generally not aware of futility policies 
nor DNR policies but appeared more aware of the culture of their institution regarding 
these policies rather than the policies themselves. 
 
While most hospital policies and state laws, do not require physicians to provide futile 
treatments, the privilege to act according to one’s moral beliefs is primarily held by the 
attending physician. Even so, attendings may find it difficult to act in accord with their 
moral convictions. While ethical objections against futile treatments in theory allow them 
to transfer patients to the care of another physician or institution, this is in practice 
challenging. Few hospitals are willing to accept patient for futile care and the patient may 
be too unstable to survive a hospital transfer.  
 
Hopkins’ policy for example, allows members of the health care team to request not to 
participate in patient care that “conflict with their strongly held personal cultural values, 
ethics, or religious beliefs (Johns Hopkins Hospital 2013).” In practice, this is also rarely 
seen. Many are unwilling to do so because they do not think they would not be 
institutionally supported in the decision despite the policy. Furthermore, given the 
tremendous residency workload, most house staff also refrains from choices, which 
would further burden their colleagues.  
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It is notable that these themes of moral distress did not frequently arise in interviews with 
UK respondents nor with experienced physicians. I suspect that this might be in part due 
to UK physicians being more empowered to make resuscitation decisions. This is 
especially relevant in situations where a patient has a cardiac arrest whilst being “full 
code,” and the hospital team is unable to discuss prognosis and treatment options with the 
family. Physicians of ST3 level or higher in the UK have the authority to halt an 
ineffective resuscitation. In contrast, in the US, only an attending physician with the 
consent of a family member if possible, are permitted to halt a futile resuscitation.  
 
Because attending physicians are not in hospital at all hours of the day, there are 
frequently situations where the code team is called to a futile resuscitation but must carry 
on resuscitating the patient until the code is “called21.” Notably, the code team leader, 
who is usually a second or third year resident, does not have the authority to discontinue 
a futile resuscitation unless ACLS has been fully attempted and there is no 
physiologically realistic possibility of establishing a viable heart rhythm. As such, there 
are systematically mandated situations where futile resuscitation must be performed in 
the US but less so in the UK. This likely contributed to a greater propensity for moral 
distress in American physician trainees due to perceived futile treatments.  
 
Interestingly, these themes of moral distress that I will describe in this chapter appeared 
both amongst trainees at Columbia, Hopkins, and UW. Given my findings regarding the 
differences in ethical thinking, willingness to recommend, and communication strategies 
between trainees at autonomy focused and best interest focused institutions, I would have 
expected trainees at the UW to demonstrate less moral distress than trainees at Hopkins 
and Columbia. This was indeed the case amongst fellows (approximately PGY 4-6) at 
UW, but residents at UW (PGY 1-3) appeared to have similar levels of moral distress to 
residents at other American institutions. Perhaps the effect of hierarchy and inexperience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 American term for when the code team leader decides there is no physiologic possibility of re-
establishing a viable heart rhythm (i.e. when there is no shockable rhythm or after prolonged periods of 
aystole despite all possible ACLS interventions). The code team leader at the hospitals in this study are 
usually junior or senior residents (PGY 2 or 3).  
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is still stronger than that of best interest oriented policies and cultures. Further research 
will be needed to explore possible reasons for these findings.  
 
Section 7.4: Themes of “Torture” and “Suffering” 
 
While definitions of futility are controversial, what is perhaps more relevant in this 
chapter are trainees’ perceptions of treatments and the effects these treatments have on 
practitioner suffering and moral distress. As such, it was particularly notable that the 
words “torture” and “suffering” were frequently used to describe therapies that 
physicians felt obligated to inflict upon their patients. Several residents and fellows 
believe that some of the things they have had to do to patients at the end of life were not 
in a patient’s best interest.  
 
“It felt horrible. I felt like I was torturing him. Absolutely torturing him. He was 
telling us we were torturing him. I did not think we were necessarily doing things 
for the patient. I think that a lot of times when we go aggressive care all the way.” 
(Columbia, PGY-3: 11)  
 
“I think that as a resident it’s almost cruel to us to resuscitate people when there’s 
no chance of bringing them back or it’s going to lead to a long ICU admission that 
they probably won’t survive.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 13) 
 
“We spend a lot of time at the end of life in the ICU torturing our patients and so, 
I can’t in good conscience say that our current system really seems to serve the 
best interests of the patient because, we torture them before they die, even though 
we know that they are going to die.” (Hopkins, PGY-4: 12) 
 
“There are scenarios in people with metastatic disease that family members have a 
tough time being able to give up and that you know they're in DIC or something 
and they have this really gruesome bloody codes that feel wrong and feels like 
this is just not the way we should be doing it.” (UW, PGY-3: 12) 
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A common source of moral angst among respondents appeared to relate to situations 
where surrogate decisions appeared to go against prior patient wishes. Physicians 
questioned whether the families made decisions in the patient’s best interest. For 
example, one said:  
 
“It is just infuriating I think when the family is not there and they cannot see and 
that makes me feel like it’s morally wrong. I think when people see their family 
members suffering and they are there suffering with them I have more of an 
understanding of what they are feeling…I agree within giving choice when it’s 
the patient giving the choice, but oftentimes it’s the family member who is not the 
patient. Sure, if the patient says, “Torture me, I want everything done.” Okay fine. 
The family member is doing it for other reasons. Guilt, they can’t let go.” 
(Columbia, PGY-3: 11) 
 
Section 7.5: Perceived Powerlessness 
 
One theme that frequently emerged from these interviews was a perceived powerlessness 
over physicians’ ability to prevent harmful and futile treatments: 
 
“You know there's no good outcome. You just continue to code them and at some 
point they're going to die. You’ve wasted time and resources and you’ve just 
provided futile care and tortured somebody for however much more time. Then 
there's the whole disassociation where you want what's best, but what you can do? 
And what do you have ability to affect? You just do your job.” (Hopkins, PGY-3) 
 
Another physician remarked:  
 
“We do a lot of terrible things to critically ill patients and at the end of life. It’s 
routine care and I feel pretty numb to having done those things…it seems like 
there is no benefit and only risk. Yet I am accepting the patient to have these 
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procedures done to them. I’m in that situation all the time. I’m pretty powerless to 
do anything about it.” (Hopkins, PGY-4: 12) 
 
Some residents remarked specifically on ethical conflicts that occurred between patient 
autonomy and acting in the best interest of the patient or not harming the patient. They 
felt powerless to do what they thought was the right thing to do:  
 
”…and if they still say, yes, I want everything to be done, I do probably subscribe 
to autonomy over beneficence in the sense that…I don’t know, maybe I’m jaded 
too much in the sense that, in this hospital I’ve seen people do so much to 
themselves. I can’t force you to do the right thing.” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
 
“I think it’s really tough. It’s this American value that patients get to dictate. I do 
think you should have some say in how you end your life, that’s the right of the 
patient. But it’s difficult when the decision is to have everything done. And 
you’re wondering, what are we doing? We’re spending all of these resources, all 
of this money on somebody that is clearly not going to benefit from it. So it’s 
tough…you see so often how poorly it turns out.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 13) 
 
One senior attending and director of the ethics committee at one hospital site remarked 
that this was not an uncommon concern:  
 
“As I say, I often say, there are things in medicine that are ethical but not legal 
and there are things that are unethical but legal. I think the house staff…agree 
with me and are loath to carry out resuscitations on people who are hopelessly ill. 
They’re human beings. They feel that there is something wrong with this picture. 
It is not a mannequin. I think they are very sympathetic to it and they really find 
themselves in very uncomfortable positions. Some people are more sensitive than 
others, some will really recoil but do it, and others will say, ‘look, it’s part of the 
job.’ It is a lousy law but you have got to do what you have got to do.” 
(Columbia, Attending in Pulmonary Medicine: 1) 
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Section 7.6: Dehumanisation and Rationalisation 
 
This resident appeared to employ a process of dehumanisation to detach himself as a 
coping mechanism:  
 
“We’re abusing a body and I get that, but as long as I remember I’m only abusing 
a body and not a person, it’s okay. Frequently when it’s an inappropriate code, 
that’s what’s happening.” (UW, PGY-3: 10) 
 
One fellow (Columbia, PGY-5: 8) remarked that she had become “numb to it” and that to 
not reflect upon these ethical dilemmas was the only way to make it through training. 
Another resident worried that his cynicism would affect his behavior and attitudes 
towards patient care: 
 
“I have grown increasingly cynical about what medicine has the capacity to do. 
That has shaped how I converse with patients. I think cynically through residency 
I started to wish this person would be DNR/DNI because they are totally 
unfixable. The danger is that you get a bit sloppy and you’re looking for DNR as 
a way to off-burden your work and labor and not be meticulous.” (Hopkins, PGY-
4: 12) 
 
Section 7.7 : Moral Distress 
 
Moral distress occurs when individuals believe they are unable to act in accordance with 
their ethical beliefs due to hierarchical or institutional constraints (Jameton 1984). It is an 
affective response rather than a cognitive one, where the individual’s integrity becomes 
threatened due to actions and situations they feel are ethically wrong. Practitioners can 
experience a high level of moral distress regarding treatments they perceive might be 
overly aggressive and contributes to a feeling of powerlessness regarding treatment 
decisions (Hefferman and Heilig 1999; Murphy and Finucane 1993). Mobley et al. 
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hypothesised that the intensity and frequency of moral distress increased with exposure 
time to futile care, resulting in burnout and emotional exhaustion (Mobley et al. 2007). 
This can have significant negative effects on job satisfaction, psychological and physical 
well being, and self-image, resulting in burnout and thoughts of quitting (Dyrbye, 
Thomas, et al. 2010; Elpern, Covert, and Kleinpell 2005; Piers et al. 2011; Sanchez-
Reilly et al. 2013). 
 
While both doctors and nurses experience moral distress regarding end of life decision-
making, the vast majority of the literature on moral distress derives from the nursing 
profession (Hefferman and Heilig 1999; Oberle and Hughes 2001). Several qualitative 
studies on nurses have demonstrated that moral distress is associated with provision of 
treatments perceived to be overly aggressive and non-beneficial to patients (Austin et al. 
2009; Elpern et al. 2005; Ferrell 2006). A small number of studies have demonstrated 
moral distress in physicians but there is overall a paucity of research on moral distress in 
American physicians and even fewer specifically on physician trainees (Abbasi et al. 
2014; Houston et al. 2013).  
 
Many of the American trainees in my study expressed practitioner suffering and 
emotional angst over treatments they or their colleagues provided at the end of life: 
 
“Usually at this point the staff has felt so much moral distress caring for this 
person. It’s been some time where they just feel like they’ve been prolonging 
suffering as opposed to providing care.” (UW, PGY-6: 7) 
 
“I thought maybe we should involve ethics here because the house staff team 
were very, very demoralised by this gentleman’s care.” (Hopkins, PGY-4: 12) 
 
Trainees felt particularly distressed providing what they believed to be overly aggressive 
treatments such as resuscitation that was unlikely to work: 
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“A lot of things happen when you're a resident, traumatic things you know. There 
was this tiny 90 something year old lady, she was so thin you could count her 
every rib. I remember we had to code her and it was one of the worst experiences 
in my life…I had a lot of moral distress when I kept coding her for an hour.” 
(Hopkins, PGY-6: 10) 
 
“The person who was on call that night that he died, who gave him the bag of 
blood is still really upset about having done that, cause she feels she's prolonged 
his suffering…” (Hopkins, PGY-1: 16) 
 
“A lot of the paediatrics residents who coded her, from talking to them, it sounds 
like some of them felt somewhat violated by being in the situation where that sort 
of had to do, against any judgement that they have.” (Hopkins, PGY-2: 15) 
 
“I felt plenty of emotional distress from just a very human way about what we do 
to others and how I would never want that for myself or a loved one. And then 
also from a kind of societal and medical system vein, distress of just how much 
resources there were and energy we’re putting in to things that are practices that I 
don’t necessarily agree with.” (UW, PGY-2: 13) 
 
Section 7.8: Can Moral Distress Lead to Declines in Empathy and Burnout? 
 
Studies have shown progressive declines in empathy throughout medical training 
(Neumann et al. 2011). While empathy remains intact during the first two years of 
medical school, empathy decreases significantly in the third year of medical school as 
well as through medicine residency training (Bellini and Shea 2005; Hojat et al. 2004, 
2009). Empathy is defined as defined an emotional attunement and sympathy with the 
patient’s experiences and perspectives, as well as the ability to communicate this 
understanding in a therapeutic manner (Halpern 2003; Neumann et al. 2011).  
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Lack of empathy hinders communication with patients, while good communication has 
been shown to have a positive effect on patients’ quality of life, anxiety, depression, and 
outcomes, as well as lower incidence of malpractice lawsuits (Levinson et al. 2014; 
Stewart 1995; Stewart et al. 2000). Physician empathy has been shown to improve 
clinical outcomes, medication adherence, and patient satisfaction (Hojat et al. 2011; Kim, 
Kaplowitz, and Johnston 2004), while declines in empathy have been associated with 
physician mood disturbances and depression (Bellini and Shea 2005; Thomas et al. 
2007). These therapeutic effects demonstrate the importance of empathy in the quality 
and effectiveness of care delivered. The Institute of Medicine recognised the key role that 
empathy plays in professionalism and in the delivery of patient centred care, which they 
have listed as one of six main goals for quality health care in the 21st century (Institute of 
Medicine 2001).  
 
Increasing or maintaining empathy has been the focus of interventions which have 
primarily centred around time limited, discrete interventions such as patient narratives, 
communication skills training, and empathy focused training (Batt-Rawden et al. 2013).  
Understanding the root cause of empathy declines might help us design more effective, 
long lasting interventions. Trainee distress may be one root cause of empathy decline and 
cynicism (Dyrbye, Thomas, and Shanafelt 2005; Hojat et al. 2004, 2011; Lomis, 
Carpenter, and Miller 2009; Neumann et al. 2011; Patenaude, Niyonsenga, and Fafard 
2003; Sheehan et al. 2014; Thomas et al. 2007). This distress may result in burnout, low 
sense of well being, depression and poor quality of life (Dyrbye et al. 2008; Dyrbye, 
Thomas, et al. 2010). It can be attributed to experiences such as mistreatment by 
superiors, high work load, perceived ethical and professional dilemmas, as well as 
exposures to death and human suffering (Dyrbye et al. 2005; Neumann et al. 2011).  
 
Contradictions between the ethics taught in medical school and practices on the wards 
teach trainees that acts of “torture” and “suffering” are not only acceptable, but inevitable 
(Hafferty and Franks 1994). This might contribute to ethical erosion that occurs during 
medical training, which can be a result of an inability to address the moral distress and 
ethically unjustified treatments they are asked to provide (Feudtner, Christakis, and 
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Christakis 1994). Ethical erosion and empathy decline may reflect self-preservation 
through detachment and dehumanization (Jennings 2009).  
 
These experiences have significant impacts on a physicians’ professional identity and 
moral personhood during their most formative years and can contribute to empathy 
declines through justification of “torture” and “abuse” in the name of medicine (Epstein 
and Hamric 2009; Jennings 2009; Lemonidou et al. 2004). This professional dispensation 
to inflict pain is a necessary professional duty, but also engenders moral vulnerabilities 
(Colaianni 2012). Stepping over the fine line between inflicting necessary and 
unnecessary pain may contribute to the undesirable declines in empathy during medical 
training demonstrated by many previous studies in the United States (Bellini and Shea 
2005; Hojat et al. 2004, 2009; Neumann et al. 2011). 
 
This detachment threatens a trainee’s professional and personal sense of self and leads to 
burnout, which then further contributes to decreased empathy (Walocha et al. 2013). 
Characterised by exhaustion, depersonalisation and a diminished sense of 
accomplishment, burnout impairs medical trainee well-being and has been associated 
with self-reported unprofessional conduct and decreased altruism (Dyrbye, Massie, et al. 
2010). Burnout has also been associated with increased depression, suicidal ideations, 
and serious thoughts of dropping out (Dyrbye et al. 2008; Dyrbye, Thomas, et al. 2010). 
One study showed that burnout in the Hopkins Osler residency programme was found in 
76% of respondents (Block et al. 2013). 
 
Section 7.9: A Crisis of Alienation in Medical Education  
 
The medical literature on burnout tends to focus on the physical aspects of burnout such 
as stress, long work hours, and physical and emotional exhaustion (Block et al. 2013; 
Paice and Hamilton-Fairley 2013). A less acknowledged source of burnout are the 
existential threats to personhood associated with moral distress and alienation. The 
destructive potential of moral distress due to their obligation to provide perceived futile 
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treatments on the trainee physician can be elucidated by a closer analysis of trainee 
alienation.  
 
Alienated labor occurs when individuals have an inability to identify with what one is 
doing, an inability to exert control over what one does, and a feeling that the work that 
she has produced does not belong to her (Jaeggi 2014). It turns labor into meaningless 
events that the individual has no power to determine – the laborer is rendered powerless 
and impotent. Alienated labor has no intrinsic purpose, and is performed for its own sake 
not as an end, but only as a means to itself.  
 
These descriptions highlight the challenges of futile care and its role in alienation, where 
the object of labor is futile treatment itself. Providing futile care has no intrinsic purpose, 
for it will not achieve its purpose of successful resuscitation nor fulfil the patient’s goals 
and values. Futile treatments are provided for its for its own sake rather than for a health 
promoting end in order to achieve an external requirement set by structural constraints 
imposed by the system in part through a twisted logic of choice. The physician trainee 
feels powerless to negotiate these choices and feels no control over whether she can agree 
or refuse to provide futile care. The act of torture in the name of medicine alienates the 
young physician from meaningful labor and her ideals that led her to pursue a career in 
medicine. Her own self-identity, which is intertwined with her professional identity, 
becomes alien to herself.  
 
Notably, Jaeggi emphasises that alienation describes a relationship beyond that of 
dominance, but rather that of a more self-inflicted nature: 
 
“What we are alienated from is always at once alien and our own. In alienated 
relations we appear to be, in a complicated manner, both victims and perpetrators. 
Someone who has become alienated in or through a role at the same time plays 
this role herself; someone who is led by alien desires at the same time has those 
desires…Social institutions that confront us as rigid and alien are at the same time 
created by us. In such as case we are not – and this is what is specific to the 
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diagnosis of alienation – masters over what we (collectively) do (Jaeggi 2014: 
24).”  
 
As I argued in chapter 5, physician trainees, especially at autonomy-focused institutions, 
felt compelled to offer choice and withhold recommendations regarding resuscitation 
regardless of clinical scenario. Their failure to communicate contributes to conflicts with 
patients and families, and drives care towards the futile treatments that they feel 
powerless to control. These trainees, influenced by the structure of their institutions, are 
unable to realise how their own failure to recommend reproduces the very moral distress 
and conflict that alienates them.  
 
Section 7.10: Academic Medical Centre Hierarchy 
 
Physician trainees attributed some of their powerlessness to a clear hierarchy in academic 
institutions. This is supported by the fact that themes and patterns that emerged relating 
to moral distress appeared primarily amongst trainees and more rarely amongst more 
experienced physicians. Trainees felt unable to question the decisions of their attending 
even when their decisions seemed contrary to what they believed was right. As this 
resident noted, the trend was often towards more aggressive care:  
 
“I was taken aback. I had multiple patients where the patient and families were on 
board with comfort care. They had the goal of decreasing suffering and pain, but 
the attending was not on board with comfort care and DNR/DNI. That can be very 
difficult as a resident.” (Hopkins, PGY-2: 15) 
 
Another reflected on the overall hierarchy with less moral distress the more removed one 
is from patient care: 
 
“It’s very significant moral distress. There are definitely patients that disturb the 
nursing staff because they are the ones who have to carry out the doctor’s orders 
and who are at bedside seeing the effects of our treatment - seeing patients suffer. 
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That translates to the interns who are seeing the patients suffer, then the residents, 
fellows, and sometimes even attendings. So it goes up the chain, but I feel that 
each step is slightly further removed from the patient so they’re seeing less.” 
(UW, PGY-6: 7) 
 
Hospital hierarchies are important for patient safety and physician training, but ethical 
issues such as the extent to which aggressive therapies should be offered at the end of life 
are subject to significant personal variation with no precise right answer. They have not 
yet developed the experience or confidence to cope wit h these ethical conflicts. 
 
Among physicians, trainees are particularly vulnerable to moral distress because they are 
subordinate but on the front line (Winkenwerder 1985). This reinforces a sense of 
perceived powerlessness to act as independent moral agents against treatments that they 
believe may do more harm than good. Because trainee physicians are licensed to practise 
medicine, but do not have the experience or autonomy to make independent decisions, 
they may be particularly prone to moral distress arising from these situations in ways 
more similar to nurses than attending physicians. One study noted that decreased 
autonomy was associated with increased frequency and intensity of moral distress 
amongst nurses (Papathanassoglou et al. 2012). My findings highlight the need for more 
nuance and attention to the differences between trainees and attending physicians, rather 
than defining moral distress monochromatically across the entire range of experience.  
 
Section 7.11: Coping Mechanisms Against Moral Distress 
 
The most common coping strategies described involved formal and informal open forum 
discussions. Notably, UW had a culture that actively promoted such conversation: 
 
“When I was a med student, a patient I was taking care of died. I didn’t find out 
for two days because I had left. I felt hurt by that. I have noticed that whenever a 
patient dies here, whoever is taking care of them is notified, whether it’s by a 
quick text message or whatever. The first time an intern has  a patient who dies, I 
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talk about it with them before, how to approach the family and talk about with 
them afterwards about how they felt it went to the family. I feel like there is a lot 
of space for emotions here.” (UW, PGY-3: 10) 
 
“I got feedback from the ethics team that there were some people that were 
severely still morally distressed about what happened. Some of the providers 
actually reflected afterwards in mass emails and I think that also helped dispel 
some of the residual distress that remained. So yes, I definitely rely a lot on my 
colleagues and particularly ethics consult if there is something that I feel isn’t 
right.” (UW, PGY-6: 7) 
 
The medicine/paediatrics resident at Hopkins also described the culture being more open 
to discussing deaths in the paediatrics department: 
 
“I wrote it up actually in debrief at the end of my PICU but I just got all the 
sympathetic nods. ‘Yep, that's hard. Yeah, that is hard, yeah.’ As a department 
and we had a lot of chronically ill kids a lot of the house staff was taking care of... 
send the chief resident to all send death notices. FYI, everyone who took care of, 
you know, baby girl Smith, she passed away on Thursday.” (Hopkins, PGY-2: 15) 
 
The culture at UW seemed to be influenced in part by a palliative care-friendly 
environment, especially a programme called “death rounds.” This weekly session 
facilitated open discussion and normalisation of emotional issues, providing time and 
space for reflection within a busy resident schedule:  
 
“We have death rounds once a week and talk about our emotions around making 
these decisions. It gives us time to slow down and everybody can say their story 
about a patient that touched them, or a concern that they had, or that made them 
feel a little uncomfortable. It usually ends with people crying. The programme, 
the staff, and the residents tend to talk about emotions a lot. I think death rounds 
helps facilitate that.” (UW, PGY-3: 12) 
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“We have death rounds because the interns see a lot of things that I think they find 
rather disturbing. Often times when you start death rounds, every single death 
rounds that I have facilitated everybody’s dead silent. It takes one of the 
attendings or one of the senior residents to be like ‘wasn’t there that Mr. So-and-
So?’ Then once you bring up a case everybody starts talking or you’ll have 
somebody who starts talking and sometimes starts crying. I mean it’s really 
fascinating to see how they are very much at the beginning and then as soon as 
you bring one of the cases up that has been really challenging, then people all start 
talking.” (UW, PGY-6: 7) 
 
“I think just giving permission to talk about death and to talk about end of life 
issues normalises it for us and then makes it easier to talk about it with patients, 
because nobody wants to talk about death.” (UW, PGY-6: 8) 
 
Interventions that remind physicians of the humanity of their patients and reconnect them 
to their own humanity and purpose for their work can help counteract this process. 
Programmes such as Schwartz Rounds22 and Death Rounds, held at UW, serve as 
important coping strategies for dealing with these difficult issues (Hough et al. 2005; 
Penson et al. 2010). Providing a safe space where emotions and compassion are 
encouraged counteracts medicine’s culture of stoicism. In the harried life of a resident, 
encouraging opportunities to stand back and reflect, even as simple as a text message or a 
short time-out, gives permission to acknowledge the inherently challenging emotional 
and humanistic aspects of patient care. These conversations also promote the importance 
of physician self-care, which is an important first step in the ability to care for others 
(Rushton et al. 2009; Sanchez-Reilly et al. 2013). This in turn may help foster the 
empathy needed to remain a compassionate physician. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Schwartz Rounds are meetings for health care practitioners to reflect on the emotional aspects of their 
work. Originally developed by the Schwartz Center for Compassionate Healthcare in Boston USA, this 
program has been implemented by more than 375 healthcare facilities in the US and over 115 in the UK 
(The Schwartz Center Rounds 2015). 
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A crucial component of fostering open dialogue and awareness of issues surrounding 
death and dying are establishing palliative care friendly environments through palliative 
care and ethics services and consultations. While all three hospitals had palliative care 
and ethics consult services, some were more established than others. UW has had a long 
tradition of palliative care and is known to be exceptionally palliative care friendly. 
Hopkins had just established a palliative care service the year before interviews 
commenced. At all three sites, palliative care services are not only a source of clinical 
palliative care services, but serve an educational and supportive role for trainees. It is 
likely that the degree of ethics and palliative care presence may have a distinct influence 
on how well trainees cope with moral distress surrounding end of life issues (Olthuis and 
Dekkers 2003). Utilizing the existing infrastructure of palliative care and ethics consults 
may be a potential area for interventions seeking to decrease moral distress and foster 
empathy and compassion amongst physician trainees. 
 
Strategies to address moral distress have been explored in the literature including re-
calibration of emotional response and individual perception through “hedonistic adaption 
(Mobley et al. 2007)” or through “principled moral outrage”, where the “energy-draining 
frustration, anger, disgust and powerlessness” is balanced by principled compassion, 
integrity and wisdom that re-establishes the person’s moral value (Rushton 2013). Other 
strategies include increasing resilience, mindfulness, and developing methods for the 
promotion of inquiry and reflection (Back et al. 2015; Krasner et al. 2009; Rushton, 
Kaszniak, and Halifax 2013). Medical education should recognise the continuing 
importance of addressing these issues through focus groups, didactic sessions, and 
awareness of the training environment and culture regarding these issues. Root cause 
analyses and other systematic methods to understand structural and organisational factors 
can also help recognise and address sources of moral distress (Rushton 2006). Policy 
oriented interventions include a statement by the American Thoracic Society on 
situations that a clinician might morally object to, that seeks to establish institutional 
norms that allow for practitioners to personally excuse themselves from morally 
problematic situations (Lewis-Newby et al. 2015). 
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Section 7.12: Conclusion 
 
Ethical challenges are common at the end of life; the uncertainty of prognosis and the 
ethically permissible boundaries of treatment create confusion and conflict about balance 
of benefits and burdens experienced by patients. This chapter sheds light on a significant 
cause of moral distress amongst physician trainees when they feel obligated to provide 
treatments at the end of life that they believe to be futile or harmful. Their words - 
“torture”, “gruesome”, “abuse”, “mutilate”, and “cruel” evoke images more fitting of 
penal regimes than hospitals. The moral toll exacted upon these physicians is evident in 
their descriptions of feeling “violated”, “traumatised”, and “morally sick to my stomach.”  
 
In light of this perceived helplessness, physician trainees can become emotionally 
detached, and may dehumanise their patients in order to protect themselves. Respondents 
in my interviews described coping by becoming “cynical”, “numb”, “powerless”, and 
“jaded.” Prior reports have highlighted the negative effects of cynicism on empathy, care 
of patients, and the culture of medicine (Dyrbye et al. 2005). Cynicism alienates young 
physicians from their profession, as they begin to wonder whether their efforts are 
meaningless or harmful.  
 
One physician trainees once described to me feeling that “nothing you do matters”, 
“residency destroyed me as a person” and like a “cog in a wheel”. A feeling that one is 
engaged in meaningful work is as important, if not more important, than the physical 
challenges of long hours. Many are willing to endure long hours if they feel that work is 
meaningful, but without meaningful work, stressful hours are much more difficult to 
tolerate. This is particularly important amongst the millennial generation who currently 
comprise the youngest cohort of physicians. Millennial tend to prioritise having a career 
that matters and making a difference over more material concerns such as money (Smith 
and Aaker 2013). Contrary to stereotypes of the millennial generation that claim that 
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Millennials23 are self centred and narcissistic, research has shown that they seek out 
meaningful lives rather than merely personal happiness. 
 
It is this clash of Millennial ideals with the changes that occurred in the physician 
profession described earlier in this thesis that have created a crisis in the medical 
profession’s collective search for meaning. For without meaning, one becomes jaded to 
the ideals of compassion and empathy, which should at its heart be the central mission of 
the healing arts. Shifts from paternalism to autonomy resulted in a rush to honour choice 
in lieu of a beneficence-oriented partnership, alienating physicians from their ability to 
meaningfully engage with patients and to identify with the goals of treatments they are 
providing.  
 
Seeking a life of meaning, Millennials entered the medical profession with the same 
ideals of healing that inspired previous generations of doctors, but this time with a tour de 
force of a generational cultural movement. The clash of these two trends has magnified 
the consequences of alienation, which in essence concerns itself with the question of the 
good society. Alienation describes the ways individuals’ lives go wrong when apathy and 
indifference towards life undermines the good life (Jaeggi 2014).  
 
Addressing issues of moral distress must include strategies to counter alienation by 
helping individuals regain power over and find meaning in what they do. Finding 
meaning in the good life requires a self-realisation of a more appropriate relationship 
between oneself and the world. Understanding that alienation harms self-identity, 
meaning and control, which then affects the way physicians are able to care for others, is 
the first step. Through this realisation and self-empowerment, the physician profession 
can seek ways to change it through gaining power to find meaning. The goal in all of this 
is not to shift power back to the doctor, but understand ingrained problems in the system 
and recalibrate it so that doctors can find meaning in what they are doing.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Millennials are a demographic generational cohort characterised by those born somewhere roughly 
between 1980 to the early 2000s. Other American generations include the baby boomers (those born after 
World War II up to the 1960s) and Generation X (early 1960s to early 1980s) (Wallop 2014). 
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This may involve changes to the system that give doctors more freedom to act in a 
patient’s best interest and move the focus from that of impersonal choice to one of care 
and compassion. In order to fully develop this argument, I need to first position these 
decisions and communication practices in relation to Habermas’ concepts of the system 
and the lifeworld. Once I have explicated the links between alienation and colonisation of 
the physician’s lifeworld in the next chapter, I will then be able to propose strategies to 
foster unalienated labor in the conclusion of this thesis.   
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Chapter 8: Communication Pathologies in End of Life Care 
 
In this chapter, I first position my interview data on the spectrum that Ruth Faden 
delineates between coercion, manipulation, and persuasion, and in particular the 
differences between manipulation and persuasion. I then focus on how communication 
pathologies from the perspective of Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action 
challenge autonomous decision-making. I then relate these micro-sociological 
communicative interactions between doctor and patient to the greater macro-sociological 
shifts in the physician profession described in Chapter 2, and how this reflects the 
unintended consequences of action influencing social patterns as described by Antony 
Giddens’ Structuration Theory. Throughout this chapter, I also bring in discussions of 
the system versus lifeworld. Finally, I tie this sociological argument to that of language, 
framing and heuristics.  
 
Section 8.1: Manipulation versus Persuasion 
 
In Faden and Beauchamp’s book24, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, they 
describe three conditions necessary for an act to be autonomous: intentionality, 
understanding, and non-control by others. Coercion occurs when a person is compelled 
by someone else to do something she does not want to do, or is prevented from doing 
something she wants to do. The coerced person’s “choice” is not her own, but instead the 
coercer’s choice. This occurs when the coercer is able to present “a credible threat of 
unwanted and unavoidable harm so severe that the person is unable to resist acting to 
avoid it (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986: 339).” 
 
In this analysis, I focus primarily on persuasion versus manipulation. Faden defines 
persuasion as an attempt to influence through appeals to reason, and are an accepted and 
unconcealed form of interpersonal influence (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986: 261-2). 
Decisions made by patients are autonomous because the physician openly explains to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  To	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  Faden	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter	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promote understanding and puts forward reasons for accepting or adopting a particular 
decision, which the patient can freely accept or decline as his or her own. These decisions 
are based on the person’s beliefs, values, intentions, attitudes, and actions as advocated 
by the persuader.  
 
In contrast, manipulation is characterised by any intention to influence a person through 
altering the actual choices available or the person’s perception of these choices in order to 
get the person to do what the manipulator intends25 (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986: 261). In 
particular, manipulation of information alters a person’s understanding of the situation 
and perception of the options available. One particularly notable form of informational 
manipulation is the exploitation of framing effects by presenting information in a way 
that leads to predictable inferences.   
 
These controlling influences lie on a continuum from controlling influences (coercion) to 
non-controlling influences (persuasion). Notably, manipulation lies on the spectrum and 
can encompass varying forms of control or non-control, with no definitive threshold for 
distinguishing influence. It is also possible for manipulative influences to be compatible 
with autonomous decision-making. The degree to which a manipulative act is deemed to 
be controlling versus non-controlling is also inherently subjective and can depend on the 
individuals’ reaction to the particular controlling influence.  
 
These definitional subtleties illustrate the complexity of these nuances in applying them 
to real life scenarios. One cannot just assume that a particular act is universally 
manipulative if it appears that autonomy is not granted or whether an act is manipulative 
may differ between one person to the next depending on the person’s health literacy, 
prior experiences, etc. For example, as I argue later in this chapter, framing should not be 
universally perceived as either manipulative or persuasive, but rather the way in which 
framing is used will determine whether it has been used positively or negatively. Faden 
describes debate in the literature on informed consent regarding the role of persuasion. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Faden’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “manipulation”	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  imply	  immorality	  or	  fault	  in	  moral	  character	  where	  a	  person	  actively	  tricks	  a	  person	  into	  doing	  something	  he	  would	  not	  otherwise	  do	  through	  a	  deceptive	  act.	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She disagrees with those who equate informed consent with non-influence, where the 
physicians, “presents the information in a way that is ‘neutral’ – that reflects as little 
personal bias as possible for one alternative as opposed to another.” This was the 
perspective that some house staff at the autonomy-focused sites held:  
 
“I have thought about that and I have wanted to say it and I never [make 
recommendations in the patient’s best interest] because I feel that it is wrong, that 
it goes against the ethics that we are talking about in terms of autonomy and you 
want to say it but at the same time I think you doubt yourself.  You can never 
fully say what will happen to somebody and again it is the family’s decision, it is 
not ours.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 12) 
 
“I personally don’t feel that that’s a problem, but I see where people might feel 
like that might be injecting your own personal opinions about life and death upon 
someone. I think somebody might say, I think you should just stick to facts and 
known things. Just give them a picture of what’s going on, versus injecting your 
own personal opinions of life and death.” (Columbia, PGY-3: 10) 
 
This viewpoint is the very strategy that shared decision-making26 opposes, as it deprives 
the decision-maker (patient) of the guidance and clinical expertise that is the 
responsibility of the physician. Faden argues against the conflation of persuasion and 
coercion, which misconstrues the physician’s proper role in the consent process:  
 
“Professionals would be morally blameworthy if they did not attempt to persuade 
their patients to consent to interventions that are medically necessitated…It would 
be a mistake to infer…that persuasion is incompatible with autonomous choice 
and absence of control by others or that bias or undue or non-rational influence is 
somehow at work…In persuasion, the influence agent must bring to the 
persuadee’s attention reasons for acceptance of the desired perspective (Faden & 
Beauchamp, 1986: 348).”   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  As	  previously	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6	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Others argue that the opposite is necessary; absence of manipulation is believed by some 
to be essential for informed consent to be truly informed and autonomous. For example, 
Jeffrie Murphy highlights the need to prevent informational manipulation, “whereby the 
structure or perception of choices available to a patient is altered by managing 
information so that the person does what the physician intends (Faden & Beauchamp, 
1986: 261).” The remainder of the chapter seeks to further dissect these nuances and 
determine the point at which manipulation ends and persuasion begins.   
 
Section 8.2: Empirical Findings Demonstrating Manipulative Communications 
 
In earlier chapters, I described the influence of hospital policies on trainees’ 
conceptualisation of autonomy and how that affected their willingness to make 
recommendations. House staff at institutions where autonomy was prioritised, tended to 
interpret autonomy as merely giving choice. As described above, they felt that there was 
no role for reasoned persuasion and that options must be presented as neutrally as 
possible. They felt constrained to refrain from giving a recommendation on whether 
resuscitation would benefit the patient. In this chapter I will outline how this 
understanding might affect the way trainees communicate with patients regarding 
discussions surrounding DNR orders and end of life discussions in general (Steps 3 to 4 
in the framework (Figure 1.1) I outlined in the Introduction on page 24).  
 
Due to a need to honour their version of autonomy, these trainees felt compelled to offer 
a menu of choices, but because they still had a clear sense of their particular medical 
treatment preference, conversations were potentially framed in different ways depending 
on the circumstance:   
 
“One thing I have noticed is this grab bag of things people can now offer, almost 
like a buffet. We can do this, this and this. We can do chest compressions, we can 
intubate. A family will maybe say, maybe I will take the compressions but I won’t 
take intubation. I really don’t understand how we have gotten to that point and I 
	   192	  
think physicians don’t really present that the same way each time. I think we 
present code status differently, we may use different language and we can make 
things very graphic if we want to or make them very un-graphic if we want to. I 
get pretty disturbed with how I see it presented (Columbia, PGY-2: 12).” 
 
A common strategy by trainees at autonomy focused institutions to address code status in 
patients where the trainee believed resuscitation would likely not work, was to use 
graphic descriptions of resuscitation to convince surrogates (by this stage, frequently the 
surrogate is the decision-maker) to not choose resuscitation. These respondents 
emphasised giving patient/surrogate choice and the need to not inject their “opinion” into 
this decision by making a clinical recommendation. However, their recommendations 
took on this form:   
 
“For patients that I think should be DNR, I go into graphic detail pretty 
aggressively that we can do chest compressions which can break ribs and 
puncture lungs, which can be very painful, and we can put them indefinitely on a 
machine that could prolong their life without improving their quality of life. Then 
I usually say, ‘but of course it is your decision and it should be what you think 
they would want.’” (Columbia, PGY-3: 11) 
 
“By default we’ll do everything which includes chest compressions, which means 
someone on top of you compressing your chest and breaking your ribs. Trying to 
be as non-judgmental as possible in the sense that, but then saying, ‘Especially in 
an elderly individual who is frail, it will entail breaking your ribs and potentially 
causing a lot of distress.’ And then electrical shocks and medications to try to get 
your heart to beat back again. Then intubation by putting a tube down your throat 
and hooking you up to a breathing machine. I will try to describe the mechanics of 
what that will entail. We do chest compressions, which involves someone 
standing over you and doing something really serious. They're not just pushing on 
your chest - they're really pushing down. The bed bounces. If they're doing it right 
you break ribs. There are electric shocks, which people have described as being 
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kicked by a horse, potentially many times. There's the breathing tube, which you 
can imagine the tube going down into your throat and breathing for you. I try to 
be descriptive about it. If they still say yes I want everything to be done, I do 
probably subscribe to autonomy over beneficence in the sense that…I don’t know, 
maybe I’m jaded too much in the sense that in this hospital I’ve seen people do so 
much to themselves. You know hopefully not in the hospital, it’s like I can’t force 
you to do the right thing.” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13) 
 
“This is kind of paternalistic, but if I'm feeling strongly that the patient would not 
really benefit from resuscitation, I'll be pretty graphic. So if her heart were to stop, 
you'll see on TV that's when people are pounding on somebody's chest. ‘Do you 
want the doctors to go in and press on the chest to pump the blood through the 
heart?’ I want you to know we have to press really hard and break ribs. If we're 
not breaking ribs, we're not pumping the blood enough. Sometimes it doesn't 
work anyway, you know. So it's pretty physical and can be kind of violent. If you 
want us to do that, we'll do anything that you want for your grandmother. But 
some people decide that if their heart were to stop and that means that it's their 
time, then they just want their family there, without the doctors on their chests.” 
(Hopkins, PGY-2: 15) 
 
Rather than persuading the surrogate that resuscitation would not be consistent with the 
patient’s goals of care, the physician trainee attempts to manipulate the surrogates’ 
perception of the actual choice. While honest descriptions of the resuscitation process are 
important for understanding and interventions have focused on improving understanding 
through videos and other decision aid modalities (Volandes et al. 2013), these 
descriptions should be presented to improve understanding, rather than as the specific 
means to dissuade.   
 
It is interesting to note the tension within these quotations between neutrally offering 
choice (“Trying to be as non-judgmental as possible (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13)”), but still 
having the desire to persuade the decision-maker to pursue the “right” treatment. The 
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emphasis on freedom of choice is clear: “but of course it is your decision and it should be 
what you think they would want.” (Columbia, PGY-3: 11) The fact that they employ this 
strategy more in their frail, elderly patients or in general people whom they think should 
not be full code, demonstrates that even though they feel compelled not to offer a 
recommendation and are potentially uncomfortable prognosticating, in their minds they 
know who they think should and should not be resuscitated and they try to convey that 
through alternative means.  
 
They emphasise that they’ll “do everything,” (Hopkins, PGY-3: 13 and Hopkins, PGY-2: 
15) offering the menu of choices, but the message that they convey is that to choose 
“everything” involves pain, violence, and bodily harm. Also notable is the perception of 
these strategies in relation to autonomy, beneficence and paternalism. Hopkins, PGY-3: 
13 notes after his description that he still subscribed to autonomy over beneficence, while 
Hopkins, PGY-2: 15 recognised that these descriptions were potentially paternalistic.  
 
Attending physicians at these hospitals sometimes alluded to these graphic strategies that 
house staff employed in code status conversations. This one in particular summarises 
some of the concerns with this particular strategy:  
 
“I think that it’s really been unfortunately bastardised to a large extent. I won't get 
into representing how sick you are, but instead say, ‘would you like us to pound 
on your chest and break your ribs.’ They are infusing it with such aggressive 
language that there is a right answer…and it’s potentially not an accurate way to 
frame it… I’m picking again on house staff here I think that this was something 
that, this is something that I think is ubiquitous. The verbiage that’s being chosen 
to express these choices is so laden with bias that you're taking away the patient’s 
autonomy but still has the illusion of giving full autonomy to them…. There’s 
been an unhealthy over-emphasis on leaving it so much in the patient’s court that 
it has left to crafty work arounds with how the discussion is framed. Using such 
negative language that the patients bristle at the notion of being resuscitated.  
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I mean could you imagine getting consent for Whipple procedure by saying yes 
I’m going to take this sharp knife and I’m going to slice you open, and there’ll be 
lots of bleeding and yes there’ll be lots of bleeding and it’s a huge amount of 
trauma to your tissues. I mean we’ll be mutilating your insides and removing 
organs that are helpful but not needed to sustain life. Yes well that’s not how we 
describe things that we want to do to people we use nomenclature when we’re 
describing CPR efforts that imply an inhumanity to it. We use nomenclature when 
we describe surgical procedures that imply we’re trying to help the person. And 
you know words matter.” (Hopkins, Attending in Hospital Medicine: 6) 
 
Experienced physicians and palliative care experts never described themselves utilizing 
this strategy of graphic descriptions in resuscitation conversations. Although there was 
some variation amongst institutions, with attendings at autonomy-focused hospitals 
palpably more concerned about autonomy than attendings at best interest oriented 
hospitals and best interest physicians more willing to be directive when they felt 
necessary, overall they had an approach to these conversations that were more focused on 
the patient’s understanding and overall goals of care:  
 
“I think it’s an inherent part of decision-making. You have to discern what’s best 
for the patient. It’s not just about what the patient believes is best for him or 
herself. More importantly, the values that they have, the goals that they have in 
respect to healthcare. For me, it’s about trying to first and foremost, understand 
that. Make recommendations that are in tune with those values and those goals. I 
find that doing that, I’m less likely to find this conflict, between patient autonomy 
and physician paternalism or physician beliefs.” (Columbia, Attending in 
Palliative Care: 6)  
 
House staff at best interest oriented institutions appeared to straddle the continuum 
between the more goals of care oriented conversations that experts and more experienced 
physicians used and the graphic descriptions of autonomy focused house staff. Many 
inexperienced physicians at these institutions were similar to experienced physicians and 
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understood the importance of placing these conversations in the overall context of goals 
of care:  
 
“A totally reasonable thing to do is just to have a conversation about goals. The 
true ideal of this is to sit down with the family and the patient and have a 
conversation about what life means to them and what goals mean to them and be 
able to run the numbers and say ‘all right, for somebody like you having CPR 
means you’ll have no chance of ever leaving a skilled nursing facility’ and you 
hear somebody say ‘that’s not life.’ Based on that, I think it’s the right thing for 
you.” (UW, PGY-3: 10) 
 
“I usually start off with, what are your goals in all of this? What do you want 
most? If you can have whatever you wanted and short of live forever, what would 
you want? Then usually it’s much easier to get people to understand what you’re 
asking of them once you frame it in that context.” (UW, PGY-6: 6) 
 
Two of the residents at UW described conversations focused on medical 
recommendations, which at times included allusions to these graphic descriptions:  
 
“Phrasing it in the context of, ‘do you think you're loved one wants to pass 
peacefully or go through aggressive measures including fractured ribs and 
invasive procedures would be consistent with their wishes?’ It’s so much in the 
phrasing in so far as helping the family member to say yes or no to that question.” 
(UW, PGY-3: 11) 
 
“I said, this means she wouldn’t want people pounding on her chest and breathing 
tubes down her throat and often bloody and gruesome measures at the end of her 
life. Instead, we can offer her things to make her more comfortable through 
comfort care that we offer people at the end of their lives.” (UW, PGY-3: 12) 
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These quotations reflect these UW residents’ understanding of the importance of goals of 
care conversations; placing treatment options in the context of the patients’ wishes. 
However, the use of graphic descriptions in these two quotations illustrates the fine (and 
debatable) line between manipulation and persuasion. As I mentioned earlier, these 
graphic descriptions in itself are not problematic. Indeed, it is sometimes important to 
describe the process of resuscitation in order to guide understanding. These descriptions 
move from persuasion to manipulation when these graphic descriptions are used to 
achieve a set purpose rather than using communication to achieve understanding. The 
resident in the first quotation appears more successful in using these descriptions for 
understanding rather than to achieve a goal of discouraging resuscitation than the second 
resident. 
 
Section 8.3: Communication Pathologies from the Perspective of Habermas’ Theory 
of Communicative Action 
 
Jürgen Habermas’ critical theory provides insights into why the graphic descriptions used 
manipulatively described in the previous section are problematic and helps us critique 
this model of autonomy’s dubious claims to patient empowerment. Habermas builds upon 
Max Weber’s work on bureaucratisation and critiques bureaucracy’s orientation towards 
reasoning for the purpose of efficiency and control. He describes this rationalisation as a 
means to instrumentalism, which seeks to homogenise and formalise human activities, 
leading to the dehumanising aspects of bureaucracy (Blaug 1995).  
 
The instrumental rationality of these bureaucratic social organisations threatens to 
overpower, or colonise, the lifeworld27, the contextually derived lived experiences of 
everyday life that naturally embraces the person’s biography. It consists of interactions 
and relationships established through shared cultural understanding and meanings. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This	  concept	  of	  lifeworld	  was	  popularised	  by	  Alfred	  Schutz	  who	  described	  it	  as	  “socially	  approved	  systems	  of	  typification	  and	  relevances	  (Schutz	  1970).”	  The	  lifeworld	  constitutes	  the	  “stocks	  of	  knowledge”	  shared	  by	  social	  actors	  (Schutz	  1962).	  It	  comprises	  the	  emergent	  product	  of	  cognition,	  decisions,	  and	  actions	  of	  individuals	  who	  operate	  within	  a	  wholly	  familiar	  and	  subjectively	  meaningful	  world	  (Wacquant,	  1992:	  9).	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Through these shared meanings derived from the lifeworld, people are able to interact 
and interpret each other based on a mutually understandable set of assumptions.  
 
Lifeworld interactions occur on a more equal footing where communicative action 
prevails (Barry, et al, 2001). Communicative action is oriented towards understanding, 
where all speakers engage in speech actions at a mutually open level to reach “an 
agreement that will provide the basis for a consensual coordination of individually 
pursued plans of action (Habermas, 1984: 289).” In communicative action, definitions of 
the situation are jointly constructed, negotiated, and agreed upon: “participants pursue 
their plans cooperatively on the basis of a shared definition of the situation…the 
attainment of consensus can itself become and end…Participants cannot attain their goals 
if they cannot meet the need for mutual understanding (Habermas 1987).” 
 
The system lies in opposition to the lifeworld and is epitomised by markets and 
bureaucracies. Communication strategies in the system are characterised by strategic 
action that orients speech actions towards success, where the ends are defined by 
technical success rather than moral objectives. This strategic action “instrumentalises 
speech acts for purposes that are contingently related to the meaning of what is said 
(Habermas, 1984: 289).” The system’s use of strategic action is used to maintain its 
dominance, by using speech not just to say something, but also to achieve a purpose 
through acting in saying something. To summarise, strategic action is used when an actor 
uses communication to achieve his goals whereas in communicative action the actor uses 
communication to achieve understanding.  
 
Strategic action can be further partitioned into open strategic action, where speakers 
openly pursue the aim of influencing and concealed strategic action, where this attempt 
at manipulation is hidden. When this strategic action is concealed, the other party does 
not have the opportunity to participate in the conversation at an equal level. In contrast, in 
communicative action, both speakers can dialectically engage in the conversation by 
raising criticisable validity claims, which allow both parties to judge whether the 
communicated facts are truthful, appropriate, justifiable, and/or sincere (Habermas, 1984: 
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Ch 1). Rationality and reason by both parties are used to accept or stand up against the 
speech acts and in the process, establish a dialogue to co-create consensus. 
 
Habermas further partitions concealed strategic action into conscious deception, which he 
describes as manipulation, and unconscious deception, which he describes as 
systematically distorted communications. This systematically distorted communication is 
described as a pathology where the speaker manipulates and exerts their influence 
through concealed means such as through use of technical jargon. Of note, this deception 
can be conscious or unconscious, as neither the doctor nor patient are aware that strategic 
action is being used. The doctor uses systematically distorted communication to act “with 
an orientation towards success, not understanding, but yet sincerely and in good faith 
(Scambler and Britten 2001).”  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Communicative and Strategic Action (Habermas 1984; Scambler and Britten 2001)  
 
Here again, we see parallels to Faden’s conception of manipulation, where the boundaries 
between intentional and unintentional action, as well as persuasion and manipulation 
blur. For both, the difference appears to lie with the capacity of the patient to openly 
engage and reason at an equal level with the physician, rather than in conscious deception 
or manipulation where a doctor uses “technical jargon to browbeat, subdue or gain assent 
from a resistant patient (Scambler and Britten 2001).” For Habermas, both unconscious 
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deception (systematically distorted communication) and conscious deception 
(manipulation) are considered pathologic.  
 
In The Discourse of Medicine: Dialectics of Medical Interviews, Elliot Mishler adapts 
this concept of system/lifeworld and the dialectical tension between these two forms of 
rationality to medicine (Mishler 1984). He describes the medical equivalent to the system 
as the “voice of medicine”, which uses strategies like jargon, medicalisation of daily life, 
and decontextualised interactions to maintain dominance and control. This voice of 
medicine encompasses technical and scientific interests that strip away the context of the 
“voice of the lifeworld.” He describes his analysis of a series of outpatient medical 
consultations, where physicians use the voice of medicine to strategically carry out his 
own agenda during the consultation, thus suppressing the patient’s accounts and purpose. 
This pattern is similar to the colonisation of the lifeworld, where doctors use distorted 
communication in a success-oriented manner.  
 
                                      
 
Figure 8.2: Mishler’s Voices of Medicine and the Lifeworld (Barry et al. 2001) 
 
Christine Barry, et al. further elucidated the tensions between the voice of the lifeworld 
and the voice of medicine in a 2001 paper where they described four communication 
patterns across 35 outpatient consultations (Barry et al. 2001). Strictly medicine 
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communications occurred when both doctor and patient used the voice of medicine 
exclusively, such as in a simple single acute physical concern. Mutually lifeworld 
situations occurred when the patient’s agenda was voiced and recognised and both the 
doctor and patient used the voice of the lifeworld, where the patient was “recognised as a 
unique human being (Barry et al. 2001).” The poorest outcomes occurred where the 
patient’s voice of the lifeworld was ignored (lifeworld ignored) or blocked (lifeworld 
blocked).  
 
Consultations that were mutually lifeworld were most similar to Habermas’ ideal speech 
type, where communicative action predominated and speech is “contextually grounded in 
everyday events where there is an emphasis on working together to reach understanding 
through negotiation (Barry et al. 2001).” It is in these situations where the patients are 
most truly empowered at an equal level with the physician to approach the conversation 
on an equal footing. This is also the situation which appears to most closely align with 
the American Sociological Association’s definition of humane healthcare, where there is 
the necessary “empathy, equality and view of the whole situated person (Barry et al. 
2001).” 
 
Section 8.3.1: Communication Pathologies in End of Life Conversations – Relating 
Back to the Interview Data 
 
Applying this to the resuscitation conversation examples described earlier in this chapter 
by American physician trainees at autonomy focused institutions, we see that their 
conversations employ strategic action, where action is oriented to success rather than to 
understanding. They use the voice to medicine to distort communications to lead patients 
towards a particular desired goal. Those graphic descriptions are entirely true and 
important for the surrogate and patients to be aware of as a part of an overall conversation 
that informs and engages the patient in a dialogue to determine the best course of action 
to achieve the patient’s goals of care. However, these physicians’ intent in using these 
graphic descriptions were not to foster understanding, but instead to manipulate through 
distortion of information and to viscerally repel them from choosing resuscitation. This 
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manipulative communication appeared to occur more frequently in autonomy focused 
institutions.  
 
Respondents in my interviews appeared to have little insight into how these forms of 
communication might potentially be manipulative or pathologic. I also recall that this was 
the way I was taught to have these conversations by my senior resident at Columbia. As 
such, I do not believe that these physicians are deliberately attempting to deceive, and are 
thus participating in unconscious deception. They are not fully aware that the reason they 
frame resuscitation in this manner is for the purpose of strategic action, but more likely 
they have learned these behaviours from role models as the way DNR conversations 
should occur. However, house staff have likely learned from experience that this form of 
communication might potentially yield the desired outcome so there may be an element 
of conscious deception which encourages them to act in this way. Future studies can help 
elucidate physicians’ motivations and insights into these behaviours. 
 
Ironically, this act of dominance stemmed in part from the current discourse of patient 
autonomy and choice in decision-making. This is supported by the fact that trainees at 
autonomy-dominant hospitals described these graphic conversations more frequently. 
Because medical trainees at autonomy dominant hospitals feel uncomfortable not giving 
choice, but frequently feel that patients choose the wrong intervention resulting in 
harmful overly aggressive treatment measures and futile resuscitation, they instead frame 
conversations in deceptive ways in order to manipulate patients and surrogates into 
choosing the “correct” treatment. They did not feel at liberty to engage in open 
communicative action, and as such felt compelled to act strategically. 
 
The graphic descriptions described earlier in the chapter all reflect a strictly medicine 
communication strategy. The ways conversation is initiated and framed from the start 
cuts off the possibility of engaging in the voice of the lifeworld. The question is framed 
as a medical question, “In the event your heart were to stop would you want us to restart 
it.” Given the inherent power imbalances towards the physician, patients and families 
frequently are unwilling or unable to redirect the conversation towards the voice of the 
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lifeworld. Furthermore, colonisation of the lifeworld has turned death, one of the most 
human of experiences, into a medical choice. The system has essentially also colonised 
death. Death in this instance has been completely decontextualised and removed from the 
personal and social context (Scambler & Britten, 2001: 55).  
 
In contrast, the focus of conversations by experienced physicians as well as established 
best practices by palliative care experts is on goals of care conversations rather than 
“getting the DNR.” This was also more frequently seen to a degree, amongst house staff 
at best interest-focused institutions. This resident noted that learning to incorporate the 
lifeworld in these discussions was something that she improved upon with experience:  
 
“I tend to think not just about the getting the DNR itself but what that looks like 
after CPR and putting that more in the context of who they were as a person more 
often now than I did as an intern or resident.” (UW, PGY-6: 8) 
 
Because there was not a cultural perception of the need to adhere to a strict notion of 
autonomy, they had greater leeway to pursue conversations that were more broadly 
focused. These conversations begin with questions about the patient – the kind of person 
he was, the relationship he had with the surrogate decision maker, what his values and 
beliefs were, and what his goals were. This focus clearly employs a mutually lifeworld 
perspective, which acknowledges the patient as a person situated in a particular lifeworld 
and allows that biography to be the driving force in the discussion and decision. Also 
inherent in best interest focused communities, are increased trust founded on a mutual 
understanding of lifeworld perspective. This resident at UW demonstrates how the 
lifeworld perspective can be incorporated into these conversations: 
 
“For some people it is based on other things. We have our experience based on 
our clinical gestalt and our knowledge base of disease…but for some people there 
is a grey zone that lies outside of clinical medicine, which is religious practices or 
their social and cultural beliefs that do kind of supersede the medicine. It doesn’t 
matter what you tell them in terms of this is what I know to be true, they're still 
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going to tell you that this would not be in line with their goals and so, and 
honestly it’s hard to really argue with that. Because I’m not obtuse enough to 
think that I know more than their belief system, their cultural system. So I usually 
won't try to disregard that, I’ll usually gauge with it and kind of tease out a little 
bit more than just what I‘m getting at face value which is this would be against 
our practice to understand why to make sure that there’s not some disconnect 
between understanding of what CPR entails and what their belief is.” (UW, PGY-
2: 13) 
 
By focusing on goals of care (i.e. lifeworld), the physician and patient and/or surrogate 
both agree they are on the same side, and are able to proceed with a deliberative process 
that allows for a dialogical interaction. This junior faculty member at Hopkins 
demonstrates communicative rationality:   
 
“Ask them about their insight into their illness is what they understand about their 
disease and try and eventually lead them to talk about what they think the short 
term and what the long term outcomes of the disease is. And in situations where 
the ultimate decision that’s made is not very discordant with the medical decision-
making, that process itself gives you the answer.” (Hopkins, Attending in Hospital 
Medicine: 8) 
 
In this quotation, this respondent focuses on the importance of the process of decision-
making, and the importance of hearing the patients’ voice and their own understanding of 
the situation.  
 
Section 8.3.2: Micro-Actions Reflecting Macro-Sociological Changes 
 
We can draw further insight into how these communication patterns developed by 
reflecting the effects of macro-sociological shifts from paternalism to autonomy 
described in Chapter 2, onto the micro-interactions between individual actors and 
between actors and the larger system described in this chapter. Decades ago, it was 
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perfectly acceptable and even expected for the doctor to have a “doctor knows best” 
attitude. These paternalistic norms allowed for open strategic action. Changes towards 
autonomous decision-making made this no longer acceptable. But rather than fostering 
true autonomous decision-making, communication instead shifted towards concealed 
strategic action, where doctors unconsciously manipulated in order to achieve his goals.  
 
While these shifts towards autonomy were meant to improve the patient experience and 
provide a more ethical decision-making framework, this strategic concealment of 
communicative purpose has undermined the original intentions of increased autonomy. 
Rather than truly empowering patients, this concealed action merely drove the acts of 
domination underground. This might perhaps explain why institutions that had less of a 
focus on autonomy and more on beneficence may in fact allow for a more empowered 
patient experience by providing the space for open communicative action. 
 
However, this discourse of autonomy constrains a doctor’s responsibility for patient 
suffering (Salmon and Hall 2003):  
 
“Sometimes with these end of life decisions, it becomes like [doctors] don't want 
to take responsibility to make a decision. But now there's a family and so instead 
of saying: ‘This is what we recommend and this is what we will do and if you 
don't agree, let's talk about it’, they instead say, ‘What would you like?’” 
(Hopkins, PGY-1: 16) 
 
“An alternative system which I got to make the decisions would put a lot 
more responsibility on me and I think that’s one thing that is a relief about our 
system. You don’t ever know who is going to pop right back out.” (Hopkins, 
PGY-3: 14) 
 
The unintended negative consequence of patient autonomy is that it allowed the doctor to 
withdraw from the responsibility of choice while still maintaining dominance in other 
ways. Doctors still choose when to give this choice; they do not ask patients whether they 
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want to have a blood test ordered or what antibiotic they would prefer despite the fact that 
some patients would actually prefer to choose their own antibiotics (Johnson, et al. 2011). 
As I will explain later in this chapter, physicians are still able to exert considerable 
control through framing and manipulation of language and conversations. Despite 
doctors’ relative power, as I discussed in the previous chapter some doctors feel 
powerless to act in the patient’s best interest – neither party feels satisfied or in control.  
 
Section 8.3.3: Critique of the Literature on the Applications of Habermas to 
Medicine and a Proposed New Direction 
 
The literature on applications of Habermas’ concept of system/lifeworld in medicine 
reflects the traditional theories of professional dominance described in Chapter 2. For 
example, Gemma Edwards states that, “the interaction that takes place between the doctor 
and patient in a consultation should at least strive to be ‘communicative’ in this manner. 
The definition of illness and course of treatment should, for example, be negotiated 
through an open dialogue that is not influenced by the power of medical expertise 
(Edwards, 2012: 36)”  
 
This view, I believe is too simplistic and does not reflect the changing nature of physician 
power. This monochromatic representation of physicians and their dominance does not 
reflect the variations that occur institutionally, geographically, and amongst physicians of 
varying experience within the same hospital. If we revisit Mishler’s concept of the voice 
of the lifeworld versus the voice of medicine, the assumption at the time (which was 
likely more accurate in the 1980s when Mishler was writing) was that the physician was 
the agent of the voice of medicine. He in fact uses the provocative term, “inhumane,” to 
describe the care that results from these distorted communication patterns.  
 
Modern day prioritisation of patient autonomy has shifted the power balance towards the 
patient in a disjointed manner where the physician maintains control of many elements of 
the interaction but is lacking in others. However, younger physicians have been fully 
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inculcated in a dogmatic understanding of autonomy feel dominated by the system28, 
enacted through institutional culture and policies. The young doctor is caught between 
two roles. He acts as the system/voice of medicine agent upon the patient, but is also 
acted upon by the greater system. His own lifeworld becomes colonised by the system 
during the process of medical education, which slowly removes his recognition of the 
lifeworld perspective during the professionalisation process and inculcates him into the 
system.  
 
Simon Sinclair describes in his ethnography of UK medical students, the nature of 
medical school as a “total institution,29” where the lay world (lifeworld) is completely 
offstage - not even in the arena of day to day consciousness and completely distinct from 
the front stage and back stage of daily medical school activities30 (Sinclair 1997). During 
the process of acculturation into the profession of medicine, students learn from the start 
that their familiar lay world is to remain off stage; their private lives become fully 
inundated by the institutional system.  
 
Perhaps this might be why in Howard Becker, et al.’s Boys in White, the authors noted 
the “tremendous homogeneity of the student body” in terms of their attitudes and actions 
regarding the medical school experience (Becker, Geer, Hughes, & Strauss, 1961: 22). 
They have all been through a homogenising process where their former lifeworld 
experiences are no longer relevant. Indeed, the goals of the system are to maximise 
efficiency through control rather than understanding and consensus. We have seen the 
transition from medicine as a cottage industry to the rise of the medical industrial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  I	  define	  system	  here	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Habermas	  originally	  defines	  it	  –	  the	  economy	  with	  its	  capitalist	  market	  and	  its	  focus	  on	  profit,	  and	  the	  nation	  state,	  with	  its	  bureaucratic	  and	  legal	  forms	  of	  power	  (Edwards,	  2012:	  38).	  	  29	  Howard	  Becker,	  et	  al.	  in	  Boys	  in	  White	  described	  medical	  schools	  to	  be	  “total	  institutions”	  in	  the	  way	  first	  described	  by	  Erving	  Goffman	  in	  Asylums	  (1961)	  such	  as	  prisons,	  hospitals	  and	  asylums	  (Becker	  et	  al.	  1961;	  Goffman	  1961).	  	  	  30	  He	  is	  referring	  to	  Erving	  Goffman’s	  concept	  of	  the	  dramaturgic	  everyday	  social	  stage	  proposed	  in	  
The	  Presentation	  of	  Self	  in	  Everyday	  Life,	  where	  Goffman	  describes	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  presentation	  of	  self	  on	  the	  front	  stage	  where	  impressions	  are	  played	  (Goffman	  1959).	  This	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  back	  stage,	  which	  is	  the	  true	  self	  constructs	  and	  contradicts	  the	  impressions	  played	  on	  the	  front	  stage.	  In	  medical	  school,	  the	  front	  stage	  comprises	  clinical	  teaching,	  lectures,	  etc.	  whereas	  the	  back	  stage	  is	  in	  libraries,	  at	  home,	  on	  the	  hospital	  wards	  (outside	  of	  the	  sight	  of	  patients),	  and	  informal	  and	  mutually	  supportive	  socialisation	  amongst	  students.	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complex dominated by bureaucratic managers whom themselves are not physicians. The 
creation of a system that controls the controller is in some ways the most efficient means 
of establishing the bureaucratic efficiency necessary for the overall system to control 
patients.  
 
In the previous chapter, I described how perceived futile treatments hinder trainees’ 
ability to find meaning in their work, its effect on self-identity, and the alienation that 
results from this moral distress.  Indeed, a word referenced in both Mishler’s description 
of the voice of medicine, and Jaeggi’s description of alienation is “inhumane/inhuman”. 
Mishler uses the emotive and judgmental term to emphasise the importance of humanely 
respecting the patient as a whole person (Barry et al. 2001). Jaeggi similarly uses the 
word “inhuman” to forcefully describe the problematic aspects of alienated labour, where 
the worker feels that her work is meaningless, one that she does not identify with, and 
one that she has no control over (Jaeggi 2014). The use of the same emotive term, 
inhumane/inhuman to describe both the inhumane voice of medicine that the doctor 
imposes upon the patient, but the doctor herself feels inhuman due to alienated work, 
highlights the dual tensions converging upon the doctor.  
 
Alienation’s fundamental critique is that of relationlessness with respect to both the world 
and oneself. Jaeggi states, “a distinctive feature of the concept of alienation is that it 
refers not only to powerlessness and a lack of freedom but also to a characteristic 
impoverishment of the relation self and the world (Jaeggi 2014).” Highlighting the 
importance of relations from the perspective of alienation to this discussion allows us to 
realise the dangers that occur when the system colonises the doctor’s lifeworld. The 
institutions of medical training and their ability as a total institution to drive out the 
doctor’s lifeworld, replacing it with the voice of medicine serves its purpose in the 
professional capacity, but at the expense of nurturing a whole physician who is able to 
maintain her lifeworld experiences throughout her professional career. The lifeworld-
impoverished physician may be able to competently practice as a physician, but her 
relationlessness to both her lifeworld and herself prevent her from engaging with the 
	   209	  
patient’s lifeworld and challenge her ability to practise with compassion, empathy, and 
with open communicative action. 
  
One can look to how the medical profession seeks to better itself and the ideals it aspires 
to as further evidence that critique of the physician profession around DNR decision-
making cannot simply be cast as a physician’s quest for domination. Best practices and 
experts in palliative care, as well as experienced physicians practice and advocate a 
patient-centered approach that focuses on a goals of care approach that employs open 
communicative rationalities. One study demonstrated that palliative care experts were 
less verbally dominant in conversations, allowing more time for the patient to speak and 
fostered more of a partnership in the dialogue (Roter, et al, 2012). Most importantly, they 
gave less biomedical information and focused more on psychosocial and lifestyle 
discussions. In essence, these experts acknowledged the lifeworld and utilised open 
communicative patterns.  
 
The intentions of individual physicians are rarely to dominate or control, but rather 
structural factors such as time pressure, lack of space to be reflective about issues of 
autonomy, interpretations of policies, and policies themselves contribute to this drive 
towards more strategic action and consequent “inhumane” care. The hidden curriculum 
and the physician trainee socialisation I described earlier also contribute. Thus, to fully 
dissect and ameliorate these communication pathologies, we must recognise the way the 
lifeworld of young physicians are themselves colonised by the system. 
 
Recognizing too the role of the system in reproducing a medical culture that is now 
focused more on choice than care and humanity, also helps shed light on how we came to 
where we are today. The “professionalisation” process from a layperson to a physician 
during medical school is an indoctrination that changes the student’s lifeworld 
perspective to that of medicine31. The ways in which patients have become customers and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The	  physician	  becomes	  colonised	  as	  they	  go	  through	  the	  transition	  to	  become	  a	  professional.	  In	  many	  ways,	  this	  is	  a	  necessary	  process	  but	  perhaps	  in	  other	  ways,	  educational	  institutions	  should	  strive	  to	  make	  doctors	  who	  have	  lost	  too	  much	  of	  their	  own	  lifeworld	  perspective.	  The	  institutional	  policies	  and	  cultures,	  which	  influence	  trainees	  through	  both	  didactic	  lectures	  as	  well	  as	  the	  hidden	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doctors providing a service rather than embarking on a professional calling, draws into 
question how the system itself has infiltrated the voice of medicine and the doctor’s own 
lifeworld. 
 
Section 8.3.4: The Unintended Consequences of Individual Actions Producing the 
Structure of Wayward Autonomy 
 
Much of the literature on the social transformation of the American physician suggested 
that physicians were either unaware of or resistant to the necessary power shifts in 
medicine. For example, in McKinlay and Arches’ 1985 paper on the proletarianisation of 
physicians, they described that physicians at that time were unable to fully comprehend 
the proletarianisation that was occurring in their profession. McKinlay and Arches 
emphasise in subsequent papers, that physicians have been increasingly subject to this 
process, but that it was masked by an “elitist conception of their role, so that even if the 
process is recognised, doctors are quite reluctant to admit it (McKinlay and Stoeckle 
1988).” Wolinsky cautioned the medical profession that if they remain unchanged in 
behaviour and attitude despite these capitalistic forces, then “its privileged status and 
professional dominance may well go the way of the dinosaur” (Wolinsky 1988).  
 
These claims might either reflect physicians’ relative lack of awareness in the 1980-90s, 
but they may also reflect their functionalist stance, of which Antony Giddens is critical. 
He instead believes that “human agents or actors…have, as an inherent aspect of what 
they do, the capacity to understand what they do while they are doing it…actors know 
tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the context of social life without being able to give them 
direct discursive expression (Giddens 1984).” Actors are generally able to explain most 
of what they do, if asked. The issue is that they ordinarily are not asked.  
 
My interviews generally demonstrated that physicians are both aware of this change, as 
well as “thoroughly inculcated in the concept of patient autonomy (Hopkins, Senior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  curriculum,	  encourage	  a	  systems-­‐oriented	  focus	  that	  may	  be	  harmful	  not	  only	  for	  the	  doctor’s	  own	  personhood,	  but	  also	  for	  patient	  care.	  
	   211	  
Attending: 4).” When asked, both formally in interviews as well as in informal 
conversations about my project, the majority of physicians were able to generally draw 
links between the changing nature of the physician profession and the culture of choice 
and autonomy within which they practice. More experienced physicians were entirely 
aware of the changes in the medical profession over their years of practice, and how it 
affected their practice. For example, this experienced physician said:  
 
“I think that factor of experience or inexperience is overlaid on a historical shift. I 
was in training when the Karen Ann Quinlan case was decided. Then the Belmont 
report came out. That was really the origin of the whole field of medical ethics 
and discussions of end of life care. So this field has grown up around my career. 
I've seen things change from a very physician centered, paternalistic approach to 
one which stresses patient involvement (Hopkins, Attending in Pulmonary and 
Critical Care Medicine: 4).” 
 
During a recent session on end of life conversations that I led with fourth (final) year 
medical students at Johns Hopkins, I was struck by the nuanced reflexivity these students 
possessed when one remarked that while the medical profession has swung over time 
toward a focus on autonomy, had had noticed Hopkins subtly shifting back towards 
desiring a more shared decision-making approach.  
 
These insights in combination with the macro/micro sociological changes discussed 
throughout this thesis, reflect the unintended consequences of social action, best 
summarised by Giddens in his Theory of Structuration (Giddens, 1984). In Structuration 
Theory, Giddens brings together structure and agency by emphasizing the recursive 
nature of social life via the duality of structure, whereby structure is constantly recreated 
out of the resources that constitute them. Human social activities are “not brought into 
being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they 
express themselves as actors. In and through these activities, agents reproduce the 
conditions that make these activities possible.  He brings in interpretative sociologies by 
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further stating that human agents display knowledgeability about their surroundings 
which feeds back into the recursive ordering of social practices.  
 
In other words, human actors are purposeful agents who have a reflexive knowledge of 
the structures within which they operate and make choices based on this interpretative 
understanding. However, aggregated social patterns emerge out of these individual 
human actions. These unintended consequences then constrain choices, imposing a 
structure onto human behaviour. A major part of Structuration Theory involves the 
routinisation of day to day social activity, which reflect “the psychological mechanism 
whereby a sense of trust or ontological security is sustained in the daily activities of 
social life (Giddens, 1984).” 
 
Physicians are fully aware of the social changes in their profession and the resulting 
prioritisation of autonomy, which they have accepted as a necessary and important 
component of physician professionalism. The problem is that the pre-existing structural 
constraints of the hospital such as workflow, limited time, and the hidden curriculum 
hinder trainees’ abilities to develop a nuanced, mature understanding of autonomy. Their 
interpretation of policies promoting autonomy then become warped into a simplistic 
notion of choice, sometimes even reflecting a false or forced choice.  
 
While the original intentions of autonomy were positive, the unintended consequences of 
this autonomy interpreted through individual physicians feed back onto the overall 
structure to create the pathologic systems of communications I describe in this thesis. 
Power transferred from the doctor to the patient during this professional evolution 
occurred in a piecemeal manner, resulting in perceived lack of power by physicians but 
without the commensurate improvements in patient empowerment that American society 
desires. 
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Section 8.3.5: Problems with Applying Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action 
to End of Life Conversations 
 
One critique of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action that must be addressed in 
this context is the patient or surrogate’s ability to participate in this dialogical interaction 
(Baert, 1998: 149). His theories are predicated on the patient and surrogate having the 
ability to make reasoned choices. Particularly for the elderly and those at the end of life, 
cognitive impairment, delirium and critical illness make it challenging for patients to 
fully engage in this co-creation of consensus. Perhaps as relevant, but less frequently 
recognised, is the emotional toll of critical illness on decision-making capacity and 
judgment.  
 
These life threatening circumstances can lead to intense fear, demoralisation and 
catastrophic thinking which leads to poor judgment and “emotionally grounded beliefs 
that are systematically unresponsive to evidence, [which]…can block the ability to 
deliberate about alternatives (Halpern, 2012).” Surrogate decision makers too may be 
especially vulnerable to emotional catastrophic thinking. However, the autonomy 
discourse is as fallible if not more to this critique, as choice can also be thrust upon those 
who neither have the capacity nor will to make informed decisions.  
 
I described in Chapter 6 the ethical fallacy of forced choice and the need to consider a 
tailored approach to decision-making. Habermas’ theories applied to this context 
presuppose that patients and surrogates want to engage with decision-making if they are 
able to. Attaining understanding and participating in a reasoned decision-making process 
is both mentally and psychologically taxing and may not be what the patient or surrogate 
want to do. It is thus imperative that in applying these theories, that we do not also forget 
the importance of first asking patients/surrogates what role they want to play in the 
decision-making process and tailoring approaches to their desires. As described in earlier 
chapters, I propose not just focusing on best interest outcomes, but beneficence of 
process. This focus on the process of consensus is consistent with the spirit of 
Habermas’s self-emancipatory theories.   
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Health illiteracy remains another major challenge in health care today and those who lack 
monetary resources and education are particularly prone to being subordinated by the 
medical system. These communicative practices require a certain level of cultural and 
educational capital, which many patients and surrogates may not have. In almost any 
medical situation, the physician will always have the upper hand in an effort to convince 
via “the force of the better argument.” This recognition though, only convinces us further 
of the need for a more communicative rationality, as poor health literacy compounds 
problems in situations where autonomy is thrust upon the patient without support from 
the physician.   
 
It also must be noted that cultural differences may influence the patient or surrogate’s 
willingness to act at an equal level and debate with the physician, even if the physician is 
willing, given certain cultures’ respect and subservience to authority figures. It is 
especially important in these situations, that the physician make it very clear that 
communicative rationality should prevail, but also allow for more directive, paternalistic 
interactions if the patient wishes. This would be consistent with the need to give the 
patient a “choice of choice” described in the last chapter. It is again essential to first 
determine or get a sense of whether the patient has the ability or desire to participate in 
communicative rationality. Of course, regardless of health literacy or cultural 
predisposition, there would never be a case where the use of manipulative language such 
as the graphic descriptions described earlier would be appropriate.  
 
Section 8.4: Language and Framing   
 
Language is a powerful tool that can either facilitate end of life conversations or 
contribute to misunderstandings and create additional emotional distress and conflict. 
According to Habermas, language is “the medium for domination and social power; it 
serves to legitimate relations of organised force. In so far as the legitimations do not 
articulate the power relations whose institutionalisation they make possible, in so far as 
these relations manifest themselves in the legitimations, language is also ideological 
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(Held, 1980: 316).” Beyond the ways in which language situates communicative or 
strategic rationality as described above, the physician’s framing and use of language is 
powerful in other ways.  
 
Defaults can be interpreted as the suggested option. Particularly in situations where 
resuscitation is unlikely to succeed, offering choice with a default of resuscitation 
potentially misguides a patient towards the non-beneficial option. The act itself of 
offering the decision to pursue full code can create false hope. Offering the decision, but 
then discouraging it when they ask for it, demonstrates that “preferences are elicited but 
not respected, decreasing trust when it is most needed (Workman 2011).” The effort to 
obtain consent for CPR often changes the physician’s focus to obtaining a DNR order 
rather than on goals of care (Billings 2012).  
 
Indeed, the importance of language is being increasingly recognised amongst the 
palliative care research community. The effort to obtain consent for CPR often changes 
the physician’s focus to “getting the DNR” rather than focusing on shared decision-
making and the larger conversations of goals of care (Billings 2012). There have been 
attempts to change the language of this decision in the US to “Allow Natural Death” 
(AND) in order to more accurately reflect the realities of this decision. Even the 
difference in language between the US and UK is informative; most American hospitals 
use “Do Not Resuscitate” and the British and UW use “Do Not Attempt Resuscitation.” 
This single additional word helpfully emphasises that this is an attempt and not actually 
an expected outcome.  
Although there has undoubtedly been a shift of power from the physician to patient over 
the past several decades, physicians are still dominant in the relationship. By definition, 
there will always be an inevitable power imbalance between physicians and patients. 
Failure to acknowledge this confers a risk of ignoring the ways in which communication 
can be used to either foster or sabotage good medical care. The main consideration is 
rather how this dominance is utilised; physician power can be used positively to persuade 
or negatively to manipulate or coerce. As Trisha Greenhalgh, et al. assert, “a ‘good 
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consultation’ does not require silencing the voice of medicine. What is required for 
communicative action is that medicine’s validity claim be open to challenge, not that they 
necessarily be challenged (Greenhalgh, Robb, and Scambler 2006).” 
As I explained earlier in the chapter, inexperienced physicians sometimes felt powerless 
to provide best interest oriented care due to perceived constraints of autonomy, and 
instead reverted to manipulative ways to shape decisions rather than achieving reasoned 
consensus. This is counter-productive, as it creates additional conflict between doctor and 
patient. Doctors perceive patients as being “demanding” and “difficult” without realizing 
their own role in creating situations where consensus is strained.” 
Framing is inevitable, as even the most neutral of questions can have a positive or 
negative default, which are known to influence decisions (Halpern, Ubel, and Asch 
2007). Framing occurs when two statements are both true, but meaning differ based on 
the associations implied by the way the statements are phrased. For example, if a 
physician tells a patient that the surgery has a 90% one month survival rate, people are 
more likely to choose surgery than if the physician says there is a 10% mortality in the 
first month (McNeill, et al., 1982). These two statements are both truthful statements of 
the exact same situation, but the associations evoked by framing mean very different 
things to the patient.  
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who were pioneers in the field of decision 
sciences, described the mind as having two systems that drive the way we think32. System 
1 is automatic, instinctive and emotional; System 2 is deliberate, reflective, and more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  The	  epistemological	  links	  between	  the	  interpretivist	  approaches	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  Habermas,	  and	  the	  behavioural	  economics	  approaches	  in	  this	  section	  are	  not	  as	  distant	  as	  one	  might	  think.	  Symbolic	  interactionists	  had	  previously	  emphasised	  that	  humans	  are	  not	  simply	  rational	  users	  of	  a	  cost	  benefit	  calculus.	  This	  is	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  that	  has	  lately	  been	  “discovered”	  in	  behavioural	  economics.	  Symbolic	  interactionists	  and	  phenomenologists	  argued	  that	  humans	  construct	  their	  lifeworlds	  using	  typifications	  and	  their	  social	  actions	  are	  determined	  by	  these	  taken	  for	  granted	  ideas	  (Kelly	  2015).	  Those	  who	  study	  heuristics,	  such	  as	  Kahneman	  provide	  us	  with	  interesting	  and	  compelling	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  the	  ways	  these	  typifications	  work.	  Although	  sociology	  traditionally	  concerns	  itself	  with	  relationships	  and	  psychology	  (which	  influences	  behavioural	  economics)	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  individual,	  it	  is	  legitimate	  to	  epistemologically	  link	  the	  two,	  as	  both	  heuristics	  and	  Habermas’	  concepts	  of	  the	  lifeworld	  deal	  with	  our	  taken	  for	  granted	  understandings	  of	  the	  lifeworld,	  and	  the	  ways	  we	  respond	  automatically	  from	  them.	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logical (Kahneman 2011). Framing betrays the rational choice side of us, and occurs 
when System 1 preferentially reacts to these choices. In one of their experiments, they 
allowed participants many trials where they encountered different frames, and thus had 
the opportunity to recognise this distracting effect of framing and “translate” the two 
statements to a common frame. While most people succumb to framing because they do 
not suspect that framing was influencing their choices, these participants had the 
opportunity to neutralise the frame. Despite this, few participants were able to do so: 
“reframing is effortful and System 1 is normally lazy. Unless there is an obvious reason 
to do otherwise, most of us passively accept decision problems as they are framed and 
therefore rarely have the opportunity to discover the extent to which our preferences are 
frame-bound rather than reality-bound (Kahneman, 2011: 367).” 
Faden finds biases in informed consent by framing troublesome (Faden & Beauchamp, 
1986: 319). She asserts that this gives professionals the power to manipulate decisions 
without resorting to deception. She wonders what the implications of this framing is 
when neither the physician nor patient are aware of the impact of framing on decisions.  
She believes that framing potentially diminishes autonomy by compromising 
understanding, as in the person fails to understand the material description of their 
choices. However, experiments have shown that experts are just as susceptible to framing 
as those without expert knowledge, making it unlikely that lack of understanding is the 
cause of our cognitive vulnerabilities towards bias.  
Researchers at Harvard gave the scenario above (90% survival versus a 10% mortality for 
surgery) to three groups: ambulatory patients with chronic diseases, graduate students, 
and physicians (McNeill, et al., 1982). The preferences of all three groups, including that 
of physicians (“experts”), were significantly affected by whether the choice was framed 
by the probability of survival or death. Similarly, when a framing problem outlining a 
choice of public health measures for a disease outbreak, known as the “Asian disease 
problem33” was given to public health experts, they too were susceptible to the problem’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  The	  “Asian	  disease	  problem”	  is	  as	  follows	  (Kahneman,	  2011:	  368):	  	  Imagine	  that	  the	  US	  is	  preparing	  for	  the	  outbreak	  of	  an	  unusual	  Asian	  disease,	  which	  is	  expected	  to	  kill	  600	  people.	  Two	  alternative	  programmes	  to	  combat	  the	  disease	  have	  been	  proposed.	  Assume	  that	  the	  exact	  scientific	  estimates	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  programmes	  are	  as	  follows:	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framing effects. Neither expert knowledge nor professional experience protects from the 
effect of framing. Given this evidence, it is difficult to claim that framing is deceptive 
due to lack of understanding.  
Indeed, framing is possibly less likely due to problems in understanding, than 
biologically determined flaws in rationality. fMRI studies have shown differences in 
brain region activation when study participants are given framing questions under fMRI 
(Kahneman, 2011: 366). When participants’ choices conformed to the frame, the 
amgydala, the region of the brain associated with emotional stimuli (i.e. System 1), lit up. 
In contrast, when participants resisted the temptation of System 1 and chose in spite of 
the frame, the anterior cingulate, the area associated with conflict and self-control, lit up. 
Finally, in the most “rational” subjects – those who were least susceptible to framing - 
demonstrated enhanced activity in the frontal area, the part of the brain that combines 
reasoning and emotions.  
Given that framing does not necessarily imply deception and cannot be attributed to a 
lack of understanding, what are the ethical principles that surround a physician’s ability 
to use framing in conversations? Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how persuasion was 
not only an acceptable, but necessary duty of the physician. How different is framing 
from persuading a patient to make a decision in their best interest? It is a fine line indeed. 
The typical “neutral” way in which residents ask about resuscitation decisions tends to 
be, “In the event that your heart were to stop, would you want us to restart it.” Many 
assume that this is as unbiased a way of asking the question as possible, but this 
statement is framed positively such that the default is for the treatment to be done. To 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   If	  programme	  A	  is	  adopted,	  200	  people	  will	  be	  saved.	  	  If	  programme	  B	  is	  adopted	  there	  are	  a	  one	  third	  probability	  that	  600	  people	  will	  be	  saved	  and	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  probability	  that	  no	  one	  will	  be	  saved.	  	  	   	  If	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  programmes	  are	  framed	  differently	  in	  a	  second	  version:	  	  	   If	  programme	  A’	  is	  adopted,	  400	  people	  will	  die.	  	  If	  programme	  B’	  is	  adopted,	  there	  is	  a	  one	  third	  probability	  that	  nobody	  will	  die	  and	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  probability	  that	  600	  people	  will	  die.	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  consequences	  of	  programmes	  A	  and	  A’	  are	  identical	  as	  are	  B	  and	  B’,	  but	  in	  the	  first	  version,	  a	  substantial	  majority	  choose	  programme	  A	  because	  they	  preferred	  the	  certain	  option	  over	  the	  gamble,	  but	  in	  the	  second	  frame,	  a	  large	  majority	  choose	  the	  gamble.	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further illustrate, this same question asked with a negative default is encapsulated in the 
informed assent strategy: “Your father is very ill and there is not much more that 
medicine can do to give him a quality of life which would be acceptable to him. When his 
heart stops, would you want us to allow him to die a natural death?” Both these 
statements ask the same thing with a positive or negative default, and can have a great 
influence on the decision ultimately made: 
“I think there is, anybody who has been part of a conversation will tell you that 
there is words you can choose, just how you describe CPR, how you describe 
intubation, how you phrase the odds. Do you say that 10% of people walk out of 
the hospital, or do you say that 90% of people don’t? And so I think that’s where 
physician emotion regarding both their own perspectives or end of life and 
individual patient prospects and prognosis come in because there are very 
different terms used on a twenty two year old who is here with a drug overdose, 
versus somebody who has a chronic disease and is ninety-five.” (Hopkins, PGY-
3: 14) 
 
This situation is similar to that of food placement in a school cafeteria in that framing is 
inevitable (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). People are more likely to choose healthier options 
if healthier options are put first in the queue than if unhealthy foods are placed at the 
beginning. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein describe this choice architecture as a 
“nudge”, which is defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives.” Since the food has to be placed somewhere, a choice has to 
be made. Since we know that placement affects food choices, is it ethical to leave it to 
50/50 chance that we inadvertently harm people by placing unhealthier options first 
(Sunstein 2015)?  
Similarly, since framing is inevitable, should physicians harness this power of defaults 
and frames for the good of patients and/or surrogates? Would it be unethical not to? 
Would it be more or less ethical to understand and use inevitable framing in describing 
end of life choices?  
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Moreover, the framing of this positive default may also be interpreted as asking someone 
to volitionally give up something (would you want us to withhold CPR, and essentially 
let them die), in contrast to the alternative system where the meaning is not focused on 
loss by allowing a natural death and transitioning to comfort care. In Kahneman’s book 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, he describes an experiment where a decision to play the lottery 
is framed as a either $5 for the cost of the lottery ticket or $5 as the loss of a gamble 
(Kahneman, 2011: 364). More people choose to play when the decision was framed as $5 
for the cost of a ticket because “losses evoked a stronger negative feeling than costs.” The 
inevitable frame thus makes resuscitation something that must be taken away or refused, 
which goes counter to our propensity towards loss aversion. 
This resident’s acknowledgement and acceptance of framing reflected her institution’s 
prioritisations of autonomy versus best interest. Her focus on providing autonomy by 
portraying choices neutrally and free of bias did not allow her to see the inevitability of 
framing. This quote illustrates the controversy between distinguishing the need to frame 
in a way that helps persuade a patient towards the best treatment versus framing in a 
manipulative manner:  
“If you have a 50 year-old guy who has pneumonia in hospital who you are 
expecting to make a full recovery, but you need the doctor to get a code status, he 
would say, ‘if your heart were to stop would you want us to press on your 
chest?’ And [the patient will] say, ‘Sure, do everything, Doc.’ And then we go 
into an 85 year-old lady’s room whose osteoporotic and we will say, ‘If your heart 
were to stop would you want us to do chest compressions? When we do these 
compressions we will do them so hard that we will break your ribs and you will 
be in severe pain.’ It’s very different to say that, which I don’t think we 
necessarily say to everyone. It is inconsistent…I think something more 
standardised, structured and uniform way to get a code status would be better 
because what is very disturbing is watching your resident or the attending present 
the code status to different patients very differently and you can tell by the way 
they are presenting it that it has an intention and your words are very impactful 
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and they can really persuade so, even though as doctors we don’t, patients have 
the autonomy, we have a lot of power. (Columbia, PGY-2: 12) 
 
Her discomfort with the situation is not in the manipulative nature of graphic 
descriptions, but in the fact that there are differences in the way that these scenarios are 
framed. Given that providing recommendations are considered best practices as well as 
that framing is inevitable, shouldn’t practitioners use framing as another tool of 
persuasion? The challenge of course is again the fine line between persuasion and 
manipulation. Problems occur in the way that many of these conversations are framed not 
because framing occurs, but that the framing is done in the context of strategic 
rationality:  
 
“Often if they are very ill and I really think a DNR is in the best interests, I will 
describe a resuscitation in more detail than I would if it was just somebody who 
was coming in who wasn’t so severely sick and I find my descriptions will vary 
depending on the situation. Definitely the motivation in doing the description is to 
encourage people to consider how maybe painful or how much suffering could be 
gained from that type of intervention and I definitely choose my words sometimes 
specifically to communicate that because I generally think that people don’t know 
what a resuscitation involves.” (Columbia, PGY-2: 12) 
 
“Yes I always say it can break your ribs. It can be very uncomfortable.  You can 
even puncture a lung. You can have adverse outcomes from it. I think from that a 
lot of my very frail patients who are very elderly who I’d recommend being 
DNR/DNI to and that kind of helps them to imagine it for themselves.” 
(Columbia, PGY-2: 13) 
 
As I alluded to earlier, while some of the residents at UW still inappropriately used 
manipulative graphic descriptions, they acknowledged and recognised the power of 
framing:  
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“Phrasing it in the context of do you think you're loved one wants to pass 
peacefully or if going through aggressive measures including fractured ribs and 
invasive procedures would be consistent with their wishes. Its so much in the 
phrasing in so far as helping the family member to say yes or no to that question.” 
(UW, PGY-3: 11) 
 
“…so repeating that back to her, I said I take this to mean she wouldn’t want 
people pounding on her chest and breathing tubes down her throat and often 
bloody and gruesome measures at the end of her life. Instead we have these, we 
can offer her things to make her more comfortable and kind of comfort care that 
we offer people at the end of their lives. If it’s somebody with like multiple 
comorbidities and you know probably cancer or end stage heart disease or 
something, and in my mind it’s like this person is nearing their death and we 
should probably allow death without these gruesome measures. And then I would 
recommend it, then I would frame it, I would first still again see if they’d had that 
conversation, have you ever had, have you ever talked about what you would 
want at the end of your life?” (UW, PGY-3: 12) 
 
These responses reveal similar desires as house staff at autonomy-focused hospitals to 
dissuade patients from resuscitation through graphic descriptions, but because they did 
not feel strictly constrained to offer choice, they were willing to use framing as a part of 
recommendations.  
 
In this thesis, I have moved from description towards a normative stance where I critique 
the communication practices of trainee physicians at autonomy-focused institutions. 
However, I have also emphasised the role of the system and the social forces that 
influence these physicians’ ethical thinking that steer them towards manipulative forms 
of communication. The preponderance of these behaviours in trainees at autonomy-
focused institutions in contrast to experienced physicians and those at best interest-
focused institutions speaks to the importance of institutional cultures and policies.  
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Many of the thinkers I cite, such as Faden and Habermas, clearly take a normative 
position, implicitly or explicitly stating that systematically distorted communications, 
coercion, and manipulation (but not persuasion) are unethical. However, the view I wish 
to advance, is that physicians are not consciously behaving unethically, but that the 
systems and structures at the societal level function sub-optimally. As I described earlier 
in the chapter, a fundamental element of this systematically distorted communication is 
its unconscious and unintentional nature. Based upon my auto-ethnographic experiences, 
physician trainees learn these behaviours and communication practices through peer 
learning and modelling. 
 
Section 8.5: Conclusion: Autonomy, Ideology and Emancipation 
 
Habermas’ theories have always had an emancipatory goal, employing these insights into 
distorted communication as a means for securing freedom by highlighting people’s 
capacity to reason and make rational decisions (Held, 1980: 317). His interest in 
knowledge stemmed from his belief that self-reflection, self-understanding, and 
awareness of forces that influence them, could achieve autonomy and emancipation. He 
draws inspiration from Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic therapy where the goals are to 
change behaviour by shifting “what happens to the individual into what the individual 
makes happen (Giddens, 1985: 126).”  
 
Habermas believes that the goals of critical theory should be the same, where individuals 
actively control their own lives through an enhanced understanding of the forces that 
influence it. With reason and understanding as a central tenant of autonomy, neither the 
doctor nor patient can withdraw from the responsibility of decision-making, as these acts 
are not passive and require the dialogical engagement of both parties. By conceptualising 
challenges in end of life communications through this emancipatory lens, we can focus 
on the ability of individual actors to truly empower themselves rather than through 
paying mere lip service to the idea of individual choice and autonomy.  
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When the lifeworld rather than the system is engaged, ends are defined by moral 
considerations rather than by technical ones. Awareness and critique of these distorted 
communication practices allows us to unmask the contradictions of the current rhetoric of 
patient empowerment which continues to dominate through an illusion of patient 
autonomy and encourages us to seek a more effective way to transform the doctor patient 
relationship. Habermas critiques the use of ideology as a controlling mechanism by the 
system, as a technocratic justification for the current social order. However, this dogmatic 
adherence to ideology can be delegitimised if they cannot be validated when subjected to 
rational discourse. 
 
In contrast, Giddens believes that ideology reflects the “capability of the dominant groups 
or classes to make their own sectional interests appear to others as universal ones. Such 
capacity is therefore one type of resource involved in domination (Giddens, 1979: p5).” 
While Habermas emphasises the role of the system in using ideology as a controlling 
mechanism, Giddens attributes ideological dominance to that of the dominant class (i.e. 
physicians themselves). Giddens’ Structuration Theory allows us to reconcile and unite 
these two contrasting theories. The interpreted knowledge and actions of individual 
physicians feeds back onto the overall system. This recursive social pattern in turn has 
the unintended effect of constraining both physicians’ and patients’ choices. As such, 
both the dominant class of physicians and the system recursively act upon each other to 
produce a controlling effect. 
 
In previous chapters, I focused on the problems associated with the tendency towards an 
un-reflective ideology of autonomy and choice, especially at autonomy-focused 
institutions. Critical theory’s critiques of ideology shed light onto the problems associated 
with this dogmatic way of thinking; “Their ideology is what prevents agents in the 
society from correctly perceiving their true situation and real interests; if they are to free 
themselves from social repression, the agents must rid themselves of ideological illusion 
(Geuss, 1981: 3).”  
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The problem with the ideology of autonomy is that it supports, legitimises and stabilises 
certain kinds of social practices. Physician trainees’ over-interpretation of policies that 
encourage patient autonomy constrains them to act in ways that cause moral distress, but 
they feel powerless to act otherwise. Ideology is also something that “masks social 
contradictions” as seems to be the case in medicine’s ideology of autonomy and patient 
empowerment (Geuss, 1981: 18). The focus on patient empowerment in modern 
medicine as a means of honouring autonomy is contradicted by the disempowering 
elements of systematically distorted communications and lack of understanding of the 
medical circumstance to make a reasoned decision.  
 
Rather than focusing on autonomy for autonomy’s sake, Habermas’ Theory of 
Communicative Action can be used to empower patients by emphasizing the need to co-
create consensus through an open discussion. This concept has familiar echoes to the 
ethical discussions on informed consent discussed at the beginning of the chapter. 
Providing the space for patients to exercise reason is a key component of both Faden’s 
concept of persuasion and Habermas’ communicative action. Further extending 
Habermas’ theories onto more contemporary fields of heuristics and framing allow us to 
further understand the ways human actors react and respond to communication cues.  
 
In previous decades when physician paternalism was permitted, physicians were able to 
engage in open strategic action. When norms shifted towards patient autonomy, rather 
than transitioning to open communicative action, the act of domination was driven 
underground with concealed strategic action, thus disempowering rather than 
empowering patients. Despite this, the loss of physician power still resulted in a 
perceived powerlessness by physician trainees.  
 
I then related these discussions of communication practices to behavioural economics and 
heuristics and discuss how framing might relate to and potentially aid decision-making. 
There is controversy over whether framing should be used by physicians, but I argue that 
framing is inevitable. As such, by not using it, we not only fail to use a valuable 
communication tool, but might even harm patients. Because there is no way to neutrally 
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frame, that framing must occur either positively or negatively, by refusing to frame 
positively to help enforce a recommendation, the physician inevitably frames negatively 
which may sway the patient towards an undesired result. 
 
In the last chapter of my thesis, I conclude by bringing together these various strands to 
propose ways that we can move forward to simultaneously empower physicians, patients 
and surrogates while also truly respecting patient autonomy.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
 
This final chapter concludes the thesis by first summarising the thesis and reiterating it 
contributions to understanding how institutional policies and culture influence how 
physician trainees understand and operationalise the ethical principles of autonomy and 
best interest. I follow this with policy and practice implications. Based upon the findings 
of this thesis, I believe that the medical profession needs to recalibration the way that 
physicians understand and process autonomy in practice and reform medical education 
such that we continue to keep medical trainees engaged with the  lay world as they go 
through the medical education process. Policies that focus more on best interest 
decision-making rather than solely autonomy appear to give physicians the space to 
consider autonomy more carefully while also encouraging trust and open communicative 
practices. I then follow with a discussion of the limitations of this study and potential 
future directions.  
 
Section 9.1: Summary of the Thesis 
 
Americans are not dying well, but little attention has been paid to the effect of hospital 
culture and policy and social structure on the way we experience death and dying. In this 
thesis, I argued that local institutional cultures and policies might influence how 
physicians conceptualise ethical principles relating to patient autonomy. I described how 
this might ultimately influence their willingness to make recommendations and how they 
communicate with patients regarding DNR and end of life decisions.  
 
This thesis was based on a limited sample of 58 physicians at four hospitals in the US and 
UK. As is usually the nature of qualitative inquiry, it was never the intention to claim that 
the findings can be generalisable to all US or UK settings or the medical profession more 
broadly. The study throws a spotlight on four hospitals and draws out some important 
differences between them and the role of some of the doctors working in those hospitals.  
However, these findings are still instructive. The dilemmas posed by the systems for the 
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physicians practicing medicine in them are sociologically interesting in themselves and 
may well occur in similar or different configurations in other institutions. These findings 
describe a set of physician attitudes and behaviours that potentially arise from 
institutional cultures and policies. However, my sample is limited and these findings need 
to be read against that.  
 
This conceptual framework below, which I first introduced in the Introduction, outlines 
the pathway by which hospital cultures might ultimately influence how physicians 
communicate end of life decisions with patients: 
 
 
Although there was significant within-institution variation with a diversity of responses 
amongst respondents, there were general patterns that emerged throughout the interviews. 
In this interview study, there appeared to be a dichotomy between autonomy focused 
institutions and best interest focused institutions where trainee physicians at autonomy 
dominant institutions developed a more simplistic notion of autonomy that defined 
autonomy to merely mean giving choice. Ironically, a simplified ideology of autonomy to 
mean offering unlimited choice without ensuring understanding or providing guidance, 
actually runs counter to the goals of respect for autonomy.  
 
This might result in harm by overwhelming the patient and lead to poor decision-making 
inconsistent with the patients’ goals and values. Because trainees at autonomy dominant 
institutions felt that the way in which autonomy is honoured is by giving “unbiased” 
choice without influence, these trainees felt less willing to provide recommendations 
against resuscitation in clinical situations where the likelihood of survival was negligible. 
In contrast, at hospitals where the focus remained on the patients’ best interest, there 
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appeared to be more freedom and flexibility to focus on a discourse of care rather than 
that of just choice.  
 
It appeared that the trainee physicians in my study experience significant moral distress 
over treatments at the end of life that they believe to be overly aggressive, including 
resuscitation that believe to be futile. Although not sufficiently experienced to feel 
comfortable prognosticating, these trainees still recognised cases where survival would 
be unlikely. They would then either consciously or subconsciously change the way they 
communicate resuscitation options with patients depending on their assessment of the 
patients’ prognosis. While framing and persuasion are appropriate and important tools in 
medical communication, because these trainees did not feel comfortable making 
recommendations, they instead reverted to more manipulative means of communications.  
 
In patients whom they believed survival would be unlikely, trainee physicians at the 
autonomy dominant institutions in my study described resuscitation in a graphic manner, 
emphasizing the bodily harm that would be committed. They did this not to provide 
information but rather to discourage the patient or surrogate from choosing resuscitation 
by viscerally repelling them from it. I explored this from a Habermasian perspective, 
drawing upon his Theory of Communicative Action to demonstrate how these strategic 
forms of communication disempowers patients. Trainees who used graphic descriptions 
to discourage demonstrate systematically distorted communications rather than open 
communicative action, which prevented the patient from engaging with the physician at 
an equal level. 
 
These trainee physicians felt powerless on an individual and, but they had also been 
manipulated by the system (in the Habermasian sense) to act with power over the patient. 
As a result of the sociological shifts in the physician profession over the past several 
decades, the traditional sociological interpretations of physicians’ powerful imposition of 
the voice of medicine onto the patient may be somewhat imprecise. One must also 
recognise the way in which the physician herself has been colonised by the voice of 
medicine which then drives the physician to then act as the system that colonises the 
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patient’s lifeworld. The influence of the system on physicians encourage them to revert to 
unconscious systematically distorted communications which then drives the act of 
domination underground. This piecemeal fulfillment of autonomy in a disjointed manner 
gives the illusion of autonomy in the most detrimental of ways by disempowering doctors 
to do what’s best for patients while not transferring this power over to patients by giving 
them true autonomy.  
 
Interestingly, none of these four institutions required that physicians refrain from giving 
recommendations. In fact, all four institutions’ policies state in their DNR policy that the 
physician must consider the patient’s prognosis and make a recommendation. New York 
State policy, the policy that is the most stringently focused on autonomy, does require 
that a physician perform resuscitation if the patient or surrogate requests it, but even that 
policy does not require that a physician refrain from making a recommendation. These 
trainee physicians were generally not aware of the policy, but due to the cultural milieu of 
their institution, they had an overall sense of how things were done, which they assumed 
reflected the policies they had never read. Trainees at hospitals that prioritised autonomy, 
essentially over-interpreted policies and felt shackled to an exaggerated form of 
autonomy in ways that did not occur at best interest focused institutions.  
Although trainee physicians appeared to be influenced by local cultures and policies, 
experienced physicians at all four sites appeared to be willing to make recommendations 
against resuscitation where appropriate and did not have an oversimplified 
conceptualisation of autonomy. They understood that a key facet of respecting autonomy 
included guiding the patient or surrogate by providing their clinical expertise. It seemed 
that as physicians become more experienced, they develop a professional confidence that 
allows them to feel empowered to act according to their own moral compass, despite 
policies or cultures that incentivised not doing so. They have learned through experiences 
with patients – what worked and what didn’t – that the idea of autonomy as merely giving 
choices is overly simplistic and potentially harmful.  
While the initial intentions of autonomy derived from the moral philosophy of Kant and 
Mill, and adapted into principlism were rigourously thought out and may contribute to 
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patient empowerment, the theory of autonomy has been poorly translated into clinical 
practice. The current forms of autonomy practiced at autonomy focused institutions in the 
United States merely play lip service to the original ideas of autonomy, resulting in an 
alienated physician patient interaction where the physician is able to use autonomy as a 
way to distance oneself from the responsibility for the consequences of treatment 
decisions. While autonomy was intended to empower patients, thrusting potentially 
unwanted decisions onto patients without giving them the tools to make informed 
decisions only disempowers. The use of systematic strategies to manipulate patients into 
making particular decisions drives acts of domination underground so that power is still 
exercised, but in a covert manner. 
 
It is of course important to acknowledge that the processes and systems described in this 
thesis, which were the main focus of this investigation, take place in a broader socio-
cultural context. Factors that have not been explored in depth here, such as health care 
financing structures and incentives, the technological development of new technologies 
that sustain life, and legal discourse at the state and national level, provide a broader 
context and interact in various ways with the processes described.  
 
For example, insurance systems might have some influence on clinical decision-making 
interaction. However this is not a simple matter. Insurance based versus state-based 
health systems may influence individual physicians’ ethical thinking and practices 
surrounding DNR decision-making. In sections 6.4.3.2.and 9.3 above I considered how a 
state-based system (UK) versus insurance-based system (US) affected physicians’ 
understanding of justice in their ethical consideration.  
 
However my auto-ethnographic experiences in American academic medical centres, 
suggest that finances and insurance status plays a surprisingly small explicit role in DNR 
and treatment decisions overall. The ethos and rhetoric in American academic centres has 
always appeared to be one where money should never be an issue. For house staff and 
attendings, day to day clinical decisions for individual patients in the hospital is to a 
significant degree sheltered from considerations of the ability to pay. Financial pressures 
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appear to be reflected in less direct ways such as pressures from the administration such 
as efforts to decrease length of stay. These kinds of complexities remain to be described 
in detail. It will therefore be an important in the future to explore the extent to which 
financial incentives might drive hospitals towards more aggressive care for profit 
generating purposes for example. The other broader issues too deserve further 
consideration and are rich areas for further research.  
 
Section 9.2: Policy Implications 
While we should never look back at and over-sentimentalise the medical paternalism of 
days past, I believe that the pendulum has swung too far towards a focus on patient 
autonomy in the US at the expense of other important principles such as acting in a 
patient’s best interest and respect for person. Ethical norms in American medicine today 
reflect an ideology of autonomy, which leads trainees towards an unreflective simplistic 
interpretation of autonomy narrowly focused on choice. Rather than offering a menu of 
choices, a more satisfying strategy would include shared responsibility to develop a 
treatment plan that balances clinical risks and benefits in ways that are most likely to 
honour the patient’s goals and values. Autonomy should mean more engagement, not 
less.  
This feedback between macro-sociological patterns and the micro-sociological 
interactions reflect Giddens’ Structuration Theory. Here, we see that the original positive 
intentions of mitigating physician paternalism inadvertently became warped into a system 
that eventually became constrained by a distorted interpretation of autonomy. 
Recognition of this problem allows us to determine ways to recalibrate the way we 
operationalise autonomy by focussing on the way social structures, policies, and cultural 
norms influence the way that physicians interpret and act upon the ethical principles of 
autonomy and beneficence. I will now outline two areas of focus for potential policy 
implications:  
1) Change policies to focus more on best interest decision-making rather than solely 
autonomy. This gives physicians the space to consider the patients’ best interest, as well 
as encourage trusting relationships and compassionate care. 
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I believe that policies focused more on best interest decision-making would allow 
physicians the space and liberty to reflect upon ethical principles and align them with 
their own moral compass. Physician trainees at best interest focused institutions appeared 
more able to balance and honour both autonomy and beneficence whereas physician 
trainees at autonomy focused hospitals often felt conflict between the two principles that 
required them to prioritise autonomy at the expense of beneficence.  
Here we must also note the powerful influence of the hidden curriculum and cultural 
norms in shaping beliefs and behaviours. Physician trainees in the US come from medical 
schools across the country, and yet even after a short period of residency training, they 
appeared to have embraced the cultural norms of their residency institution. These 
trainees were often aware of the differences between their medical schools’ culture and 
their residency training institution’s cultures and were generally able to reflect upon them 
cogently.  
Autonomy in the US tends to be simplified to a principle of choice, especially in a busy 
hospital setting when doctors do not have the time and space in their busy work flow to 
deliberate on ethical principles. Autonomy can be interpreted as the right to have 
“everything done.” In contrast, best interest decision-making inherently focuses on care, 
as the ethical focus is on what is best for the patient. In contrast to prior conceptions of 
paternalism, modern interpretations of best interest require physicians to acknowledge 
and account for the patients’ goals of care and values to determine this best interest. 
Furthermore, I argue that best interest decision-making should focus on beneficence of 
process rather than merely of outcome, as I described in Chapter 6.  
By focusing on these more humanistic values through best interest decision-making, 
rather than a detached systems-oriented prioritisation of autonomy, the medical 
establishment might be able to focus on care and compassion rather than a discourse of 
choice. A best interest focused approach also necessitates a degree of trust between the 
doctor and patient, as well as trust of the society in the medical profession. Whether the 
medical profession has earned the trust of society is a point of contention and something 
the medical profession needs to continue to improve.  
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However, important first steps include establishing a mutual trust and belief among 
patients and the general public that physicians generally are genuinely concerned about 
providing the best care to their patients, rather than interested in their own incentives. We 
must recognise that frequently it is lack of time, stress, and bureaucracy that prevent 
optimal care rather than physician malevolence. Physicians must in turn empathise with 
patients and understand the emotional, mental and physical toll of illness and 
compassionately and patiently guide them towards treatments that fulfil their goals and 
values. Rather than attributing problems of overly aggressive care and barriers to end of 
life care on demanding or difficult patients, physicians should reflect upon and 
understand their own role through poor communications and structural incentives within 
the health care system that encourage overly aggressive care (You et al. 2015). 
2) Reforming medical education such that medical students and physician trainees 
maintain their engagement with their own lay experiences outside of the world of 
medicine. Theoretically speaking, medical trainees need to stay engaged with their 
lifeworld and resist colonisation by the system.  
In chapters 7, I discussed the moral distress experienced when the physician trainees 
interviewed felt powerless to withhold perceived futile treatments, which lead to 
alienation and meaninglessness in their labour. I subsequently elaborated in Chapter 8 
that this alienation and lack of meaning in part stemmed from as well as contributed to 
the colonisation of the physician trainee’s own lifeworld. The inability to recognise 
herself in her activities and find a meaningful relationship between the physician and her 
own activities encourages both self-alienation and professional alienation.  
 
Jaeggi emphasises that unalienated work requires that the individual produces and 
realises herself in her work (Jaeggi 2014). This sentiment emphasises the importance of 
caring for the physician’s self before the physician can care for others, as the two are 
inherently intertwined. As such, interventions to improve compassionate care and 
humanism must begin by caring for the physician herself. This is not a selfish goal, but 
rather addresses a root cause of the problems we see in health care today of unempathetic 
doctors, bureaucratic medicine, physician burnout, and much more. As I described in 
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Chapter 8, the colonisation of the physicians’ lifeworld is what ultimately leads to the 
colonisation of the patient by the system and voice of medicine. 
 
During the course of my PhD research, several senior American physicians had remarked 
to me that addressing moral distress in physician trainees was unimportant because it is a 
temporary event in a physician’s life marked by a distinct ending. What they have failed 
to acknowledge is the lasting impact of moral distress on individual physicians and the 
culture of medicine as a whole. Moral residue is a lasting and powerful consequence of 
unaddressed moral distress which has been defined as “that which each of us carries with 
us from those times in our lives when in the face of moral distress we have seriously 
compromised ourselves or allowed ourselves to be compromised (Epstein and Hamric 
2009).” Individual acts of alienation, detachment and empathy loss further aggregate to 
reproduce a culture of dispassionate care and stoicism in the medical profession. 
 
I hypothesised earlier that experienced physicians felt comfortable making 
recommendations because they had both the professional confidence and experience to 
act according to their moral compass and not be swayed by ideologies that blindly pursue 
an ethics of choice. Perhaps these physicians maintained the empathy and compassion to 
continue guiding patients even when the easier choice may have been to give them 
whatever they wanted. Much of this can be attributed to improved communication skills 
that come with experience and having more time to talk to patients than physician 
trainees. This trainee reflects on her time as an intern and offers her regarding the 
challenges inherent in DNR conversations as an inexperienced physician:  
 
“I think when you first start out when you’re an intern, you don’t really know 
what you’re doing. It’s really hard to have a conversation with a family member 
about the prognosis when you’ve only taken care of X number of patients and 
maybe none with that particular disease. You don’t want to overstep. Then I think 
that ratio of certainty to uncertainty goes into the other direction. You really don’t 
know because you just don’t have the experience. You get that by seeing 
hundreds and hundreds of patients. If you really don’t know that’s usually when 
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you can focus more broadly on their goals, which is what I think I used to do.” 
(UW, PGY-6: C6) 
 
As a trainee at UW, she does describe how this lack of prognostic uncertainty encourages 
her to focus more broadly on the patients’ goals and values, which is actually the strategy 
more often taken by experienced experts rather than trainees. This emphasises the fact 
that using a goals of care approach does not require experience and can be successfully 
accomplished by inexperienced trainees, particularly when they feel uncomfortable 
prognosticating. 
 
However, another factor might be that experienced physicians have re-learned how to 
engage with the lay human world and reconcile the professional jargon and mentality of 
medicine with that of real world interactions. Studies have demonstrated how end of life 
care communications or ethics experts  in end of life care conversations “practise what 
they preach,” and spend more time compassionately listening than talking in comparison 
to primary care physicians who did not specialise in end of life care (Roter et al. 2012). 
They engaged more with the lifeworld than with the voice of medicine, talking more 
about psychosocial and lifestyle issues than biomedical treatments. The manipulative 
graphic descriptions that physician trainees used blocked the lifeworld and engaged in 
strategic rather than open communication patterns. They exert medical power over 
patients by using strictly medicine jargon, which blocks opportunities for the doctor and 
patient to engage mutually in the familiar language of the lay world. 
 
While educational training modules are undoubtedly important, perhaps prevention can 
be more effective than treatment. Rather than intervening late after colonisation of the 
physician’s lifeworld has already occurred, we should find ways to reform medical 
education to continue engaging the lay world during medical training so that trainees 
never lose their engagement with their personal experiences. Medical students often cite 
their desire to help people in their motivation to pursue medicine. This is oftentimes 
motivated by human compassion and empathy, but the indoctrination process of medicine 
replaces this humanism with a jaded detachment (99 2015).  
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This year at the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities, a session leader on using 
theatre improvisation techniques to teach medical students how to communicate with 
patients joked, “Medical students all know how to be human beings but as soon as they 
put on the white coat, they become awkward.” Perhaps the medical profession needs to 
look past the idea of Aequanimtas34 and consider that it might be better for both the 
medical profession and for patients that physicians not lose themselves and thus their 
sense of humanity and compassion during medical training.  
 
Section 9.3: Limitations 
 
This study has several limitations. I have broadly divided this section into issues 
surrounding limitations related to myself as a researcher, limitations in methodology, and 
limitations related to the hospital sampling. The limitations section is naturally the 
stepping-stone for the next section on future directions.   
 
Section 9.3.1: Self-reflexivity as a Researcher 
 
Given my position as an insider, and especially as a former resident at Columbia, a PhD 
candidate at the University of Cambridge, and a former medical student and current 
general internal medicine fellow at Johns Hopkins, social desirability bias may have 
influenced answers. I have had prior interactions with several of the respondents at both 
Johns Hopkins and Columbia, some as resident colleagues and some as superiors 
(attendings). Regardless of whether I had past interactions with respondents, I noticed 
distinct differences in the ways I interacted with physicians of differing age and seniority.  
 
I could not help the fact that interactions with residents and fellows were more collegial 
and relaxed, whereas interactions with the more senior physicians were more formal and 
reflected a clear hierarchy. This was inevitable given my age and rank. I found it 
especially notable when speaking with a former attending physician at Columbia, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Unperturbability,	  coolness	  under	  fire	  (Johns	  Hopkins	  Osler	  Medical	  Residency	  2014)	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brought out his iPad and started drawing survival curves and charts to describe some of 
the evidence he brought to support his statements – something I recalled him doing 
frequently during ICU rounds when I was a resident.  
 
I also noticed that some physicians who had some academic interest in this area had 
difficulty engaging their own personal understandings rather than evidence from the 
academic literature. For example, if I asked them for their impression on a particular 
trend, rather than describing their own experience or thoughts, they would instead cite 
evidence in the literature regarding that trend. In these situations, I attempted to redirect 
them towards a more personal reflection with varying levels of success. It was interesting 
to see how immersion in academic research distances oneself from reflecting upon the 
more personal aspects of these issues. Perhaps this in some ways reflects the colonisation 
of these physicians’ lifeworlds. It was easier to cite scientific studies of their experiences 
rather than reflect upon their own narratives and their years of training educated them in 
the way to detach themselves from this personal inquiry in an evidence-based manner.  
 
A related limitation was differences in sampling protocol amongst institutions. Because I 
had a history and established network at Johns Hopkins and Columbia, it was 
significantly easier to recruit physicians for the study. For example, because I knew the 
house staff schedule, and the login information to access their call schedules, I was able 
to search call schedules for residents who were on easy electives, access the intranet to 
find the resident’s e-mail addresses and directly e-mail house staff who were likely to 
have more time for interviews. I also had institutional knowledge of the faculty so could 
specifically recruit physicians to provide for a diverse array of opinions.  
 
My knowledge of Addenbrooke’s and the British medical education system was much 
more limited. As such, I did not have easy access to insiders’ knowledge that made 
recruitment easier. Similarly, at the University of Washington, I was dependent upon the 
help of Randy Curtis and Jimmy Hoard for recruitment. I only had two days to interview 
at UW and am indebted to them for helping to make this study possible at UW. Dr. Curtis 
is a pioneer in palliative care and is the section head of Harborview’s Centre for 
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Palliative Care Excellence. As such, recruitment of physicians was remarkably easy for 
him as he had more clout at his institution than I did at mine. I had significantly less 
control though, over whether the physicians he recruited were different from those not 
recruited.  
 
I discussed earlier that as an insider, it was inevitable that I came into this project with 
my own preconceptions and views. It was important to maintain stringent self-reflexivity 
and recognise how my own biases could effect the way I conducted interviews and 
interpreted data. I was very cognisant of the need to ask questions in as neutral a manner 
as possible, without biasing by framing the question in a certain way. The evolution of 
my own thinking I believe reflects the rigour of my attempts at minimising bias and 
preventing my preconceived biases from influencing my data. The fact that I initially 
came to this project intending to pursue a comparative analysis of the US and UK, but 
later realising after my UW interviews that local cultures play a dominant role illustrates 
my willingness to let the data guide my direction and focus. 
 
Section 9.3.2: Limitations on the Methodology 
 
Interviews with physicians do not reflect actual practices but instead reflect physician’s 
opinions, attitudes, and their perceptions of clinical practice. As the first portion of this 
thesis primarily concerned about how physicians conceptualise ethical principles, this is 
less relevant of a limitation, but rather a purposeful intent of the project (boxes 1 and 2 
below).  
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This limitation becomes more relevant in the relationships detailed in boxes 3 and 4 of 
this thesis, their willingness to recommend and their communication practices. I was only 
able to determine what they believed they communicated in end of life conversations 
rather than what they actually said. Further validation for what is actually done in 
practice rather than what respondents state they do will be an important future step. 
 
Although the difference between more and less experienced physicians’ willingness to 
offer clinical recommendation could reflect more traditional paternalistic attitudes among 
older respondents, my study suggests a different explanation as trainees at the best 
interest focused hospital had similar attitudes to experienced physicians in those 
hospitals. It was also beyond the scope of my study to interview nurses or other health 
care practitioners, as well as patients or surrogates. The lack of these alternative voices is 
a significant limitation and an area of potential future study.  
The research methods employed in this study did not allow for a determination of the 
exact interaction between policies and culture. My informal observations lead me to 
hypothesise that the cultures of the hospitals in New England and the UK are strongly 
influenced by policies. In the UK, national policies govern practices at local hospitals, 
although local variations are still known to exist. In New York, state laws very strongly 
defend patient autonomy and hospitals are required to be adherent. As such, policies have 
a greater effect on these hospitals’ cultures than vice versa. In contrast, from informal 
conversations with key informants at the hospital in the Pacific North-West, it appears 
that their policies were developed to reflect their existing hospital culture. This 
heterogeneity illustrates the complexity of the interactions between cultures and policies 
at different institutions. Alternative methodologies such as ethnographic work would 
allow for further determination of the relationships between institutional cultures and 
policies.  
Section 9.3.3: Limitations Related to Hospital Sampling 
 
The research objectives and hypotheses generated in this study evolved organically 
through the interviews based on the themes and patterns that emerged from initial 
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interviews which had a profound influence on the subsequent course of the project. As 
described in the methods section, this project began as a cross-cultural comparison of the 
US and UK through two sites, Johns Hopkins and Addenbrooke’s Hospital in Cambridge. 
My initial research question was to understand and explore how US and UK physicians 
differed in their prioritisation of best interest and autonomy in DNR decision-making. It 
was only after interviews at Hopkins revealed to me differences in perception between 
my own experiences at Columbia and Hopkins that I decided to expand my interviews to 
Columbia. Subsequently, we decided that it would be important to have a third site in the 
US whose practices might be more similar to the UK (i.e. University of Washington).  
 
Several limitations emerge as a result of this organic hospital sampling strategy. 
Although my study highlights the importance of institutional cultures, there may be other 
internal and external factors that influence physician attitudes and communication 
practices regarding end of life decision-making. For example, it is possible that the 
backgrounds of patients and the cultural milieu around which these hospitals are located 
influence aggressiveness of care, attitudes towards death, and degree of deference to 
authority.  
 
For example, I highlighted the distrust prevalent in African Americans communities due 
to the medical establishment’s unfortunate history of unethical experimentation and 
inequitable care in this population. Given that Johns Hopkins serves a predominantly low 
income, inner city, African American population, mistrust runs high and may influence 
physicians’ behavior regarding choice and resolving conflict. In contrast, UW’s location 
in the Pacific Northwest results in a higher prevalence of Asian American patients, who 
may harbour more traditionally Asian views that are deferential to authority and who 
prioritise family-centered decision making. Columbia’s patient population is 
predominantly Dominican Republican and Catholic. Columbia is also near predominantly 
Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods. Jewish beliefs focus on the sanctity of life and that 
every second of life matters. Both of these populations tend towards religious view of life 
and death, which tend towards more aggressive care. Addenbrookes Hospital is located in 
the highly educated and affluent city of Cambridge, although there are areas of East 
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Cambridge that are economically depressed.  
 
There are cultural differences and stereotypes between the US and UK which have also 
influenced my results. These have not been legitimated through academic research, but 
are nonetheless present and influential. In informal conversations with British physicians 
who had clinical experience in the States, they believed from their experiences that UK 
patients were indeed less pushy, less demanding, and more grateful. Many physicians 
saw this behaviour as reflective of a more collective ethos in the UK, which can be 
contrasted with the more entitled behaviour of Americans.  
 
More generally, I have noticed striking differences between the US and UK during my 
own experiences living in the UK for six years. The cultural stereotypes of loud 
Americans who feel entitled to choice and are much more willing to demand them stands 
in contrast to the more reserved and politely tolerant nature of the British. While both 
may feel just as dissatisfied with a particular issue, the American is more likely to 
complain whereas the British person would be more likely to grumble internally but say 
that everything is fine (Anon 2012). These cultural factors may contribute to less overt 
conflict between doctors and patients for reasons unrelated to medical communication or 
practices. Future studies comparing hospitals within the same geographic location that 
prioritise autonomy and best interest would help mitigate this confounding factor. 
 
Institutional culture is also a very broad concept. There are many factors, which 
contribute to an institution’s cultural milieu. I’ve chosen to focus on the ethical 
dichotomy between autonomy and best interest. As I discussed previously, this can be 
influenced by other factors such as receptiveness to palliative care, ethics consultation 
practices, degree of shared decision-making, leadership, national culture, educational 
curricula, and many other things.  
 
For example, is UW more similar to British hospitals because they also prioritise best 
interest? Or is it because UW has a very palliative care friendly environment, with 
significant commitment within senior leadership to palliative care? Britain is far ahead of 
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the US in uptake and integration of palliative care into the health system. Perhaps the 
overarching philosophy of palliative care may be a contributing factor. Although I 
believe palliative care friendliness may be a factor, the reason I focused more on ethical 
principles rather than palliative care friendliness in this study is because the specific 
responses demonstrated a link between their willingness to recommend and their 
understandings of autonomy.  
 
Similarly, institutions might differ by the way they think about care on a spectrum of 
aggressiveness of care. For example, Barnato et al. studied two institutions within the 
same hospital system that were of high intensity and low intensity with regards to norms 
surrounding use of life sustaining therapies (Barnato et al. 2012). Future studies are 
needed to more fully dissect the potential interactions between palliative care 
environment, aggressiveness of care, ethical thinking, and communication practices.  
 
Other sampling limitations include the fact that I have only interviewed physicians as 
academic medical centres. I have not included community hospitals or for profit hospitals 
in this study. As I described above, I believe the exclusion of for profit and community 
hospitals have helped focus my attention towards the sociological interactions without the 
potential confounding factor of economic incentives.  
 
Section 9.4: Changes in Institutional Culture and Policy During the Study 
 
Time does not stand still during the course of a PhD; cultures, attitudes, and policies are 
ever evolving. As I remarked in Chapter 4, there were many changes that occurred at a 
national and institutional level, which may have influenced results. Most notably, UK 
policies on DNR decision-making changed following the completion of my interviews as 
a result of the Janet Tracey court decision, which required that physicians consult with 
patients regarding these decisions. The unilateral physician decision-making previously 
permitted was no longer possible. This does not substantively affect my study or outdate 
it, as I was interested in the UK as a site that offered a greater extreme of physician 
authority than permitted in the US, rather than a comparative analysis. Indeed, it was a 
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good thing that I conducted my study prior to this policy change. The Janet Tracey did 
occur during my study and thus did raise awareness of issues of DNR decision-making at 
Addenbrooke’s Hospital and may have possibly influenced respondents’ answers.  
 
Institutional level changes such as the UFTO project at Addenbrooke’s, Tom Smith’s 
arrival to Hopkins and the establishment of the Palliative Care Program, as well as many 
of the interventions research occurring at Randy Curtis’s group at UW may have also 
affected respondents’ attitudes and awareness of palliative care issues. As I emphasised 
earlier, society and culture is constantly evolving and its aggregate effects influence and 
mould the very institutional cultures that I sought to examine. As such, rather than 
limitations, I saw these instead as influencing factors that dynamically contributed to my 
respondents’ understanding and response to these issues.  
 
This relates to another influential factor, which is the presence of individuals whom 
through their leadership had profound influences on their hospital’s culture. I was struck 
during my interviews at UW, the degree to which respondents referred to Randy Curtis’s 
leadership and research in palliative care and how that influenced their thinking on the 
issues discussed. The University of Washington’s Palliative Care Centre of Excellence 
recently received a $10 million endowment from the Cambia Health Foundation to 
advance palliative care leadership and research (University of Washington 2014). This 
award reflects UW and Randy Curtis’s excellence in this field, which may make UW an 
exceptional institution that is not necessarily representative of a more typical institution 
that is best interest focused. Similarly, in the methods section (Chapter 3), I described the 
changes and palliative care initiatives that occurred at Johns Hopkins and Addenbrooke’s 
that may have affected the culture and evolution of palliative care at these institutions.   
 
Section 9.5: Future Directions 
 
I have accepted an Assistant Professor faculty position as a clinician investigator in the 
Division of Hospital Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) 
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starting 1 October 2015. During this next phase of my academic career, I will build upon 
this PhD thesis to further validate the hypotheses generated in this qualitative inquiry.  
 
Naturally, my observations of the limitations of my study have been a jumping off point 
for potential future studies, which will help to further elucidate the influence of hospital 
cultures and policies on physicians’ ethical thinking, clinical reasoning, and 
communications practices. I have divided this section on potential future steps into two 
strands: generalizability of results and culture change, communications, and framing. 
 
Section 9.5.1: Further Descriptive Studies Needed to Determine Generalisability of 
Results 
 
Qualitative studies are helpful in generating hypotheses, which can be later be tested for 
generalizability through mixed methods approaches. A limitation of the study was the 
potential confounding factor of cultural diversity between different geographic regions. 
The cultures between the US and UK are most obvious, but there are also cultural 
differences between New York, Baltimore, and Seattle. Different demographics such as a 
prevalence of Asian-Americans versus Hispanics versus African-American populations 
also influence doctor patient relationships, especially in relation to trust and norms of 
patient autonomy. Further descriptive studies are also needed to obtain other voices such 
as that of nurses, patients, and surrogates. 
 
As such, I hope to conduct a future mixed methods study between hospitals with 
expected differences in institutional culture but in similar geographic regions. As I will be 
working in California, I will focus on institutions within the same state of California. I 
have already established links between key faculty members at UCLA (Neil Wenger) and 
Stanford (several faculty members in the ethics and palliative care departments) for future 
collaborations. Barnato, et al. previously established variations in end of life ICU use 
between hospitals with different advanced care planning norms (Barnato et al. 2014). The 
two hospitals used in this study were UCSF (low intensity) and UCLA (high intensity). 
From informal conversations with colleagues at both institutions, it seems that there are 
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differences in approaches to futility and possibly autonomy as well, with UCLA possibly 
being more aggressive (Huynh et al. 2013).  
 
More pilot studies would obviously be necessary, but this remains a practical and 
promising possibility. As I mentioned earlier in this conclusion, I believe that a good 
nexus to establish culture change can be ethics and palliative care consults. In addition to 
selecting hospitals based on policy differences, I am also aware of very different usages 
of ethics consultations between Stanford and UCSF. Stanford has a very busy ethics 
consultation service whereas UCSF’s appears underutilised. Some combination of these 
three institutions might be a good foundation for a future study examining institutional 
variations within a similar geographic region.  
 
Future studies to further validate my findings regarding the influence of institutional 
culture and policies on DNR decision-making could more closely examine each step of 
the framework I described earlier: 
 
 
To further validate steps 1 through 3, I could conduct surveys of a greater number of 
trainees within the institution of choice on their attitudes towards autonomy and other 
ethical principles and their understanding of their hospital’s policies and cultures, as well 
as their willingness to recommend using clinical vignettes. I could also do a combination 
of a smaller number of semi-structured in-depth interviews and ethnography to get an 
understanding of the hospital’s culture with respect to these issues.  
 
My study focused on physicians’ reports of what they would say during end of life 
conversations, rather than what they actually said. My hypotheses on graphic descriptions 
and manipulative language will need to further exploration in order to determine actual 
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practices. As such, to further explore steps 3 to 4, I could audiotape end of life 
conversations between physician trainees and patients/surrogates to examine actual 
communication strategies used and the degree of conflict experienced.   
 
Section 9.5.2: Potential Future Interventions: Communication Pathologies and 
Culture Change 
 
More descriptive studies are needed before interventions can be designed. I must first 
emphasise the inherent tensions between sociology, which often seeks to identify and 
describe social interactions, and clinical medical sciences, which is more focused on 
designing interventions to improve medical care. This will be a tension I will need to 
come to terms with and balance as my career moves forward. One major challenge is how 
one can change culture, and whether changing policies can potentially influence culture.  
 
How can we use insights from Habermas’s theories to improve how physicians 
communicate with patients? Habermas believed that “theory and practice are intimately 
connected in the process of self-reflection. Through self-reflection, individuals can 
become aware of forces, which have exerted a hitherto unacknowledged influence over 
them. Thus, the act of knowing coincides with the act which achieves the goal of the 
interest, namely emancipation from hypostatic forces (Held 1980: p 318).” From this self-
emancipatory perspective, better understandings of these communication pathologies and 
the sociological forces that drive these attitudes and behaviours have the potential to 
change behaviour.  
 
One important finding in Barry et al.’s analysis was that some doctors switched 
communication strategies between patients, suggesting that their behaviour might be 
amenable to change. They suggest that if doctors could be sensitised to these 
communication patterns and develop and understanding of the importance of dealing with 
lifeworld concerns, especially in conditions such as chronic physical conditions, this 
might enable doctors to better utilise mutually lifeworld communication strategies.  
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There is a need to better educate medical trainees, especially at autonomy dominant 
hospitals of the fallacies of this communication strategy and help them understand how 
this does not achieve the goals of autonomy and medicine in an honest and trustworthy 
way. Physician trainees are easily influenced at this stage of training and absorb 
behaviours and attitudes that are reflective of the culture and role models they experience.  
Simply an understanding of ineffective communication behaviours that were either 
subconsciously enacted or incorrectly taught might go far as a first step in improving end 
of life care outcomes and satisfaction.  
 
What is as important though, is ensuring that structural constraints such as lack of time 
and space to reflect upon these issues are simultaneously addressed. Without addressing 
the hidden curriculum and structural constraints, interventions focused on the individual 
are unlikely to promote long-standing change. Another potential area for future 
interventions might be in the realm of language, heuristics and framing, although more 
ethical inquiry needs to be pursued prior to this given the controversial nature of 
libertarian paternalism and its uses more generally as well as at the end of life.  
 
Section 9.6: Closing Thoughts 
 
This experienced attending summarises his interpretation of how changes in the medical 
profession changed the way autonomy was fulfilled and its unintended consequences:  
 
“It’s what makes the decision-making easier. In the old days, paternalism made it 
easier. You didn’t talk about things with patients, but today you can’t do that 
anymore. You still want to make the decision-making easy. You’re still under the 
gun as an intern. You still have too many things to do and too few minutes to do it 
in. And so they’re going to find the next easiest way. They can’t get away with 
paternalism anymore, so they just go in they say, ‘yes, no we’ll do whatever you 
want’, and they don’t spend a lot of time on the decision-making.” (Hopkins, 
Attending of Oncology: A2)  
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This quotation demonstrates how individuals oftentimes learn how to take the path of 
least resistance to produce unintended consequences of policies and actions. While 
policies prioritising autonomy were intended to empower patients, by equating autonomy 
to unlimited choice, patients risk again being unempowered by having responsibility for 
decisions they do not have the understanding to make, thrusted upon them. This thesis 
focuses on how these sociological shifts resulted in these unintended consequences of 
social action, which subsequently form social constraints that encourage reductionist 
ethical thinking, physician moral distress and alienation, and manipulative 
communication pathologies.  
 
In recent years, the medical profession has embarked in a degree of soul searching as it 
increasingly recognises the degree and impact of decreased empathy, compassion and 
humanism. While the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education’s 
(ACGME) requirements for professionalism reflect an ideal of compassion and care, the 
hidden curriculum of medical training encourages something very different. On the 
wards, these “soft” characteristics of care and compassion take the back burner to 
medical knowledge and expertise. While of course medical knowledge and expertise is of 
critical importance, what I argue is that the medical profession needs to recalibrate 
medical education so that physicians and students are able to maintain their connect with 
their own lifeworld throughout their medical training.  
 
An important aspect of this is addressing moral distress and the alienation that results 
from perceived meaningless work (i.e. provision of futile treatments). As I described 
earlier, this alienation and the relationlessness have similarities to Habermas’s concept of 
the system and lifeworld. Alienated physician trainees are deprived of connections 
between themselves, the work they produce, and the world. The lasting effects of moral 
distress in the form of moral residue can subconsciously affect them during the remainder 
of their professional careers. The emotional detachment that physician trainees learn as a 
coping mechanism may affect their ability to empathise with patients and on a larger 
scale, influence the physician profession’s ability to deliver compassionate, humanistic 
care. In order to address the problems in the medical profession of lack of empathy and 
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compassion, we must look beyond the superficial and address root causes and influences 
by institutional cultures and policies.  
 
In the tradition of Habermas and critical theory, an essential component of this project 
was its self-emancipatory nature. This PhD journey was a very personal one, inspired and 
motivated by my own moral distress and ethical dilemmas that arose during my medical 
residency training. I recognised my experiences as a house staff as one without power 
and control over one’s actions. I recognised a physician’s power in society and yet, like 
some of the other respondents in the study, I felt powerless always to do what I thought 
was in my patients’ best interest. It was challenging and painful to realise “that the 
decision has been made (by a more senior physician or by the team’s failure to determine 
resuscitative status) to ‘flog’ a hopeless patient and that [I] would be the one doing the 
flogging (Winkenwerder 1985).”  
 
Through this emancipatory self-reflection, I became aware of the greater sociological 
forces, which had an unacknowledged influence on the ways that physicians (i.e. myself) 
practice and communicate. It elucidated some of the root causes of the tensions and 
conflicts which we grapple with on a daily basis. Understanding how domination is 
inadvertently realised despite the best of intentions through the use of systematically 
distorted communication, might allow us to conceive strategies for self-emancipation and 
consequently foster mutual emancipation for both physicians and patients.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. NHS East of England’s DNACPR Flowsheet for DNACPR Decision-
Making 
 
 
If there is no reason to believe that the patient is likely 
to have a cardiac or respiratory arrest it is not necessary 
to initiate discussion with the patient (or those close to 
patients who lack capacity) about CPR. If, however, the 
patient wishes to discuss CPR this should be respected.
Is cardiac or respiratory arrest 
a clear possibility in the 
circumstances of the patient?
When a decision not to attempt CPR is made on these 
clear clinical grounds, it is not appropriate to ask the 
patient’s wishes about CPR, but careful consideration 
should be given as to whether to inform the patient of 
the DNACPR decision. Where the patient lacks capacity 
and has a LPA health and welfare or CAD, this person 
should be informed of the decision not to attempt 
CPR and the reasons for it as part of the ongoing 
discussions about the patient’s care. If a second 
opinion is requested, this request should be respected, 
whenever possible.
If a patient has made an advance decision refusing  
CPR and the criteria for applicability and validity are 
met, this must be respected. If an attorney or deputy 
has been appointed they should be consulted.
PLEASE NOTE: Decisions about CPR are sensitive 
and complex and should be undertaken by 
experienced members of the healthcare team and 
documented carefully. Advice should be sought if 
there is uncertainty.
Is there a realistic chance that 
CPR could be successful?
Does the patient lack capacity 
and have an advance decision 
refusing CPR or a LPA health and 
welfare with relevant authority?
Are the potential risks and 
burdens of CPR considered to be 
greater than the likely benefits of 
CPR?
CPR should be attempted unless 
the patient has capacity and 
states that they would not want 
CPR attempted.
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
When there is only a small chance of CPR being 
successful and/or there are questions about whether 
the burdens outweigh the benefits of attempting CPR, 
the involvement of the patient (or, if the patient lacks 
mental capacity, those close to the patient) in making 
the decision is crucial. 
NO
YES
NO
To re-order forms please telephone 07855 404409 quoting reference number 1187-2012.
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Appendix B. DNR Forms for Columbia New York Presbyterian Hospital 
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Appendix C. DNACPR Form for NHS East of England and Addenbrooke’s Hospital 
 
 
DO NOT ATTEMPT 
CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION
Adults aged 16 years and over. In the event of cardiac or respiratory 
arrest do not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
All other appropriate treatment and care will be provided.
Record of discussion of decision (tick one or more boxes and provide further information)
Discussed with the patient / Lasting Power of Attorney [welfare]?    Yes    No  
If ‘yes’ record content of discussion. If ‘no’ say why not discussed.
Discussed with relatives/carers/others?  Yes    No  
If ‘yes’ record name, relationship to patient and content of discussion. If ‘no’ say why not discussed.
Discussed with other members of the health care team?  Yes    No  
If ‘yes’ record name, role and content of discussion. If ‘no’ say why not discussed.
Reason for DNACPR decision (tick one or more boxes and provide further information)
  CPR is unlikely to be successful [i.e. medically futile] because:
  Successful CPR is likely to result in a length and quality of life not in the best interests of the patient because:
  Patient does not want to be resuscitated as evidenced by:
Healthcare professional completing this DNACPR order
Name:       Signature:
Position: Date:         Time:
Name:                            (OR USE ADDRESSOGRAPH)
Address:
Postcode:                                                        Date of birth:          
NHS number:
Review and endorsement by responsible senior clinician
Name:       Signature:
Position: Date:         Time:
Date of DNACPR order: 
ORIGINAL
PATIENT COPY TO 
STAY WITH PATIENT
Is DNACPR decision indefinite?  Yes    No        If ‘no’ specify review date:         
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Appendix D. Sample DNACPR Form from Addenbrooke’s Hospital 
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Appendix E. Consent Forms for the US and UK 
 
US Version: 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMED CONSENT AND PRIVACY 
AUTHORIZATION FORM 
 
Protocol Title:  Understanding the Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) Decision Making 
Process:  
A Comparative Analysis of the United States and England 
 
Application No.: NA_00080529 
 
Principal Investigator: David Levine, MD. 2024 E. Monument Street, Suite 2-600; 
Baltimore, MD 21205. Phone: (410) 614-4577. Fax: (410) 
614-5593 
   
1. What you should know about this study: 
• You are being asked to join a research study. 
• This consent form explains the research study and your part in the study.   
• Please read it carefully and take as much time as you need.  
• Please ask questions at any time about anything you do not understand.   
• You are a volunteer.  If you join the study, you can change your mind later. 
You can decide not to take part or you can quit at any time. There will be no 
penalty or loss of benefits if you decide to quit the study.   
• During the study, we will tell you if we learn any new information that might 
affect whether you wish to continue to be in the study. 
• When the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine IRB reviews a study 
that includes participants from Anne Arundel Medical Center, Greater 
Baltimore Medical Center, Inova Health System and/or Peninsula Regional 
Medical Center then the term “Johns Hopkins” when used in this consent form 
also refers to Anne Arundel Medical Center, Greater Baltimore Medical 
Center, Inova Health System and Peninsula Regional Medical Center. 
 
 Why is this research being done? 
 
The purpose of this research is to compare the practices of DNR in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. In England, it is not required that the physician 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Patient	  I.D.	  Plate	  
	   261	  
seek permission for the patient or family to institute DNR orders. We will enquire 
into how doctors understand the DNR process, as well as their attitudes and 
satisfaction with it.  
 
How many people will be in this study? 
 
This study will interview approximately twenty physicians in the Johns Hopkins 
Health Care System. In addition twenty physicians from the Addenbrookes 
Hospital in Cambridge, England will be interviewed in a separate arm of the 
study. 
 
2. What will happen if you join this study? 
 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
• The study doctor will explain to you the purpose of the interview and obtain 
your informed consent 
• The study doctor will ask you questions about your thoughts and beliefs about 
the research topic 
  
How long will you be in the study? 
 
You will be in this study for the duration of this one time interview, which will 
last approximately one hour. We will not contact you after the interview unless 
you give us permission to do so.  
 
3. What are the risks or discomforts of the study? 
 
The risks to the physician volunteers in the study should be minimal. Discussing 
the topic of resuscitation might raise some emotional concern with a given 
physician. However, this if anything should be transient because this is a topic 
that all physicians are aware of and are required to deal with in their profession.  
 
4. Are there benefits to being in the study? 
 
There is no direct benefit to you from being in this study. If you take part in this 
study, you may help others in the future. 
 
5. What are your options if you do not want to be in the study? 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you do not have to join this study.   
 
6. Will it cost you anything to be in this study?   
 
No, there are no costs associated with participation in this study. 
 
7. Will you be paid if you join this study? 
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No, this study is voluntary and you will not be compensated monetarily for the 
study.  
 
8. Can you leave the study early? 
 
You can agree to be in the study now and change your mind later. Any part of the 
interview that you do not wish to respond to does not need to be answered.  
 
9. How will your privacy be protected? 
 
Johns Hopkins has rules to protect information about you.  Federal and state laws 
also protect your privacy.   
 
The research team working on the study will collect information about you.  This 
includes things learned from the procedures described in this consent form. We 
may also collect other information including your name, address, date of birth, 
and other details, which will be stored in a separate location from the interview 
data. Any information collected about you will have identifying information 
removed. 
 
Generally, only people on the research team will know your identity and that you 
are in the research study. We cannot do this study without your permission to use 
and give out your information. Once collected, any identifying information will 
be removed. Your responses will only be seen by study personnel, all of whom 
have been fully trained in privacy.  
 
10. What does a conflict of interest mean to you as a participant in this study?  
 
None of the research staff have any financial conflicts of interest or other interest 
in this study which might affect their judgment.  
 
11. What other things should you know about this research study? 
a. What is the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and how does it protect 
you?  
 
The Johns Hopkins Medicine IRB is made up of: 
• Doctors 
• Nurses 
• Ethicists 
• Non-scientists 
• and people from the local community.  
 
The IRB reviews human research studies. It protects the rights and welfare of 
the people taking part in those studies.  You may contact the IRB if you have 
questions about your rights as a participant or if you think you have not been 
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treated fairly.  The IRB office number is 410-955-3008. You may also call 
this number for other questions, concerns or complaints about the research.  
 
If you are a participant at Greater Baltimore Medical Center, you may contact 
James Mersey, M.D. (Chairman of the GBMC IRB) at 410-828-7417. 
 
b. What do you do if you have questions about the study?   
  
Call the principal investigator, Dr. David Levine at (410) 614-4577. If you 
wish, you may contact the principal investigator by letter or by fax.  The 
address and fax number are on page one of this consent form. If you cannot 
reach the principal investigator or wish to talk to someone else, call the IRB 
office at 410-955-3008. 
 
c. What are the Organizations that are part of Johns Hopkins?  
 
Johns Hopkins includes the following:  
• The Johns Hopkins University 
• The Johns Hopkins Hospital 
• Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center 
• Howard County General Hospital 
• Johns Hopkins Community Physicians.  
• Suburban Hospital 
• Sibley Memorial Hospital 
 
Anne Arundel Medical Center, Greater Baltimore Medical Center, Inova 
Health System, Peninsula Regional Medical Center and Johns Hopkins 
University are separate organizations that work together on research studies. 
When the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine IRB reviews a study 
that includes participants from Anne Arundel Medical Center, Greater 
Baltimore Medical Center, Inova Health System and/or Peninsula Regional 
Medical Center, then the term “Johns Hopkins” when used in this consent 
form also refers to Anne Arundel Medical Center, Greater Baltimore Medical 
Center, Inova Health System and/or Peninsula Regional Medical Center. 
 
12. What does your signature on this consent form mean? 
 
 Your signature on this form means that: 
• You understand the information given to you in this form  
• You accept the provisions in the form 
• You agree to join the study  
 
 You will not give up any legal rights by signing this consent form.  
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Please let me know if you have any questions about this form. I will be happy to 
clarify whatever is not clear 
 
May we contact you by phone, mail, or email in the next year for further interviews 
or group meetings related to the study? 
⁪  Yes 
⁪  No 
 
WE WILL GIVE YOU A COPY OF THIS SIGNED AND DATED CONSENT 
FORM 
 
 
Signature of Participant                                                                                                                                          
Date/Time  
 
________________________________________________________________________
_________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent                                                                                                                    
Date/Time 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: A COPY OF THE SIGNED, DATED CONSENT FORM MUST BE KEPT 
BY THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR; A COPY MUST BE GIVEN TO THE 
PARTICIPANT; AND, IF APPROPRIATE A COPY OF THE CONSENT FORM 
MUST BE PLACED IN THE PARTICIPANT’S MEDICAL RECORD.  
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UK Version: 
 
 
 
Title of Project: Understanding the Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) Decision Making 
Process: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and England 
 
Lead Investigator: Dr Elizabeth Dzeng 
 
 
 
Consent by Physician     ID number: ___________ 
 
 Please 
initial 
box 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information leaflet dated 21/2/13 version 3.0 
for this research study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 
and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
 
  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving a reason, without my legal rights being affected. 
 
 
  
3. I give my consent for audio-recording of interviews and for transcriptions of the audio-
recordings to be made.  
 
 
  
4. I understand that any information I provide will be treated as confidential. Anonymization 
will occur at the point of audio recording prior to transcription. I confirm that anonymous 
quotations from audio recordings may be used in research publications.  
 
  
5. I would be willing to be contacted after the interview once more briefly, if there are 
additional questions that the study coordinator wants to clarify. 
 
  
6. I agree to take part in the above study.  
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Name of 
Physician 
 Date  Signature 
     
     
Name of 
researcher 
 Date  Signature 
 
Please write your name and contact information below:  
 
Name: _________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mobile Number: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
E-mail Address: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
One copy for the participant, one copy for the researcher 
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Appendix F. Participant Information Sheets for the US and UK 
 
US Version:  
 
Understanding the Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) Decision Making Process: A 
Comparative Analysis of the United States and England 
 
 
Information about the Research 
 
 
I am writing to request your participation in a research study. Please read this information 
sheet, which might answer questions you might have about the study. If you have any 
additional questions, please feel free to ask me. Thank you for considering participating 
in this study.  
 
Who am I?  
 
This study is led by Liz Dzeng, MD, who will be doing the interviewing and analysis.  
The principle investigator of the study is David Levine, MD. Both are in the department 
of General Internal Medicine 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
I am interested in the medical decisions surrounding institution of Do Not Resuscitate 
(DNR) orders at the end of life. I am especially interested in physician attitudes and 
beliefs about the decision making process, and their satisfaction with the process 
 
Why have I been invited?  
 
I am requesting your participation in the study because you have been suggested as a 
good person to talk to about this subject, by one of your colleagues.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
 
The decision to take part is entirely up to you. You are free to stop at any time and 
without giving a reason. You should feel free not to answer any questions you do not 
want to answer. 
 
What do I do if I want to take part?  
 
Please reply to my e-mail or verbally expressing your interest in the study. We will then 
arrange a time that is mutually suitable to meet.  
 
What will happen if I take part?  
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The interviews will take place at a pre-arranged location that is private. This can be at 
your office, or at another location convenient to you on campus. I will first ask you to fill 
out the informed consent form. This will also be an opportunity for you to ask any 
questions you might have about the study. With your permission, the interview will be 
audio recorded and transcribed.   
 
I will also ask you if you are willing to be contacted after the interview with additional 
questions I may have. You are free to accept or refuse this. If you do, I will not contact 
you again after the interview.  
 
What will happen to the study findings?   
 
Results of this study will be published in peer-reviewed journals and at conferences. In 
addition, the information will be used to write my doctoral thesis.  
If you are interested in receiving information about the results of the study, please let me 
know. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
All information relating to you as a result of this research will be kept strictly 
confidential, any contribution you make will not be identfiable in any reports, 
presentations or papers. 
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
 
This study has been approved by the Hopkins IRB committee 
 
How do I contact the researchers?  
 
If you have any questions about the study or taking part please call me at (410) 207-9923 
or e-mail me at edzeng1@jhmi.edu 
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UK Version:  
 
 
 
Title of Project: Understanding the Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) Decision Making 
Process: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and England 
 
Lead Investigator: Dr Elizabeth Dzeng 
 
Information about the Research for Physicians 
 
I am writing to request your participation in a research study. Please read this information 
sheet, which answers questions you might have about the study. If you have any 
additional questions, please feel free to ask me. Thank you for thinking about 
participating in this study.  
 
Who am I?  
 
I am a doctoral research student at the University of Cambridge. I am doing this research 
as part of my studies.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
I am interested in the medical decisions surrounding institution of Do Not Resuscitate 
(DNR) orders at the end of life. I am especially interested in whether or not physicians 
act in the best interest of patients and the balance between autonomy and non-
maleficance.  
 
Why have I been invited?  
 
I am requesting your participation in the study because you have been suggested as a 
good person to talk to about this subject, by one of your colleagues.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
 
The decision to take part is entirely up to you. You are free to stop at any time and 
without giving a reason. You should feel free not to answer any questions you do not 
want to answer. 
 
What do I do if I want to take part?  
 
Please reply to my e-mail or verbally expressing your interest in the study. We will then 
arrange a time that is mutually suitable to meet.  
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What will happen if I take part?  
 
The interviews will take place at a pre-arranged location that is private. This will most 
likely be a meeting room within the Addenbrookes Institute of Public Health. I will first 
ask you to fill out the informed consent form. This will also be an opportunity for you to 
ask any questions you might have about the study. With your permission, the interview 
will be audio recorded and outsourced for transcription.  
 
I will also ask you if you are willing to be contacted after the interview with additional 
questions I may have. You are free to accept or refuse this. If you do, I will not contact 
you again after the interview.  
 
What will happen to the study findings?   
 
Results of this study will be published in peer-reviewed journals and at conferences. In 
addition, the information will be used to write my doctoral thesis. If you are interested in 
receiving information about the results of the study, please let me know. 
 
Are there any risks to participation? 
 
Participants are at liberty to give as much or as little information as they wish. I will not 
be asking about bad practices and you will not be asked to reveal identities of your 
colleagues. If any practices giving rise to concerns are disclosed by the participant, I will 
discuss the situation on a case by case basis with my supervisor. Given my position as a 
PhD student, it is highly unlikely that I would have the capacity or authority to pursue 
any legal action. Instead, any concerns would only be explored from the perspective of 
promoting ethical and professional patient care.  
 
Who is involved with the study? 
 
This study is led by Dr Liz Dzeng, a PhD Student at Cambridge. Her supervisors are 
Professor Martin Roland and Dr Stephen Barclay, both based at the Institute of Public 
Health and the General Practice and Primary Care Research Unit of the University of 
Cambridge. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
All information relating to you as a result of this research will be kept strictly 
confidential. Your information will be anonymized from the very start before 
transcription, as I will not identify your name in any of the recordings. Direct quotes will 
be used in publications in an anonymized manner. Any contribution you make will not be 
identfiable in any reports, presentations or papers. 
 
Who is organizing and funding the research? 
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The research has been organized by myself and my supervisors at the University of 
Cambridge as part of my doctoral studies. My doctoral studies are funded by a Gates 
Cambridge Scholarship.   
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
 
The NHS Research Ethics Committee (Norfolk) has reviewed this study and has 
approved its procedures.  
 
How do I contact the researchers?  
 
If you have any questions about the study or taking part please call me at 07890 622577 
or e-mail me at ed263@cam.ac.uk  
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Appendix G. Recruitment Email for the US and UK 
 
US Version 
 
Dear Dr. _____,  
 
My name is Liz Dzeng and I am a General Internal Medicine Fellow at Johns Hopkins. I 
am conducting a qualitative research study investigating experiences of US and UK 
doctors regarding autonomy and satisfaction in DNR decision-making at the end of life. It 
hopes to explore the prioritization of autonomy versus non-maleficence in decisions 
surrounding the “Do Not Resuscitate” (DNR) status.   
 
I am writing to ask you if you would be interested in participating in an interview asking 
about your experiences with patients at the end of their life and how you and the patient 
came to decisions whether or not to pursue a DNR order. This interview will take 
approximately 45 minutes.  
 
I would be very much appreciative if you would be interested in participating in this 
interview. We can schedule it in a way that best fits your schedule. Please reply to this e-
mail if you are interested in the study.  
 
Sincerely,  
 
Elizabeth Dzeng, MD, MPH 
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UK Version 
 
Dear Dr. _____,  
 
My name is Liz Dzeng and I am a PhD student at the University of Cambridge. I am 
conducting a qualitative research study investigating experiences of US and UK doctors 
regarding autonomy and satisfaction in DNR decision-making at the end of life. It hopes 
to explore the prioritization of autonomy versus non-maleficence in decisions 
surrounding the “Do Not Resuscitate” (DNR) status.   
 
I am writing to ask you if you would be interested in participating in an interview asking 
about your experiences with patients at the end of their life and how you and the patient 
came to decisions whether or not to pursue a DNR order.  
 
In order to participate in this study, you must be a registered doctor practicing through the 
NHS in internal medicine or a medicine subspecialty. You should also regularly 
encounter patients at the end of life and discuss resuscitation status with patients.  
 
I would be very much appreciative if you would be interested in participating in this 
interview. This interview will take approximately 45 minutes. We can schedule it in a 
way that best fits your schedule. Interviews will take place in a private location, either in 
your office or in a room at the Institute of Public Health at Addenbrooke’s, whichever 
you prefer. I have attached the participant information sheet to this e-mail which provides 
more details on the study. Please reply to this e-mail if you are interested in the study.  
 
Sincerely,  
 
Elizabeth Dzeng, MD, MPH 
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Appendix H. Initial Interview Guide 
 
Thank you for taking the time to talk with me today. I know that your time is very 
valuable and I appreciate you taking the time out of your busy schedule to speak with me. 
I am interested in decision-making concerning DNR orders and how these decisions 
reflect broader issues concerning the doctor patient relationship. 
 
End of life questions 
 
How frequently are you involved with patients at the EOL? 
 
What has been your typical involvement in DNR decision making. Please 
describe your role. 
 
Could you please describe your hospital’s policy regarding DNR? 
 
What is your hospital’s culture when it comes to DNR decisions, i.e. what do people 
usually do? 
 
Describe your usual process of reaching a decision to pursue a DNR order. Please think 
about recent experiences that you’ve had with patients. If it helps your thinking, you can 
think about one particular patient.  
 
Usual clinical context 
 
How are decisions normally reached regarding a DNR order and by whom?  
 
Who was this decision discussed with?  
 
Was there any disagreement and how was that dealt with? 
 
How do you feel about the current approach that you take to DNR orders? 
 
How satisfied are you with the way decisions are reached? 
 
How satisfied are you about the way decisions are discussed with patients/family?  
 
Do you think the current system of DNR practice serves the best interest of the patient? 
 
If yes, why? If no, why not? 
 
Are there any situations where you think the current system for DNR does not serve the 
best interest of the patient?  
  
 Can you tell me why that is?  
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What might be a better approach in these cases?  
 
Have you ever felt emotional distress in relation to issues around DNR status. 
 
Autonomy 
 
I’d like to move on to talk about your views of who should have priority in making DNR 
decisions and how patient autonomy fits within this. 
 
What do you feel is the role of the patient or family in making DNR decisions?  
 
How much priority do you think their preferences have in the decision made?  
 
To what extent do you feel this is a clinical decision?  
 
What is your reasoning behind that position? 
 
How much do you feel patients generally want to know about their situation? 
 
If legally permitted, would you feel comfortable making a decision to pursue a DNR 
order without consulting the patient or family? 
 
If yes, what are your reasons for answering yes. 
 
If permitted at your institution, would you feel comfortable making a decision to pursue a 
DNR order against the patient or family’s wishes? 
 
 If yes, what are your reasons for answering yes. 
 
What might your thoughts be about making a DNR decision against the patient/family’s 
wishes? 
 
What is your reasoning behind that position? 
 
General questions 
 
I’d like to finish with some background information about yourself 
 
What is your medical specialty? 
 
Do you see patients with all types of medical problems or mostly those with a particular 
disease?  
 
Are you based primarily in an ICU, inpatient or outpatient? 
 
How long have you been practicing medicine? 
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What stage of your training are you in or what is your title? 
 
How long have you been working at this hospital 
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Appendix I. Final Working Interview Guide 
 
This was my final working interview guide, which I have left in its original unedited form 
to show the actual printed document I carried with me to my interviews. It includes my 
original interview guide as well as notes generated from subsequent interviews and 
analyses that reminded me of other questions and/or themes I wanted to address. 
 
Understanding the Do Not Attempt Resuscitate (DNAR) Decision Making Process: 
A Comparative Analysis of the United States and England 
In-Depth Interview Guide – Doctors/US 
Updated 21 September, 2013 
 
What is your understanding of rules/laws/hospital policy on DNR 
 
Thinking of a patient where DNR would be appropriate, how would you go about with 
that conversation. You can pretend I’m the patient/family 
 
How often is there a conflict when you say this (again a patient who you think should be 
DNR) 
 
Where did your ideas of what should be done regarding DNR/Autonomy come 
from? Were there any particular role models for this? Any particularly memorable 
experiences which shaped your views about this issue and informs you of what needs 
to be done in certain situations?  
 
Have you ever had to do a procedure or CPR that you thought to be against your 
moral/ethical beliefs 
 
Depending on your views (i.e. choice v “autonomy) – do you feel like this option 
respects a patient’s autonomy OR works in the best interest of the patient. Do you 
think the opposite scenario – disrespects or respects autonomy/best interest?  
 
-what role models, mentors, experiences informed your understanding of DNR policies, 
of how to approach patients, on how to think about and give these conversations?  
 
-has that changed at all over the course of your training?  
 
-have you noticed any differences in the way your thinking is with other clinicians (i.e. 
junior and senior doctors). What is your reaction to that? 
 
-what is your definition of autonomy?  
 
-what experiences/factors/training made you think of that particular definition ? 
 
-do you think families have the information they need to know to make these decisions? 
Are we giving them autonomy 
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-do you think you're in a privileged position of having more knowledge. what do you 
think is your professional obligation to do what is best for the patient, what would be 
inappropriate?  
 
-what is your moral obligation? To the patient? where do your ethical principles arise 
from? Do you think about it? Is it consistent with what you think your institution's 
practices are?  
 
-would you be supported by your institution to do what you think is right?  
-do you think that these issues are opinion or fact (obviously said in a dfiferent way)  
 
So just sort of looking through your evolution as you’ve gone from just starting out after 
med school to now, how have you seen your process of talking to a patient as a family 
about this evolve? 
Docs are often portrayed as having power. Do you think dr or pt has power in this 
situation 
Why do you think we have a society that prioritized best interest or autonomy? 
Do you feel like you have a choice in what choices to offer patients. 
In your ideal world how would you do things differently (or stay the same) 
in interviews, is there a way to distinguish between differences of age, vs experience, vs 
change in perception of role of doctor in society (profession)? 
 
How well do you think we communicate with patients 
 
Think back to when you started medical school and/or internship. Was there 
anything in particular that you thought went against your personal beliefs in terms 
of what was right or wrong, or appropriate, that people in medicine do, that you 
later found commonplace?  
 
describe your understanding of this hospital’s official policy regarding DNR decisions 
that end in conflict (i.e. whether 2 physician consent is permitted, who has to make the 
decision, who signs of, etc.) 
 
What is your hospital’s culture when it comes to DNR decisions, i.e. what do people 
usually do? 
 
Think of a case where there was conflict 
 
How are decisions normally reached regarding a DNR order and by whom?  
 
Who was this decision discussed with?  
 
Was there any disagreement and how was that dealt with? 
 
Do you think that patients/families understand what is being asked of them regarding 
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DNR? Before convo? After convo?  
 
Do you think they know all the information needed to make the decision?  
 
How do you feel about the current approach that you take to DNR orders? 
 
How satisfied are you with the way decisions are reached? 
 
How satisfied are you about the way decisions are discussed with patients/family?  
 
Have you ever performed a slow code? 
 
2 physician consent? Have you ever done it or seen it?  
 
Emotional conflict/moral distress?  
 
 
Have you ever had a patient refuse DNR? Have you ever had a patient who instituted a 
DNR that you felt was inappropriate?  
 
Do you think the current system of DNR practice serves the best interest of the patient? 
 
If yes, why? If no, why not? 
 
Why do you think patients full code even if doctors think it’s futile?  
 
Are there any situations where you think the current system for DNR does not serve the 
best interest of the patient?  
  
 Can you tell me why that is?  
 
What might be a better approach in these cases?  
 
Do you think hospital/doctor culture has anything to do with driving patients in one 
direction vs other?  
 
How much do you think patients trust doctors?  
 
Have you had situations where you felt that your clinical and personal beliefs were in 
conflict with what a patient wanted? 
 
Have you ever felt emotional or moral distress in relation to issues around DNR status. 
Can you describe a situation that resulted in moral distress. How did others in the team 
react to this situation, do you feel that they may have experienced moral distress as well? 
Are there opportunities to talk about these situations? Did that help?   
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Autonomy 
 
What is your definition of autonomy?  
 
 Do we give patient autonomy according to this definition?  
 
What is your definition of best interest?  
What is prioritized in your system? Do you think this is the appropriate prioritization 
based on your moral belief system?   
 
Is DNR a clinical or other decision (legal, personal, opinion?) 
 
Would you feel comfortable making decisions unilaterally? (i.e. UK system) 
 
 
What do you feel is the role of the patient or family in making DNR decisions? What do 
you think it should be based on your beliefs? What is it in reality?   
 
How much priority do you think their preferences should have in the decision made? 
What do you think it should be based on your beliefs? What is it in reality?   
 
To what extent do you feel that a DNR order is a clinical decision?  
 
What is your reasoning behind that position? 
 
How much do you feel patients generally want to know about their situation? 
 
If legally permitted, would you feel comfortable making a decision to pursue a DNR 
order without consulting the patient or family? (i.e. would you do it if you were allowed 
to? Would you do it in the system that you are in now?) 
 
If yes, what are your reasons for answering yes. 
 
If permitted at your institution, would you feel comfortable making a decision to pursue a 
DNR order against the patient or family’s wishes? (i.e. would you do it if you were 
allowed to? Would you do it in the system that you are in now?) 
 
 If yes, what are your reasons for answering yes. 
 
Would you feel comfortable making a DNR decision against the patient/family’s wishes? 
Why?  
 
General questions 
 
How long have you been practicing medicine? 
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How long have you been working at this hospital 
 
What is your religion?  
 
What is your family cultural background?  
 
Have you had any personal experiences that have informed your views on the EOL? 
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Appendix J. Initial Codebook 
 
These were initial themes that I developed for my initial codebook developed prior to 
initiation of coding but following completion of all interviews 
 
Conversations (examples of what they'd say) 
What doctors/interviewee would want for himself/herself/loved one/family 
Families "seeing" patient suffering (i.e. the "California" daughter) 
Would you feel comfortable with the UK system - for US doctors, not telling patients or 
deciding unilaterally 
Aggressive care/technology/expectations of technology/ethics of technology 
Appropriate/inappropriate resuscitation 
Autonomy 
Best interest 
Burden on family 
Burden of doctor/fear of responsibility 
Burnout/emotional strain 
Capacity (of patient) 
Choice/decision of patient/what patient wants/false choice/offering choice 
Class/race/SES/education of patient 
Confidence (of house staff v experienced doctors)/"comfortable" 
Communicative action/Habermas/manipulation/graphic descriptions 
Communication/phrasing of conversation/biasing 
Compassion 
Conflict/agreement (doctor/patient)/discordance 
Conflict within family 
Consent/informed consent 
Consumerisation 
Continuity of care (i.e. outpatient/floor/ER/ICU) 
Conversation/discussion/family meeting 
CPR 
Culture/ethnicity death (thinking about it/fear of) 
Decision-making 
Defaults (choice architecture) 
Discussing DNR status/telling a patient their DNR status 
DNR forms (anything to do with it) 
Doctor's personality 
Dying/EOL/death 
Emotions of patient/family 
Empathy 
Patient empowerment 
DNR status and quality/escalation of care 
Ethics committee 
Ethics/morals, experience (house staff)/experienced doctors/evolution of professional 
development 
Family member/surrogate/surrogate decision making/proxy 
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Fighting 
Futility 
"Getting the DNR" 
Goals of care 
Good death 
Grief 
Guardian 
Guilt 
Harm/do no harm/nonmalefecance 
Health literacy 
Hospice 
Hospital culture 
House staff/junior trainee behaviour/younger doctor 
Humanism 
ICU (setting) 
Inappropriate resuscitation (either before convo too late, or done appropriately by pt 
choice) 
Information/education of patient/family/understanding/knowledge 
Informed assent 
Informed consent 
Lay impressions of CPR 
Legal/litigation 
Letting go 
Lifeworld of doctor 
Setting limits (by doctor)/withholding care 
Limits of medicine/iatrogenesis 
Living will 
Miracle/hope 
Moral distress/emotions of doctor/personal views/personal conflict 
Nurses 
Oncology 
Opinion vs clinical decision of CPR 
Palliative care 
Patient case examples 
Policy/law 
Politics of DNR 
Power 
Prognostication/certainty 
Quality of life 
Recommendation against 
Religion 
Resources(limited)/rationing 
Respecting patient's wishes/respect 
Responsibility (as a doctor) 
Rights (of patient) to CPR 
Shared decision-making 
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Slow code/limited codes 
Sociological transformation of doctors 
Societal norms 
Suffering 
Surveillance/panopticon (Foucault) 
Teaching of doctors/training 
Television 
Terminal/end stage 
Time for patients to make decision 
Time/workflow/structure of doctor routine 
Torture/painful, etc. 
Trust/truth 
Two physician consent 
US/UK impressions 
Variation 
"Want everything" 
 
 
 
  
	   285	  
Appendix K. Sample Transcript with Hand Coding 
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Appendix L. Sample Excel Spreadsheet  
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Appendix M. Final Codebook 
 
AD: Advanced directive. Any conversation about institution of an advanced directive, or 
having a DNR form coming in, etc.  
 
Administration: Any supportive administrative staff, such as patient services or 
administrator-on-duty. Usually called if there are problematic patient situations or 
conflicts. 
 
Advanced planning:  Also patient’s own wishes. (even if not advanced) Any discussion 
of whether a person has previously thought about their wishes, or not thought about their 
wishes. Does not have to include actually having an AD. Also can be allusions to starting 
the conversation earlier, or needing to start these conversations as an outpatient.  
 
Aggressive care: Care that is aggressive, care that involves excessive use of technology, 
care that would not benefit the patient. Use of technology. 
 
Appropriate care: care that is appropriate  
 
Autonomy: autonomy of the patient, rights of the patient 
Autonomy definition: direct answer to question of defining autonomy  
Autonomy priority: prioritization of autonomy (especially US) 
 
Bad healthcare experience: usually in reference to lack of trust or more difficulty 
convincing them to do what the doctor wants.  
 
Bad news: discussion of learning how to give, or giving bad news. As distinct from 
discussing death.  
Bad news rosy: delivering bad news in too optimistic a way, painting a rosy picture 
 
Best Interest: Actions that are determined by a doctor to be in the best interests of the 
patient. Also when people discuss whether something is a benefit.  
 
Best practice: or guidelines  
 
Bull’s ring: Not really knowing what you’re going to do or the full situation until you’re 
actually in that situation yourself.  
 
Burden: Burden upon the family for having to make a decision about the patient. Burden 
of responsibility onto family 
 
Burnout 
 
“California daughter”: reference to far away relative who swoops in and wants 
everything 
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CAM: complementary and alternative medicines 
 
Can’t demand: in the UK referring to not being able to demand therapies.  
 
Capacity: whether doctors deem someone to have the capacity to make decisions 
 
Caring:   
 
Capitulate: when doctor sides with family becuase they feel like they have to. 
 
Case Example: When an interviewee gives a specific case.  
 
Choice:  
Choice false: also refers to when docs say of course a family would say no don't kill my 
loved one I want everything 
Choice of choice: ability to decide how much choice one wants to make 
Choice offering: offering a choice. Giving patients or family a choice to make between 
different treatment options (e.g. DNR/no DNR) 
Choice public perception: how UK (usually) public understands how much choice they 
have in EOL decisions. or patients themselves thinking they have more choice than they 
do.  
 
Chronic disease: disease such as COPD, CHF where decline is slower and more insidious 
so EOL more difficult to accept or determine 
 
Clinical Decision: Also clinical judgment. Physician’s personal opinion versus clinical 
opinion.  
Clinical Decision Accuracy: discussion of whether doctor is making right decision or not. 
Sensitivity and specificity.  
 
Code: 
Code discussion: any discussion of code status or need to have convo 
Code Limited:  With the patient or family’s knowledge and permission, performing some 
aspects of a code but not others. E.g. chemical code only, compressions but not 
intubation, etc. Also called a tailored code.   
Code Slow:  Without patient’s/family’s knowledge. Intentionally ineffective CPR 
performed by providers. This can be a “short code” (e.g. “We only do one round of epi”), 
a sham code (e.g. injecting the mattress instead of the patient).  
Code Status 
Code status delay: not having asked about code status when it should have been 
addressed ages ago. sometimes causing inappropriate resuscitation 
Code status neutral: being sure not to inject any personal opinion into code status 
discussion 
Code Stop: when you decide not to resuscitate when called to a code and the person is 
obviously not appropriate. pretty much same as limited code actually….but I guess not 
necessarily with family’s understanding.  
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Code teaching: Resuscitation on “futile” patients as a teaching experience for residents.  
 
Comfort care: when goals at the end of life change so that patient comfort is the priority.  
 
Comfortable: whether the doctor is comfortable making decisions or having 
conversations. Also confidence.  
 
Communication: Communication in the broad sense - talking about “we are bad at 
communication” generally, or having “communication” seminars.  
Communication F/P: communication between the family and the patient 
Lack of communication:  can be any sort of lack of communication, including when 
services are not speaking to each other and giving conflicting information to the family. 
mixed messages 
 
Compassion: also includes “caring” for people 
 
Complication: iatrogenesis, side effects 
 
Conflict: Discordance or disagreement.  
Conflict bt F: inter-family conflict (e.g. sister disagrees with mother) 
Conflict D: internal conflicts that the doctor herself perceives i.e. between what she 
thinks is best and what she has to do, or conflict about what is best. Ethical 
conflicts/problems/reservations.  
Conflict D/D: Conflicts between team members or doctors.  
Conflict F/D: conflicts of opinion on best course of action between family and doctor 
Conflict P/D:  conflict of opinion between patient and doctor 
Conflict P/F:  conflict of opinion between patient and family.  when family does not do 
what patient wanted 
Conflict rare: when doctors say conflicts are rare. Started coding this halfway through so 
some of these may be under conflict % 
Conflict secrecy: primarily in the UK, when a DNR written without the patient/family’s 
permission creates conflict, or there is a complaint about it 
Conflict %: specific answer to my question of how frequently do you see discordance in 
your preferences for patient code status and their wishes 
 
consensus: consensus between everyone 
 
Consumer: consumerization 
 
Control: patient/family maintaining control 
 
Conversation: discussion 
Conversation E: Examples of dialogue or imagined dialogue between physician and 
patient. (e.g. “I would probably approach them and say, ‘We’re at the end of the road...’”) 
Conversations F: anytime a conversation comes up with the family, having a 
conversation with the family. Family meeting 
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Conversation fear D: Doctor afraid to broach subject of DNR, death, etc. not wanting to 
hurt patient. 
Conversations P: anytime a conversation comes up with the patient, having a 
conversation with the patient 
 
Cost: cost of care, health care costs, end of life costs 
 
CPR: 
CPR Appropriate: may also refer to medical interventions generally 
CPR Different: Any discussion of CPR as being somehow different from other treatment 
options in the way that we treat it.  
CPR Inappropriate:  
CPR Patient Aware: discussion that the patient is dead and won’t feel the code anyways. 
That the patient can’t feel when CPR is being done, so things are okay to do. (i.e. 
teaching case, treating the family) 
CPR Reality: what actually happens in CPR, reality chance of survival, worse than when 
you started. realistic views on CPR, history of CPR. 
CPR request: or request treatments. more in the UK, when patients specifically request to 
be full code.  
CPR won’t work 
 
Culture: 
Culture background: Patient or family’s religious, cultural, ethnic, or socioeconomic 
background. Also may refer to things that prevent good communication/understanding 
such as language barriers, etc.  
Culture change: general changes occurring in societal mindsets. social transformation 
Culture change profession: discussion of Social transformation: discussion of change in 
profession, swing from paternalism to autonomy, etc.  
Culture comparisons: comparing two systems, i.e. US, UK 
Cultural Disparities: Referring to a particular racial or ethnic group as having a particular 
characteristic.  
Culture Hospital: Referring to a particular hospital’s specific culture around a particular 
practice. Differences in VA hospitals as well most notably. Can also refer to variation in 
hospitals 
Culture medicine: culture of the medical profession, medicine in general  
Culture Mistrust: not trusting doctor because of race/culture issues 
Culture Norms: Cultural assumptions. For example views on youth. Attitudes towards 
death.  
Culture SES: culture and behaviour of people who have higher SES, etc. (late category, 
may have missed some wrt knowledge self, trust, etc.) May tend to feel more entitled.  
 
Curriculum:  also refers to teaching/training  
Curriculum Formal: Didactic training, role-play, any mention of medical school.  
Curriculum Hidden: Unintentional or unspoken lessons learned. Often in conflict with 
formal curriculum.  
Curriculum Informal: Learning on the wards; training on the wards. 
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Death:  
Death accepting: accepting death 
Death border - discussion of border between life and death 
Death CPR: discussion that CPR is occurring after the patient is already dead.  
Death Denial: The patient, doctor or society being in “denial” about death being 
imminent or about death in general. also can be unrealistic expectations  
Death Delay D: Doctor not talking about death in conversations 
Death Fearing: society or individuals not comfortable with death 
Death inevitable: that despite anything we do the patient will die.  
Death Natural: discussion of dying a natural death or “allowing natural death”  
Death Talking: Talking explicitly about death. Can be feeling uncomfortable about 
talking about death or illness. Could be things done in program which help facilitate 
talking about death.  
Death unexpected: where illness and death are rather sudden, rather than chronic, which 
usually means that families/patients have not had time to accept death and tend to be 
more aggressive.  
Good death: dying the “good death”. 
 
Decision Making: Any discussion of a patient weighing the options, family weighing the 
options.  
SDM: Shared decision-making. Also any situation where interviewee alludes to doctor’s 
role being giving information and/or patient’s role giving goals and values 
Wrong decision: doctor alluding to there being a right or wrong decision, and the wrong 
one was made by the patient. Or a bad decision made. When it’s the doctor making the 
wrong decision, that would go under “clinical decision accuracy”  
 
Default: the default option of CPR. Erring towards aggressive treatment when there is 
disagreement.   
Default Aggressive: when the default is aggressive. Situations where there are conflicting 
views and the default goes with the most aggressive treatment.  
 
Demanding: demanding patient or family. May also mean that the patient requests 
something that won’t work. Or any allusion to doing what they ask.  
 
Did everything: the medical team and/or family tried everything. For many of these 
interviews, these are under “want everything”.  
 
Difficult: 
Difficult F: difficult family 
Difficult P: difficult patient 
 
Dignity: dying with dignity 
 
Distress: withholding information or discussion of DNR from a patient (usually in the 
UK) due to concern that it would be too emotionally distressing for the patient/family.  
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DNR: includes the process  
DNR Form: form 
DNR ask everyone: anything pertaining to the norm of always asking anyone on 
admission what their code status is 
DNR change mind: when doctor has a unilateral decision but changes mind after 
speaking with the family. (different from capitulate, as he actually changes mind and not 
capitulates) 
DNR omission: Primarily in the UK, when a DNR form is signed unilaterally, with 
intention to discuss with the family or patient, but doesn’t get around to doing so. Or 
when they are unable to discuss with the family because they are not there, etc. logistical 
difficulties. Not making sure that the family is aware of what is going on, aware of care 
plan, etc.  
DNR not informing: instituted w/o discussion w family or patient 
DNR wrong reason: unilateral DNR instituted in UK for wrong reasons, i.e. prejudice, 
time, etc.  
DNR worse care: when a patient is DNR, physician impressions that the patient receives 
worse care overall.  
 
Doctor personal: Personal experiences of doctor which informs or influences practice. 
also personal qualities/personality. Respondent’s own EOL wishes 
 
Dying: patient is just dying 
 
Emotion: Talking about specific emotions (e.g sad, frustrated, relieved) 
Emotion D: Physician Emotion (crossover with Moral Distress) 
Emotion F: Family emotion, usually surrounding CPR 
Emotions P: Patient emotions, usually surrounding CPR 
 
Empathy: on the part of the doctor for the patient/family/situation 
 
Empowerment:  patient empowerment. Control of patient  
 
Entitled: patient feeling entitled to certain things.  
 
Environment: the environment with which we operate within hospitals. location, 
environment of hospital/discussions that may or may not be conducive to good 
conversation/comfort 
 
EOL: end of life 
 
Ethics:  
Ethics balance: any discussion of balancing the four principles of ethics 
Ethics consult: when ethics is called 
Ethics D: ethical beliefs of doctor. when doctor talks about the “right thing” to do 
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Euthanasia 
 
Evolution: Or evolution of experience through training? Development 
 
Experience: Experience of doctor. Any mention of the doctor’s level of training as being 
a factor in their decision-making (e.g. “I’ve only seen a few cases…”). also refers to 
house staff  
 
Expertise: IN CLINICAL JUDGEMENT 
 
False hope: when doctors waffle or suggest treatments that will not work 
 
Family dynamic:  
Family informed: also can mean patient. Includes anytime doctors talk about explaining 
the situation, not using jargon. educating the patient 
Family involved: Making sure the family/surrogates/patient are involved in discussions.  
Family not informed:  
 
Feedback: any occasion where a learner is observed by attending and gets feedback. or 
any opportunity where doctors see other doctors doing things and can get feedback. also 
includes “observation”  
 
Fighter: references to the EOL or battling terminal disease as a battle, war. The person is 
a fighter, or she is fighting. Or going on because family wants you to go on 
 
Fixer: doctors being types of people who want to fix things, and be aggressive 
 
Framing: use of graphic descriptions of CPR. (i.e. breaking ribs, etc.) any discussion of 
phrasing that influences, bias, attempts not to bias. Discussions of manipulation v 
persuasion. 
 
Front line: discussion of the people doing the code, usually referring to residents or 
people running the code.  
 
Futility: something is futile, not going to work 
 
Geriatrics: any discussion of the elderly, including frailty, etc.  
 
Getting the DNR: house staff attitudes to conversations with the goal being getting a 
DNR, and associated comments around why getting a DNR is important in 
workflow/house staff issues (i.e. so that cross cover knows what to do). Also refers to 
checklists of getting code status. How it is a check box 
 
GOC: Goals of care. discussion of this being more than just DNR, but addressing goals of 
care. Also means being on active treatment, or treatment decisions apart from DNR. Also 
means big picture. 
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Got better last time: when families want everything because it worked last time, or 
because docs said he’d die but he lived last time 
 
Grey area: where it’s not clear clinically whether CPR would be in the patient’s best 
interest.  
 
Grey hair: reference to having grey hair or other signs of age as a reason people tend to 
trust them more because they are old/experienced.  
 
Guardian: when there is no surrogate available and patient has no capacity. May 
generally refer to a situation where a guardian would be appropriate 
 
Guilt: can be about giving up, letting go. Inability to make decision due to guilt or issues 
of letting go. May hinder decision making. Could also be “giving up” when a patient’s 
family or the patient or the physician uses the term “giving up” on a patient, abandoning 
patient. "Letting" someone die. guilt also to mean inability to say no to aggressive 
treatment. afraid of blame, family dynamics, etc  
 
Harm: Do no harm, non-maleficence. Causing a patient to suffer; avoiding patient 
suffering. Words used by interviewee such as trauma, etc. Torture is also a separate sub-
category. This is also a count of how many times words such as trauma, horrible, etc. are 
used 
 
Health literacy: any discussion of patient’s educational background, especially wrt how 
they are able to understand the medical situation 
 
Healthcare System: discussion of how the healthcare system influences behavior or 
thinking, broader structural constraints. This might also include the business of medicine 
or economics. Cost of care, economic incentives that are skewed, etc.  
 
Hierarchy: “attending level discussion”, going up the hierarchy in discussions 
 
Holistic: thinking about the whole person, the art of medicine, well being, etc. discussion 
about healing relationship, etc. rather than just fixing the person. Also humanism (I know 
that's not a precise fit). Humane  
 
Honest: giving honest answers, being upfront with them, being open with them etc.  
 
Hope: either absence or presence of it. optimism.  
 
IA: Informed assent. When you inform the patient and don’t ask them to make a decision, 
but say “this is what we are going to do” and they don’t object.  
IA Changed: when doctor goes in with an informed assent approach, but then the 
patient/family wants differently so doctor goes with patient’s wishes.  
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ICU: Intensive care unit. A setting of care.  
ICU Triage: decisions not to (or to) take patients to the ICU, esp in UK if that means 
stopping code. 
 
Inappropriate CPR: Instance where there are requests for CPR which the doctor believes 
is inappropriate. Similar to want everything but specifically for CPR.  
 
Informed consent: any use of this word, or discussion of this process.  
 
Interdisciplinary team: involvement of interdisciplinary team, ancillary staff, i.e. clergy, 
social work 
 
Internet: Under “knowledge self” 
 
Intervention: when the respondent suggests interventions that could be done to improve 
the process of EOL care  
 
Jargon: Medical language, overly medical language.  
 
Junior: changed to EXPERIENCE 
 
Keeping from patient: family requesting informatino about prognosis not be told to 
patient 
 
Kill loved one: Similar to false choice, but situation where families are asked impossible 
question of whether they want loved one to live or not. and reference to killing that said 
loved one. Or doctors saying of course loved ones will say yes to resuscitation because of 
course they would want them to live. (similar to false choice)  
 
Knowledge self: patient able to find their own information by looking on the internet, 
support groups, etc. Anything to do with the internet including social media  
 
LCP: Liverpool care pathway 
 
Leadership: discussion of someone being able to do something more because he’s in a 
leadership position. Stories about a leader in the hospital influencing.  
 
Legal/Litigation: Any situation where legal services or consultations are called or when 
people practice defensive medicine. also could be fear of losing job 
 
Limits: limits of medicine 
 
LIsten: hearing the patient out, why they want certian things, listening to them. (added 
late) 
 
Managing expectations 
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MD refusing: Revised, now under “Setting Limits” 
 
Mechanic: Use of a mechanic to defend not giving patients choice 
 
Media: Television/movie influence on understanding of CPR 
Media news: press coverage of CPR, also includes public understandings/perception of 
CPR. Includes the Tracey case  
 
Medical team: discussion of team, medical personnel, references to staff, etc. reference to 
colleagues 
 
Mental Capacity Act 
 
Miracle: Family (or doctor) expecting things that are very unlikely to be possible. or that 
their loved one will be the exception where things will work. 
 
MOLST 
 
Moral distress: Does not have to be so strong as to encompass actual moral distress, but a 
general feeling of negativity such as discomfort felt by a caregiver (nurse or physician) 
over some aspect of a patient’s care. For example, “feeling bad” about being required to 
give CPR to a patient who is terminally ill. Use of words such as “frustrating” 
"uncomfortable" 
 
Multiple admissions: reference to frequent flyers or multiple admissions, etc.  
 
NHS: referring to NHS or NICE.  
 
Non beneficial treatments: treatments docs don't think will help 
 
Nurses 
 
Obviously dying: Gestalt - terminal patient. 
 
Oncology: Any mention of oncologists or oncology wards specifically. 
 
Open mind - not being judgemental, open to other ideas, not going in with an agenda 
 
Opinion: Doctors’ opinion. Also bias as distinct from framing, as this is not bias that 
comes up in conversation, but acknowledgement of bias. Also anything “subjective” 
 
Opt out: option for practitioner uncomfortable with situation to opt out of care 
 
Other specialties: any reference to other subspecialties or medical disciplines, such as 
surgery, neurology, etc.  
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Outpatient: previously in relationship, advanced planning, or others.  
 
Past Experiences: Family’s prior experiences with hospitals, end-of-life care, hospice, 
etc., with other family members.  
 
Paternalism: or reference to decisions that doctor make about what autonomy to grant, 
etc. (paternalistic autonomy)  
 
PC (Palliative Care): Talking about calling a PC consult, PC practices, etc. Also includes 
hospice. 
 
Politics: when politics gets mentioned, i.e. Death Panels, Obama Care.  
 
Preferences P/F: changed to “choice of choice” 
 
Professional: professionalism, any comment pertaining to being a doctor, or the 
experience of being a doctor. anything referring to the act of being a doctor. Doesn’t 
necessarily need to be professionalism in the traditional physician sense  
   
Prognostication: Physician giving an opinion about what will happen to the patient. 
Terminal, outcome. Prognosis. also means uncertainty 
 
Proletarianization: any discussion of doctors being reduced to workers, or the bureacrats 
above.  
 
Policies: Policies/law - any description of what their impression of what hospital 
requirements are 
 
Power: of doctor, discussion of doctor having power in the relationship. Sense of 
authority 
 
Powerless: any description of feeling powerless to do the right thing, learned 
helplessness, feeling “numb” to it, cynicism about what medicine can accomplish, etc. 
giving up on thinking about something, not bothering because of time, etc. Feeling of 
helplessness. Resignation. Could also be feeling numb 
 
QOL: Quality of Life: The state of a patient’s general well-being. Discussion of life worth 
living 
 
Rapport: discussion of establishing one in patient doctor relationship. Distinct from 
relationship 
 
Rationing: of limited resources 
 
Recommendation: Physician making a recommendation 
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Reflection: Physician reflecting on end-of-life issues or ethical issues.  
 
Relationship: Physician-patient relationship, mention of having prior relationship with 
patient, etc. Continuity of care. Or having face to face contact with the patient. Also 
refers to primary care.  
 
Relief: when doctors make decision and family relieved to have decision taken away.  
 
Religion: influence of religion or mention of religion. Also includes discussion on the 
sanctity of life 
 
Resource: resource use, societal distribution of justice. May also include rationing. 
 
Respect: also includes respect for persons (from an autonomy standpoint)  
Respect F: Respecting family’s wishes (or health care proxy’s wishes) - not written 
advanced directive or what the patient has previously expressed, but what the family has 
chosen. 
Respect P: Respecting patient’s wishes - not written advanced directive but what the 
patient had previously expressed as what they wanted to do.  Or respect for patient 
 
Responsibility: Physician’s responsibility to make a decision in the patient’s best interest. 
Or could be patient’s as well. Burden of decision making. Also Duty . 
 
Role Models: observation  
Role Models Peers: fellow residents, etc. If you are an intern, learning from resident.  
Role Models Superior: i.e. attendings 
 
RR: situations describing what would be a rapid response. (This was a late addition, may 
be previously in other categories) 
 
Sanctity of life: every minute of life is precious  
 
Satisfaction: of doctor or family/patient 
 
Scientific: where doctors have scientific mindset, either EBM or etc.  
 
Second opinion:  referring to a second opinion (i.e. if the doc cant provide said aggressive 
treatment) 
 
Setting limits: i.e. surgeons can say surgery not an option, but not CPR, harder to do with 
medicine. setting limits on things. Not offering things  
 
Social media: Under “knowledge self” 
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Skills: discussion of skills involved to have these conversations, to be able to convey 
these things.  
 
Spectrum: using the spectrum of decision making from autonomy to paternalism where 
appropriate. Similar to tailored approach.  
 
Stalling: Doctors not making decisions, being indecisive, kicking the stone down the 
road, not wanting to make decisions or feeling that they should be offering treatments 
(i.e. he can have surgery if he gets stronger) 
 
Substituted judgement 
 
Subversive: acts by doctors to defy policy in the best interest of the patient.  
 
Success unlikely: discussion of intervention unlikely to succeed. Less extreme than 
futility.  
 
Suffering: use of word suffering 
 
Surrogate: Speaking to a surrogate-decision maker for the patient. This can be a family 
member or a healthcare proxy.  
Surrogate secondary gain: if surrogates make decisions with other incentives influencing  
Surrogate worse: Reference to the surrogate being more difficult than patients and 
oftentimes more aggressive. Differences between decisions of patient vs. family (i.e. 
families often want more than the patient”). Situations where the default goes to more 
aggressive care (specific situation of a surrogate) will go under “default” 
Tailored approach: the idea that you have to approach convos differently with different 
people. Similar to spectrum.  
 
Technology: Description of specific life-sustaining technologies, the role of technology, 
etc. 
 
Tertiary Care: When very sick patients transfer to a tertiary care hospital perceived as 
“really good” as a hail-mary pass. Or discussion of tertiary care vs community hospital.  
 
Theory versus practice: Any mention of teaching versus “real life experience”  
 
Time: 
Time earlier: Discussion of need to approach conversations about DNR or GOC earlier 
Time F: Time for family to make the decision regarding DNR.  
Time P: Time for the patient to make the decision regarding DNR. 
Time W: Time - Anything about workflow of doctor. As in, is there time during the 
working day/clinic visit for physicians to have conversations about DNR with their 
patients.  
Time trial: willingness to do a time limited trial of aggressive care.  
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Torture: Anytime an interviewee independently uses the word “torture.” Should also put 
in “Harm” 
 
Transfer: when a patient is transferred because hospital won't provide futile care.  
 
Treating the Family: Mention of CPR as a treatment for the family as opposed to for the 
patient.  
 
Trust: Patients trusting doctors, believing doctor is telling the truth, etc. Also includes 
mistrust that is not cultural 
 
Truth: Doctor telling the truth about the prognosis, being honest.  
 
Two physician consent: mythical two physician consent 
 
UFTO: Universal form of Treatment Options. RCT at Addenbrookes on Advanced Care 
Planning 
 
UK mindset less: the trend that UK docs tend to think the default or what people want is 
less rather than US assumption that patients usually want more. 
 
Understanding: (Also: information, education, knowledge)  
Understanding CPR: Patient/family’s understanding of what CPR is.  
Understanding F: Family understanding/comprehension of patient’s medical situation or 
options for treatment.  
Understanding P: Patient understanding/comprehension of their medical situation or 
options for treatment. 
 
Unilateral:  
Unilateral DNR: when a unilateral DNR is instituted. Opposite sort of, of choice offering. 
But could also be a situation where a UK doctor describes not having to have the 
conversation before instituting a DNR, or saying they’ll talk to the family after 
instituting, but never get to it, etc. And could be about conversation that occurs.  
Unilateral US? : answer to question to US docs as to whether they’d be comfortable with 
UK system of unilateral DNRs 
 
Unrealistic expectation: when family wants things that medicine can't achieve or hearing 
an overly optimistic version of what the doctor says 
 
Values:  
Values D: values of the doctor. What doctors would want for themselves 
Values F; Values of Family 
Values P: Values Patient: Discussion of patients’ values, morals, etc. wrt EOL. Also can 
be values surrounding what it is to have a “meaningful life” 
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Variation: Whether there is variation in institutions or within opinions of doctors. Or 
alternatively, interviewee alluding to the fact that their views are mainstream or not 
uncommon. Generally speaking - this is distinct from overt conflicts with doctors (which 
would belong in Conflict D/D) 
 
WWYD: what would you do - when patients ask doctors what they would do if it were 
they’re loved one. Or more simply, patient asking, what should I do?  
 
Waiting for family: keeping someone alive so that family members can come to see them 
one last time.  
 
Want everything: Patient/family wants everything done. Doctor giving everything would 
go under “choice offering”. Could also be variation on “do everything” → wanting to do 
everything 
 
Want less: situation where patient wanted less intervention than what doctors thought 
should be right. i.e. DNR in a healthy patient 
 
Whim: things that don’t make sense medically that families or patients request, given to 
make them feel better. Psychologically therapeutic. Tailored treatments that don’t make 
sense. Like full code but DNI.  
 
Withdrawal: Withdrawal of care - Removing care from a patient, e.g. turning off a 
ventilator.  
 
Won’t work: not giving treatments that wont work (primarily UK)  
 
Young: when talking about young people and how that makes a difference in this 
situation.  
 
 
 
 
  
	   302	  
References 
99. 2015. “Optimistic, Bright-Eyed Med Students Eager to Transform into Jaded, 
Burned-Out Physicians.” Gomer Blog. Retrieved July 7, 2015 
(http://www.gomerblog.com/2015/06/bright-eyed-med-students/). 
Abbasi, Mahmoud et al. 2014. “Moral Distress in Physicians Practicing in Hospitals 
Affiliated to Medical Sciences Universities.” Iranian Red Crescent Medical Journal 
16(10). Retrieved (http://www.ircmj.com/?page=article&article_id=18797). 
Abbott, K. H., J. G. Sago, C. M. Breen, a P. Abernethy, and J. a Tulsky. 2001. “Families 
Looking Back: One Year after Discussion of Withdrawal or Withholding of Life-
Sustaining Support.” Critical care medicine 29(1):197–201. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11176185). 
Allen, Larry et al. 2012. “Decision Making in Advanced Heart Failure: A Scientific 
Statement from the American Heart Association.” Circulation 125(15):1928–52. 
Retrieved July 18, 2014 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3893703&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Allmark, P. J. 1995. “Can There Be an Ethics of Care?” Journal of Medical Ethics 
21:19–24. Retrieved (http://shura.shu.ac.uk/1749/). 
American Thorasic Society. 2015. “New Guidelines Aim to Resolve Conflicts in Treating 
Critically Ill Patients.” Retrieved May 21, 2015 
(http://www.thoracic.org/about/newsroom/new-guidelines-aim-to-resolve-conflicts-
in-treating-critically-ill-patients.php). 
Anderson, Wendy G., Rebecca Chase, Steven Z. Pantilat, James a Tulsky, and Andrew 
D. Auerbach. 2011. “Code Status Discussions between Attending Hospitalist 
Physicians and Medical Patients at Hospital Admission.” Journal of general internal 
medicine 26(4):359–66. Retrieved September 7, 2014 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3055965&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Angus, Derek C. et al. 2004. “Use of Intensive Care at the End of Life in the United 
States: An Epidemiologic Study.” Critical care medicine 32(3):638–43. 
Anon. 2008. “Death with Dignity Act.” 
Anon. 2012. “21 Brilliant British People Problems.” Buzzfeed. Retrieved March 13, 2013 
(http://www.buzzfeed.com/expresident/british-people-problems#.uvR4Q99Ko). 
	   303	  
Austin, Wendy, Julija Kelecevic, Erika Goble, and Joy Mekechuk. 2009. “An Overview 
of Moral Distress and the Paediatric Intensive Care Team.” Nursing ethics 16(1):57–
68. Retrieved October 26, 2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19103691). 
Back, Anthony L., Cynda H. Rushton, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and Joan S. Halifax. 2015. 
“‘“Why Are We Doing This?”’: Clinician Helplessness in the Face of Suffering.” 
Journal of Palliative Medicine 18(1):26–30. 
Baert, Patrick. 1998. Social Theory in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York 
University Press. 
Barbour, Rosaline S. 2001. “Checklists for Improving Rigour in Qualitative Research: A 
Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog?” British Medical Journal 322:1115–17. 
Barbour, Rosaline S. 2003. “The Newfound Credibility of Qualitative Research? Tales of 
Technical Essentialism and Co-Option.” Qualitative Health Research 13(7):1019–
27. Retrieved October 10, 2013 
(http://qhr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1049732303253331). 
Barnato, Amber E. et al. 2014. “Advance Care Planning Norms May Contribute to 
Hospital Variation in End-of-Life ICU Use: A Simulation Study.” Medical decision 
making 34(4):473–84. Retrieved August 14, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24615275). 
Barnato, Amber E., Judith A. Tate, Keri L. Rodriguez, Susan L. Zickmund, and Robert 
M. Arnold. 2012. “Norms of Decision Making in the ICU: A Case Study of Two 
Academic Medical Centers at the Extremes of End-of-Life Treatment Intensity.” 
Intensive care medicine 38(11):1886–96. 
Barry, C. a, F. a Stevenson, N. Britten, N. Barber, and C. P. Bradley. 2001. “Giving 
Voice to the Lifeworld. More Humane, More Effective Medical Care? A Qualitative 
Study of Doctor-Patient Communication in General Practice.” Social science & 
medicine (1982) 53(4):487–505. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11459399). 
Batt-Rawden, Samantha a, Margaret S. Chisolm, Blair Anton, and Tabor E. Flickinger. 
2013. “Teaching Empathy to Medical Students: An Updated, Systematic Review.” 
Academic medicine  : journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 
88(8):1171–77. Retrieved September 18, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23807099). 
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 2013. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7th 
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Becker, Howard, Blanche Geer, Everett Hughes, and Anselm Strauss. 1961. Boys in 
White. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
	   304	  
Bellini, Lisa M., and Judy A. Shea. 2005. “Mood Change and Empathy Decline Persist 
Training.” 80(2):164–67. 
Bernstein, Nina. 2014. “Fighting to Honor a Father’s Last Wish: To Die at Home.” New 
York Times. Retrieved (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/nyregion/family-fights-
health-care-system-for-simple-request-to-die-at-home.html?_r=0). 
Bernstein, Richard J. 1985. Habermas and Modernity. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
Billings, J. Andrew. 2012. “Getting the DNR.” Journal of palliative medicine 
15(12):1288–90. Retrieved December 25, 2013 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23206150). 
Billings, J. Andrew, and Eric L. Krakauer. 2011. “On Patient Autonomy and Physician 
Responsibility in End of Life Care.” Archives of Internal Medicine 17(9):849–53. 
Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21555665). 
Bishop, Jeffrey P., Kyle B. Brothers, Joshua E. Perry, and Ayesha Ahmad. 2010a. 
“Reviving the Conversation around CPR/DNR.” The American journal of bioethics 
10(1):61–67. Retrieved July 20, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20077345). 
Bishop, Jeffrey P., Kyle B. Brothers, Joshua E. Perry, and Ayesha Ahmad. 2010b. 
“Reviving the Conversation around CPR/DNR.” The American journal of bioethics  : 
AJOB 10(1):61–67. Retrieved July 20, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20077345). 
Blaug, Ricardo. 1995. “Distortion of Face to Face: Communicative Reason and Social 
Work Practice.” 423–39. Retrieved (http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/11449/). 
Blendon, Robert J., John M. Benson, Joachim O. Hero, Robert Wood, and Johnson 
Foundation. 2014. “Public Trust in Physicians — U.S. Medicine in International 
Perspective.” New England Journal of Medicine 371(17):1570–72. 
Blinderman, Craig D., Eric L. Krakauer, and Mildred Z. Solomon. 2012. “Time to Revise 
the Approach to Determining Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Status.” JAMA  : the 
journal of the American Medical Association 307(9):917–18. 
Block, Lauren, Albert W. Wu, Leonard Feldman, Hsin-Chieh Yeh, and Sanjay V Desai. 
2013. “Residency Schedule, Burnout and Patient Care among First-Year Residents.” 
Postgraduate medical journal 89(1055):495–500. Retrieved September 23, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23852828). 
Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspectives and Method. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
	   305	  
Bond, C. E., R. J. Lunn, Z. K. Shipton, and a. D. Lunn. 2012. “What Makes an Expert 
Effective at Interpreting Seismic Images?” Geology 40(1):75–78. 
Borgstrom, Erica, and Tony Walter. 2015. “Choice and Compassion at the End of Life: A 
Critical Analysis of Recent English Policy Discourse.” Social Science & Medicine 
136-137:99–105. Retrieved 
(http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0277953615002865). 
Borry, Pascal, Paul Schotsmans, and Kris Dierickx. 2005. “The Birth of the Empirical 
Turn in Bioethics.” Bioethics 19(1):49–71. Retrieved 
(http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00424.x). 
Boseley, Sarah. 2012. “Acutely Ill Patients Prevented from Dying with Dignity in 
Hospital.” The Guardian, June 1. 
Bosslet, Gabriel T. et al. 2015. “An Official ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM Policy 
Statement  : Responding to Requests for Potentially Inappropriate Treatments in 
Intensive Care Units.” American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 
191(11):1318–30. 
Botti, Simona, Kristina Orfali, and Sheena S. Iyengar. 2009. “Tragic Choices: Autonomy 
and Emotional Responses to Medical Decisions.” Journal of Consumer Research 
36(3):337–52. Retrieved March 19, 2014 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/598969). 
Bowen, G. a. 2008. “Naturalistic Inquiry and the Saturation Concept: A Research Note.” 
Qualitative Research 8(1):137–52. Retrieved March 13, 2012 
(http://qrj.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1468794107085301). 
Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital. 4th ed. New York, NY: Monthly 
Review Press. 
Breen, Catherine M., P. Amy, Katherine H. Abbott, and James A. Tulsky. 2001. 
“Conflict Associated with Decisions to Limit Life-Sustaining Treatment in Intensive 
Care Units.” Journal of General Internal Medicine 16:283–89. 
Brett, Allan S., and Laurence B. McCullough. 2012. “Addressing Requests by Patients 
for Nonbeneficial Interventions.” JAMA  : the journal of the American Medical 
Association 307(2):149–50. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22235082). 
British Medical Association, Resuscitation Council UK, and Royal College of Nursing. 
2014. Decisions Relating to Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation. Retrieved 
(http://www.resus.org.uk/pages/DecisionsRelatingToCPR.pdf). 
	   306	  
Buchanan, Allen. 1978. “Medical Paternalism.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7(4):370–
90. 
Butler, Katy. 2010. “What Broke My Father’s Heart.” New York Times, June 16. 
Retrieved (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/magazine/20pacemaker-
t.html?pagewanted=all). 
Cabana, Michael D. et al. 1999. “Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice 
Guidelines?” Journal of the American Medical Association 282(15):1458–65. 
California Health Care Foundation. 2012. “Poll Finds Wide Gap Between the Care 
Patients Want and Receive at End of Life.” Retrieved May 27, 2015 
(http://www.chcf.org/media/press-releases/2012/end-of-life-care#ixzz2eLhnscM1). 
Campbell, a V. 2003. “The Virtues (and Vices) of the Four Principles.” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 29(5):292–96. Retrieved 
(http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/jme.29.5.292). 
Chi, Jeffrey, and Abraham Verghese. 2013. “Improving Communication with Patients: 
Learning by Doing.” Journal of the American Medical Association 310(21):2257–
58. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24302087). 
Christakis, Nicholas. 2001. Death Foretold: Prophecy and Prognosis in Medical Care. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Christakis, Nicholas A., and Elizabeth B. Lamont. 2000. “Extent and Determinants of 
Error in Doctors’ Prognosis in Terminally Ill Patients: Prospective Cohort Study.” 
British Medical Journal 320:469–73. 
Chung, Grace S., Ryan E. Lawrence, Farr a Curlin, Vineet Arora, and David O. Meltzer. 
2012. “Predictors of Hospitalised Patients’ Preferences for Physician-Directed 
Medical Decision-Making.” Journal of medical ethics 38(2):77–82. Retrieved 
March 27, 2012 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21697296). 
Clarke, Juanne N. 1981. “A Multiple Paradigm Approach to the Sociology of Medicine , 
Health and Illness.” Health (San Francisco) 3(1):89–104. 
Colaianni, Alessandra. 2012. “A Long Shadow: Nazi Doctors, Moral Vulnerability and 
Contemporary Medical Culture.” Journal of medical ethics 38(7):435–38. Retrieved 
September 21, 2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22556311). 
Cooper, Jonas a., Joel D. Cooper, and Joshua M. Cooper. 2006. “Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation: History, Current Practice, and Future Direction.” Circulation 
114(25):2839–49. 
	   307	  
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. 1991. 
“Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders.” JAMA 
265(14):1868–71. 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. 1999. “Medical 
Futility in End-of-Life Care: Report on the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs.” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 282(10):937–41. 
Crawford, R. 1977. “You Are Dangerous to Your Health: The Ideology and Politics of 
Victim Blaming.” International Journal of Health Services 7(4):663–80. 
Cribb, Alan, and Sarah Bignold. 1999. “Towards the Reflexive Medical School: The 
Hidden Curriculum and Medical Education Research.” Studies in Higher Education 
24(2):195–209. Retrieved October 5, 2013 
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03075079912331379888). 
Crotty, Michael. 1998. The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in 
the Research Process. 3rd ed. London: SAGE Publications. 
Curtis, Andrew. 2012. “The Science of Subjectivity.” Geology 40(1):95–96. 
Curtis, J. Randall et al. 2013. “Effect of Communication Skills Training for Residents 
and Nurse Practitioners on Quality of Communication with Patients with Serious 
Illness: A Randomized Trial.” JAMA  : the journal of the American Medical 
Association 310(21):2271–81. Retrieved August 28, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24302090). 
Curtis, J. Randall, and Robert A. Burt. 2007a. “Point: The Ethics of Unilateral ‘Do Not 
Resuscitate’ Orders: The Role of ‘Informed Assent.’” Chest 132:748–51. 
Curtis, J. Randall, and Robert A. Burt. 2007b. “Rebuttal from Dr . Curtis Rebuttal from 
Dr . Curtis.” 
Davies, Nicola. 2014. Tracey v. Cambridge University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, 
et Al. Judgment Approved by the Court for Handling Down. 
Dawson, Angus. 2010. “The Future of Bioethics: Three Dogmas and a Cup of Hemlock.” 
Bioethics 24(5):218–25. Retrieved January 1, 2015 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20500759). 
Desbiens, Norman et al. 1996. “Pain and Satisfaction with Pain Control in Seriously Ill 
Hospitalized Adults: Findings from the SUPPORT Research Investigations.” 
Critical Care Medicine 24(12):1953–61. 
Donohue, Julie M., Marisa Cevasco, and Meredith B. Rosenthal. 2007. “A Decade of 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs.” The New England journal 
	   308	  
of medicine 357(7):673–81. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17699817). 
Dorsey, E. Ray, David Jarjoura, and Gregory W. Rutecki. 2003. “Influence of 
Controllable Lifestyle on Recent Trends in Specialty Choice by US Medical 
Students.” JAMA  : the journal of the American Medical Association 290(9):1173–
78. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12952999). 
Drought, Theresa S., and Barbara a Koenig. 2002. “‘Choice’ in End-of-Life Decision 
Making: Researching Fact or Fiction?” The Gerontologist 42 Spec No(Iii):114–28. 
Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12415142). 
Dworkin, Gerald. 1982a. “Chapter 5 - Is More Choice Better than Less?” Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 7(1):47–61. Retrieved (http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-
4975.1982.tb00083.x). 
Dworkin, Gerald. 1982b. “Is More Choice Better than Less?” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 7(1):47–61. Retrieved (http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-
4975.1982.tb00083.x). 
Dworkin, Gerald. 1988. “Paternalism  : Some Second Thoughts.” Pp. 121–29 in The 
Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Dyrbye, Liselotte et al. 2008. “Burnout and Suicidal Ideation among U.S. Medical 
Students.” Annals of Internal Medicine 149:334–41. 
Dyrbye, Liselotte N., Matthew R. Thomas, et al. 2010. “Burnout and Serious Thoughts of 
Dropping out of Medical School: A Multi-Institutional Study.” Academic medicine  : 
journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 85(1):94–102. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20042833). 
Dyrbye, Liselotte N., F. Stanford Massie, et al. 2010. “Relationship between Burnout and 
Professional Conduct and Attitudes among US Medical Students.” Jama 
304(11):1173–80. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20841530). 
Dyrbye, Liselotte N., Matthew R. Thomas, and Tait D. Shanafelt. 2005. “Medical Student 
Distress: Causes, Consequences, and Proposed Solutions.” Mayo Clinic proceedings 
80(12):1613–22. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16342655). 
Dzeng, Elizabeth. 2013a. “Bringing Emotions Back into Medicine.” KevinMD. Retrieved 
(http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2013/10/bringing-emotions-medicine.html). 
Dzeng, Elizabeth. 2013b. “Dying with Dignity – What next after the Liverpool Care 
Pathway?” The Guardian. Retrieved July 16, 2013 
	   309	  
(http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/16/dying-liverpool-care-
pathway). 
Dzeng, Elizabeth, Alessandra Colaianni, Martin Roland, Geetanjali Chander, et al. 2015. 
“Influence of Institutional Culture and Policies on Do-Not-Resuscitate Decision 
Making at the End of Life.” JAMA Internal Medicine 21287:1–8. Retrieved 
(http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamainternmed.2015.02
95). 
Dzeng, Elizabeth, Alessandra Colaianni, Martin Roland, Thomas J. Smith, et al. 2015. 
“Institutional Culture and Policies’ Influence on Do-Not-Resuscitate Decision-
Making at the End of Life.” Journal of the American Medical Association Internal 
Medicine In Press. 
Dzeng, Elizabeth, Alessandra Colaianni, Martin Roland, David Levine, et al. 2015. 
“Moral Distress Amongst American Physician Trainees Regarding Futile 
Treatments at the End of Life: A Qualitative Study.” Journal of General Internal 
Medicine (doi:10.1007/s11606-015-3505-1). 
Ebell, Mark H. 1995. “When Everything Is Too Much. Quantitative Approaches to the 
Issue of Futility.” Archives of Family Medicine 4:352–56. 
Ebell, Mark H., Lorne a. Becker, Henry C. Barry, and Michael Hagen. 1998. “Survival 
after in-Hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation.” Journal of General Internal 
Medicine 13(12):805–16. Retrieved 
(http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1046/j.1525-1497.1998.00244.x). 
Edwards, Gemma. 2012. “Jurgen Habermas: Politics and Morality in Health and 
Medicine.” Pp. 33–48 in Contemporary Theorists for Medical Sociology, edited by 
Graham Scambler. New York: Routledge. 
Ehlenbach, William J. et al. 2009. “Epidemiologic Study of in-Hospital Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation in the Elderly.” The New England journal of medicine 361(1):22–31. 
Retrieved 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2917337&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Ellingson, Laura, and Carolyn Ellis. 2008. “Autoethnography as Constructionist Project.” 
Pp. 445–66 in Handbook of Constructionist Research, edited by James Holstein and 
Jaber Gubrium. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Elpern, Ellen H., Barbara Covert, and Ruth Kleinpell. 2005. “Moral Distress of Staff 
Nurses in a Medical Intensive Care Unit.” American Journal of Critical Care 
14:523–30. 
	   310	  
Elster, Nanette. 2013. “When Less Is More - Saying No to the Technological Imperative 
at the End of Life.” Bioethics.net. Retrieved July 3, 2015 
(http://www.bioethics.net/2013/12/when-less-is-more-saying-no-to-the-
technological-imperative-at-the-end-of-life/). 
Emanuel, E. J. 1996. “Cost Savings at the End of Life. What Do the Data Show?” JAMA  : 
the journal of the American Medical Association 275(24):1907–14. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8648872). 
Emanuel, E. J., and L. L. Emanuel. 1998. “The Promise of a Good Death.” Lancet 351 
Suppl :SII21–29. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9606363). 
Epstein, Elizabeth G., and Ann B. Hamric. 2009. “Moral Distress, Moral Residue, and 
the Crescendo Effect.” Journal of Clinical Ethics 20(4):330–42. 
Faber-Langendoen, K. 1991. “Resuscitation of Patients with Metastatic Cancer. Is 
Transient Benefit Still Futile?” Archives of internal medicine 151(2):235–39. 
Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1842666). 
Faden, Ruth R., and Tom L. Beauchamp. 1986. A History and Theory of Informed 
Consent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fenton, Joshua J., Anthony F. Jerant, Klea D. Bertakis, and Peter Franks. 2012. “The 
Cost of Satisfaction: A National Study of Patient Satisfaction, Health Care 
Utilization, Expenditures, and Mortality.” Archives of internal medicine. Retrieved 
March 12, 2012 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22331982). 
Ferrell, Betty R. 2006. “Understanding the Moral Distress of Nurses Witnessing 
Medically Futile Care.” Oncology nursing forum 33(5):922–30. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16955120). 
Feudtner, Chris, Dmitri A. Christakis, and Nicholas A. Christakis. 1994. “Do Clinical 
Clerks Suffer Ethical Erosion? Students’ Perceptions of Their Ethical Environment 
and Personal Development.” Academic Medicine 69(8):670–79. 
Findlay, George. 2012. Cardiac Arrest Procedures: Time to Intervene? 
Fischer, Stacy M. et al. 2015. “Doctors Don’t Die Differently: Doctors Use of High Cost 
Low Value Care at End of Life No Different from Non-Doctors.” Pp. 89–443 in 
Abstracts from the 31st Annual Meeting of the Society of General Internal Medicine, 
vol. 23. 
Foucault, Michel. 1973. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. 
London: Routledge. 
	   311	  
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Penguin 
Books. 
Freidson, Eliot. 1970. Profession of Medicine: A Study in the Sociology of Applied 
Knowledge. New York, NY: Dodd ,Mead and Company. 
Freidson, Eliot. 1972. Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied 
Knowledge. New York: Dodd ,Mead and Company. 
Freidson, Eliot. 2001. Professionalism: The Third Logic. Cambridge, England: Polity 
Press. 
Fritz, Zoë et al. 2013. “The Universal Form of Treatment Options (UFTO) as an 
Alternative to Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR) Orders: 
A Mixed Methods Evaluation of the Effects on Clinical Practice and Patient Care.” 
PloS one 8(9):e70977. Retrieved December 1, 2014 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3762818&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Gardiner, P. 2003. “A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Dilemmas in Medicine.” Journal 
of Medical Ethics 29(5):297–302. Retrieved 
(http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/jme.29.5.297). 
Gawande, Atul. 2014. Being Mortal: Medicine and What Matters in the End. 1st ed. New 
York, NY: Metropolitan Books. 
Geuss, Raymond. 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt 
School. 9th ed. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and 
Contradiction in Social Analysis. London: The Macmillan Press. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1985. “Jurgen Habermas.” Pp. 123–39 in The Return of Grand Theory 
in the Human Sciences, edited by Quentin Skinner. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Giddens, Antony. 1984. The Constitution of Society: An Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
Gilligan, Carol. 1990. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Gillon, R. 2003. “Ethics Needs Principles--Four Can Encompass the Rest--and Respect 
for Autonomy Should Be ‘First among Equals.’” Journal of Medical Ethics 
29(5):307–12. Retrieved October 6, 2013 
(http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/jme.29.5.307). 
	   312	  
Gillon, Raanan. 2015. “Defending the Four Principles Approach as a Good Basis for 
Good Medical Practice and Therefore for Good Medical Ethics.” Journal of medical 
ethics 41(1):111–16. Retrieved January 1, 2015 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25516950). 
Glasser, B. G., and Anselm Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies 
for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine. 
Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin 
Books. 
Goffman, Erving. 1961. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and 
Other Inmates. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Golafshani, Nahid. 2003. “Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative 
Research.” 8(4):597–606. 
Goldie, J. 2000. “Review of Ethics Curricula in Undergraduate Medical Education.” 
Medical education 34(2):108–19. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10652063). 
Goodman, David C., Amos R. Esty, Elliott S. Fisher, and Kristen K. Bronner. 2011. 
“Trends and Variation in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries with Severe 
Chronic Illness.” Dartmouth Atlas Project. Retrieved 
(http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/EOL_Trend_Report_0411.pdf). 
Goodyear-Smith, F., and S. Buetow. 2001. “Power Issues in the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship.” Health care analysis  : HCA  : journal of health philosophy and policy 
9(4):449–62. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11874258). 
Greenhalgh, T., J. Howick, and N. Maskrey. 2014. “Evidence Based Medicine: A 
Movement in Crisis?” Bmj 348:g3725–g3725. Retrieved 
(http://www.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/bmj.g3725). 
Greenhalgh, Trisha, Nadia Robb, and Graham Scambler. 2006. “Communicative and 
Strategic Action in Interpreted Consultations in Primary Public Health Care: A 
Habermasian Perspective.” Social Science and Medicine 63:1170–87. 
Guest, Greg, Arwen Bunce, and Laura Johnson. 2006. “How Many Interviews Are 
Enough?: An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability.” Field Methods 
18(1):59–82. Retrieved March 2, 2012 
(http://fmx.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1525822X05279903). 
Habermas, Jurgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and 
the Rationalization of Society. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
	   313	  
Habermas, Jurgen. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two: Lifeworld 
and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
Hafferty, Frederic, and Ronald Franks. 1994. “The Hidden Curriculum, Ethics Teaching, 
and the Structure of Medical Education.” Academic Medicine 69:861–71. 
Hafferty, Frederic W. 1998. “Beyond Curriculum Reform: Confronting Medicine’s 
Hidden Curriculum.” Academic Medicine 73(4):403–7. 
Halpern, Jodi. 2001. From Detached Concern to Empathy. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press. 
Halpern, Jodi. 2003. “What Is Clinical Empathy?” Journal of general internal medicine 
18(8):670–74. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24343367). 
Halpern, Jodi. 2012. “When Concretized Emotion-Belief Complexes Derail Decision-
Making Capacity.” Bioethics 26(2):108–16. 
Halpern, Scott, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel. 2012. “Advance Directives and Cost Savings: 
Greater Clarity and Perpetual Confusion.” Archives of Internal Medicine 
172(3):266–68. 
Halpern, Scott, Peter Ubel, and David Asch. 2007. “Harnessing the Power of Default 
Options to Improve Health Care.” New England Journal of Medicine 357(13):1340–
44. 
Hare, J., C. Pratt, and C. Nelson. 1992. “Agreement between Patients and Their Self-
Selected Surrogates on Difficult Medical Decisions.” Archives of internal medicine 
152(5):1049–54. 
Harris, Gardiner. 2010. “Doctor Faces Suits Over Cardiac Stents.” New York Times, 
December 5. Retrieved 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/health/06stent.html?pagewanted=all). 
Hart, Joanna L. et al. 2015. “Variability Among US Intensive Care Units in Managing the 
Care of Patients Admitted With Preexisting Limits on Life-Sustaining Therapies.” 
JAMA Internal Medicine 19104. Retrieved 
(http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamainternmed.2015.03
72). 
Haug, M. R. 1976. “The Erosion of Professional Authority: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry in 
the Case of the Physician.” The Milbank Memorial Fund quarterly. Health and 
society 54(1):83–106. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1045012). 
Haug, M. R., and B. Lavin. 1979. “Public Challenge of Physician Authority.” Medical 
care 17(8):844–58. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/470473). 
	   314	  
Haug, Marie. 1973. “Deprofessionalization: An Alternate Hypothesis for the Future.” Pp. 
195–211 in The Sociological Review Monograph, edited by Paul Halmos. University 
of Keele. 
Hedgecoe, Adam M. 2004. “Critical Bioethics: Beyond the Social Science Critique of 
Applied Ethics.” Bioethics 18(2):120–43. Retrieved 
(http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00385.x). 
Hefferman, Pam, and Steve Heilig. 1999. “Giving ‘Moral Distress’ a Voice: Ethical 
Concerns Amongst Neonatal Intensive Care Unit Personnel.” Cambridge Quarterly 
of Healthcare Ethics 8(2):173–78. 
Hejafred. 2014. “One Physician’s Creative Response to Bureaucratic Frustration.” Fine 
Feathers. Retrieved July 5, 2015 
(https://heatherjfrederick.wordpress.com/2014/01/15/one-physicians-creative-
response-to-bureaucratic-frustration/). 
Held, David. 1980. Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
Held, Virginia. 2007. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global: Personal, 
Political, Global. 2nd ed. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Herrera, Chris. 2008. “Is It Time for Bioethics to Go Empirical?” Bioethics 22(3):137–
46. Retrieved January 17, 2015 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18257800). 
Hoffmaster, Barry. 2001. Bioethics in Social Context. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press. 
Hojat, Mohammadreza et al. 2004. “An Empirical Study of Decline in Empathy in 
Medical School.” Medical education 38(9):934–41. Retrieved August 31, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15327674). 
Hojat, Mohammadreza et al. 2009. “The Devil Is in the Third Year  : A Longitudinal.” 
84(9):1182–91. 
Hojat, Mohammadreza et al. 2011. “Physicians’ Empathy and Clinical Outcomes for 
Diabetic Patients.” Academic medicine  : journal of the Association of American 
Medical Colleges 86(3):359–64. Retrieved September 22, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21248604). 
Holstein, James, and Jaber Gubrium. 2008. Handbook of Constructionist Research. New 
York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Hough, Catherine Lee, Leonard D. Hudson, Antonio Salud, Timothy Lahey, and J. 
Randall Curtis. 2005. “Death Rounds: End-of-Life Discussions among Medical 
	   315	  
Residents in the Intensive Care Unit.” Journal of Critical Care 20(1):20–25. 
Retrieved September 24, 2014 
(http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0883944104001340). 
Houston, Susan et al. 2013. “The Intensity and Frequency of Moral Distress among 
Different Healthcare Disciplines.” Journal of Clinical Ethics 24(2):98–112. 
Hughes, Patricia. 2002. “Can We Improve on How We Select Medical Students?” 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 95(1):18–22. 
Hundert, Edward. 1996. “Characteristics of the Informal Curriculum and Trainees’ 
Ethical Choices.” Academic Medicine 71(6):624–33. 
Huynh, Thanh N. et al. 2013. “The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to Be 
Futile in Critical Care.” JAMA internal medicine 173(20):1887–94. Retrieved 
November 5, 2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24018712). 
Illich, Ivan. 1974. “Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis, the Expropriation of Health.” 
Marion Boyars Publishers. 
Institute of Medicine. 2001. Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 
21st Century. 
Institute of Medicine. 2014. Dying in America Improving Quality and Honoring 
Individual Preferences Near the End of Life. Retrieved 
(http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2014/Dying-In-America-Improving-Quality-and-
Honoring-Individual-Preferences-Near-the-End-of-Life.aspx). 
Iserson, Kenneth V. 2010. “Resuscitation Strategies in the United States: Realities of 
Hospital and Prehospital Treatment.” The American Journal of Bioethics 10(1):72–
73. 
Ives, Jonathan, and Heather Draper. 2009. “Appropriate Methodologies for Empirical 
Bioethics: It’s All Relative.” Bioethics 23(4):249–58. Retrieved January 19, 2015 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19338525). 
Jacoby, Susan. 2012. “Taking Responsibility for Death.” New York Times, March 30. 
Jaeggi, Rahel. 2014. Alienation. 1st ed. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Jennings, M. L. 2009. “Medical Student Burnout  : Interdisciplinary Exploration and 
Analysis.” Journal of Medical Humanities 30:253–69. 
Johns Hopkins Hospital. 2013. “Johns Hopkins Hospital Policy on ‘Staff Request Not to 
Participate in Patient Care.’” 
	   316	  
Johns Hopkins Osler Medical Residency. 2014. “Aequanimitas.” Retrieved 
(http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/Medicine/hstrainingprogram/overview/). 
Johnson, Sara, Christopher A. Bautista, Seo Yeon Hong, Lisa Weissfeld, and Douglas B. 
White. 2011. “An Empirical Study of Surrogates’ Preferred Level of Control over 
Value-Laden Life Support Decisions in Intensive Care Units.” American Journal of 
Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 183:915–21. 
Judd, Terri. 2012. “Doctors Twice Placed ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ Orders on Medical Notes 
of Janet Tracy, against Her and Her Family’s Wishes.” The Independent. Retrieved 
March 21, 2013 (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/doctors-twice-
placed-do-not-resuscitate-orders-on-medical-notes-of-janet-tracy-against-her-and-
her-familys-wishes-8282760.html). 
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Katz, Jay. 1996. “The Nuremberg Code and the Nuremberg Trial.” 
Katz, Jay. 2002. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. 3rd ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Kaufman, Sharon. 2006. And a Time to Die: How American Hospitals Shape the End of 
Life. first. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Keating, Nancy L. et al. 2010. “Physician Factors Associated with Discussions about 
End-of-Life Care.” Cancer 116(4):998–1006. 
Kelly, Michael. 2015. “On Epistemological and Ontological Incommensurability in 
Modelling Behaviour Change.” in Thinking about behaviour change: an 
interdisciplinary dialogue, edited by S Christmas, S Michie, and R West. London: 
Silverback. 
Kelly, Michael P., and D. May. 1982. “Good and Bad Patients: A Review of the 
Literature and a Theoretical Critique.” Journal of Advanced Nursning 7:147–56. 
Kiely, Belinda E., Martin R. Stockler, and Martin H. N. Tattersall. 2011. “Thinking and 
Talking about Life Expectancy in Incurable Cancer.” Seminars in Oncology 
38(3):380–85. Retrieved (http://dx.doi.org/10.1053/j.seminoncol.2011.03.007). 
Kim, Sung Soo, Stan Kaplowitz, and Mark V Johnston. 2004. “The Effects of Physician 
Empathy on Patient Satisfaction and Compliance.” Evaluation & the health 
professions 27(3):237–51. Retrieved August 15, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15312283). 
	   317	  
Kitzinger, Jenny, and Celia Kitzinger. 2013. “The ‘window of Opportunity’ for Death 
after Severe Brain Injury  : Family Experiences.” Sociology of Health & Illness 
35(7):1095–1112. 
Kong, Wing May. 2015. “What Is Good Medical Ethics? A Clinician’s Perspective.” 
Journal of medical ethics 41(1):79–82. Retrieved January 1, 2015 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25516942). 
Krasner, Michael S. et al. 2009. “Association of an Educational Program in Mindful 
Communication with Burnout, Empathy, and Attitudes among Primary Care 
Physicians.” JAMA  : the journal of the American Medical Association 
302(12):1284–93. 
Lane, Christopher. 2008. Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness. 1st ed. 
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
Larkin, Gregory Luke, Wayne S. Copes, Brian H. Nathanson, and William Kaye. 2010. 
“Pre-Resuscitation Factors Associated with Mortality in 49,130 Cases of in-Hospital 
Cardiac Arrest: A Report from the National Registry for Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation.” Resuscitation 81(3):302–11. Retrieved April 16, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20047786). 
Lemonidou, Chryssoula, Elizabeth Papathanassoglou, Margarita Giannakopoulou, 
Elisabeth Patiraki, and Danai Papadatou. 2004. “Moral Professional Personhood: 
Ethical Reflections during Initial Clinical Encounters in Nursing Education.” 
Nursing Ethics 11(2):122–37. Retrieved September 18, 2014 
(http://nej.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1191/0969733004ne678oa). 
Levinson, Wendy, Debra L. Roter, P. John, and Valerie T. Dull. 2014. “Physician-Patient 
Communication Relationship With Malpractice Claims The.” 
Lewis-Newby, Mithya et al. 2015. “An Official American Thoracic Society Policy 
Statement: Managing Conscientious Objections in Intensive Care Medicine.” 
American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 191(2):219–27. 
Retrieved (http://www.atsjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1164/rccm.201410-1916ST). 
Light, D., and S. Levine. 1988. “The Changing Character of the Medical Profession: A 
Theoretical Overview.” The Milbank quarterly 66 Suppl 2(1988):10–32. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3075008). 
Livingstone, Julie. 2015. “On Longer Lives and Longer Deaths.” Public Books. Retrieved 
June 9, 2015 (http://www.publicbooks.org/nonfiction/on-longer-lives-and-longer-
deaths#footnote-1). 
	   318	  
Loewy, Erich H. 2005. “In Defense of Paternalism.” Theoretical medicine and bioethics 
26(6):445–68. Retrieved November 25, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16292603). 
Lomis, Kimberly D., Robert O. Carpenter, and Bonnie M. Miller. 2009. “Moral Distress 
in the Third Year of Medical School; a Descriptive Review of Student Case 
Reflections.” American journal of surgery 197(1):107–12. Retrieved September 18, 
2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19101252). 
Mack, Jennifer W., and Thomas J. Smith. 2012. “Reasons Why Physicians Do Not Have 
Discussions about Poor Prognosis, Why It Matters, and What Can Be Improved.” 
Journal of clinical oncology  : official journal of the American Society of Clinical 
Oncology 30(22):2715–17. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22753911). 
Malterud, K. 2001. “Qualitative Research: Standards, Challenges, and Guidelines.” 
Lancet 358(9280):483–88. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11513933). 
Marsh, Frank H., and Allen Staver. 1991. “Physician Authority for Unilateral DNR 
Orders.” Journal of Legal Medicine 12:115–65. 
Mays, Nicholas, and Catherine Pope. 2000. “Assessing Quality in Qualitative Research.” 
British Medical Journal 320:50–52. 
McKinlay, John, and Joan Arches. 1985. “Towards the Proletarianization of Physicians.” 
International Journal of Health Services 15(2):161–95. 
Mckinlay, John B., and Lisa D. Marceau. 2002. “The End of the Golden Age of 
Doctoring.” International Journal of Health Services 32(2):379–416. 
McKinlay, John, and John Stoeckle. 1988. “Corporatization and the Social 
Transformation of Doctoring.” International Journal of Health Services 18(2):191–
205. 
McNeill, Barbara, Stephen Pauker, Harold Sox, and Amos Tversky. 1982. “On the 
Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies.” New England Journal of 
Medicine 306:1259–62. 
Meikle, James. 2014. “Hospital Violated Patient’s Rights with ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ 
Order, Court Rules.” The Guardian. Retrieved June 18, 2014 
(http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/17/hospital-patient-rights-do-not-
resuscitate-addenbrookes). 
Mello, M., and C. Jenkinson. 1998. “Comparison of Medical and Nursing Attitudes to 
Resuscitation and Patient Autonomy between a British and an American Teaching 
	   319	  
Hospital.” Social science & medicine 46(3):415–24. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9460822). 
Mental Capacity Act. 2005. Mental Capacity Act. Retrieved 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents/enacted). 
Mill, John Stuart. 1974. On Liberty. London: Penguin Books. 
Miller, Donna L., Martin J. Gorbien, Loretta Simbartl, and Dennis W. Jahnigen. 1993. 
“Factors Influencing Physicians in Recommending In-Hospital Cardiopulmonary 
Resucitation.” Archives of Internal Medicine 153:1999–2003. 
Millerson, G. 1964. The Qualifying Associations. London: Routlidege and Kegan Paul. 
Mishler, Elliot. 1984. The Discourse of Medicine: Dialectics of Medical Interviews. 
Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation. 
Mobley, Melinda J., Mohamed Y. Rady, Joseph L. Verheijde, Bhavesh Patel, and Joel S. 
Larson. 2007. “The Relationship between Moral Distress and Perception of Futile 
Care in the Critical Care Unit.” Intensive & critical care nursing  : the official 
journal of the British Association of Critical Care Nurses 23(5):256–63. Retrieved 
October 26, 2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17681468). 
Mol, Annemarie. 2008. The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice. 
London: Routledge. 
Muller, J. H. 1992. “Shades of Blue: The Negotiation of Limited Codes by Medical 
Residents.” Social science & medicine 34(8):885–98. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1604378). 
Murphy, Donald, and Thomas Finucane. 1993. “New Do-Not-Resuscitate Policies: A 
First Step in Cost Control.” Archives of Internal Medicine 153:1641–47. 
Murray, Ken. 2012. “How Doctors Die: It’s Not like the Rest of Us, but It Should Be.” 
Zocalo Public Square. 
National Health Service. 2012. “News Analysis: What Is the Liverpool Care Pathway.” 
NHS Choice. Retrieved (http://www.nhs.uk/news/2012/11November/Pages/What-is-
the-Liverpool-Care-Pathway.aspx). 
Navarro, Vicente. 1976. Medicine under Capitalism. New York: Prodist. 
Neuberger, Julia. 2013. “More Care Less Pathway: A Review of the Liverpool Care 
Pathway.” Retrieved 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2124
50/Liverpool_Care_Pathway.pdf). 
	   320	  
Neumann, Melanie et al. 2011. “Empathy Decline and Its Reasons: A Systematic Review 
of Studies with Medical Students and Residents.” Academic medicine  : journal of 
the Association of American Medical Colleges 86(8):996–1009. Retrieved 
September 3, 2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21670661). 
New York Presbyterian Hospital. 2010. New York Presbyterian Hospital Family Health 
Care Decision Act Policy, Number H122. 
NHS. 2011. NHS East of England Integrated Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation (DNACPR) Policy for Adults. 
Novack, Dennis et al. 1979. “Changes in Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Telling the 
Cancer Patient.” Journal of the American Medical Association 241(9):897–900. 
O’Neill, Onora. 2002. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Oberle, Kathleen, and Dorothy Hughes. 2001. “Doctors’ and Nurses' Perceptions of 
Ethical Problems in End-of-Life Decisions.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 
33(6):707–15. 
Olthuis, Gert, and Wim Dekkers. 2003. “Medical Education, Palliative Care and Moral 
Attitude: Some Objectives and Future Perspectives.” Medical education 
37(10):928–33. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12974850). 
Paice, Elisabeth, and Diana Hamilton-Fairley. 2013. “Avoiding Burnout in New Doctors: 
Sleep, Supervision and Teams.” Postgraduate medical journal 89(1055):493–94. 
Retrieved September 23, 2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23955328). 
Palin, Sarah. 2009. “Statement on the Current Health Care Debate.” Facebook.com. 
Retrieved May 18, 2015 
(https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=113851103434). 
Papathanassoglou, By Elizabeth D. E. et al. 2012. “Professional Autonomy, 
Collaboration with Physicians, and Moral Distress among European Intensive Care 
Nurses.” American Journal of Critical Care 21(2):e41–52. 
Parlimentary and Health Service Ombudsman. 2014. Dying without Dignity: 
Investigations by the Parlimentary and Health Service Ombudsman into Complaints 
about End of Life Care. 
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. “Illness and the Role of the Physician: A Sociological 
Perspective.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 21(3):452–60. 
Pasternak, Susan. 2013. “End-of-Life Care Constitutes Third Rail of U.S. Health Care 
Policy Debate.” The Medicare Newsgroup. Retrieved 
	   321	  
(http://www.medicarenewsgroup.com/context/understanding-medicare-
blog/understanding-medicare-blog/2013/06/03/end-of-life-care-constitutes-third-
rail-of-u.s.-health-care-policy-debate). 
Patenaude, Johane, Theophile Niyonsenga, and Diane Fafard. 2003. “Changes in 
Students’ Moral Development during Medical School: A Cohort Study.” CMAJ  : 
Canadian Medical Association journal = journal de l’Association medicale 
canadienne 168(7):840–44. Retrieved 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=151989&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract). 
Penson, Richard T., Lidia Schapira, Sally Mack, Marjorie Stanzler, and Thomas J. Lynch. 
2010. “Connection: Schwartz Center Rounds at Massachusetts General Hospital 
Cancer Center.” The oncologist 15(7):760–64. Retrieved November 22, 2014 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3228008&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Periyakoil, Vyjeyanthi S., Eric Neri, Ann Fong, and Helena Kraemer. 2014. “Do unto 
Others: Doctors’ Personal End-of-Life Resuscitation Preferences and Their Attitudes 
toward Advance Directives.” PloS one 9(5):e98246. Retrieved August 14, 2014 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=4037207&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Perkins, Gavin, David Pitcher, and Jasmeet Soar. 2012. “Challenges of Do-Not-Attempt-
Resuscitation Orders.” JAMA  : the journal of the American Medical Association 
307(23):2488; author reply 2488–89. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22797444). 
Peteet, Tom. 2015. “Want to Decrease Physician Burnout? Stop Blaming the Victim.” 
KevinMD. Retrieved May 21, 2015 (http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2015/04/want-
to-decrease-physician-burnout-stop-blaming-the-victim.html). 
Phillips, J., and D. Wendler. 2014. “Clarifying Substituted Judgement: The Endorsed Life 
Approach.” Journal of Medical Ethics 0(0):1–8. Retrieved 
(http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/medethics-2013-101852). 
Piers, Ruth D., Adeline Max, Andrej Michalsen, Paulo Azevedo Maia, and et al. 2011. 
“Perceptions of Appropriateness of Care Among European and Israeli Intensive 
Care Unit Nurses and Physicians.” Journal of the American Medical Association 
306(24):2694–2703. 
Psathas, G. 1973. Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications. New York: 
Wiley. 
Quill, Caroline M., Sarah J. Ratcliffe, Michael O. Harhay, and Scott D. Halpern. 2014. 
“Variation in Decisions to Forgo Life-Sustaining Therapies in US ICUs.” Chest 
	   322	  
146(3):573–82. Retrieved September 8, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24522751). 
Quill, T. E., and H. Brody. 1996. “Physician Recommendations and Patient Autonomy: 
Finding a Balance between Physician Power and Patient Choice.” Annals of internal 
medicine 125(9):763–69. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8929011). 
Rhem, Diane. 2012. “Cutting Back on Unnecessary Medical Tests and Procedures.” 
Richert, Catherine. 2009. “McCaughey Claims End-of-Life Counseling Will Be Required 
for Medicare Patients.” politifact.com. Retrieved May 18, 2015 
(http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/jul/23/betsy-
mccaughey/mccaughey-claims-end-life-counseling-will-be-requi/). 
Richtel, Matt. 2004. “Young Doctors and Wish Lists: No Weekend Calls, No Beepers.” 
New York Times, January 7. Retrieved 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/07/us/young-doctors-and-wish-lists-no-weekend-
calls-no-beepers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm). 
Robbins, Alexandra. 2015. “The Problem with Satisfied Patients.” The Atlantic. 
Retrieved May 19, 2015 (http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/04/the-
problem-with-satisfied-patients/390684/). 
Von Roenn, J. H. 2003. “Setting Goals to Maintain Hope.” Journal of Clinical Oncology 
21(3):570–74. Retrieved September 29, 2014 
(http://www.jco.org/cgi/doi/10.1200/JCO.2003.10.161). 
Roter, Debra L., Susan Larson, Gary S. Fischer, Robert M. Arnold, and James A. Tulsky. 
2012. “Experts Practice What They Preach: A Descriptive Study of Best and 
Normative Practices in End-of-Life Discussions.” Annals of Internal Medicine 
160:3477–85. 
Rushton, Cynda H., Alfred W. Kaszniak, and Joan S. Halifax. 2013. “Addressing Moral 
Distress: Application of a Framework to Palliative Care Practice.” Journal of 
palliative medicine 16(9):1080–88. Retrieved October 21, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23930918). 
Rushton, Cynda Hylton et al. 2009. “Impact of a Contemplative End-of-Life Training 
Program: Being with Dying.” Palliative & supportive care 7(4):405–14. Retrieved 
October 22, 2014 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19939303). 
Rushton, Cynda Hylton. 2013. “Principled Moral Outrage: An Antidote to Moral 
Distress?” AACN advanced critical care 24(1):82–89. Retrieved October 21, 2014 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23343816). 
	   323	  
Salmon, Peter, and George M. Hall. 2003. “Patient Empowerment and Control: A 
Psychological Discourse in the Service of Medicine.” Social Science & Medicine 
57(10):1969–80. Retrieved March 7, 2012 
(http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0277953603000637). 
Sanchez-Reilly, Sandra et al. 2013. “Caring for Oneself to Care for Others: Physicians 
and Their Self-Care.” The journal of supportive oncology 11(2):75–81. Retrieved 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3974630&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Sanders, Lisa. 2004. “The End of Primary Care.” New York Times, April 18. Retrieved 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/18/magazine/the-end-of-primary-
care.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm). 
Sayers, Sean. 2011. Marx and Alienation: Essays on Heglian Themes. 1st ed. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Scambler, Graham. 2001. Habermas, Critical Theory and Health. London: Routledge. 
Scambler, Graham, and Nicky Britten. 2001. “System, Lifeworld and Doctor-Patient 
Interaction: Issues of Trust in a Changing World.” Pp. 45–67 in Habermas, critical 
theory and health, edited by Graham Scambler. London: Routledge. 
Schneiderman, Lawrence J., and Nancy S. Jecker. 2011. Wrong Medicine: Doctors, 
Patients, and Futile Treatment. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Schneiderman, Lawrence J., and Sharyn Manning. 1997. “The Baby K Case: A Search 
for the Elusive Standard of Medical Care.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 6:9–18. 
Schneiderman, Lawrence, Nancy Jecker, and Albert Jonsen. 1990. “Medical Futility: Its 
Meaning and Ethical Implications.” Annals of Internal Medicine 949–54. 
Schneiderman LI, Jecker N. 1993. “Futility in Practice.” Archives of Internal Medicine 
153:437–41. 
Schutz, Alfred. 1962. Collected Papers (Volume 1). The Hague, The Netherlands: 
Nijhoff. 
Schutz, Alfred. 1970. On Phenomenology and Social Relations. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Shannon, Diane. 2013. “Why I Left Medicine: A Burnt-Out Doctor’s Decision To Quit.” 
WBUR’s Common Health. Retrieved July 5, 2015 
(http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2013/10/why-i-left-medicine-a-burnt-out-doctors-
decision-to-quit). 
	   324	  
Sheehan, David V, Kim White, Alan Leibowitz, and Dewitt C. Baldwin. 2014. “Study of 
Medical Student ’ Abuse ’ and Misconduct in Medical School Perceptions of 
Mistreatment.” 
Sinclair, Simon. 1997. Making Doctors. Oxford, England: Berg. 
Sinha, Pranay. 2014. “Why Do Doctors Commit Suicide?” New York Times. Retrieved 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/why-do-doctors-commit-
suicide.html?_r=1). 
Skloot, Rebecca. 2011. The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks. New York, NY: Broadway. 
Smith, Emily Esfahani, and Jennifer L. Aaker. 2013. “Millenial Searchers.” New York 
Times. Retrieved May 22, 2015 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/opinion/sunday/millennial-
searchers.html?_r=0). 
Smith, Lawrence G. 2005. “Medical Professionalism and the Generation Gap.” The 
American journal of medicine 118(4):439–42. Retrieved February 26, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15808146). 
Smith, Linell. 2008. “Get a Life!?” Hopkins Medicine Magazine. 
Smith, Rebecca. 2009. “NHS Targets ‘May Have Led to 1,200 Deaths’ in Mid-
Staffordshire.” The Telegraph. Retrieved March 11, 2015 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/5008935/NHS-targets-may-have-led-
to-1200-deaths-in-Mid-Staffordshire.html). 
Smith, T. J., and K. Swisher. 1998. “Telling the Truth about Terminal Cancer.” JAMA  : 
the journal of the American Medical Association 279(21):1746–48. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16700776). 
Smith, Thomas J., and Bruce E. Hillner. 2010. “Concrete Options and Ideas for 
Increasing Value in Oncology Care: The View from One Trench.” The oncologist 15 
Suppl 1(suppl 1):65–72. Retrieved November 27, 2011 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20237220). 
Smith, Thomas J., and Bruce E. Hillner. 2011. “Bending the Cost Curve in Cancer Care.” 
New England Journal of Medicine 364(21):2060–65. 
Smith, Thomas J., and Dan L. Longo. 2012. “Talking with Patients about Dying.” The 
New England journal of medicine 367(17):1651–52. Retrieved November 5, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23094728). 
Snyder, Lois. 2012. “American College of Physicians Ethics Manual.” Annals of Internal 
Medicine (156):73–104. 
	   325	  
Spielmans, Glen I., and Peter I. Parry. 2009. “From Evidence-Based Medicine to 
Marketing-Based Medicine: Evidence from Internal Industry Documents.” 
Bioethical Inquiry 7(1):13–29. Retrieved April 30, 2012 
(http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s11673-010-9208-8). 
Spitzer, Eliot. 2003. Opn. No. 2003-F1. 
Starr, Paul. 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a 
Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry. Basic Books. 
Steinhauser, Karen E., Nicholas A. Christakis, Elizabeth C. Clipp, and Lauren Mcintyre. 
2000. “Factors Considered Important at the End of Life by Patients, Family, 
Physicians , and Other Care Providers.” Journal of the American Medical 
Association 284(19):2476–82. 
Stewart, M. et al. 2000. “The Impact of Patient-Centered Care on Outcomes.” The 
Journal of family practice 49(9):796–804. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23995120). 
Stewart, Moira A. 1995. “Effective Physician-Patient Communication and Health 
Outcomes: A Review.” Canadian Medical Association Journal 152(9):1423–33. 
Stoeckle, John. 1987. “Working on the Factory Floor.” Annals of Internal Medicine 
107(2):250–51. 
Stolman, C. J., J. J. Gregory, D. Dunn, and J. L. Levine. 1990. “Evaluation of Patient, 
Physician, Nurse, and Family Attitudes toward Do Not Resuscitate Orders.” 
Archives of internal medicine 150(3):653–58. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2310285). 
Sulmasy, D. P., and L. S. Sulmasy. 2015. “On Substituted Arguments.” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 0(0):2014–16. Retrieved 
(http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/medethics-2014-102503). 
Sulmasy, Daniel P., and Lois Snyder. 2014. “Substituted Interests and Best Judgments.” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 304(17):1946–47. 
Sunstein, Cass. 2015. Why Nudge?: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism. Reprint Ed. 
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
SUPPORT Principal Investigators. 1995. “A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for 
Seriously III Hospitalized Patients.” Journal of the American Medical Association 
274(20):1591–97. 
	   326	  
Suzuki, Lisa, Muninder Ahluwalla, Agnes Kwong Arora, and Jacqueline Mattis. 2007. 
“The Pond You Fish in Determines the Fish You Catch: Exploring Strategies for 
Qualitative Data Collection.” The Counseling Psychologist 35:295–327. 
Tanco, Kimberson et al. 2015. “Patient Perception of Physician Compassion After a 
More Optimistic vs a Less Optimistic Message.” JAMA Oncology 1(2):176–83. 
Retrieved 
(http://oncology.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamaoncol.2014.297). 
Taylor, Robert M., Jillian L. Gustin, and Sharla M. Wells-digregorio. 2010. “Improving 
Do-Not-Resuscitate Discussions  : A Framework for Physicians.” The Journal of 
Supportive Oncology 8:42–44. 
Temel, Jennifer S. et al. 2010. “Early Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic Non-
Small-Cell Lung Cancer.” The New England journal of medicine 363(8):733–42. 
Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20818875). 
Teno, Joan M. et al. 2013. “Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries: Site 
of Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in 2000, 2005, and 2009.” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 309(5):470–77. 
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness. 2nd ed. London: Penguin Group. 
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research. 1979. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Report of the National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
Retrieved May 29, 2015 
(http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html). 
The Schwartz Center Rounds. 2015. “The Schwartz Center for Compassionate Health 
Care.” Retrieved July 4, 2015 (http://www.theschwartzcenter.org/supporting-
caregivers/schwartz-center-rounds/). 
Thomas, Matthew R. et al. 2007. “How Do Distress and Well-Being Relate to Medical 
Student Empathy? A Multicenter Study.” Journal of general internal medicine 
22(2):177–83. Retrieved September 3, 2014 
(http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1824738&tool=pmcent
rez&rendertype=abstract). 
Timmermans, Stefan, and Emily S. Kolker. 2004. “Evidence-Based Medicine and the 
Reconfiguration of Medical Knowledge.” Journal of health and social behavior 45 
Suppl(2004):177–93. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15779473). 
	   327	  
Timmermans, Stefan, and Hyeyoung Oh. 2010. “The Continued Social Transformation of 
the Medical Profession.” Journal of health and social behavior 51 Suppl:S94–106. 
Retrieved July 18, 2011 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20943586). 
Truog, Robert D. 2012. “Patients and Doctors - The Evolution of a Relationship.” New 
England Journal of Medicine 366(7):581–85. 
Tulsky, James A., MA Chesney, and Bernard Lo. 1995. “How Do Medical Residents 
Discuss Resuscitation with Patients?” Journal of General Internal Medicine 
10(8):436–42. 
Turner, Bryan. 1987. Medical Power and Social Knowledge. 2nd ed. London: Sage 
Publications. 
UK General Medical Council. 2010. “Treatment and Care towards the End of Life  : The 
Duties of a Doctor Registered with the General Medical Council.” UK General 
Medical Council. Retrieved (http://www.gmc-
uk.org/End_of_life.pdf_32486688.pdf). 
United States Census Bureau. 2012. “Older Americans Month: May 2012.” Profile 
America: Facts for Feature. Retrieved June 9, 2015 
(https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_edi
tions/cb12-ff07.html). 
University of Washington. 2013. Do Not Attempt Resuscitation (DNAR) Order 80.2. 
University of Washington. 2014. “A Transformative Investment: Cambia Health 
Foundation’s $10 Million Gift to Palliative Care.” Retrieved 
(http://depts.washington.edu/givemed/about-our-donors/cambia/). 
Venneman, S. S., P. Narnor-Harris, M. Perish, and M. Hamilton. 2008. “‘Allow Natural 
Death’ versus ‘Do Not Resuscitate’: Three Words That Can Change a Life.” Journal 
of medical ethics 34(1):2–6. Retrieved August 13, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18156510). 
Volandes, Angelo E. et al. 2013. “Randomized Controlled Trial of a Video Decision 
Support Tool for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decision Making in Advanced 
Cancer.” Journal of Clinical Oncology 31(3):380–86. 
De Vries, Raymond. 2010. “Sociology.” Pp. 175–91 in Methods in Medical Ethics, edited 
by Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel Sulmasy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press. 
Vries, Raymond De, Leigh Turner, Kristina Orfali, and Charles Bosk. 2006. “Social 
Science and Bioethics: The Way Forward.” Sociology of Health and Illness 
28(6):665–77. 
	   328	  
Wacquant, Loic. 1992. “Towards a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of 
Bourdieu’s Sociology.” Pp. 1–59 in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, edited by 
Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant. Cambridge, England: Polity Press. 
Wallop, Harry. 2014. “Gen Z, Gen Y, Baby Boomers – a Guide to the Generations.” The 
Telegraph. Retrieved July 4, 2015 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/features/11002767/Gen-Z-Gen-Y-baby-boomers-
a-guide-to-the-generations.html). 
Walocha, E., KA Tomaszewski, E. Wilczek-Ruzyczka, and J. Walocha. 2013. “Empathy 
and Burnout among Physicians of Different Specialties.” Folia Med Cracov 
53(2):35–42. 
Weeks, J. C. et al. 1998. “Relationship between Cancer Patients’ Predictions of Prognosis 
and Their Treatment Preferences.” JAMA  : the journal of the American Medical 
Association 279(21):1709–14. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9624023). 
Weeks, Jane C. et al. 2012. “Patients’ Expectations about Effects of Chemotherapy for 
Advanced Cancer.” The New England journal of medicine 367(17):1616–25. 
Retrieved November 1, 2012 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23094723). 
Wendler, David, and Annette Rid. 2011. “The Effect on Surrogates of Making Treatment 
Decisions for Others.” Annals of Internal Medicine 154(5):336–46. 
White, Douglas B., Ruth Engelberg, Marjorie Wenrich, Bernard Lo, and J. Randall 
Curtis. 2011. “The Language of Prognostication in Intensive Care Units.” Med Decis 
Making 30(1):76–83. 
Winkenwerder, William Jr. 1985. “Ethical Dilemmas for House Staff Physicians.” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 254(24):3454–57. 
Wise, J. 2012. “Dying Remains a Taboo Subject for Patients and GPs, Finds Study.” 
British Medical Journal 334:e3356–e3356. 
Wolinsky, Frederick. 1988. “The Professional Dominance Perspective, Revisited.” The 
Milbank quarterly 66 Suppl 2(1988):33–47. Retrieved 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3075009). 
Wolinsky, Fredric D. 1993. “The Professional Dominance, Deprofessionalization, 
Proletarianization, and Corporatization Perspectives: An Overview and Synthesis.” 
Pp. 11–24 in The Changing Medical Profession: An International Perspective, 
edited by Frederic W Hafferty and John B. McKinlay. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
	   329	  
Workman, S. R. 2011. “Never Say Die?--as Treatments Fail Doctors’ Words Must Not.” 
International journal of clinical practice 65(2):117–19. Retrieved March 30, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21134078). 
Wright, Eric R., and Brea L. Perry. 2010. “Medical Sociology and Health Services 
Research: Past Accomplishments and Future Policy Challenges.” Journal of health 
and social behavior 51 Suppl:S107–19. Retrieved February 22, 2012 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20943576). 
Wunsch, Hannah, and David A. Harrison. 2005. “End-of-Life Decisions  : A Cohort Study 
of the Withdrawal of All Active Treatment in Intensive Care Units in the United 
Kingdom.” 823–31. 
You, John J. et al. 2015. “Barriers to Goals of Care Discussions With Seriously Ill 
Hospitalized Patients and Their Families.” JAMA Internal Medicine 175(4):549–56. 
Retrieved 
(http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.77
32). 
Zhang, Baohui et al. 2009. “Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associations 
with End of Life Conversations.” Archives of Internal Medicine 169(5):480–88. 
Zingmond, David S., and Neil S. Wenger. 2012. “Regional and Institutional Variation in 
the Initiation of Early Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders.” Archives of internal medicine 
165(15):1705–12. Retrieved (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16087817). 
De Zulueta, Paquita C. 2015. “Suffering, Compassion and ‘Doing Good Medical 
Ethics’.” Journal of medical ethics 41(1):87–90. Retrieved January 1, 2015 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25516944). 
 
 
 
 
 
